Kate Hendrickson v. Nathaniel Natoli ( 2022 )


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  • VERMONT SUPREME COURT                                                      Case No.       22-AP-179
    109 State Street
    Montpelier VT 05609-0801
    802-828-4774
    www.vermontjudiciary.org
    Note: In the case title, an asterisk (*) indicates an appellant and a double asterisk (**) indicates a cross-
    appellant. Decisions of a three-justice panel are not to be considered as precedent before any tribunal.
    ENTRY ORDER
    DECEMBER TERM, 2022
    Kate Hendrickson v. Nathaniel Natoli*                }    APPEALED FROM:
    }    Superior Court, Addison Unit,
    }    Family Division
    }    CASE NO. 22-FA-01590
    Trial Judge: Kathryn A.C. Kennedy,
    Specially Assigned
    In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:
    Defendant appeals a final relief-from-abuse (RFA) order entered by the family division.
    We affirm.
    Plaintiff and defendant were formerly in a relationship and have a five-year-old son
    together. In June 2022, plaintiff filed an RFA complaint alleging that defendant had attempted to
    cause or caused physical harm to her during a custody exchange.
    At the final hearing, plaintiff testified that over the preceding year, defendant had
    initiated unwanted physical contact numerous times during custody exchanges, touching her
    waist, her back, her hand, and her shoulders. One time, she alleged he pushed her aside with
    both hands, and another time he hit her face.
    During the most recent incident, on June 7, 2022, plaintiff described that she arrived at
    the custody exchange location with the parties’ son and defendant came to the door of her
    vehicle. Plaintiff remained seated in the vehicle, leaned back, and unbuckled her son’s car seat.
    She pushed a button that opened her son’s door. Defendant then reached into the car and shoved
    a piece of cloth in her face, saying that he found a dress of hers and wanted to return it to her.
    Plaintiff testified, “[h]e hit me hard with [the dress]. And then he held it there and rubbed it
    around on my face as he was pressing it against my face.” She testified that the cloth covered
    her nose and mouth and that defendant pressed it hard against her face, causing her pain. She
    stated that she felt cornered in the vehicle and asked him to stop, which he eventually did. The
    parties’ son was in the car during this incident. Plaintiff testified that she feared further physical
    abuse from defendant.
    Plaintiff’s romantic partner, J.B., testified that on June 8, one day after the custody
    exchange described by plaintiff, defendant came to plaintiff’s house while J.B. was there.
    Defendant told J.B. that he had come to get his son’s shoes. Defendant refused to wait outside,
    entered the home, and took the shoes. J.B. told defendant he could leave. Defendant then
    shoved J.B. and physically attacked him, repeatedly shoving him against the stairs. J.B. testified
    that he suffered bruises and cuts on his back, bruising on his arm and elbow, and wounds on his
    hand where defendant bit him, for which he later sought medical treatment.
    Defendant testified on his own behalf. He stated that during the custody exchange on
    June 7, he saw an item fall out of plaintiff’s car when she opened the door. He asked her where
    to put it and she said, “just put it here,” and he did. He denied that he ever trespassed on her
    property or that he had any interaction with J.B. He stated that plaintiff had filed a previous RFA
    complaint based on similar allegations that was denied.
    Defendant then called a tenant of his, A.B. She testified that she had accompanied him to
    a custody exchange in April 2022, during which he got the parties’ son and the son’s belongings
    out of his car and helped the son into plaintiff’s vehicle. She described the exchange as “short
    and sweet.” She agreed when asked by defendant that it was possible that something could fall
    out of the car during that process and that defendant had to partially enter plaintiff’s car to place
    the child in his car seat. She did not indicate that she witnessed the June 2022 exchange.
    After A.B. testified, the court stated that the evidence was closed and went into recess,
    after which it returned and made findings on the record. The court found that plaintiff had
    proven by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant had physically abused her and that
    there was a danger of further abuse. The court issued a final RFA order directing defendant to
    stay 300 feet away from plaintiff. The court ordered the parties to arrange for a third party to
    facilitate custody exchanges until they were able to arrange exchanges through a visitation
    center.
    On appeal, defendant claims that the order should be reversed because he did not have
    adequate time to present testimony. Vermont Rule of Evidence 611(a) generally directs the court
    to “exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and
    presenting evidence” to make the “presentation orderly and effective,” to “avoid needless
    consumption of time,” and to “protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.”
    Although this rule encompasses the authority “to set reasonable limits on the consumption of
    time in examining witnesses,” any “limits must be reasonable and sufficiently flexible to ensure
    that important evidence is not excluded due to artificial time constraints.” Varnum v. Varnum,
    
