Porter v. Stafford ( 2019 )

Porter v. Stafford, No. 281-5-18 Wncv (Teachout, J., Jan. 4, 2019).
[The text of this Vermont trial court opinion is unofficial. It has been reformatted from the original. The accuracy of the text and the
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STATE OF VERMONT
SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL DIVISION
Washington Unit Docket No. 281-5-18 Wncv
CORIANDER PORTER
Plaintiff
v.
TIMOTHY N. STAFFORD and
PATRICK J. BOUCHER
Defendants
DECISION
Ms. Porter’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiff Coriander Porter obtained a substantial foreign judgment against Defendant
Timothy N. Stafford and domesticated it in Vermont under a separate docket number. Before
she recorded it as a judgment lien against Mr. Stafford’s Waitsfield, Vermont property, he
substantially encumbered that property with a mortgage to Defendant Patrick J. Boucher. In this
case, Ms. Porter seeks to void the encumbrance on the property as a fraudulent transaction and
then foreclose her judgment lien. Ms. Porter has filed a summary judgment motion exclusively
addressing the fraudulent conveyance issue.
The Fraudulent Conveyances Act allows a creditor to seek the “avoidance of a
[fraudulent] transfer . . . to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor’s claim.” 9 V.S.A. §
2291(a)(1); see also id. § 2292(a) (“A transfer or obligation is not voidable under subdivision
2288(a)(1) of this title against a person who took in good faith and for a reasonably equivalent
value or against any subsequent transferee or obligee.”). Ms. Porter claims that the conveyance
in this case is fraudulent because it was made “with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud”
her, the creditor. 9 V.S.A. § 2288(a)(1).
The following facts are undisputed. In 2017, Ms. Porter obtained a foreign judgment
against Mr. Stafford. She domesticated that judgment in this court under a different docket
number, establishing a Vermont judgment for $401,817.33 on January 29, 2018. On February 2,
2018, Mr. Stafford encumbered his Waitsfield property with a mortgage to Mr. Boucher to
secure payment on a note in the original principal amount of $200,000. Plaintiff claims that in
exchange for the mortgage and note, Mr. Stafford did not receive “$200,000 or any other
consideration which could be construed as reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the
transfer.” Ms. Porter’s Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶ 6.
Defendants did not contest any of Ms. Porter’s purported undisputed facts in a manner
cognizable by Rule 56. However, even if the court were to deem the facts, as presented by Ms.
Porter, to be undisputed, they are insufficient for summary judgment purposes.
The timing and nature of the transaction certainly raise suspicions. The transaction may
be illusory insofar as Mr. Stafford may have acquired nothing of value in exchange for the
encumbrance on his property. The factual record, however, is too sparse to support judgment as
a matter of law on these grounds.
An important detail missing from the summary judgment record is the effect that the
disputed transaction may have had on Mr. Stafford’s ability to satisfy his debt to Ms. Porter. See
9 V.S.A. §§ 2288(b)(5), (b)(9). Ms. Porter states in argument: “Defendant Stafford did not
receive any funds from defendant Boucher for the transfer and he clearly intended to incur this
debt well beyond his ability to pay.” Ms. Porter’s Motion for Summary Judgment 5 (emphasis
added). Nothing in the record indicates anything about Mr. Stafford’s “ability” to pay any debt
to either Ms. Porter or Mr. Boucher. If Mr. Stafford is otherwise fully capable of satisfying his
debt to Ms. Porter, there is no reason inquire into potential fraudulent transactions.
The purpose of setting aside a conveyance as fraudulent is “to prevent the conveyance
from depriving creditors of the means of collecting their debts.” Becker v. Becker, 138 Vt. 372,
378 (1980). Part of the proponent’s fraud showing is “that the condition of the debtor’s estate is
such that [the creditor] cannot collect on [her] debt.” Id. Even if the disputed transaction were
found to be fraudulent, Ms. Porter nevertheless has failed to show that the state of Mr. Stafford’s
estate is such that she otherwise is unable to collect her judgment.
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, Ms. Porter’s motion for summary judgment is denied.
A pretrial status conference will be scheduled.
Dated at Montpelier, Vermont this ____ day of January, 2019.
_____________________________
Mary Miles Teachout
Superior Judge
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