In re S.L., Juvenile ( 2014 )


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  • Note: Decisions of a three-justice panel are not to be considered as precedent before any tribunal.
    ENTRY ORDER
    SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2013-412
    JANUARY TERM, 2014
    In re S.L., Juvenile                                  }    APPEALED FROM:
    }
    }    Superior Court, Chittenden Unit,
    }    Family Division
    }
    }    DOCKET NO. 116-4-13 Cnjv
    Trial Judge: Alison Arms
    In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:
    Father appeals from the trial court’s order finding his son S.L. to be a child in need of
    care or supervision (CHINS). He argues that the court applied the wrong legal standard in
    evaluating whether S.L. was at risk of harm. We affirm.
    S.L. was born in August 2010, just after a CHINS petition was filed with respect to his
    sister and step-siblings. In April 2013, the Department for Children and Families (DCF) filed a
    petition alleging that S.L. was CHINS. The parties stipulated to the following facts. In 1994,
    father was convicted of lewd and lascivious conduct on his minor sister, and he received a three-
    to-five year incarcerative sentence. Father did not engage in sex offender treatment. During the
    CHINS proceedings involving S.L.’s sister and half-siblings, father denied he was guilty of lewd
    and lascivious conduct. In that CHINS case, the court found that father had sexually abused his
    sister when she was a child and that there was ongoing abuse over a span of years. Based on a
    2011 psychosexual evaluation of father, the court determined that father needed to engage in sex
    offender treatment before he could have unsupervised contact with S.L.’s sister and step-siblings.
    That order is still in effect. At the time that the instant CHINS petition was filed, father
    continued to deny that he had sexually abused his sister, and he still had not participated in sex
    offender treatment. S.L.’s mother had been allowing father to have unsupervised contact with
    S.L.
    In addition to these stipulated facts, the court credited the testimony of Dr. John Holt, an
    expert in the preparation of psychological evaluations and risk assessments for sex offenders.
    Dr. Holt had prepared the 2011 psychological evaluation of father. In this report, he concluded
    that while father was at a low risk level to reoffend, father should participate in sex offender
    treatment based on antisocial aspects of his personality. Because of these antisocial tendencies,
    Dr. Holt found that father fit the typology of an opportunistic offender, despite the passage of
    more than eighteen years since the original offense. Dr. Holt opined that it would be prudent to
    limit father’s contact with children until a sex offender treatment provider approved of such
    contact.
    Dr. Holt testified at the merits hearing in the instant case that his recommendation
    remained the same despite the passage of time. Assuming that he had no additional information
    in the two and a half years that had elapsed since the evaluation, and assuming that father had not
    participated in sex offender counseling in the interim, Dr. Holt believed that father still should
    obtain sex offender counseling and have supervised visitation with his children, and, further, that
    he should undergo another psychosexual evaluation.
    Based on these findings, the court concluded that S.L. was CHINS. In reaching its
    conclusion, the court considered the factual findings of the orders involving S.L.’s sister and
    step-siblings, finding that those facts remained relevant to the instant CHINS petition. The court
    reasoned that mother and father were on notice, after lengthy and contested hearings and judicial
    findings, that father should be supervised around his children. While S.L. was not specifically
    named in the earlier CHINS order, he was nonetheless similarly situated to father’s other
    children. No evidence was presented that father had addressed the need for sex offender
    treatment and follow-up evaluation. Nor was any evidence presented that mother was aware that
    father had met these requirements. Accordingly, the court found that mother was on notice of
    father’s past and the potential risk he presented to his children, not merely to those children who
    were the specific subjects of prior CHINS cases. The court concluded that based on mother’s
    knowledge of an outstanding order that father should not be allowed unsupervised contact with
    children and given father’s unaddressed need for sex offender treatment, S.L. was without proper
    parental care necessary for his well-being. This appeal followed.*
    Father argues on appeal that DCF failed to prove that S.L. was at a sufficient risk of harm
    to warrant the court’s CHINS finding. He complains that the court did not quantify the risk that
    he posed to S.L., and he suggests that the court improperly accepted any risk of harm as
    sufficient. According to father, he poses a very low risk of harm to S.L. He points to the fact
    that he has not reoffended since his 1994 conviction. Father also suggests that antisocial
    personality traits are not limited to sexual offenders, and thus, these personality traits did not
    prove that he was at a risk to reoffend.
    We reject father’s arguments. The trial court applied the appropriate legal standard here,
    and its decision is supported by the evidence. As relevant here, a child is “in need of care or
    supervision” when he or she “is without proper parental care, or subsistence, education, medical,
    or other care necessary for his or her well-being.” 33 V.S.A. § 5102(3)(B). Certainly, the
    likelihood that a child may be harmed is relevant in this determination, but we do not require the
    court to make findings concerning a precise “risk of harm.” The court similarly is not required to
    apply the definition of “risk of harm” applicable to the child protection registry. See In re M.E.,
    
