State v. Jeffrey Brandt ( 2013 )


Menu:
  • Note: Decisions of a three-justice panel are not to be considered as precedent before any tribunal.
    ENTRY ORDER
    SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2012-175
    APRIL TERM, 2013
    State of Vermont                                      }    APPEALED FROM:
    }
    }    Superior Court, Chittenden Unit,
    v.                                                 }    Criminal Division
    }
    }
    Jeffrey M. Brandt                                     }    DOCKET NO. 3859-10-09 Cncr
    Trial Judge: James R. Crucitti
    In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:
    Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction, based on a jury verdict, of possession
    of child pornography, in violation of 13 V.S.A. § 2827(a). He contends the evidence was
    insufficient to prove that he knowingly possessed the material in question. We affirm.
    Defendant was charged by information with possession of child pornography, specifically
    a video entitled “Hot Spermed Girls.” A two-day jury trial was held in October 2011. The
    evidence adduced at trial may be summarized as follows. Defendant’s wife testified that she and
    defendant lived together at a hotel for a period of several months in the Fall of 2007.1 Defendant
    was incarcerated in December 2007, and was not released until April 2009. His wife recalled
    that in mid-April 2008, while defendant was incarcerated, she turned on defendant’s laptop
    computer, went into the “downloaded files” to try to play music, and observed pictures that
    greatly disturbed her. She thereupon called the police, reported what she had seen, and brought
    them the laptop.
    The computer was examined by a police lieutenant with expertise in computer forensics.
    The officer testified that he found over a thousand photographs and a number of videos
    containing images of child erotica. A majority of the material, including a video entitled “Hot
    Spermed Girls,” was contained within a folder called “Slim,” which according to his wife is
    defendant’s nickname. Defendant stipulated that the video in question contained images which
    met the statutory definition of child pornography. The officer testified that the video was
    “created” or “placed on that computer” on October 11, 2007, prior to defendant’s incarceration.
    The officer further explained that software exists that would allow “a techie” to modify the
    creation date.
    Defendant’s wife testified that he spent a lot of time on his laptop computer, was
    “secretive” about his use, and often carried it with him. She stated that they never had company
    in their hotel room, and that she never saw anyone other than defendant using the computer
    1
    Although defendant and his wife were later divorced, for simplicity we shall refer to
    her herein as defendant’s wife.
    before his incarceration. She recalled that after defendant was incarcerated the only other person
    to use the computer was her friend Erin; Erin’s husband was incarcerated with defendant, and, in
    defendant’s wife’s presence, Erin used the laptop to place money in her husband’s and
    defendant’s prison commissary accounts.
    Two other police officers testified. One had been acquainted with defendant for several
    years. The officer recalled that while defendant was incarcerated the officer conveyed the
    computer’s password from defendant to his wife so she could use it to put money into his
    commissary account. The officer also described an interview with defendant in which defendant
    acknowledged that he had downloaded child pornography onto his computer into the folder titled
    “Slim,” that he knew its contents, and that he had used it on numerous occasions. A state trooper
    who was present during the interview also recalled that defendant acknowledged possessing
    child pornography on his computer.
    At the conclusion of the State’s case, defendant moved for judgment of acquittal,
    asserting that the evidence was insufficient to prove possession. The court denied the motion.
    Defendant thereafter testified in his own behalf, denying that he had owned a computer at the
    time of the events in question, and asserting that any admissions he made to the officers were the
    result of threats. Defendant did not renew the motion for acquittal at the close of the evidence.
    The jury, as noted, returned a guilty verdict. Defendant thereafter filed a motion for new trial,
    which the court denied. This appeal followed.
    Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to prove the element of knowing
    possession. He argues that “[m]erely linking the Defendant to some number of unspecified items
    of child pornography on his computer without linking him to the specific video in question” was
    insufficient. He also observes that his wife had access to the computer, and also that he might
    have removed the computer from their hotel room and allowed access to “someone else” on the
    day of the download.
    Although defendant moved for judgment of acquittal on this basis at the close of the
    State’s case, he failed to reassert the claim at the end of the trial or in a post-verdict motion, and
    therefore failed to preserve it for review on appeal. State v. Faham, 
    2011 VT 55
    , ¶ 15, 
    190 Vt. 524
     (mem.). Defendant did file a motion for new trial on the ground that the verdict was against
    the weight of the evidence, arguing specifically that the State failed to prove “where the
    downloads occurred” or that defendant was “the legal owner of the computer.” This was
    insufficient to preserve the claims defendant raises on appeal—namely, that the court erred in
    denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. See id. ¶¶ 16-17 (holding that post-verdict motion
    for judgment of acquittal on grounds different from those raised on appeal was insufficient to
    preserve issues for review). Accordingly, we consider the claim solely to determine whether the
    evidence was so inadequate “that a conviction would be unconscionable.” State v. LaFlam, 
    2008 VT 108
    , ¶ 4, 
    184 Vt. 629
     (mem.).
    It is undisputed that the video in question meets the definition of child pornography.
    Furthermore, there was ample evidence that the video was located within a folder bearing
    defendant’s nickname “Slim” on a laptop computer belonging to defendant. There was evidence
    that defendant acknowledged having downloaded and viewed child pornography on the
    computer in question into the folder labeled “Slim.” Defendant was also the only person—apart
    from his wife—identified as having access to the computer on the date that the video in question
    2
    was placed in the folder, and the jury was entitled to credit his wife’s testimony that she was
    unaware of the photos and videos until she found them there.
    Taken as a whole, this was more than sufficient to prove that defendant possessed the
    video, that is, exercised “ownership, dominion or control over an illegal item.” United States v.
    Terrell, 
    700 F.3d 755
    , 765 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that evidence was sufficient to show that
    defendant “ ‘knowingly possessed’ . . . images of child pornography that were found on his
    laptop computer” where he exercised exclusive control of computer). The jury had an
    opportunity to consider defendant’s argument that someone else may have accessed the computer
    or altered the date that the video was placed in the folder, and was apparently unpersuaded.
    Especially given the absence of evidence to support this theory, defendant’s alternate explanation
    for the presence of the offending video on his computer does not undermine the judgment. See
    id. at 766 (absent evidence that other individuals exercised any control over laptops, defendant’s
    assertion that someone else may have downloaded images or planted photos was “pure
    speculation”); see also United States v. Winkler, 
    639 F.3d 692
    , 700 (5th Cir. 2011) (jury was not
    required to accept defendant’s “alternative explanations for how the illicit pornography came to
    be on his computer” where State presented affirmative and “overwhelming evidence . . . of
    [defendant’s] involvement with child pornography” and evidence that he “downloaded child
    pornography”).       Accordingly, we find no grounds to conclude the conviction was
    unconscionable.
    Even if we treated defendant’s appeal as an appeal of the trial court’s denial of his motion
    for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence, for the
    above reasons, we would affirm the trial court’s judgment as amply supported by the evidence.
    Affirmed.
    BY THE COURT:
    _______________________________________
    John A. Dooley, Associate Justice
    _______________________________________
    Brian L. Burgess, Associate Justice
    _______________________________________
    Beth Robinson, Associate Justice
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2012-175

Filed Date: 4/10/2013

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021