    155 Vt. 376
    , 390 (1990). However, in abuse-prevention cases these considerations are tempered
    by the goal of the statute, which is “to provide immediate relief to victims of domestic violence.”
    2
    Rapp v. Dimino, 
    162 Vt. 1
    , 4 (1993). “This goal is accomplished in part by providing
    inexpensive and uncomplicated proceedings . . . without the need for counsel, advance pleadings,
    or a full-blown evidentiary hearing.” 
    Id.
    The record shows that defendant had a full and fair opportunity to present a defense
    during the final hearing. He cross-examined plaintiff and J.B. after each of them testified. When
    it was his turn to present evidence, he recalled plaintiff to the stand to ask her a question. He
    testified for several minutes on his own behalf. He then stated that he wanted to call his witness
    and proceeded to question her for several minutes. After she finished testifying, the court stated
    that the evidence was closed. Defendant did not object at that point or ask the court for more
    time.
    Defendant asserts in his reply brief that he did object earlier in the hearing. However, the
    objection to which he refers had nothing to do with the court’s decision to close the evidence.
    During plaintiff’s direct testimony, she stated that the sheriff successfully served defendant with
    a notice against trespass. Defendant objected, stating “I did not. She said successful—,” at
    which point the court interrupted him and indicated that he would have an opportunity to respond
    later. Defendant subsequently had the opportunity to cross-examine plaintiff about this
    statement and to present his own testimony but did not do so. His objection to plaintiff’s
    statement about service cannot be fairly construed as a request for more time. More importantly,
    he does not indicate what evidence he would have presented if he had more time, or how it
    would have impacted the outcome of the case. Under these circumstances, we see no reason to
    disturb the decision below.
    Defendant also claims that plaintiff made up her abuse claim to interfere with his parent-
    child contact and that her allegations were untrue. “In matters of personal relations, such as
    abuse prevention, the family court is in a unique position to assess the credibility of witnesses
    and weigh the strength of evidence at hearing.” Raynes v. Rogers, 
    2008 VT 52
    , ¶ 9, 
    183 Vt. 513
    .
    We will therefore affirm a family court’s decision to grant a relief-from-abuse order unless the
    court abused its discretion, “upholding its findings if supported by the evidence and its
    conclusions if supported by the findings.” 
    Id.
    Plaintiff’s testimony supports the court’s finding that defendant abused plaintiff by
    shoving a cloth in her face and rubbing it against her skin, causing her pain and fear. See 15
    V.S.A. § 1101(1)(A) (defining abuse as occurrence of one or more of list of specific acts
    including “attempting to cause or causing physical harm”). The evidence also supports the
    finding that there was a danger of further abuse: plaintiff testified that defendant had repeatedly
    initiated unwanted physical contact despite her asking him to stop and that his behavior appeared
    to be escalating. This was corroborated by J.B.’s testimony that defendant went to plaintiff’s
    house the following day, entered the home uninvited, and then attacked J.B. Although defendant
    denies that any of these events occurred, the court was not required to believe his version if it
    found plaintiff and J.B. to be more credible. His disagreement with the court’s conclusions does
    not constitute an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Meyncke v. Meyncke, 
    2009 VT 84
    , ¶ 15, 
    186 Vt.
                                                        3
    571 (mem.) (explaining that arguments which amount to nothing more than disagreement with
    court’s reasoning and conclusion do not make out a case for abuse of discretion).
    Affirmed.
    BY THE COURT:
    Harold E. Eaton, Jr., Associate Justice
    Karen R. Carroll, Associate Justice
    Nancy J. Waples, Associate Justice
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 22-AP-179

Filed Date: 12/16/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/26/2024