Snyder Group, Inc. Act 250 - Decision on Motion ( 2019 )


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  •                                           STATE OF VERMONT
    SUPERIOR COURT                                                               ENVIRONMENTAL DIVISION
    Docket No. 107-10-18 Vtec
    Snyder Group, Inc. Act 250
    ENTRY REGARDING MOTION
    Count 1, Act 250 District Commission Decision (107-10-18 Vtec)
    Title:           Motion to Stay (Motion 4)
    Filer:           Michael Scollins
    Attorney:        Daniel A. Seff
    Filed Date:      July 17, 2019
    Response filed on 07/18/2019 by Attorney Evan P. Meenan for the Natural Resources Board
    Response in Opposition filed on 07/31/2019 by Attorney Celeste E. Laramie for Appellee
    The Snyder Group, Inc.
    Response filed on 08/01/2019 by Attorney Evan P. Meenan for the Natural Resources Board
    The motion is DENIED.
    In the decision appealed from, the District #4 Environmental Commission (“District
    Commission”) issued The Snyder Group, Inc.; Spears Meadows, Inc.; 1350 Spear, LLC; and Gary
    Farrell (together, “Snyder Group”) an Act 250 permit for the development of land located at 1302
    and 1350 Spear Street in South Burlington, Vermont. Snyder Group proposes to construct 47
    new dwelling units, with associated infrastructure improvements, to subdivide, and to demolish
    an existing structure (“the Project”).1
    A group of neighboring property owners (collectively, “Appellants”) oppose the Act 250
    permit.2 The Court here considers Appellants’ motion to stay this matter until the Vermont
    Supreme Court issues its decision in a companion appeal related to Snyder Group’s application
    for a municipal zoning permit for the Project.
    1
    The Project has been referred to as a 48-unit development throughout its lifecycle because, in addition
    to the 47 new units, an existing residence will remain at 1350 Spear Street.
    2
    Appellants are Michael Scollins, Mary Scollins, Robert Skiff, Marley Skiff, and the Pinnacle at Spear
    Homeowners Association. We resolved certain questions relating to their party status under Criterion 9(B) in a May
    22, 2019 decision. See In re Snyder Grp., Inc. Act 250, No. 107-10-18 Vtec (Vt. Super. Ct. Envtl. Div. May 22, 2019)
    (Durkin, J.).
    In re Snyder Group, Inc. Act 250 Appeal, No. 107-10-18 Vtec (EO on Mot. to Stay) (08-14-2019)   Page 2 of 4
    To provide some context, we note that before filing for the Act 250 permit at issue, Snyder
    Group received municipal approval for the Project from the City of South Burlington
    Development Review Board. Appellants challenged the municipal permit in a separate appeal
    before this Court. In a decision on cross-motions for summary judgment, this Court concluded
    that the Project exceeded the municipality’s maximum density limit of 1.2 units per acre. See In
    re Snyder Grp. Inc. PUD Final Plat, No. 114-8-17 Vtec (Vt. Super. Ct. Envtl. Div. Feb. 28, 2019)
    (Durkin, J.). This followed from our conclusion that South Burlington’s “transferrable
    development rights” (“TDR”) regulation was unconstitutionally vague and failed to comply with
    its enabling statute, 24 V.S.A. § 4423(a). Id. at 9-21.
    The TDR regulation allowed Snyder Group to increase the Project’s unit density to
    accommodate the 48 units as proposed. Without it, Snyder Group could only construct a
    maximum of 31 units. Snyder Group appealed our decision in the municipal docket to the
    Vermont Supreme Court in March 2019. Appellants cross-appealed on April 5, 2019.
    Appellants assert that we should stay the present matter to await the outcome of the
    Supreme Court appeal. They argue that if the Supreme Court affirms this Court’s February 28,
    2019 decision, Snyder Group will be obligated to redesign the 48-unit Project to conform with
    the 31-unit maximum. Appellants posit that this reduction in units will amount to a substantial
    and material change that the District Commission needs to review in the first instance. To
    proceed here, they argue, is to hazard time and resources that will be wasted if the Project is
    returned to the District Commission. Appellants also assert that a stay is in the best interest of
    Snyder Group.
    Snyder Group opposes Appellants’ motion. It argues that Appellants did not meet their
    burden of showing that a stay of this proceeding is necessary to prevent hardship. In addition,
    Snyder Group asserts that if the Supreme Court affirms, a reduction in the number of units from
    48 to 31 will not introduce a substantial change requiring District Commission review. Further,
    Snyder Group submits that progress made in this appeal will be useful even if the Project
    eventually returns to the District Commission.
    The Vermont Natural Resources Board (“NRB”) also contributed to this discussion. The
    NRB takes a neutral position on the motion to stay but cautions that it would be premature for
    the Court to decide whether the change from 48 to 31 units would require a remand. The NRB
    asserts that the Court does not have enough information to make an informed decision on the
    potential need for a remand.
    We consider a motion to stay a matter to be synonymous with a motion for continuance,
    as “[a] stay in this context is a ‘suspension of proceedings’ until a specified event occurs in
    another case.” In re Woodstock Cmty. Tr. & Hous. Vt. PRD, 
    2012 VT 87
    , ¶ 36, 
    192 Vt. 474
     (citing
    Stone v. Briggs, 
    112 Vt. 410
    , 412-13 (1942)). The Court has substantial discretion in deciding such
    a motion, deriving from every court’s inherent power to control the disposition of the cases that
    make up its docket. 
    Id.
     (quoting Landis v. N. Am. Co., 
    299 U.S. 248
    , 254 (1936)). We decide the
    motion in light of the specific circumstances surrounding this individual case. State v. Schreiner,
    
