James H. Hart v. Town of Bradford ( 2022 )

VERMONT SUPREME COURT Case No. 22-AP-073
109 State Street
Montpelier VT 05609-0801
802-828-4774
www.vermontjudiciary.org
Note: In the case title, an asterisk (*) indicates an appellant and a double asterisk (**) indicates a cross-
appellant. Decisions of a three-justice panel are not to be considered as precedent before any tribunal.
ENTRY ORDER
SEPTEMBER TERM, 2022
James H. Hart et al.* v. Town of Bradford et al. } APPEALED FROM:
}
} Superior Court, Washington Unit,
} Civil Division
} CASE NO. 330-10-20 Wncv
Trial Judge: Robert A. Mello
In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:
Plaintiff James Hart appeals from the civil division’s order denying his request to file an
amended complaint and granting summary judgment in favor of the Town of Bradford and two
of its former police chiefs. We affirm.
In October 2020, plaintiff filed a complaint against the Town of Bradford, the Bradford
Police Department, former Bradford police chiefs Gene Martin and Jeffrey Stiegler, the Vermont
State Police (VSP), VSP Trooper David White, and the Orange County Sheriff’s Office (OCSO).
Plaintiff alleged that defendants violated 18 U.S.C. § 242 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by depriving him
of his civil rights and conspired to interfere with his civil rights and obstructed justice in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Plaintiff also asserted claims of negligence, gross negligence, and
a claim for “equitable relief” under Chapter I, Article 4 of the Vermont Constitution.
Plaintiff’s claims arose from a long-running boundary dispute with his neighbors, the
Joneses. Plaintiff alleged that as the result of a civil action he filed against the Joneses, they
were ordered to remove a recreational vehicle from plaintiff’s property. In August 2009,
plaintiff parked a truck in the area vacated by the Joneses, and Chief Martin and Trooper White
were called to the scene. Martin told plaintiff to remove the truck. Plaintiff responded that he
owned the property, but Martin believed there was an easement on the property. Plaintiff alleged
that he refused to leave and Martin shoved and head-butted him. Plaintiff called Bradford police
and the VSP to complain, but “[n]either office responded appropriately” to his requests. Then, in
July 2010, Robert Jones attempted to run plaintiff over with his truck. Plaintiff reported the
incident to the Bradford police and the VSP but they refused to investigate or take a statement.
Plaintiff alleged that Martin continued to harass him by stopping him seven times for no
reason while driving an OCSO vehicle. Plaintiff also alleged that while serving on the Bradford
selectboard, Martin took plaintiff’s tax payment and deposited it into his personal checking
account, causing plaintiff to be listed as delinquent on his taxes. Plaintiff further alleged that
Stiegler, who succeeded Martin as police chief, refused to investigate plaintiff’s allegations of
perjury against the Bradford public works department. Stiegler also called a friend at the U.S.
Department of Justice to ensure that plaintiff’s complaints to that office would not be
investigated. According to plaintiff, Stiegler refused to investigate plaintiff’s complaints that the
Joneses were trespassing on and vandalizing his property. Plaintiff further alleged that the
Town, the Bradford Police Department, and the OCSO refused to comply with his public records
requests.
The Town, Martin, Stiegler, White, and the State moved to dismiss, and the OCSO filed a
motion for summary judgment. In March 2021, the court issued a decision regarding all pending
motions. Before addressing the merits of the motions, the court noted that the complaint “is
nearly 100 paragraphs of scattershot factual allegations, most of which are extremely conclusory
and vague. The legal claims are no less vague.” It dismissed all of plaintiff’s claims under 18
U.S.C. § 242 because that statute does not provide a private right of action. It declined to
dismiss the claims against the Town, Martin, and Stiegler as barred by the statute of limitations,
noting that while plaintiff’s allegations began in 2009, the complaint was too vague to determine
when the other alleged conduct occurred. However, it concluded that plaintiff’s claims against
the State and Trooper White were time-barred because the complaint only alleged conduct by
them in 2009 and 2010. The court granted the OCSO’s motion for summary judgment because
the undisputed facts showed that Martin ceased working for the OCSO in 2009 and that
plaintiff’s public records request to the OCSO occurred in 2013. Because both incidents
occurred more than three years before plaintiff filed his complaint, any claims based on them
were barred as untimely.
Plaintiff’s counsel moved for reconsideration, arguing that the court had overlooked
factual statements by plaintiff in addressing the motion for summary judgment filed by the
OCSO. At the same time, plaintiff, acting pro se, filed a limited notice of appearance, a motion
to reconsider, and a proposed amended complaint. Plaintiff stated that he would represent
himself on the claims against the State and White, but his attorney would continue to represent
him against the other defendants. His proposed amended complaint was a narrative description
of various alleged wrongdoing by the VSP and other actors and concluded with the following
list: “fraud, fraud upon the court, fraud on the court, unclean hands, bad faith, negligence, gross
negligence, obstruction of justice, corruption, collusion.”
