Hart v. Town of Bradford ( 2021 )

STATE OF VERMONT
SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL DIVISION
Washington Unit FILED Docket No. 330-10-20 Wncv
James H. Hart, MAR 19 2021 :
James H. Hart,
Plaintiffs VERMONT SUPERIOR DOURT
WASHINGTON CIVIL
V.
Town of Bradford, Vermont, DECISION ON MOTION
Bradford Police Department,
Gene H. Martin,
Jeffrey Stiegler,
David White,
Orange County Sheriff's,
Defendants
' Regarding All Pending Motions
Plaintiff James H. Hart alleges that Defendants the Town of Bradford and its police
department, two of its police chiefs, Gene H. Martin and Jeffrey Stiegler, the Orange County
Sheriff's Office {OCSO), Vermont State Police Trooper David White, and the State of Vermont
have harassed him in various ways over the years starting in 2009, when Mr. Hart became
embroiled in a boundary dispute with a neighbor (not a defendant here). The vague implication
is that they have done so because of the dispute with the neighbor and alignment with the
neighbor. According to the complaint, Mr. Hart claims violations of 18 U.S.C. § 242 (count 1);
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (count 2); 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) (count 3); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (counts 4 and 5);
and unspecified “negligence and tort claims” {count 6); “equitable relief’ (count 7); and “gross
negligence” (count 8). Defendants the Town, Mr. Martin, and Mr. Stiegler each have filed
substantially similar motions to dismiss. Mr. White and the State have filed a joint motion to
dismiss. The OCSO has filed a motion for summary judgment. All Defendants’ motions address
all claims in the complaint. .
This case is complicated by the manner in which the complaint was drafted. Mr. Hart
has been represented by Attorney Brice Simon throughout the litigation of this case. However,
the complaint apparently was drafted pro se by Mr. Hart himself. Only Mr. Hart signed it.
Attorney Simon did not. See V.R.C.P. 11{a) (“Every pleading, written motion, and other
document that requires a signature shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the
attorney’s individual name, or, if the party is not represented by an attorney, shall be signed by
the party.”). The complaint was “verified” by Mr. Hart’s “oath to the truth of the allegations.”
Johnson v. Harwood, 2008 VT 4, 7. 3, 183 Vt. 157. Mr. Hart’s signature on the complaint is
notarized by Attorney Simon, who also filed the complaint with the court along with his notice
of appearance for Mr. Hart. An affidavit was also filed. Perhaps the pro se drafting explains in
part why, rather than the “simple, concise, and direct” pleading required by the rules, V.R.C.P.
8(e)(1), the complaint instead is nearly 100 paragraphs of scattershot factual allegations, most
of which are extraordinarily conclusory and vague. The legal claims are no less vague. Despite
this, Attorney Simon never amended the complaint to clarify Mr. Hart’s claims.
As a preliminary matter, in response to Defendants’ motions, Mr. Hart has sought to
“consolidate” the motions, convert the dismissal motions to summary judgment motions, and
hold an evidentiary hearing at which he proposes that the court will take evidence and
conclude that the facts are disputed or for some other reason. These requests all are denied.
The court is unfamiliar with any practice of consolidating motions, or what doing so might
accomplish in this case, and there is nothing to consolidate under Rule 42. The court can
‘convert a motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment in appropriate circumstances, Rule
12(b), but there is no evident utility in doing so here, and Mr. Hart does not say why thinks it
might be a good idea. Regardless, in no event would the court hold an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether the facts are disputed under either Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 56 or to establish
any fact. Disputes of fact are irrelevant under Rule 12(b)(6) and they must be demonstrated
under Rule 56(c) by statements of fact and appropriate evidence in the record.
Count 1—18 V.S.A. § 242
All Defendants seek dismissal of Mr. Hart’s clatm of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242because it is a criminal statute and there is no private right of action under it. Section 242 is the
“criminal analogue” to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Powell v. Kopman, 511 F.Supp. 700, 704 (S.D.N.Y.
1981). As such, there ts no private right of action under it. fd. This claim is dismissed as to all
Defendants. .
_ The Tawn’s, Mr. Martin’s, and Mr. Stiegler’s Motions to Dismiss
The Town, Mr. Martin, and Mr. Stiegler all argue that all other claims are foreclosed by
the relevant statute of limitations. They do not seek dismissal on any other basis at this time.
Mr. Hart responds that none are foreclosed by any statute of limitations because {1) he only
realized he had these claims when he won a lawsuit against his neighbor in 2019, (2) the statute
of limitations should be tolled for an undisclosed reason, and (3) there is a dispute of fact as to
when these Defendants’ actions occurred. .
A statute of limitations is triggered when the underlying cause of action accrues, not
when a party subjectively realizes that he has a claim. “A cause of action accrues when the
plaintiff discovers, or should have discovered, both the injury and its cause.” Est. of Alden v.