    2007 VT 138
    , ¶ 14, 
    183 Vt. 42
     (citing State v. Hanlon, 
    164 Vt. 125
    , 128 (1995)).
    In re Snyder Group, Inc. Act 250 Appeal, No. 107-10-18 Vtec (EO on Mot. to Stay) (08-14-2019)   Page 3 of 4
    Our precedent instructs that “a party seeking a stay [of this type] ‘must make out a clear
    case of hardship or inequity in being required to go forward’ if there is a possibility that a stay
    will damage someone else.” Woodstock Cmty. Tr., 
    2012 VT 87
    , ¶ 36; see also In re Killington
    Resort Parking Project Act 250 Permit Application, No. 173-12-13 Vtec, slip op. at 2-3 (Vt. Super.
    Ct. Envtl. Div. May 13, 2015) (Durkin, J.).
    We begin our assessment by observing that this Court cannot presently decide whether
    a potential future reduction in the Project’s number of units would amount to a substantial
    change necessitating a remand to the District Commission. This is a Project change that has not
    occurred, might not occur, and might take any number of forms. A ruling on this question would
    constitute an improper advisory opinion. See In re Regan Subdivision Permit, No. 188-9-09 Vtec,
    slip op. at 5 (Vt. Super. Ct. Envtl. Div. June 18, 2013) (Durkin, J.) (citing In re Appeal of 232511
    Invs., Ltd., 
    2006 VT 27
    , ¶¶ 18-19, 
    179 Vt. 409
    ) (declining to issue an advisory opinion); In re
    Paynter 2-Lot Subdivision, No. 160-7-08 Vtec, slip op. at 9-10 (Vt. Envtl. Ct. May 1, 2009) (Wright,
    J.) (same). Further, we lack the information necessary to make such a determination.
    This Court can recognize, however, that even if Snyder Group’s application returns to the
    District Commission, progress made in this appeal will not be undone, contrary to Appellants’
    suggestion. In the event that this matter returns to the District Commission, certain steps taken
    in discovery or in the evaluation of the Project against the relevant Act 250 criteria may not need
    to be repeated. There is the risk of waste with or without a stay; Appellants have not shown the
    type of one-sided, probable hardship and inequity our standards require.
    This is especially true given that Snyder Group could only revise the Project to have a
    lower unit density, presumably with lesser impacts under the Act 250 criteria. In addition, we
    only consider Criteria 8 and 9(B) in this appeal. Both of these Criteria will inevitably play a part
    in any future decision on the Project’s Act 250 compliance, no matter what form the Project may
    take. Party status issues related to Criterion 9(B) will need to be conclusively resolved regardless.
    Further, the Supreme Court’s decision will not reach fundamental issues like the
    applicant’s right to develop the property at all, which has served as the basis for continuances in
    the past. See, e.g., In re Wilcox Ice Cream Factory, No. 70-4-07 Vtec, slip op. at 1-2 (Vt. Super. Ct.
    Envtl. Div. July 8, 2010) (Durkin, J.) (granting a continuance because the Supreme Court appeal
    would decide whether the applicant had rights to the project site); cf. Killington Resort Parking
    Project, No. 173-12-13 Vtec at 2 (May 13, 2015) (denying a continuance and distinguishing Wilcox
    because the applicant’s basic ownership of the project site was not in question).
    Finally, we give weight to an applicant’s perspective on how the permitting process would
    proceed best. See In re Killington Vill. Act 250 Master Plan Application, No. 147-10-13 Vtec, slip
    op. at 2 (Vt. Super. Ct. Envtl. Div. May 13, 2015) (Durkin, J.); In re Wagner & Guay Permit, No.
    150-10-14 Vtec, slip op. at 2 (Vt. Super. Ct. Envtl. Div. Mar. 27, 2015) (Walsh, J.). We decline to
    adopt Appellants’ characterization of what is in the best interest of Snyder Group. Snyder Group
    itself asserts that a continuance would ultimately impair the speedy resolution of this matter.
    The applicant has a right to the expeditious resolution of appeals and is well situated to
    understand the demands of the application process as it relates to their specific project. A
    continuance would delay this matter for an unspecified period of time, while postponing progress
    on certain issues that will need to be resolved in any case.
    In re Snyder Group, Inc. Act 250 Appeal, No. 107-10-18 Vtec (EO on Mot. to Stay) (08-14-2019)   Page 4 of 4
    For these reasons, Appellants’ motion to stay the present appeal is DENIED. Given this
    result, we return to the course of action this Court proposed at the June 17, 2019 status
    conference in this matter: The parties shall attempt to draft a mutually agreeable scheduling
    order. If they cannot agree, the parties are free to each submit their own. The proposal, or
    proposals, shall be filed with the Court no later than Friday, September 13, 2019.
    So Ordered.
    Electronically signed on August 14, 2019 at Burlington, Vermont, pursuant to V.R.E.F. 7(d).
    ________________________________
    Thomas S. Durkin, Superior Judge
    Environmental Division
    Notifications:
    Daniel A. Seff (ERN 1514), Attorney for Appellants Michael and Mary Scollins, Robert and Marley
    Skiff, and the Pinnacle at Spear Homeowners Association
    Evan P. Meenan (ERN 1632), Attorney for the Vermont Natural Resources Board
    Matthew B. Byrne (ERN 2486), Attorney for Appellee The Snyder Group, Inc.
    Robert H. Rushford (ERN 4714), Attorney for Appellee The Snyder Group, Inc.
    Celeste E. Laramie (ERN 8852), Attorney for Appellee The Snyder Group, Inc.
    Alison Milbury Stone (ERN 7087), Attorney for the Vermont Agency of Agriculture
    rmaher
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 107-10-18 Vtec

Filed Date: 8/14/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 7/31/2024