In June 2021, the court denied the motion for reconsideration of its decision granting
summary judgment to the OCSO. The court construed plaintiff’s pro se filings as a motion to
amend the complaint, which it denied. The court explained that the proposed amended
complaint did not meet “the essential rules of pleading,” citing provisions in Vermont Rule of
Civil Procedure 8. The court reasoned that the complaint did not give defendants or the court
adequate notice of plaintiff’s claims because it did not identify recognizable legal claims, set
forth their elements, or include factual allegations in support of those elements. Further,
plaintiff’s legal claims were not so obvious that they could be reasonably inferred. The court
therefore gave plaintiff thirty days to submit a new proposed amended complaint that complied
with basic pleading rules and asked plaintiff to clearly indicate whether plaintiff, or counsel,
would be pursuing each claim.
In July 2021, plaintiff, through counsel, filed a second proposed amended complaint.
This complaint omitted the legal counts that were identified in the original complaint and instead
contained a “summary of claims” followed by 136 paragraphs of factual allegations. It did not
indicate whether plaintiff or his attorney would be pursuing specific claims. The summary
indicated that plaintiff wished to assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his rights
to equal protection and to be free from unreasonable seizure, as well as negligence and civil
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conspiracy. Plaintiff also filed a “motion for relief from prior orders,” asking the court to
reinstate all claims against all defendants. The motion did not explain how the new complaint
cured the deficiencies in the earlier versions or how it stated a claim against any of the
defendants. The State, White, and the OCSO opposed the motion. The Town, Stiegler, and
Martin filed a motion for summary judgment.
The court denied plaintiff’s motion for relief from prior orders because it was premised
on the court accepting the second proposed amended complaint, which the court declined to do.
The court found that the complaint did not comply with its June 2021 order, which conditioned
acceptance on compliance with basic pleading rules and the court’s decision. It found that the
complaint was even less organized than the original complaint. It noted that plaintiff had
explained in his opposition to the Town’s motion for summary judgment that he deliberately
opted not to set out discrete counts because it would be “unduly burdensome.” The court found
that the complaint did not comply with Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure 8 or 10(b). Because
the complaint failed to address the deficiencies of the earlier complaints, the court declined to
accept it, and because the motion was premised on acceptance of the complaint, the court denied
the motion. The court also granted the Bradford defendants’ motion for summary judgment
because plaintiff had failed to identify any cognizable legal claims against them or show how the
evidence supported the elements of such claims. Plaintiff appealed.*
Plaintiff first argues that the court abused its discretion in refusing to accept his second
proposed amended complaint. Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that after a
responsive pleading has been served, “a party may amend the party’s pleading only by leave of
court or by written consent of the adverse party,” and that “leave shall be freely given when
justice so requires.” We review the trial court’s denial of a motion to amend for abuse of
discretion. Id.Amendments to pleadings should be liberally allowed when there is no prejudice to the
other party. Colby v. Umbrella, Inc., 2008 VT 20, ¶ 4, 184 Vt. 1. Denial of a proposed
amendment typically must be justified by a showing of undue delay, bad faith, futility of
amendment, or prejudice to the opposing party. See Perkins v. Windsor Hosp. Corp., 142 Vt.
305, 313 (1982) (citing Forman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). However, another factor
that may support denial of a motion under Rule 15(a) is “repeated failure to cure deficiencies by
amendments previously allowed.” Forman, 371 U.S. at 182. Here, the court denied the motion
to amend because the proposed amended complaint failed to meet basic pleading standards or to
resolve the deficiencies of the original complaint, even after the court had explained these issues
to plaintiff and given him another chance to address them. We conclude that the court acted
within its discretion.
Civil Rule 8 states that a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” and that “[e]ach averment of a pleading shall be
simple, concise, and direct.” V.R.C.P. 8(a), (e). Rule 10 provides that “[e]ach claim founded
upon a separate transaction or occurrence . . . shall be stated in a separate count . . . whenever a
separation facilitates the clear presentation of the matters set forth.” V.R.C.P. 10(b). The main
purpose of these rules is to give a defendant “fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which
it rests.” Molleur v. Leriche, 142 Vt. 620, 622 (1983) (quotation omitted).
*
The OCSO moved to dismiss the appeal against it because plaintiff did not make any
arguments about the OCSO in his brief. Because we are affirming the judgment below, the
OCSO’s motion is denied as moot.
