Mazur v. Mywebgrocer, Inc. ( 2018 )


Menu:
  • Mazur v. Mywebgrocer, Inc., No. 639-7-17 Cncv (Mello, J., Mar. 5, 2018).
    [The text of this Vermont trial court opinion is unofficial. It has been reformatted from the original. The accuracy of the text and the
    accompanying data included in the Vermont trial court opinion database is not guaranteed.]
    VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT
    CHITTENDEN UNIT
    CIVIL DIVISION
    │
    CHRISTOPHER MAZUR, et al.,                                               │
    Plaintiffs                                                              │
    │
    v.                                                                      │                 Docket No. 639-7-17 Cncv
    │
    MYWEBGROCER, INC.,                                                       │
    Defendant                                                               │
    │
    RULING ON THE ENFORCEABILIITY OF THE FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE IN THE
    RELEASE SIGNED BY PLAINTIFF KRISTIN PRETTYMAN
    This is a class action suit brought by Plaintiffs Christopher Mazur, Vicki Porter
    and Kristin Prettyman, on behalf of themselves and other former employees of the
    predecessor to Defendant MyWebGrocer, Inc. (“MWG”), claiming that MWG wrongfully
    failed to pay them and the other members of the class the full value of “phantom shares”
    they had earned under the predecessor’s Phantom Share Plan (“Plan”). Plaintiffs seek
    an award of damages for MWG’s alleged breach of its contractual obligations under the
    Plan and its alleged breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
    Currently before the court is MWG’s motion to dismiss the Complaint as to one of
    the three named plaintiffs, Kristin Prettyman, on the grounds that she signed a release
    that bars her claims and requires any claims relating to the release to be brought in the
    State of Delaware under Delaware law. Prettyman opposes the motion. She contends
    that the release, including its forum selection clause, is an unconscionable contract of
    adhesion and is unenforceable for lack of consideration. Prettyman is represented by
    Patrick J. Bernal, John D. Stasny, Jonathan M. Feigenbaum and Phillip Gordon, Esqs.
    MWG is represented by Jerome F. O’Neill and Navah C. Spero, Esqs.
    Plaintiffs Mazur and Porter reside in Chittenden County, Vermont, and Plaintiff
    Prettyman resides in Media, Pennsylvania. All three plaintiffs were early employees of
    Defendant MWG’s predecessor, a start-up company in Winooski, Vermont, named
    MyWebGrocer, L.L.C. (the “LLC”). As employees of the LLC, plaintiffs were also
    participants in a Phantom Share Plan, administered by the LLC, the stated purpose of
    which was to provide the employees with an opportunity to “share in the growth of the
    Company” (see Article 1.1 of Exhibit B to Plaintiff’s Opposition memorandum). Under
    that Plan, the Plaintiffs and other vested participants were entitled to have their
    “phantom shares” converted into equity and paid off in cash under certain
    circumstances, such as if the company should be acquired in the future.
    1
    In May of 2013, the Start Up was acquired by the Defendant, MWG, which is a
    Delaware corporation having its principal place of business in Chittenden County,
    Vermont. The acquisition triggered the rights of the participants to be paid for their
    vested shares under the Phantom Share Plan. However, the participants were told that
    they would have to sign a release before they could be paid for their shares. The release
    stated, among other things:
    This Acknowledgement and Release shall be governed by, and construed
    in accordance with, the internal laws of the State of Delaware, without
    reference to the choice of law or conflicts of law principles thereof. Each
    party irrevocably submits to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of (a)
    the state courts located in Wilmington, Delaware and (b) the United States
    District Court for the District of Delaware, with respect to any matter
    arising hereunder or relating hereto.
    (Exhibit A to MWG’s Motion to Dismiss, p. 3).
    According to the Complaint, there were approximately 60 participants in the Plan
    at the time, all but three of whom signed the release (Complaint, ¶ 70). Plaintiff
    Prettyman and approximately 56 others signed the release; Plaintiff Mazur, Plaintiff
    Porter, and one other participant (David Tanzer) did not sign the release. Nevertheless,
    MWG allegedly paid all 60 participants the same amount per share for their shares,
    whether they signed the release, or not. Plaintiffs contend that MWG shortchanged
    them and the other participants by paying them approximately $6.5 million less than
    what they were entitled to receive under the Plan (Complaint, ¶ 68).
    As noted earlier, MWG contends that Plaintiff Prettyman must be dismissed from
    this case because she signed a release that bars her claim and requires any claim relating
    to the release to be brought in the State of Delaware under Delaware law. Prettyman
    contends that MWG’s motion to dismiss must be denied because the release that she
    signed release is an unconscionable contract of adhesion and is unenforceable for lack of
    consideration. MWG denies Prettyman’s contentions.
    In this ruling, the court will not decide whether the release is valid or whether it
    bars Prettyman’s claim. Those are matters to be decided later. The only question the
    court will decide at this time is whether the choice-of-forum provision of the release
    should be enforced. In deciding this question, the court will assume, without deciding,
    that the release is lawful and supported by adequate consideration.
    “[F]orum selection ‘clauses are prima facie valid and should be enforced unless
    enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be “unreasonable” under the
    circumstances.’” International Collection Service v. Gibbs, 
    147 Vt. 105
    , 107 (1986)
    (quoting The Breman v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 
    407 U.S. 1
    , 10 (1972). Thus, enforcement
    of a forum selection clause is “not automatic, and courts may disregard such clauses if
    enforcement would be unreasonable.” Chase Commercial Corp. v. Barton, 
    153 Vt. 457
    ,
    459 (1990).
