In re J.B. & J.B., Juveniles ( 2016 )


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  • Note: Decisions of a three-justice panel are not to be considered as precedent before any tribunal.
    ENTRY ORDER
    SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2016-165
    OCTOBER TERM, 2016
    In re J.B. & J.B., Juveniles                          }    APPEALED FROM:
    }
    }    Superior Court, Orange Unit,
    }    Family Division
    }
    }    DOCKET NO. 30/31-7-13 Oejv
    Trial Judge: Walter M. Morris, Jr.
    In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:
    Parents appeal from the trial court’s order terminating their parental rights in Jae.B. and
    Jam.B. Father argues that the court should not have terminated parents’ rights given the progress
    that they made in addressing the goals of their case plans. Mother argues that the court erred in
    faulting parents for having minimal contact with the children. We affirm.
    Jae.B. was born in October 2010, and Jam.B. in April 2013.* Parents have experienced
    long-standing substance abuse issues, which also contributed to criminal convictions and
    supervision by the Department of Corrections. Both children were born with drugs in their system.
    From an early age, Jae.B. suffered from medical complications and required daily administrations
    of a variety of medications and consistent personal management and monitoring.
    In 2013, the children were determined to be in need of care or supervision (CHINS) due to
    parents’ drug use, and they were placed in foster care. In April 2014, Jae.B. suffered serious
    medical complications from prolonged seizures, requiring a crainiectomy to relieve pressure in his
    brain. He sustained significant damage to the left side of his brain and will have lifelong physical
    impairments. Jae.B. requires intense and skilled daily care and interventions.
    The Department for Children and Families (DCF) filed petitions to terminate parents’
    rights in January 2015. Following several days of hearings, the court granted its request. The
    court made numerous findings, including the following. Visitation with the children initially
    occurred through the Family Time Coaching (FTC) program. Parents visited inconsistently, and
    when visits did occur, parents often arrived too late to engage in meaningful preplanning. Mother
    resisted suggestions for improving her interactions with the children, and neither parent could
    recognize or respond to the children’s cues during visits. Parents’ sporadic attendance at FTC
    visits and repeated failures to appear without notice significantly contributed to their failure to
    assume greater parenting responsibilities.
    Parents ended all contact with Jam.B. in December 2014 and with Jae.B. in May 2015. The
    parties disputed who was to blame for the cessation of visits. The court found that mother had
    *
    Parents also have a third child, Jo.B., born in September 2014.
    requested visitation with both children at the same time, but then failed to reasonably pursue the
    opportunity for these combined visits at Umbrella, a program based in St. Johnsbury intended to
    foster healthy relationships by providing families with supervised visitation. The court rejected as
    not credible parents’ assertion that they repeatedly tried, in vain, to pursue regular contact with the
    children. It found that despite direct assistance in contacting the Umbrella program, parents failed
    to complete enrollment or follow through with actual visits. With additional direct assistance,
    parents ultimately managed to complete an intake for visitation services with the Umbrella
    program in May 2015, but they then failed to keep sustained contact with the program to actually
    initiate the visits that had been planned for. The court found that parents had the means and ability
    to establish regular parent-child contact but they failed to do so.
    The court found that parents had no functional relationship with Jam.B. They had had no
    contact with him for over ten months, and they had not provided him with any parental care during
    that time. Parents had not moved toward resuming any meaningful exercise of parental
    responsibilities for Jam.B. To the contrary, they had effectively abandoned him. In the interim,
    Jam.B. had fully bonded to his foster parents, who provided him with excellent care. Parents
    similarly ceased to engage in any meaningful parenting of Jae.B. Their interactions with him were
    sporadic, and they had not provided him with physical or emotional care. Jae.B. had been in the
    primary care of his foster parents for prolonged periods of time, and he had developed strong bonds
    with his foster parents. The foster parents provided for his physical and emotional needs.