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The proposed amended complaint’s “summary of claims” indicated that plaintiff
purported to assert claims of negligence, violation of his constitutional rights to equal protection
and freedom from unreasonable seizure, and civil conspiracy. However, this summary was
followed by 136 paragraphs of factual allegations, many of which appeared to assert other legal
theories such as slander, due process violations, and “willful and gross negligence,” or involved
actors who were not named as defendants. The sheer length of the proposed amended complaint,
coupled with its vague, jumbled, and conclusory factual allegations, make it extremely difficult
to parse. The complaint did not explain in any comprehensible fashion how the factual
allegations satisfied the elements of any of the claims plaintiff was ostensibly asserting. The
original complaint contained similar deficiencies, which the court explained in its June 2021
order. The court gave plaintiff a chance to file a new complaint that addressed these issues, but
he chose not to comply because he found doing so would be unduly burdensome.
Under these circumstances, the court acted within its discretion in denying the proposed
amendment. As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has observed, “[t]hough length alone is
generally insufficient to justify rejecting a complaint, unintelligibility is certainly a legitimate
reason for doing so.” Stanard v. Nygren, 658 F.3d 792, 797-98 (7th Cir. 2011). “[T]he issue is
notice; where the lack of organization and basic coherence renders a complaint too confusing to
determine the facts that constitute the alleged wrongful conduct, dismissal is an appropriate
remedy.” Id. (affirming denial of permission to file second amended complaint where “rampant
grammatical, syntactical, and typographical errors contributed to an overall sense of
unintelligibility,” which “was compounded by a vague, confusing, and conclusory articulation of
the factual and legal basis for the claims and a general ‘kitchen sink’ approach to pleading the
case”); see also Loos v. Immersion Corp., 762 F.3d 880, 890-91 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that
trial court did not abuse discretion in dismissing plaintiff’s amended complaint without to leave
to amend because plaintiff “essentially re-pled the same facts and legal theories” that the court
had previously explained were deficient (quotation omitted)); 6 Wright & Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 1487 (3d ed.) (“[N]umerous courts have held that a proposed
amendment that . . . fails to include allegations to cure defects in the original pleading, should be
denied.”). The court was not required to sift through the complaint to assemble the elements of a
claim where the attorney who drafted it could not be bothered to do so. We therefore decline to
disturb the court’s decision.
Plaintiff also argues that the court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment
filed on behalf of the Town, Martin, and Stiegler. We review a summary judgment decision
without deference, using the same standard as the trial court. Boyd v. State, 2022 VT 12, ¶ 19.
“Summary judgment is appropriate when, construing the facts as alleged by the nonmoving party
and resolving reasonable doubts and inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, there are no
genuine issues of material fact and judgment is appropriate as a matter of law.” Sheldon v.
Ruggiero, 2018 VT 125, ¶ 14, 209 Vt. 33; V.R.C.P. 56. “To survive a defendant’s motion for
summary judgment, the plaintiff must respond with specific facts to raise a triable issue and
demonstrate sufficient admissible evidence to support a prima facie case.” Gates v. Mack
Molding Co., Inc., 2022 VT 24, ¶ 14.
We first note that the Bradford defendants’ motion for summary judgment was based on
the proposed amended complaint, which the court did not accept, instead of the original
complaint. This makes no difference to our analysis because, as we discuss below, plaintiff
failed to demonstrate that there was evidence tending to support any of his claims against these
defendants.
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First, plaintiff failed to demonstrate a cognizable claim against defendant Martin. Most
of plaintiff’s original claims against Martin involved events that took place in 2009 or earlier,
including the claims that Martin refused to enforce his property rights, physically assaulted him,
stopped him without reason while in an OCSO vehicle, and converted his tax payment. Plaintiff
did not dispute that Martin ceased working for the Bradford police department in 2011, had
never been on the Bradford selectboard, and had not served as delinquent tax collector since
2008. Thus, to the extent plaintiff’s claims against Martin were premised on actions Martin took
in his official capacity as an officer of the Town, they were barred by the statute of limitations.
See 12 V.S.A. § 512 (stating action for injury to person or property must be filed within three
years after cause of action accrues); Tierney v. Tierney, 131 Vt. 48, 52 (1972) (stating summary
judgment may be granted to moving party where opposing party asserts claim barred by statute
of limitations).
Seemingly recognizing this, plaintiff stated in his affidavit in opposition to summary
judgment that Martin had harassed him at Halls Lake and threatened to fight him “within (3)
three years prior to initiating this litigation.” Plaintiff further alleged that Martin made false
reports to police that plaintiff was on a jet ski on Halls Lake and that his boat was unregistered.