    2010 VT 105
    , ¶ 13, 
    189 Vt. 114
     (“[W]e have expressly recognized that the statutes governing the
    registry process, found in chapter 49 of Title 33, have legislative goals, functions, and procedures
    completely different from those governing juvenile proceedings in family court.” (quotation
    omitted)). As we have explained, “the central concern in CHINS proceedings is the ability of the
    *
    The trial court docket entries indicate that the trial court stayed the disposition hearing
    in this case pending the outcome of this CHINS appeal. This approach is inconsistent with our
    recent decision in In re D.D., 
    2013 VT 79
    , ¶¶ 30-31. We indicated in D.D. that disposition
    hearings should proceed during the pendency of a CHINS appeal. 
    Id.
     We explained that a party
    could ask this Court to stay a CHINS appeal pending disposition, but regardless of whether such
    request was made, an appeal of the merits would not “delay or stay proceedings in the family
    division, including the disposition hearing.” Id. ¶ 31. We found that this approach—allowing
    disposition to proceed while the CHINS merits decision is on appeal—best serves “the
    Legislature’s goal of resolving neglect and dependency cases in a timely way so that children can
    achieve permanency.” Id. It thus appears that the disposition hearing in this case should not
    have been stayed pending appeal.
    2
    parents to render appropriate and necessary care for the child’s well-being.” E.J.R. v. Young,
    
    162 Vt. 219
    , 222-23 (1994). The State has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the
    evidence that a child is CHINS. 33 V.S.A. § 5315(a). On review, we “will uphold the court’s
    factual findings unless clearly erroneous and the court’s legal conclusions when supported by
    these findings.” In re D.D., 
    2013 VT 79
    , ¶ 34.
    The record here supports the court’s determination that mother’s decision to allow father
    unsupervised contact with S.L. rendered S.L. without proper parental care necessary for his well-
    being. Dr. Holt explained in detail why he believed that father’s antisocial personality traits
    were significant enough to require him to participate in sex offender treatment, notwithstanding
    his generally low risk to reoffend sexually. As set forth above, Dr. Holt opined that, given
    father’s anti-social orientation, it was possible that father fit the typology of sex offender that is
    opportunistic and indiscriminate in victim selection. Dr. Holt reiterated his conclusions at the
    instant merits hearing, and the trial court found his testimony credible. While father disagrees
    with Dr. Holt’s assessment, it is for the trial court, not this Court, to “determine the credibility of
    witnesses and to weigh the evidence.” In re A.F., 
    160 Vt. 175
    , 178 (1993). The possibility that
    father could sexually abuse S.L. poses a sufficient risk of harm to S.L. to support the court’s
    CHINS determination and to require that any father-child contact be supervised.
    Affirmed.
    BY THE COURT:
    _______________________________________
    Paul L. Reiber, Chief Justice
    _______________________________________
    John A. Dooley, Associate Justice
    _______________________________________
    Geoffrey W. Crawford, Associate Justice
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2013-412

Filed Date: 1/23/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021