    The court recognized that parents had had success in other areas. They had achieved
    housing stability by the time of the TPR hearing. Both had made good progress in resuming and
    maintaining sustained sobriety. Nonetheless, the court noted that there had been periodic and
    continued conduct that placed their sobriety at risk. The court found that while parents had
    generally complied with their individual responsibilities, they failed to comply with the case plan
    responsibilities most directly related to resuming their relationship and parenting of the children.
    They had not engaged in consistent, meaningful, and successful progression in Family Time
    Coaching while it was available, but instead had had sporadic, lapsed, and insubstantial
    engagement with Jae.B., and had entirely severed any contact or relationship with Jam.B.
    Based on these and numerous additional findings, the court concluded that parents had
    stagnated in their ability to parent and that they could not become fit to parent the children within
    a reasonable period of time. The court explained that, in this case, stagnation had to be considered
    in the unique context of parents’ effective abandonment of their parental roles and responsibilities,
    and could not simply be measured by parents’ personal progress in achieving sobriety and general
    case plan goals. While parents might have achieved their individual case plan goals, they had
    effectively abandoned the parental relationship and the exercise of parental responsibility for
    periods of time critical to the children’s needs for permanency and stability. The court found that,
    with respect to Jam.B., parents’ abandonment of contact for over a year—during which time he
    firmly bonded with and developed in the beneficial care of his foster parents—was unquestionably
    such a substantial change of circumstances as to warrant jurisdiction to examine whether
    termination of parents’ rights was in his best interests. As to Jae.B., the court found that substantial
    change was clearly presented by the medical emergency that he suffered while in DCF custody,
    and his present enduring, complex caretaking needs. It added that in Jae.B.’s case as well, parents’
    lack of progress in furthering a meaningful parental role constituted a change in circumstances.
    The court also concluded that parents could not assume their parenting responsibilities
    within a reasonable period of time. They made no progress in assuming greater exercise of
    parenting responsibilities, and the children could wait no longer to have permanency of parenting
    2
    and home life. They had abandoned any relationship with Jam.B. With respect to Jae.B., parents
    had never exercised a parental role for him in the context of his present complex therapeutic needs.
    He had not lived in his parents’ custody since July 2013, and he received highly skilled, intense
    and consistent caretaking in his present placement. The evidence of the parent-child contact that
    did occur since he came into custody, moreover, established parents’ inability to recognize,
    respect, and respond to his emotional cues, and their contact with him had served as a source of
    distress and unease to him. The court found that mother and father could not parent Jae.B. within
    a reasonable period of time given their sparse parent-child contact, the complexity and intensity of
    Jae.B.’s present treatment and caretaking needs, and parents’ failure to participate in this
    caretaking. After considering the remaining best-interest factors, the court terminated parents’
    rights in both children. This appeal followed.
    We begin with father’s arguments. According to father, the evidence fails to show
    stagnation or that parents are unable to resume their parental responsibilities within a reasonable
    period of time. Father points to the progress that he and mother made in addressing certain goals
    under their case plans. He notes that parents’ third child, Jor.B., was not found to be CHINS.
    Father also contends that there was no evidence to show that parents could not meet Jae.B.’s special
    needs. Father acknowledges that parents’ contact with the children “has dropped significantly in
    the past year,” but argues that parents have an established relationship with the children that can
    be rebuilt.
    As we have often explained, when the termination of parental rights is sought post-
    disposition, the trial court must first find that there has been a substantial change in material
    circumstances, and if so, that termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interests. In re B.W.,
    
    162 Vt. 287
    , 291 (1994); see also 33 V.S.A. § 5114 (setting forth best-interests standard). “[A]
    substantial change in material circumstances[] is most often found when the parent’s ability to care
    properly for the child has either stagnated or deteriorated over the passage of time.” In re 
    B.W., 162 Vt. at 291
    (quotation omitted). “Stagnation may be shown by the passage of time with no
    improvement in parental capacity to care properly for the child.” 
    Id. (quotation omitted).
