Whiteyville Properties, LLC ( 2012 )


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  •                                       State of Vermont
    Superior Court—Environmental Division
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    ENTRY REGARDING MOTION
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    In re Whiteyville Properties, LLC                                   Docket No. 179-12-11 Vtec
    (Appeal of City of Burlington DRB decision)
    Title: Motion for Summary Judgment (Filing No. 2)
    Filed: May 15, 2012
    Filed By: Whiteyville Properties, LLC
    Opposition to Motion filed on 6/18/12 by City of Burlington
    Response to Opposition filed on 7/2/12 by Whiteyville Properties, LLC
    Reply to Response to Opposition filed on 7/24/12 by City of Burlington
    Response to Reply to Response to Opposition filed on 8/3/12 by Whiteyville Properties, LLC
    Granted                      X Denied                        Other
    Currently before the Court is Whiteyville Properties, LLC’s (“Applicant”) motion for
    summary judgment on its own Statement of Questions related to its property at 26 Summit
    Street in the City of Burlington (“the City”). This property is located in a Low Density
    Residential Zoning District (“RL District”) and it contains two duplexes, for a total of four
    dwelling units. At issue is one of these four units, for which the City of Burlington
    Development Review Board (“DRB”) denied conditional use approval to exceed the residential
    occupancy limit of four unrelated adults per dwelling unit. The DRB additionally denied
    Applicant’s request to expand onsite parking. Applicant desires to have and rent out six, rather
    than four, bedrooms in one of the dwelling units.
    In asking whether the DRB erred by requiring a management plan and by ultimately
    denying its request, Applicant mistakenly frames the legal issues in its Statement of Questions
    as if this Court were reviewing the DRB’s decision on-the-record. Burlington is not an “on-the-
    record” municipality, thus our review here is de novo.1 In a de novo review, the Court does not
    consider the propriety of any previous decision; rather, we review the application anew as to
    the specific issues raised in the statement of questions. See Chioffi v. Winooski Zoning Board,
    
