Kenneth Neil Barnett v. Commonwealth ( 1996 )


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  •                      COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Baker, Willis and Overton
    Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
    KENNETH NEIL BARNETT
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.           Record No. 2622-95-1         JUDGE JOSEPH E. BAKER
    SEPTEMBER 24, 1996
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS
    Robert P. Frank, Judge
    R. L. Shrecengost for appellant.
    Leah A. Darron, Assistant Attorney General
    (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on
    brief), for appellee.
    Kenneth Neil Barnett (defendant) was convicted of assault
    and battery, a violation of Code § 18.2-57, on an indictment
    charging felony child abuse.    He complains on appeal that the
    misdemeanor is not a lesser-included offense of the felony
    originally subject of the indictment.    Finding no error, we
    affirm the conviction.
    The parties are fully conversant with the record, and we
    recite only those facts necessary to a disposition of this
    appeal.
    Upon well established principles, we view the evidence in
    the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.       Martin v.
    Commonwealth, 
    4 Va. App. 438
    , 443, 
    358 S.E.2d 415
    , 418 (1987).
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    On June 3, 1995, Jay Michael Kerivan, then three years of age,
    was entrusted to defendant's care for several days by the child's
    mother, Jennifer Miller.   When Jay was returned to Miller, she
    noted numerous bruises about his body.   The child was immediately
    taken to the hospital, and his injuries were determined to be
    consistent with abuse.   Defendant subsequently admitted to
    "los[ing] his temper," "smacking" and "slapp[ing]" the child in
    the face, hitting him in the stomach "about six times,"
    "pinch[ing] his nose, and "grabb[ing] him by his neck." 1
    At the conclusion of the Commonwealth's evidence, defendant
    moved the trial court to "reduc[e]" the "felony abuse to assault
    and battery," arguing that the Commonwealth had failed to
    establish conduct "so gross, wanton and culpable as to show a
    reckless disregard for human life," a necessary element of the
    offense.   See Code § 18.2-371.1(B).   Defendant's motion prompted
    the following colloquy between the court and his counsel.
    The Court:     Are you suggesting that there's a lessor
    [sic] included offense?
    Counsel:        Yes, I would suggest that there is. If not,
    we would certainly have no--quite frankly, we
    would have no objection at this point to
    amend the charge and plead guilty to assault
    and battery, waive any defense that might
    come from to eliminate the Court--the Appeals
    1
    Defendant was indicted for a "willful act or omission in
    the care of the child . . . so gross, wanton and culpable as to
    show a reckless disregard for the life of Jay Michael Kerivan" in
    violation of Code § 18.2-371.1(B).
    - 2 -
    Court finding that it's not lessor [sic]
    included.
    The Court:     Well, my question to you is are you
    suggesting that assault and battery is a
    lessor [sic] included in this offense?
    Counsel:       I believe that it's implicit in that charge.
    The Court:     All right, sir. I'm going to grant your
    motion. What this man did was reprehensible
    of a three-year-old child who was
    defenseless. . . . The evidence before me
    does not indicate that there's a reckless
    disregard for human life; clearly there's a
    willful act of assault and battery.
    (Emphasis added).
    Nevertheless, defendant later requested the court to "set
    aside the conviction of assault and battery," contending that the
    offense is not "lesser included . . . in the abuse or neglect
    charged in the indictment."   The trial court denied this motion
    and defendant appeals.
    It is well established that a "'defendant, having agreed
    upon the action taken by the trial court, should not be allowed
    to assume an inconsistent position.'"   Manns v. Commonwealth, 
    13 Va. App. 677
    , 679, 
    414 S.E.2d 613
    , 615 (1992) (citation omitted).
    "'No litigant, even a defendant in a criminal case, will be
    permitted to approbate and reprobate--to invite error . . . and
    then to take advantage of the situation created by his own
    wrong.'"   Id. at 680, 414 S.E.2d at 615 (citation omitted).
    Moreover, assuming, without deciding, that assault and
    battery is not lesser included within the indicted offense, the
    order of conviction in this instance clearly reflects that the
    - 3 -
    court "reduce[d] the . . . indictment to [a]ssault and [b]attery"
    on defendant's motion.   Code § 19.2-231 provides that "if there
    shall appear to be any variance between the allegations therein
    and the evidence offered in proof thereof, the court may permit
    amendment of such indictment . . . at any time before the jury
    returns a verdict or the court finds the accused guilty or not
    guilty, provided the amendment does not change the nature or
    character of the offense charged." 2   Any objection to
    deficiencies in arraignment on the amended indictment was not
    presented to the trial court and, therefore, is not before this
    Court on appeal.   See Rule 5A:18; Jacques v. Commonwealth, 12 Va.
    App. 591, 593, 
    405 S.E.2d 630
    , 631 (1991).
    Accordingly, we affirm defendant's conviction.
    Affirmed.
    2
    Defendant concedes that the Commonwealth's evidence was
    sufficient to prove assault and battery.
    - 4 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2622951

Filed Date: 9/24/1996

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021