Garcia v. Farm Family Ins. Co. ( 2019 )

Garcia v. Farm Family Ins. Co., No. 465-5-15 Cncv (Toor, J., Aug. 28, 2019).
[The text of this Vermont trial court opinion is unofficial. It has been reformatted from the original. The accuracy of the text and the
accompanying data included in the Vermont trial court opinion database is not guaranteed.]
STATE OF VERMONT
SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL DIVISION
Chittenden Unit Docket No. 465-5-15 Cncv
Garcia vs. Farm Family Insurance Company
ENTRY REGARDING MOTION
Count 1, Insurance (465-5-15 Cncv)
Title: Motion for Summary Judgment (Motion 37)
Filer: Farm Family Insurance Company
Attorney: Kaveh S. Shahi
Filed Date: April 12, 2019
Response filed on 05/07/2019 by Attorney Robert B. Luce for Plaintiff
Plaintiff's Opposition;
Response filed on 05/21/2019 by Attorney Robert Hemley for Defendant
Defendant's Reply;
Response filed on 05/29/2019 by Attorney Robert B. Luce for Plaintiff
Plaintiff's Sur-Reply;
Response filed on 06/03/2019 by Attorney Robert Hemley for Defendant
Defendant's Supplemental Authority;
Response filed on 06/04/2019 by Attorney Robert B. Luce for Plaintiff
Plaintiff's Response to Supplemental Authority;
Plaintiff Kitty Garcia alleges bad faith denial of benefits by Defendant Farm Family
Insurance Company (the Company) in connection with her workers’ compensation claim.
Garcia suffered a serious head injury while working at Alpine Glen Farms. The Company
was the farm’s workers’ compensation insurer. It hired Broadspire Services Inc.
(Broadspire) to administer the claim. The Company moves for summary judgment.
A number of the “facts’ listed on the Company’s statement of undisputed facts are
either not facts, or are unsupported by any record evidence. The court disregards all such
alleged “facts.” Rather than reciting here all the relevant facts, the court adopts all facts
in the Company’s statement to which Garcia agrees. The court also takes note of the
additional facts that Garcia sets forth to show that disputes exist.
Conclusions of Law
The claim here is one for bad faith handling of Garcia’s workers’ compensation
claim. “Bad faith” is “the general shorthand for breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing which the law implies in every insurance policy.” Murphy v. Patriot Ins. Co.,
2014 VT 96, ¶ 17, 197 Vt. 438. “To establish bad faith, the plaintiff must show that: (1) the
insurance company had no reasonable basis to deny benefits of the policy, and (2) the
company knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that no reasonable basis existed for
denying the claim.” Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted). The Company raises
numerous arguments in support of its motion for summary judgment. The court will
address each in turn.
The first argument is that Garcia has failed to proffer sufficient evidence of bad
faith to get to a jury. The court disagrees. Garcia’s statement of facts provides adequate
evidence to meet her burden. Even setting aside the argument about whether financial
incentives to deny treatment can be bad faith, the testimony of multiple doctors that
Garcia needed treatment that was denied for no reason, the rejection of the opinion of the
very doctor that had been chosen by Broadspire to manage her care, and the allegations
that requests for approval of treatments were ignored, not responded to, or that payments
came extremely late, is sufficient to get to a jury. See, e.g. 14 Couch on Ins. § 198:23 (“Good
faith also applies . . . to the claims-paying process, specifically as regards to prompt
payment.”); Buote v. Verizon New England, 249 F. Supp. 2d 422, 433 (D. Vt. 2003) (“the
long history of delays and ‘bureaucratic glitches’ in the payment of Buote’s benefits,
creates a reasonable inference that, at the very least, recklessness was involved”); Essinger
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v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 529 F.3d 264, 271 n. 1 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Inordinate delays in
processing claims and a failure to make a meaningful investigation have combined to
create a jury question on bad faith.”). Even if the pre-2011 evidence is excluded, Garcia
points to sufficient facts to support her claim.
