Choquette Zoning Permit Amendment ( 2009 )


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  •                           Environmental Court of Vermont
    State of Vermont
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    E N T R Y R E G A R D I N G M O T I O N
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    Choquette Zoning Permit Amendment                 Docket No. 199-9-08 Vtec
    Project:     Choquette Cross Rd. Amendment
    Applicant:   Ernest & Louise Choquette
    (Appeal from Municipal ZBA Decision)
    Title: Motion to Dismiss, (No. 2)
    Filed:        September 23, 2008
    Filed By: Coe, Sara Davies, Attorney for Appellee Town of Newport
    Response filed on 10/28/08 by Appellants Ernest & Louise Choquette
    ___ Granted                 _X_ Denied                 ___ Other
    This matter arises from a decision by the Town of Newport Zoning Board
    of Adjustment (“ZBA”), denying Appellants Ernest and Louise Choquettes’
    application for an amended zoning permit. The Town of Newport (“Town”) has
    moved to dismiss the Choquettes’ appeal, and the Choquettes have responded
    with their objection.   The Town raises two arguments in its motion for why
    the Choquettes’ appeal should be dismissed: (1) failure to timely serve the
    Town with notice of their appeal, and (2) consideration of the pending
    application is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.   We address each of
    the Town’s arguments below.
    The Town’s claim that the Choquettes failed to timely serve the Town is
    based upon what appears to be a selective reading of this Court’s procedural
    rules, and it ignores the Town’s own duties under those rules.       The ZBA’s
    decision denying the Choquettes’ amendment application was made on August 11,
    2008.   On August 25, the Choquettes (who were pro se at the time) filed a
    Notice of Appeal with the Town, rather than sending it to this Court.       On
    September 10, the Town notified the Choquettes that they needed to file their
    appeal with the Environmental Court.     The Choquettes did so that day, but
    they failed to serve the new Notice of Appeal on the Town.      The Choquettes
    then retained counsel, and their lawyer served the Town on September 24.
    The Town now argues that the September 24 service was untimely, since
    it was done two weeks after the Choquettes filed their September 10 Notice of
    Appeal with this Court.    See V.R.E.C.P. 5(b)(4)(A) (requiring that service
    happen “at the same time” as the filing of the Notice of Appeal).     We find
    that service was timely.    Although the Choquettes on August 25 mistakenly
    sent their Notice of Appeal to the Town (rather than to this Court), our
    procedural rules provide that “[i]f a notice of appeal is mistakenly filed
    with the tribunal appealed from, . . . the appropriate officer of the
    tribunal, board, or panel shall note thereon the date on which it was
    received and shall promptly transmit it to the clerk of the Environmental
    Court.” V.R.E.C.P. 5(b)(1) (emphasis added).
    The Town does not     dispute the fact that it failed to follow this
    procedure.   Rather than    immediately forwarding the Choquettes’ Notice of
    In re Choquette Zoning permit Amendment, Docket No. 199-9-08 Vtec (Jan. 7, 2009 Entry Order)   Page 2 of 3.
    Appeal to this Court, the Town sent the Choquettes a letter, fifteen days
    later, telling them that their appeal had to be filed with this Court. The
    Town’s letter to the Choquettes appears to have been sent on the day that the
    Choquettes’ right to appeal would otherwise have expired.
    Our Rule 5(b)(1) states that when notices of appeal are mistakenly
    filed with a town, the town is obligated to note when the notice was received
    and forward it to this Court, and the notice of appeal “shall be deemed filed
    with the Environmental Court on the date so noted” by the Town. Id. Thus,
    under our Rule, the Choquettes’ Notice of Appeal must be considered to have
    been filed on August 26 (the day the Town received the Choquettes’ August 25
    letter). See id. The Choquettes’ August 25 letter also served to notice the
    Town of their appeal.     We therefore conclude that the Choquettes timely
    served the Town with notice of their appeal, thereby fulfilling the
    requirements of V.R.E.C.P. 5(b)(4)(A).
    We also note that even if the Choquettes had failed to timely serve the
    Town, our Rules provide no basis for the harsh penalty of dismissal for such
    failure.   Our Rules note that “[f]ailure of an appellant to take any step
    other than the timely filing of the notice of appeal does not affect the
    validity of the appeal but is ground only for such action as the court deems
