PNC Mortg. v. Maruca ( 2012 )


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  • PNC Mortg. v. Maruca, No. 321-4-10 Rdcv (Teachout, J., Feb. 17, 2012)
    [The text of this Vermont trial court opinion is unofficial. It has been reformatted from the original. The accuracy of the text and the
    accompanying data included in the Vermont trial court opinion database is not guaranteed.]
    STATE OF VERMONT
    SUPERIOR COURT                                                                                   CIVIL DIVISION
    Rutland Unit                                                                               Docket No. 321-4-10 Rdcv
    PNC MORTGAGE
    v.
    PAMELA LANDO MARUCA
    DETERMINATION AND ORDER
    Foreclosure Mediation
    A hearing was held on January 30, 2012 pursuant to 12 V.S.A. § 4635(a) and the
    Entry Order of August 2, 2011 to determine whether Plaintiff has complied with its
    obligations under 12 V.S.A. § 4633(a)(1). Plaintiff was represented by Attorney Andrew
    Montroll, and a representative of Plaintiff attended. Defendant was present through her
    attorney-in-fact and was represented by Attorney Heather Z. Cooper.
    It is undisputed that when Defendant originally applied for the mortgage loan, in
    determining eligibility, the lender relied on not only her income, but the income of other
    members of her extended household. The Defendant and the other household members
    continue to reside in the home, and continue to receive income from the same sources.
    This Court, the Hon. William Cohen presiding, denied a motion for summary
    judgment on August 30, 2010, stating that: “The Plaintiff must prove standing and the
    debt. Also, Plaintiff must have clean hands in regards to attempting a workout.” Thus,
    Plaintiff’s standing has not yet been proved. Nonetheless, the Defendant elected to
    proceed with foreclosure mediation.
    Foreclosure mediation took place on February 23, 2011 and March 2, 2011. The
    Mediator reported that “Lender stated there was no authority to consider contribution or
    co-habitant income based upon investor prohibition for farm loan, despite use of same
    income for original application.” Defense counsel represents, unrefuted, that at the
    mediation, PNC refused to provide a copy of any documents showing who the investor is
    and the basis for a prohibition of consideration of co-habitant income. It is also unrefuted
    that when the income of the co-habitants is included, as was done originally, there is
    sufficient income to qualify for a modification. Defendant also contends that standing
    was not shown at the mediation, and that PNC has never disclosed whether its own status
    is as mortgage holder or servicer, nor the identity of the investor prohibiting
    consideration of co-habitant income.
    1
    Plaintiff made an offer of proof, which Defendant did not contest and which the
    Court accepts, that the loan is insured by the Rural Housing Services of the USDA, and
    that federal regulations apply to such loans. Plaintiff identified the USDA as the investor,
    and claimed that under the federal regulations, only the borrower’s income can be
    considered. Defendant’s counsel, who was present at the mediation, said that this was all
    news—that Plaintiff had never identified the USDA as the investor in the loan, and had
    refused to provide documentation of the prohibition on which it relied. She noted that the
    disclosure of this information approximately a year after the mediation had increased the
    arrearages and late fees.
    The mortgagee’s obligations under the mortgage foreclosure statute, 12 V.S.A. §
    4631 et seq., specifically include the requirement to produce a copy of a “pooling and
    servicing or other similar agreement [that] prohibits modification.” 12 V.S.A. § 4633
    (a)(3). In addition, the mortgagee “shall produce for the mortgagor and mediator
    documentation of its consideration of the options available. . .” 12 V.S.A. § 4633 (a)(2).
    There is no basis for the Plaintiff to conclude that it did not have the obligation to provide
    documentation of the identity of the investor as the USDA, or a copy of the federal
    regulations upon which it relied to exclude cohabitant income that had been the basis of
    the granting of the loan in the first place.
    This information was not provided until this Court held a hearing to determine
    compliance with the mortgagee’s obligation under the statute. Even then, it was not
    provided to Defendant’s counsel in document form. Plaintiff’s counsel simply made
    representations and argument in support of its request for a determination of compliance,
    but did not offer the documentation, and has still not disclosed the Plaintiff’s status or
    interest in the loan.
    Plaintiff’s counsel argued that because there was something on the loan
    application at the time Defendant applied about the loan being a rural development loan
    that Defendant should have known that this was a USDA loan (and presumably therefore
    subject to federal regulations which prohibit cohabitant income), but there is nothing in
    the loan documents to that effect. Withholding at foreclosure mediation specific
    information about the investor and documentation of investor prohibition against
    including income that was originally included at the time of origination is thoroughly
    inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the foreclosure mediation statute and the
    obligations it imposes on mortgagees.
    The Court determines, pursuant to 12 V.S.A. § 4635, that Plaintiff has not
    complied with its obligations, and that sanctions are warranted. 12 V.S.A. § 4635 (b).
    Sanctions include prohibition against the collection of interest and any late fees for the
    period from March 2, 2011 (the second day of mediation) to January 30, 2012 (the date of
    hearing); Defendant’s attorneys’ fees for attending the mediation sessions and the hearing
    on January 30, 2012; and denial of the equitable remedy of foreclosure in this case.
    2
    Therefore, Counts I and III of the complaint are dismissed with prejudice.
    Plaintiff may pursue judgment on Count II, subject to set-off for the sanctions set forth in
    the preceding paragraph. Nothing in this Order precludes Plaintiff from subsequently
    pursuing foreclosure on any judgment that may be obtained in this case, but Plaintiff is
    prohibited from collecting, in any subsequent foreclosure on such judgment, attorneys
    fees attributable to this case to the extent they are not included in any judgment Plaintiff
    may obtain in this case.
    Dated this 16th day of February, 2012.
    ________________________
    Hon. Mary Miles Teachout
    Superior Judge
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 321

Filed Date: 2/17/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/24/2018