Dee, 2011 VT 64, 71 20, 190. Vt. 401 (emphasis added). Mr. Hart’s claims in this case all are torts
or civil rights violations that he claims directly happened to him. There is nothing about his
lawsuit with his neighbor that has any bearing on when these claims would have accrued that
the court can tell, and he cites none in opposition to dismissal. The relevant causes of action
likely accrued whenever the underlying events happened. Also, there is no apparent basis for
any statutory tolling once the limitations period was triggered.
The allegations against these Defendants begin in 2009, long outside the longest
potentially applicable limitations period, which would appear to be 3 years, 12 V.S.A. § 512.
See V.R.C.P. 9(f) (“For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of a pleading, averments of time
and place are material.”). However, ultimately, the complaint is too vague to support any
2
determination that the alleged courses of conduct at issue ceased entirely by 3 years prior to
the filing of the complaint.
These motions are denied to that extent.
Mr. White and the State’s Motion to Dismiss
The allegations against Trooper White and the State of Vermont are few. Mr. Hart
alleges that in 2009, during an altercation with his neighbor, police arrived, including Mr. White.
Mr. White did not involve himself in whatever happened, but he “witnessed the incident.” Due
to the incident, Mr. Hart called the Vermont State Police (VSP), but they did nothing. In 2010,
Mr. Hart reported another incident to the VSP and they again did nothing. Elsewhere, there is a
passing reference to some request for records that the State allegedly did not comply with.
This request-for-records allegation is too conclusory to support any of the asserted legal claims
and, indeed, bears no apparent relevance to any of them. See Colby v. Umbrella, Inc., 2008 VT
20, 9] 10, 184 Vt. 1 (citing Smith v. Local 819 1.B.T. Pension Plan, 291 F.3d 236, 240 (2d Cir. 2002)
for the proposition that “courts [are] not required to accept as true ‘[c]onclusory allegations or
legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions’ in 12(b)(6) analysis”). These are the only
factual allegations in the complaint against Mr. White or the State as far as the court can tell.
Mr. White and the State argue several bases for dismissal, but only one need be
addressed. The actions of Mr. White and the State that Mr. Hart has asserted in the complaint
occurred in 2009 and 2010. Mr. Hart’s complaint in this case was filed in 2020. The statute of
limitations, 12 V.S.A. § 512, required Mr. Hart’s complaint to be filed within 3 years of the
accrual of his claims. Mr. Hart’s claims against Mr. White and the State would have accrued
when Mr. White “witnessed the incident” in 2009 and the VSP did nothing in response to Mr.
Hart’s complaints in 2009 and 2010. There is no cogent way in which the discovery rule or any
statutory tolling would have extended the accrual of Mr. Hart’s cause of action or stopped the.
- statutory period from running such that the complaint in 2020 possibly could have been timely
filed.
Mr. White and the State’s motion to dismiss is granted on statute of limitations grounds.
The OCSO’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Unlike the other defendants, the Orange County Sheriff's Office (OCSO}) has filed a
motion for summary judgment, which is well-supported by a statement of undisputed facts and
citations to evidence in the record. Mr. Hart’s opposition to summary judgment is largely
nonresponsive and is not supported by any statement of disputed facts. See V.R.C.P. 56(c). The
OSCO seeks summary judgment on several bases, but again, the only one necessary to address
is the statute of limitations.
As far as the allegations go, the OSCO’s only apparent connection to this case is that Mr.
Martin (who the OSCO describes as the primary target of Mr. Hart’s claims in this case) at one
point was a deputy within the OSCO, and in 2013 Mr. Hart submitted a records request to it, in
the course of which he claims he was threatened with arrest. It is undisputed that Mr. Martin
stopped being an OSCO deputy in 2009. There are no cogent allegations that the OSCO did
anything else relevant to Mr. Hart’s claims.
Again, the statute of limitations, 12 V.S.A. § 512, required Mr. Hart’s complaint to be
filed within 3 years of the accrual of his claims. Mr. Hart's claims against the OSCO would have
accrued no later than 2009, in relation to Mr. Martin, and 2013 in relation to the records
request. There is no cogent way in which the discovery rule or any statutory tolling would have
extended the accrual of Mr. Hart’s cause of action or stopped the statutory period from running
such that the complaint in 2020 could have been timely.
The OSCO is entitled to summary judgment on this basis.
Order
For the foregoing reasons, the dismissal motions filed by the Town, Mr. Martin, and Mr.
Stlegler are granted as to count 1 and otherwise denied. Mr. White and the State’s motion to
dismiss is granted. The OSCO’s motion for summary judgment is granted. Any other pending
motions are moot.
Robert R/ Bent,
Judge