    appropriate.” V.R.E.C.P. 5(b)(1); accord V.R.E.C.P. 5(b)(1) reporter’s notes
    (“Only the filing deadline is jurisdictional.”).       Although this Court’s
    response to untimely service “may include dismissal of the appeal” under
    V.R.E.C.P. 5(b)(1), dismissal would be inappropriate here, particularly since
    the Town had actual notice that the Choquettes had appealed the ZBA decision.
    The Town’s second basis for seeking dismissal rests on the doctrine of
    res judicata, also known as claim preclusion.       The Town claims that the
    Choquettes’ current application asks the Town to reevaluate a land use plan
    that the Choquettes already presented in 1999.     The Town asserts that the
    Choquettes’ current proposal is nothing more than a repetition of the prior
    project that they agreed to pursue only after they acquired an adjoining
    0.63± acre parcel, so as to make their already undersized lot larger.    The
    Town therefore asserts that the Choquettes’ current proposal is an
    impermissible successive application and should be dismissed.
    We first note that the Vermont Supreme Court has stated that motions to
    dismiss are generally disfavored and that in reviewing such motions, we must
    take all of the nonmoving party's factual allegations as true and determine
    whether ‘“it appears beyond doubt’ that there exist no facts or circumstances
    that would entitle the plaintiff to relief.” Amiot v. Ames, 
    166 Vt. 288
    , 291
    (1997) (quoting Levinsky v. Diamond, 
    140 Vt. 595
    , 600-01 (1982)); accord
    Alger v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 
    2006 VT 115
    , ¶ 12, 
    181 Vt. 309
    .         The
    Supreme Court has also recently reiterated that the doctrine of claim
    preclusion should not be strictly applied to zoning decisions. In re Dunkin
    Donuts S.P. Approval, 
    2008 VT 139
    , ¶ 10.       Rather, towns and courts are
    directed to apply the successive-application doctrine, which “is an attempt
    to balance the competing concerns of flexibility and finality in zoning
    decisions.” Id. at ¶ 9.
    Under the successive-application doctrine, the ZBA must entertain the
    Choquettes’ request for a permit amendment if “‘a substantial change of
    conditions ha[s] occurred or other considerations materially affecting the
    merits of the request have intervened between the first and second
    applications.’” Id. (alteration in original) (citing In re Carrier, 
    155 Vt. 152
    , 157–58 (1990)). The Choquettes have the burden to proving that such a
    change in circumstances has occurred. In re Carrier, 155 Vt. at 158. This
    burden of proof can be substantial, since the Choquettes must not only show
    In re Choquette Zoning permit Amendment, Docket No. 199-9-08 Vtec (Jan. 7, 2009 Entry Order)   Page 3 of 3.
    that such a change has occurred, but also that the change warrants relieving
    them from the requirement to increase the size of their lot, in consideration
    for receiving the authority to increase their property from a two-unit
    residential structure to a five-unit one.        The Choquettes have already
    completed this expansion, but have not acquired the adjoining land.
    The Choquettes have alleged that a change in circumstances has occurred
    here, either because of a change in the intervening law or because of a
    change in the character of the neighborhood. At this relatively early stage
    of this litigation, we must treat the Choquettes’ factual allegations as
    true. See, e.g., Alger, 
    2006 VT 115
    , ¶ 12. In doing so, we do not hold that
    facts or circumstances exist that would entitle the Choquettes to relief, but
    rather that the law entitles the Choquettes to have an opportunity to fulfill
    their burden of proof. We therefore conclude that dismissal is inappropriate
    at this time. See 
    id.
    For all of the reasons more fully explained above, we decline to
    dismiss the Choquettes’ appeal; the Town’s motion to dismiss is therefore
    DENIED. We look forward to discussing the proper scheduling for this matter
    with the parties at the telephone conference, now scheduled for 10:00 a.m. on
    January 15, 2009.
    ___________________________________________      ______________________
    Judge                                Date
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    Date copies sent to: ____________               Clerk's Initials _______
    Copies sent to:
    Attorney Stephen A. Reynes for Appellant Ernest & Louise Choquette
    Attorney Sara Davies Coe for Appellee Town of Newport
    Co-Counsel for Appellant Jesse L. Moorman
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 199-09-08 Vtec

Filed Date: 1/7/2009

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/24/2018