ANR v. Mountain Valley Marketing, Inc. ( 2003 )


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  •                                     STATE OF VERMONT
    ENVIRONMENTAL COURT
    Secretary, Vermont Agency of
    Natural Resources, Plaintiff,      }
    }   Docket No. 41-2-02 Vtec
    v.                                 }
    }   (Stage II Vapor Recovery)
    Mountain Valley Marketing, Inc., , }
    Respondents
    Secretary, Vermont Agency of
    Natural Resources, Plaintiff,      }
    }   Docket No. 278-12-02 Vtec
    v.                                 }
    }    (Stage II Vapor Recovery)
    Premium Petroleum, Inc.,           }
    Respondents
    Secretary, Vermont Agency of
    Natural Resources, Plaintiff,
    }
    }    Docket No. 176-8-02 Vtec
    v.
    }
    }     (Stage I Vapor Recovery)
    Premium Petroleum, Inc, Odessa }
    Corp., Timberlake Associates, and
    Wesco, Inc., Respondents
    Secretary, Vermont Agency of
    Natural Resources, Plaintiff,
    }    Docket No. 175-8-02 Vtec
    }
    v.
    }
    }    (Hazardous Waste
    Premium Petroleum, Inc, Odessa }       Management Regulations)
    Corp., Timberlake Associates, and
    Wesco, Inc., Respondents
    Decision and Order on Motions for Summary Judgment - Selective Enforcement
    In Docket No. 41-2-02 Vtec on January 24, 2002, the Secretary of the Vermont Agency of Natural
    Resources (ANR) issued an administrative order pursuant to 10 V.S.A. ' 8008 regarding
    Respondent Mountain Valley Marketing, Inc., which timely requested a hearing in Environmental
    Court. This administrative order alleged violations of the Air Pollution Control Regulations
    regarding Stage II Vapor Recovery. In Docket No. 278-12-02 Vtec on November 26, 2002, the
    Secretary of the Vermont Agency of Natural Resources (ANR) issued another administrative
    order pursuant to 10 V.S.A. ' 8008 also alleging violations of the Stage II Vapor Recovery
    Regulations regarding Respondent Premium Petroleum, Inc., which also timely requested a
    hearing in Environmental Court.
    In Docket No. 176-8-02 Vtec, on July 31, 2002 the Secretary of the Vermont Agency of Natural
    Resources (ANR) issued an administrative order pursuant to 10 V.S.A. ' 8008 regarding
    Respondents Premium Petroleum, Inc, Odessa Corp., Timberlake Associates, and Wesco, Inc.,
    which timely requested a hearing in Environmental Court. This administrative order alleged
    violations of the Air Pollution Control Regulations regarding Stage I Vapor Recovery.
    In Docket No. 175-8-02 Vtec, on July 31, 2002 the Secretary of the Vermont Agency of Natural
    Resources (ANR) issued an administrative order pursuant to 10 V.S.A. ' 8008 regarding
    Respondents Premium Petroleum, Inc, Odessa Corp., Timberlake Associates, and Wesco, Inc.,
    which timely requested a hearing in Environmental Court. This administrative order alleged
    violations of the Hazardous Waste Management Regulations regarding exempt and small-
    quantity generators of hazardous waste.
    In all the above-captioned cases, all Respondents (which are all related corporations or entities)
    are represented by Jon Anderson, Esq., William E. Simendinger, Esq. and Kathryn Sarvak; and
    the Agency of Natural Resources is represented by Catherine Gjessing, Esq.
    The Secretary first argues that V.R.C.P. 56, providing for summary judgment, does not apply to
    proceedings under 10 V.S.A. Chapter 201. V.R.C.P. 76(a)(3). The Secretary is correct that
    V.R.C.P. 56 summary judgment does not apply, but the Court may provide for the A disposition of
    legal issues prior to the hearing@ as it has done in these cases, by allowing the filing of
    memoranda analogous to motions for summary judgment. V.R.C.P. 76(d)(3)(D).
    Respondents seek to make the argument that they have been unconstitutionally singled out for
    enforcement. To succeed in an argument of selective enforcement, particularly in a civil case,
    they must satisfy both prongs of a two-part test, as reiterated by the Vermont Supreme Court in In
    re Appeals of Letourneau 
    168 Vt. 539
    , 549 (1998, as corrected 1999), first, that A the person,
    compared with others similarly situated, was selectively treated;@ and, second, that the A
    selective treatment was based on impermissible considerations such as . . . intent to inhibit or
    punish the exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person.@
    And see LeClair v Saunders, 
    627 F.2d 606
    , 608 (2d. Cir. 1980).
    Material facts are in dispute at least as to whether any of the Respondent entities are similarly
    situated as compared with any other entities subject to the Vapor Recovery or Hazardous Waste
    regulations, and for that reason alone Respondents= motion must be denied. If Respondents
    wish to present at trial evidence of selective enforcement, they will first have to show that they
    were similarly situated as compared with the other entities with which they wish the comparison to
    be made, before putting on evidence of selective treatment. Similarly, on the other prong of the
    test, they will have to show that the selective treatment was due to the Agency= s intent to inhibit
    or punish the exercise of constitutional rights, or its malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person.
    Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that Respondents=
    motions for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of selective enforcement are DENIED. We
    will hold a further telephone conference under V.R.C.P. 76(d)(3)(D) on July 23, 2003 to discuss
    whether and when these matters may be set for trial. (Please see enclosed conference notice
    and two other orders issued this date in the above-captioned cases.)
    th
    Done at Barre, Vermont, this 7 day of July, 2003.
    ___________________
    Merideth Wright
    Environmental Judge
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 41-2-02 Vtec

Filed Date: 7/7/2003

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/24/2018