Accepting these allegations as true, as we must for purposes of summary judgment, plaintiff has
failed to demonstrate that they satisfied the elements of any of his claims for relief as to Martin,
since he was undisputedly a private citizen and no longer associated with the police or town
government when they occurred, and plaintiff did not assert any recognizable tort claims against
Martin personally. The court therefore properly granted summary judgment to Martin.
Similarly, plaintiff failed to provide evidence to demonstrate that there was a genuine
issue of fact that, if resolved in his favor, would entitle him to relief against defendant Stiegler.
Plaintiff alleged in his original complaint that Stiegler refused to investigate his trespassing and
vandalism complaints against his neighbors; refused to investigate his allegation of perjury
against the Town’s public works department; and colluded with officials at the U.S. Department
of Justice to ensure plaintiff’s complaints wouldn’t be investigated by that agency. Stiegler
responded to these allegations in an affidavit submitted in support of defendant’s motion. He
stated that he received numerous complaints of trespass from plaintiff and that he investigated
these complaints but determined that they were not supported by sufficient evidence. He also
stated that he received a complaint from plaintiff in June 2014 alleging that neighbors damaged
plaintiff’s fence, and he investigated the complaint and interviewed witnesses. Stiegler also
stated that in June 2018, he pulled plaintiff over for failure to display a front license plate and
issued him a warning. He provided police records relating to these incidents. Stiegler denied
plaintiff’s other allegations.
In plaintiff’s affidavit opposing summary judgment, he denied that Stiegler had
adequately investigated the 2014 complaint, reiterated his conclusory allegation that Stiegler was
part of a coordinated campaign among town officials to deprive him of his property rights, and
asserted that the reason Stiegler gave for the 2018 stop was pretextual. However, he did not
provide any independent evidence to demonstrate that Stiegler had failed to adequately
investigate his 2014 vandalism complaint or that Stiegler’s asserted basis for pulling him over in
2018 was false. See Cate v. City of Burlington, 2013 VT 64, ¶ 11, 194 Vt. 265 (“A party
opposing summary judgment may not rest on allegations or denials, but must demonstrate, with
citations to the record, that a fact is genuinely disputed.”). Plaintiff did assert that at some point,
Stiegler failed to investigate his claim that someone had cut the brake line on his vehicle.
However, he provided no corroborating evidence to support this assertion, and it is contradicted
by his proposed amended complaint, in which he states that he filed the complaint with a VSP
trooper, not Stiegler. Plaintiff further asserted that Stiegler told him that he had “a good working
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relationship with the Joneses,” and told plaintiff that “I called my friend that I was on a police
board with, he’s an ex-cop at the V.S.P., and he works for the DOJ in Burlington. I’m all set.”
He further alleges that Stiegler said, “I can only do what my employer tells me, and you’re suing
my employer.” Assuming Stiegler made these statements, they are too vague to support any of
plaintiff’s asserted legal theories. See Gates, 2022 VT 24, ¶ 34 (holding affidavit submitted by
party opposing summary judgment did not create dispute of fact where allegations contained
therein were “simply too vague”). The court therefore did not err in granting summary judgment
in Stiegler’s favor.
Likewise, plaintiff failed to put forth evidence to demonstrate that there was a genuine
dispute of fact regarding his claims against the Town. He alleged in his original complaint that
the Town refused to comply with his public records requests, and generally participated, through
its police, in a conspiracy to violate his civil rights. The Town submitted evidence
demonstrating that plaintiff filed public records requests with the Town and its police department
in October 2015. The Town and Department estimated the costs to compile the records and
asked plaintiff to pay these costs before they did the work to compile the records. Plaintiff did
not pay, and did not appeal the Town’s prepayment requirement. In his affidavit opposing
summary judgment, plaintiff did not dispute these facts.
Plaintiff did assert in his affidavit that “[w]ithin the (3) year statute of limitations prior to
filing the Complaint, upon Belief, the V.S.P. and Town, together, sent police to Hart’s home in
the early morning hours and served him with no trespass orders on property” eventually
determined to be his, and that this demonstrates that the Town was conspiring against him. This
statement is insufficient to create a dispute of material fact because it appears not to be based on
personal knowledge. See Levy v. Town of St. Albans Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 152 Vt. 139,
145 (1989) (holding affidavit containing allegations made “upon information and belief” did not
raise genuine issue of fact because allegations not based on personal knowledge or admissible
evidence). Furthermore, it lacks sufficient specificity to create an issue of fact with regard to any
of plaintiff’s claims against the Town. See Gates, 2022 VT 24, ¶ 34. Because plaintiff did not
provide any further evidence to support his claims, the court properly granted summary judgment
to the Town.
Affirmed.
BY THE COURT:
Paul L. Reiber, Chief Justice
Nancy J. Waples, Associate Justice
Walter M. Morris, Jr., Superior Judge (Ret.),
Specially Assigned
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