    2
    Plaintiffs contend that enforcement of the release’s forum selection clause would
    be unreasonable because it would result in a waste of judicial resources, it would create
    a risk of inconsistent outcomes, it would force Prettyman to litigate her claim in a state
    having no interest in the litigation, and it would make it difficult, if not impossible for
    Prettyman to pursue her claim there because nearly all the witnesses and evidence are
    located in Vermont. MWG contends that the clause should be enforced because MWG is
    incorporated in Delaware, Prettyman lives just 20 miles from Wilmington, Delaware,
    and Prettyman agreed in the release to litigate any issue relating to the release in
    Delaware.
    For several reasons, the court agrees with the Plaintiffs that, dismissing the
    Complaint as to Prettyman, thereby compelling her to litigate her claim in Wilmington,
    Delaware, in accordance with the forum-selection clause of the release, rather than here
    in Burlington, Vermont, would be unreasonable. First, granting MWG’s motion would
    result in two separate lawsuits involving the same underlying dispute, one in
    Wilmington, Delaware involving the claims of Plaintiff Prettyman and other Plan
    participants who signed the release, and another one here in Burlington, Vermont
    involving the claims of Plaintiffs Mazur and Porter, who did not sign the release. The
    facts and circumstances relating to the rights of the plaintiffs under the Phantom Share
    Plan, and whether those rights were violated, would be identical in both suits. The only
    difference between the two suits would be that one of them (the suit in Delaware) would
    also involve the question of the enforceability of the release. It would be a waste of
    judicial resources, as well as the resources of the parties, to have courts in two states
    litigating the same underlying dispute for parties whose circumstances and claims are
    identical in all respects but one. Having two courts litigating the same claims at the
    same time would also run the risk of inconsistent outcomes.
    Second, nearly all of the witnesses and parties necessary for an adjudication of
    the Plaintiffs’ claims reside and work in Vermont. Although MWG is incorporated in the
    State of Delaware, its principal place of business is located in Winooski, Vermont, which
    is just a few miles from this courthouse, and which is where nearly all, if not all of its
    officers and employees, including those who would have to testify in this matter, are
    located. Other than Prettyman herself, who happens to now live just 20 miles from
    Wilmington, Delaware, virtually no one interested in the outcome of the case lives or
    works there. Moreover, it would be difficult, if not impossible for Prettyman to compel
    witnesses to appear in a court in Wilmington, Delaware, if her case were brought there.1
    Third, the only contact that Delaware has with this matter is the fact that
    MWG happens to be incorporated there. All of the events which gave rise to this
    litigation occurred in Vermont, involved Vermont residents and employees, and
    involved a Phantom Share Plan administered in Vermont. Moreover, the Phantom
    1
    Indeed, it might be impossible for Prettyman to pursue her claim in Delaware at this point in time. The parties
    appear to agree that Delaware has a three-year statute of limitations for breach of contract claims. The limitations
    period in Vermont is six years.
    3
    Share Plan contains choice-of-law and choice-of-forum provisions of its own. The Plan
    provides:
    Consent to Jurisdiction. The parties to this agreement hereby consent to
    the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the State of Vermont in
    connection with any matter or dispute arising under this Plan or between
    them regarding the affairs of the Company.
    Governing Law. The validity and construction of the Plan and any
    agreements entered into there under shall be governed by the laws of the
    state of Vermont without regard to the principles of conflicts of laws.
    (Exhibit B, Articles 7.2 and 7.3).
    Fourth, this court has had extensive involvement with the legal and factual issues
    that are at the heart of this case. In March of 2014, David Tanzer, a former MWG
    employee, filed a suit in this court asserting the same claims as are presented by the
    plaintiffs in the case at bar. In August of 2016, the court disposed of some of those
    claims and related defenses on cross-motions for summary judgment, and in March of
    2017, the court conduced a lengthy jury trial on the remaining claims and defenses. No
    other court has as much familiarity with the issues and claims presented by this
    litigation. Moreover, this court can without much difficulty determine whether the
    release is valid and enforceable under Vermont or Delaware law, whichever is ultimately
    determined to apply.
    MWG relies heavily upon Atlantic Marine Constr. Co. v. United States District
    Court, 
    134 S. Ct. 568
    , 582 (2013), which held that “[w]hen the parties have agreed to a
    valid forum-selection clause, a district court should ordinarily transfer the case to the
    forum specified in the clause.” However, Atlantic Marine involved the transfer of cases
    from one federal district court to another, which involves little more than a change in
    venue. The case simply does not apply to the state courts, which cannot transfer cases to
    courts in another state. In order to honor the forum selection clause in the release, this
    court would have to dismiss Prettyman from the case, which would force her to re-file
    her suit in Delaware, where she might have no remedy at all, if Delaware’s three-year
    statute of limitations were held to apply to her claim.
    For the foregoing reasons, the court will not enforce the forum selection clause in
    the release. Defendant’s motion to dismiss the Complaint as to Plaintiff Kristin
    Prettyman is DENIED.
    SO ORDERED this 5th day of March, 2018.
    _____________________________
    Robert A. Mello, Superior Judge
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 639-7-17 Cncv

Filed Date: 3/5/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 7/31/2024