Mooney v. Vt. Dep't of Motor Vehicles ( 2012 )


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  • Mooney v. Vt. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, No. 104-3-12 Bncv (Carroll, J., Oct. 4, 2012)
    [The text of this Vermont trial court opinion is unofficial. It has been reformatted from the original. The accuracy of the text and the
    accompanying data included in the Vermont trial court opinion database is not guaranteed.]
    VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT
    SUPERIOR COURT                                                                                         CIVIL DIVISION
    Bennington Unit                                                                                        Docket No. 104-3-12 Bncv
    Paul Mooney
    Plaintiff
    v.
    Vermont Department of Motor Vehicles
    Defendant
    DECISION ON APPEAL FROM VT AGENCY OF TRANSPORTATION
    Factual Background
    This case is an appeal from a hearing by the Agency of Transportation. The Vermont
    Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) refused to renew Plaintiff Paul Mooney’s Vermont
    drivers license because Massachusetts suspended Plaintiff’s nonresident operating privileges
    until 2022 for refusing to take a chemical test. Plaintiff appealed DMV’s action to the Agency of
    Transportation. A hearing officer heard Plaintiff’s appeal and affirmed DMV’s action. Plaintiff
    appealed the hearing officer’s decision under V.R.C.P. 74.
    Standard of Review
    In administrative appeals under V.R.C.P. 74, the Court evaluates whether the agency had
    a reasonable basis for its findings. In re Soon Kwon, 
    2011 VT 26
    , ¶ 6, 
    189 Vt. 598
    . The Court
    defers to the hearing officer because the hearing officer has special expertise in these types of
    cases. See 
    id. ¶¶ 6–7.
    The Court evaluates statutes by reading the plain meaning of the statute
    and then deferring to the hearing officer’s interpretation to resolve ambiguities. See 
    id. ¶ 9.
    The
    Court reads sections of a “statute together as a harmonious whole.” 
    Id. ¶ 17
                                                       Discussion
    The issue in this case is whether the hearing officer correctly refused to reissue Plaintiff’s
    license under 23 V.S.A. § 603(c). Plaintiff argues the hearing officer should have applied 23
    V.S.A. § 3905 instead. Section 603(c) of Title 23 indicates a “An operator license, junior
    operator license, or learner permit shall not be issued to an applicant whose license or learner
    permit is suspended, revoked or canceled in any jurisdiction.” Under section 603(c), Plaintiff
    would not be able to be reinstated until Massachusetts lifts its suspension in 2022. On the other
    hand, section 3905(a)(2) indicates Vermont should give a Massachusetts conviction1 for refusal
    to provide a chemical sample the same effect as if the event happened in Vermont. Plaintiff
    contends application of section 3905(a)(2) means that DMV should only suspend Plaintiff’s
    license for eighteen months.
    Plaintiff argues that section 603(c) does not apply to his case because Massachusetts
    suspended his nonresident operating privileges and not his license. Plaintiff notes Vermont does
    not define license in Title 23 in a way that incorporates another state’s suspension of a driver’s
    nonresident operating privileges. See 23 V.S.A. 4(48).2 Plaintiff cites several examples where the
    legislature included both license and nonresident operating privileges when it intended to include
    both. See, e.g., 23 V.S.A. §§ 109(b) (directing DMV to prepare a monthly list of all drivers who
    have had either their operator’s license or their nonresident operating privileges revoked), 672(a)
    (authorizing DMV to suspend or revoke the operating privileges of nonresidents on the same
    terms as those of residents), 802(a) (authorizing DMV to suspend operating privileges of
    residents and nonresidents on the same basis).
    1
    “‘Conviction’ means a conviction of any offense related to the use or operation of a motor that is prohibited by
    state law…” 23 V.S.A. § 3903.
    2
    License to operate a motor vehicle includes a “nonresident’s operating privilege.” 23 V.S.A. § 4(48)(C). However,
    the definition only applies to a license issued “by the laws of this state. 