    But “the
    mere fact that a parent has shown some progress in some aspects of his or her life does not preclude
    a finding of changed circumstances warranting modification of a previous disposition order.” In
    re A.F., 
    160 Vt. 175
    , 181 (1993).
    To determine a child’s best interests, the court must consider the four statutory factors
    described in 33 V.S.A. § 5114. The most important factor is the likelihood that the natural parent
    will be able to resume his or her parental duties within a reasonable period of time. See In re B.M.,
    
    165 Vt. 331
    , 336 (1996). As long as the court below has applied the proper standard, we will not
    disturb its factual findings on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous, and we will affirm its legal
    conclusions if they are supported by the findings. In re 
    B.W., 162 Vt. at 291
    .
    We find no error here. As to stagnation, the court recognized that parents had made
    progress in addressing their drug addictions, although they continued to engage in risky behavior.
    It acknowledged that they had complied with the individual responsibilities in their case plans.
    Nonetheless, it found that they wholly failed to maintain any relationship with Jam.B. and had
    only minimal contact with Jae.B., and that they failed to progress toward assuming any parenting
    responsibilities for the children. Parents’ failure to make any progress in this key area, over an
    almost two-year period, amply demonstrates that they had stagnated in their ability to parent. The
    fact that parents have a third child, who was not found to be CHINS, does not undermine this
    conclusion or in any way minimize the impact of parents’ failure to maintain contact with Jam.B.
    and Jae.B. or otherwise make progress in assuming greater parenting responsibilities for these
    3
    children. We note that, with respect to Jam.B., the disposition plan required parents to maintain
    regular consistent contact with him, which they clearly failed to do. As to Jae.B., the court also
    found that his acute medical crisis and complex needs constituted a substantial change in
    circumstances. Father does not challenge this finding on appeal. The court’s finding of stagnation
    is supported by the record.
    The court similarly did not err in concluding that parents would be unable to parent the
    children within a reasonable period of time. As set forth above, parents had no relationship with
    the children, and they provided minimal parental care while the children were in custody. Jam.B.
    had spent almost his entire life in foster care and was bonded to his foster parents. Jae.B. had very
    special needs, and the court reasonably found that parents’ failure to maintain contact with him
    and their inability to respond to his cues when visitation did occur made it unlikely that they could
    resume providing him with parental care. The court reasonably concluded that the children, after
    almost two years in DCF custody, had an immediate need for stability and permanency. While
    father argues that parents could have rebuilt their relationship with the children, the court
    concluded otherwise, and its decision is supported by the evidence. This Court does not reweigh
    the evidence on appeal. See In re S.B., 
    174 Vt. 427
    , 429 (2002) (mem.).
    Turning to mother’s arguments, she contends that the court erred in finding that she and
    father failed to pursue regular contact with the children. Mother points to parents’ testimony that
    they made numerous calls to Umbrella to schedule visitation, leaving messages and receiving no
    responses. She questions the veracity of the testimony provided by the Umbrella program director
    who said no such messages had been received. Mother also notes that, at least until the Family
    Time Coaching program ended, parents “expressed love and affection for the children.”
    Mother merely challenges the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses and
    the weight of the evidence, matters reserved exclusively for the trial court. See 
    id., at 429-30.
    The
    court rejected parents’ testimony, referenced above, as not credible. It instead relied on testimony
    that Umbrella had not received any calls from parents, and that Umbrella employees had reached
    out to parents but could not connect with them. The evidence showed that parents were provided
    with contact information for Umbrella, including the private cellphone number of the director, but
    they never followed through. The record amply supports the court’s finding that parents were
    responsible for their failure to maintain contact with the children.
    Affirmed.
    BY THE COURT:
    _______________________________________
    John A. Dooley, Associate Justice
    _______________________________________
    Beth Robinson, Associate Justice
    _______________________________________
    Harold E. Eaton, Jr., Associate Justice
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2016-165

Filed Date: 10/7/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/10/2016