    151 Vt. 9
    , 11 (1989) (quoting In re Poole, 
    136 Vt. 242
    , 245 (1978)) (“A de novo trial ‘is one where
    the case is heard as though no action whatever has been held prior thereto’”).
    1  See 24 V.S.A. § 4471(b) (detailing the steps a municipality must take to afford its land use
    determinations on-the-record appellate review) and 10 V.S.A. § 8504(h) (requiring the Environmental
    Division to conduct a de novo hearing of the issues appealed except in the context of on-the-record
    appeals); V.R.E.C.P. 5(g).
    In re Whiteyville Properties, LLC, No.179-12-11 Vtec (E.O. on Mot. for Summ. J.) (12-13-12)   Pg. 2 of 4.
    A court conducting a de novo review may hear issues on summary judgment; de novo
    review is not, as Applicant appears to conceptualize it, an alternative to summary judgment.
    (Applicant’s Resp. to City’s Opp. to Summ. J. at 3, filed Jul. 2, 2012). 2
    We will grant summary judgment to the moving party (here, Applicant) if the party
    shows that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
    judgment as a matter of law.” V.R.C.P. 56(a); V.R.E.C.P. 5(a)(2). We must give the non-moving
    party (here, the City) the benefit of all reasonable doubts and inferences and “accept as true the
    [factual] allegations made in opposition to the motion for summary judgment.” Robertson v.
    Mylan Labs., Inc., 
    2004 VT 15
    , ¶ 15, 
    176 Vt. 356
    ; see V.R.C.P. 56(c). In claiming that a material
    fact is undisputed or disputed, parties must support their assertions with citations to admissible
    evidence. V.R.C.P. 56(c)(1). See Reporter’s Notes—2012 Amendment, V.R.C.P. 56 (“Rules
    56(c)(1)(B) and (c)(2) clarify that all asserted facts must be based on admissible evidence”).
    We understand Applicant seeks to present the legal question of whether its request “to
    make one [duplex] unit . . . a 6-bedroom unit and [to expand] the parking lot” complies with the
    City’s required conditional use standards.3 Applicant’s Statement of Questions at 1, filed Dec.
    19, 2011. The purpose of conditional review is “to provide for a more detailed consideration of
    development proposals which may present a greater impact on the community” and to ensure
    that “projects of major significance or impact receive a comprehensive review under established
    criteria” and that “the city’s natural, physical and fiscal resources and city services and
    infrastructure are adequate to accommodate the impact of such developments, both
    individually and cumulatively.” CDO § 3.5.1. Conditional use approval may be granted only
    upon a determination that the proposed use will not result in an undue adverse effect on
    several factors, including the character of the area affected (here, a specific neighborhood within
    a zone “intended primarily for low-density residential development in the form of single
    detached dwellings and duplexes,” CDO § 4.4.5(a)(1)) and other standards set forth in existing
    City bylaws and city and state ordinances, such as nuisance standards.
    Applicant has failed to present sufficient undisputed material facts for this Court to
    conclude as a matter of law that Applicant is entitled to summary judgment. In order to gauge
    a project’s impact upon the community in which it is proposed, we must begin with evidence
    describing that community. Applicant’s original filings included insufficient evidence of the
    character of the affected area and whether the proposed six-bedroom unit would have an undue
    adverse effect on that character or violate nuisance standards or other regulations. Applicants’
    subsequent affidavits purporting to describe the surrounding neighborhood (Aff’s of Michael
    Johnson and Eric Hanley, filed July 2, 2012), contain assertions that the City, in turn, disputes
    with evidence of its own (Aff. of Scott Gustin, filed Jul. 24, 2012; Attachment C, filed Jul. 24,
    2012). Given these disputed material facts, we may not render summary judgment in
    2  We encourage Applicant to include page numbers in its future filings. Also, a party need not, when
    making a supplemental filing, repeat the factual representations and other statements made in its initial
    filing.
    3 Subject to conditional use approval, more than four unrelated adults may occupy a dwelling unit in the
    RL district if the unit meets minimum dimensional and parking standards. CDO § 4.4.5(d)[emphasis
    added]. The DRB found that Applicant’s six-bedroom proposal, with its proposed additional parking,
    does meet these basic dimensional and parking requirements. Although Applicant spends considerable
    time emphasizing its compliance with these criteria, such compliance does not automatically entitle
    Applicant to approval. The project must additionally pass conditional use review.
    In re Whiteyville Properties, LLC, No.179-12-11 Vtec (E.O. on Mot. for Summ. J.) (12-13-12)   Pg. 3 of 4.
    Applicant’s favor on the question of whether the project complies with the conditional use
    standards.
    Additionally, in considering a project under conditional use criteria, the review by the
    DRB—and this Court acting in its place4—is not limited to dimensional standards and
    submission requirements. Rather, applications subject to conditional use review “shall provide
    any additional information necessary for the adequate review of the proposal under [applicable
    criteria].” CDO § 3.5.4. Moreover, the reviewing body “may attach such additional reasonable
    conditions and safeguards, as it may deem necessary to implement the purposes of this chapter
    and the zoning regulations.” CDO § 3.5.6(a)(15). We “may require suitable mitigation
    measures” where necessary “to maintain the property in a character in keeping with the
    surrounding area.” CDO § 3.5.6(a)(10). These provisions guide and give us the authority to
    require, among other things, a management plan for the property. Once we receive the
    evidence presented at trial both for and in opposition (if any) to the application, we will
    determine whether to require Applicant to provide and follow a management plan that
    provides a specific explanation of how Applicants intend to ensure that the improved property
    meets the conditional use criteria within the RL district and specific neighborhood at issue.
    Given the concerns that have been thus far presented, we recommend that Applicant be
    prepared to submit a management plan at trial and to explain how that plan will assure that the
    impact from its expansion will not be adverse to the surrounding area. Satisfying such a
    standard is required for conditional use review approval in this case.
    Finally, we briefly address Applicant’s plan to expand parking. From the plan
    submitted, it appears that the current lot contains six spaces with ground coverage of 2,663
    square feet and that Applicant proposes to devote an additional 2,844 square feet to parking, so
    that a total of 13 spaces may be accommodated. (Exhibit 4, filed May 15, 2012 with Applicant’s
    Mot. for Summ. J.). Applicant and the City disagree as to whether the proposal to expand
    parking should be considered independently or in conjunction with Applicant’s proposal to
    increase the bedrooms in one of the dwelling units. Based upon the facts Applicant has
    presented in support of its summary judgment, we cannot conclude that Applicant’s proposed
    parking expansion complies with the CDO as a matter of law. We conclude that this legal issue
    can only be resolved through a trial.
    The CDO mandates that parking spaces in the Neighborhood Parking District may not
    exceed 125% of the minimum required spaces for all enumerated uses in Table 8.1.8-1.
    CDO § 8.1.9. That table requires two spaces per dwelling unit for duplexes. This property
    contains two duplexes: four dwelling units. Thus, the CDO mandates a minimum of eight and
    maximum of ten (that is, 125% of eight) parking spaces for the property in its current
    configuration. Applicant’s proposal of 13 spaces for the property with its current configuration
    and uses would therefore not conform to the CDO. Applicant argues that because the CDO’s
    discussion of maximum parking spaces includes the statement, “In no case shall the maximum
    number of required spaces be less than one (1) per unit of measurement (beds, units, 1000 gross
    sq ft, etc.) for the use,” the property should be allowed to have fourteen parking spaces “since
    there are currently fourteen bedrooms.” (Applicant’s Resp, to City’s Opp. to Summ. J. at 3, filed
    July 2, 2012). The unit of measurement for duplexes is clearly “per unit unless otherwise
    4 A court conducting a de novo review of a DRB decision stands in the place of the DRB; it possess the
    same authority as the DRB. In re Torres, 
    154 Vt. 233
    , 235 (1990).
    In re Whiteyville Properties, LLC, No.179-12-11 Vtec (E.O. on Mot. for Summ. J.) (12-13-12)              Pg. 4 of 4.
    noted.” Table 8.1.8-1. Applicant’s contention that the property as currently configured could
    have fourteen parking spaces is based upon an incorrect interpretation. The “unit” upon which
    the CDO calculates parking spaces is dwelling units, not beds. As explained above, and unless
    the material issues are resolved differently at trial, it appears to the Court at this stage that the
    CDO will not authorize the property in its current configuration to host more than ten parking
    spaces.
    As to the legality of Applicant’s proposal for parking expansion in conjunction with
    Applicant’s proposal to increase the bedrooms, we will consider that issue along with the
    conditional use review at trial.
    For the reasons stated above, we DENY Applicant Whiteyville Properties, LLC’s motion
    for summary judgment.
    _________________________________________                                        December 13, 2012
    Thomas S. Durkin, Judge                                                       Date
    =============================================================================
    Date copies sent: ____________                                               Clerk's Initials: _______
    Copies sent to:
    Attorney Michael D. Johnson for Appellant Whiteyville Properties, LLC
    Attorney Kimberlee J. Sturtevant for City of Burlington
    Interested Person John Douglas
    Interested Person Eleanor Lanahan
    Interested Person Amanda Phillips
    Interested Person Briggs Phillips
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 179-12-11 Vtec

Filed Date: 12/13/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/24/2018