Coolidge v. Clark ( 2020 )


Menu:
  • Coolidge v. Clark, No. 284-5-19 Wncv (Tomasi, J., Feb. 13, 2020).
    [The text of this Vermont trial court opinion is unofficial. It has been reformatted from the original. The accuracy of the text and the
    accompanying data included in the Vermont trial court opinion database is not guaranteed.]
    STATE OF VERMONT
    SUPERIOR COURT                                                                                            CIVIL DIVISION
    Washington Unit                                                                                Docket No. 284-5-19 Wncv
    Jeffery P Coolidge,
    Plaintiff
    v.
    Catherine Clark,
    Defendant
    Opinion and Order on Motion to Reconsider
    Plaintiff has filed a “letter” with the Court. It is unclear its intent. To the
    extent it could be construed as a motion to reconsider this Court’s dismissal Order,
    it is denied. Plaintiff now appears to be arguing, in contrast to his actual
    Complaint, that he is seeking review of his expungement determination, as opposed
    to his substantiation determination. For a number of reasons, that contention does
    not convince the Court to reconsider its ruling.
    First, the Complaint plainly asks the Court for an order concerning the
    “substantiation determination.” Complaint at 3. It seeks no relief in connection
    with expungement.
    Second, even if Plaintiff had challenged the expungement determination, the
    Complaint would be subject to dismissal. Vt. R. Civ. P. 75 is available, under
    certain circumstances, to review governmental decisions. One requirement for such
    review is that a plaintiff must have first gone through or “exhausted” all of the
    possible administrative remedies available to him or her. “A party's failure to
    exhaust administrative remedies permits a court to dismiss the action for lack of
    subject matter jurisdiction.” Jordan v. State Agency of Transp., 
    166 Vt. 509
    , 511,
    
    702 A.2d 58
    , 60 (1997). In this instance, at the time Plaintiff filed his Complaint, he
    had available to him and was still seeking review of his expungement determination
    before the Human Services Board. Until that process was completed, this Court
    would not have jurisdiction to entertain this suit. 
    Id.
    Finally, Plaintiff may not “cure” that lack of jurisdiction by subsequently
    completing his administrative remedies. The administrative process is designed “to
    afford the parties and the courts the benefit of the administrative agency’s
    experience and expertise, and to afford the agency the opportunity to cure its own
    errors.” Pratt v. Pallito, 
    2017 VT 22
    , ¶ 14, 
    204 Vt. 313
    , 318–19 (internal quotations
    omitted). In a similar vein, courts also require that all issues sought to be raised in
    court were raised and adequately preserved before the administrative body. 
    Id.
    Plaintiff simply may not circumvent an available administrative process by filing
    suit before he has exhausted his administrative remedies and preserved before the
    administrative body the issues he wishes to raise in the court proceeding.
    Indeed, in other analogous contexts, courts have rejected the notion that a
    party may file judicial lawsuit, complete the administrative process, and then
    proceed with the litigation. See Oriakhi v. United States, 
    165 F. App’x 991
    , 993 (3d
    Cir. 2006) (“there appears to be unanimous circuit court consensus that a prisoner
    may not fulfill the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement by exhausting administrative
    remedies after the filing of the complaint in federal court”). As the District Court
    for the District of New Jersey has stated:
    Because exhaustion of administrative remedies is not just a
    requirement but a pre-requisite to suit, the relevant time for
    measuring exhaustion is the date of filing the complaint. In McNeil v.
    United States, for example, the Court upheld the dismissal of a pro se
    plaintiff’s claim under the FTCA where the plaintiff had filed a claim
    for administrative relief, but only after filing suit. 
    508 U.S. 106
    , 111–
    12 (1993). Nor, in such a case, can jurisdiction be restored by
    subsequent administrative action and the filing of a post-exhaustion
    amended complaint. Hoffenberg v. Provost, 
    154 F. App’x 307
    , 310 (3d
    Cir. 2005).
    Torres v. United States, No. CV 19-16395, 
    2019 WL 7343494
    , at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 31,
    2019).
    The United States Supreme Court has explained the policy reasons for such a
    conclusion. In McNeil, the Court pointed out that premature filing of judicial cases
    in advance of exhaustion of administrative remedies places an unwarranted burden
    on the judicial system and on the defendants who must defend against such claims.
    McNeil, 
    508 U.S. at 112
    . While the impact in any one case may be small, across
    many actions, the effect would be weightier. 
    Id.
    WHEREFORE, because Plaintiff’s Complaint does not seek relief concerning
    the expungement determination and because this Court would lack jurisdiction if it
    had raised such a claim, the motion to reconsider is denied.
    The Court does, however, appreciate the efforts Plaintiff has made to address
    the issues that led to his inclusion on the Registry. The Court encourages him to
    continue his best efforts in that regard.
    2
    Electronically signed on February 13, 2020 at 03:09 PM pursuant
    to V.R.E.F. 7(d).
    ________________________
    Timothy B. Tomasi
    Superior Court Judge
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 284-5-19 Wncv

Filed Date: 2/13/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 7/31/2024