    Id. §4(48). Page
    2 of 4
    Plaintiff further argues that 23 V.S.A. § 3905 should apply and DMV should suspend
    Plaintiff’s license until October 1, 2013. Sections 3901 to 3910 of Title 23 implement the Driver
    License Compact (Compact). The Compact establishes procedures for standardizing how states
    handle other states’ driving laws. 23 V.S.A. § 3902. Plaintiff correctly notes both Vermont and
    Massachusetts enacted the Compact. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 30B (2012); 23 V.S.A. §§ 3901–
    10. According to Plaintiff’s argument, the Court should apply 23 V.S.A. § 1208 through 23
    V.S.A. § 3905 and issue Plaintiff a suspension for eighteen months.
    Conversely, DMV argues section 603(c) means it cannot renew Plaintiff’s license until
    Massachusetts ends its suspension of Plaintiff’s nonresident driver’s privileges. DMV forces
    applicants to surrender their out-of-state licenses when Vermont issues a license. DMV reasons it
    is impossible for someone to have a Vermont license and a suspended license in another
    jurisdiction. Therefore, section 603(c) must apply to both licenses and nonresident operating
    privileges. Finally, DMV argues section 3905 does not apply because the American Association
    of Motor Vehicle Administrators3 does not list Massachusetts as member of the Compact.
    The Court finds that the hearing officer should have applied section 3905 rather than
    section 603(c). Although the meaning of “license” within section 603(c) is ambiguous, the Court
    must determine its meaning within the context of the entire statute. In re Soon Kwon, 
    2011 VT 26
    , ¶ 17.The Court does not defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute if the statute is clear
    in context. See 
    id. ¶¶ 9,
    17. The legislature’s use of only the term “license” in section 603(c) and
    its use of both “license” and “nonresident operating privileges” in other sections indicates the
    terms have different meanings.
    3
    The American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators is a non-profit organization that monitors interstate
    laws. About AAMVA, American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, http://www.aamva.org/about-aamva/
    (last visited Oct. 3, 2012).
    Page 3 of 4
    Additionally, the Court must read sections 603 and 3905 together and give meaning to
    both sections. See 
    id. ¶ 17.
    The Compact aims to standardize treatment of motorists regardless of
    where they commit violations. The Massachusetts General Laws and the Massachusetts judiciary
    indicate Massachusetts is a member of the Compact. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 30B (2012);
    Bresten v. Bd. of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Policies & Bonds, 
    921 N.E.2d 134
    , 135 n.2 (Mass.
    App. Ct. 2010). The Court finds DMV’s claim that Massachusetts is not a member of the
    Compact unpersuasive. Accordingly, DMV should have applied section 3905.
    Section 3905(a)(2) requires DMV to treat Plaintiff’s refusal to take a chemical test in
    Massachusetts as though the event had happened in Vermont. The hearing officer should
    evaluate whether to treat Plaintiff’s suspension as a second or third offense and suspend
    Plaintiff’s license for the duration required by statute.4
    Order
    The Agency of Transportation’s decision is reversed and remanded for further
    proceedings consistent with this order.
    Dated at Bennington, Vermont on October 4, 2012
    Karen R. Carroll
    Superior Court Judge
    4
    Under both 23 V.S.A. § 1205(m) and 23 V.S.A. § 1208(a), Plaintiff would receive an eighteen month suspension
    for a second offense. DMV must suspend Plaintiff’s license for life if it finds the suspension here was a third
    offense. 23 V.S.A. §§ 1205(m), 1208(b). Plaintiff argues, and the hearing officer appeared to accept, the suspension
    is Plaintiff’s second offense. However, Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2 appears to indicate Plaintiff received a DWI conviction
    in Vermont and two alcohol related suspensions in Massachusetts.
    Page 4 of 4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 104

Filed Date: 10/4/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/24/2018