The next argument is that any bad faith was that of Broadspire, not the Company,
and cannot be imputed to the Company because Broadspire was an independent
contractor. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 409. However, it is an open question
whether Broadspire was acting as the Company’s agent in handling the claims here. The
question in deciding whether a party is an independent contractor is whether “[the
Company] had the right to control not only the result, but also the means and methods
adopted to accomplish that result.” Rich v. Holmes, 104 Vt. 433, 437 (1932). The fact that
the contract between the parties designated the role as that of an independent contractor
is evidence on the Company’s side, but there is contrary evidence on Garcia’s side:
testimony and records suggesting that the Company oversaw and directed Broadspire’s
work, and Broadspire’s signing of documents on behalf of Farm Family. That creates a
jury question.
In any case, an insurer cannot delegate its duty to act in good faith and avoid
liability by saying “they did it, not us.” See, e.g., 14 Couch on Ins. § 198:17 (“An insurer
cannot delegate its duty of good faith.”);Hamill v. Pawtucket Mutual Insurance Co., 2005
VT 133, ¶ 13, 179 Vt. 250 (“the insurer is liable for the adjuster’s mishandling of claims in
actions alleging breach of contract or bad faith”); Riccatone v. Colorado Choice Health
Plans, 315 P.3d 203, 206–07 (Colo. App. 2013) (“the duty imposed on an insurer is
nondelegable, preventing the insurer from escaping liability by delegating tasks to third
parties”); De Dios v. Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 927 N.W.2d 611, 621 (Iowa 2019) amended
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(May 14, 2019)(Delegating workers’ compensation claim handling to a third-party
administrator—Broadspire—“doesn’t give the insurer a free pass for two reasons. First, if
the third party is an agent, then vicarious liability applies. . . Second, the nondelegable
duties imposed by Iowa statutes and administrative regulations remain on the carrier
regardless of any attempt to pass them to a third party.”); Cooper v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins.
Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 921 P.2d 1297, 1300 (Ok. Ct. App. 1996) (“an insurer cannot avoid
liability for ‘bad faith’ failure to pay simply because it was due to the act of an independent
contractor adjuster, given the non-delegable nature of the duty to deal fairly and in good
faith.”).
The Company also argues that there is no privity between it and Garcia. However,
in the workers’ compensation context, that is irrelevant:
Under our workmen’s compensation act, the liability of an insurance carrier
who undertakes to protect an employer is more than that of a mere
indemnitor. Its liability is primary and direct. The statute affords the
injured employee the option of proceeding directly against the insurer as a
party defendant.
Marsigli’s Estate v. Granite City Auto Sales, Inc., 124 Vt. 95, 106 (1964); 21 V.S.A. § 693;
Racine v. Am. Int’l Adjustment Co., 980 F. Supp. 745, 746 (D. Vt. 1997) (“Under the
Vermont Workers’ Compensation Act, an individual claimant has a direct right to enforce
the liability of an insurance carrier for the payment of a workers' compensation claim.”);
see also Thornton v. Am. Interstate Ins. Co., 897 N.W.2d 445, 461 (Iowa 2017)(citation
omitted)(“We view bad-faith claims by employees against their employers’ workers’
compensation insurers as first-party bad-faith claims, even though ‘[a]t first blush, a
cause of action for bad faith pursued by an employee against an employer’s workers’
compensation carrier appears to be a matter of ‘third-party’ bad faith more than one of
‘first-party’ bad faith.”).
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The Company next contends that Garcia’s claims are barred by the statute of
limitations. The parties agree that the limitations period is three years, and that pursuant
to a previous stipulation the filing date of this action is deemed to be March 25, 2014.
Thus, the Company argues that any claims based upon conduct prior to March 25, 2011
are barred. Although the Company tries to point to one statement from a doctor that
Garcia was “going downhill” as of 2010, and pin all of her claims to that date, the court is
not persuaded. Garcia responds that there are many instances of bad faith after the 2011
date, including delays and denials of treatment, and provides testimony from doctors as
to the injuries caused to her as a result of those acts. The court agrees that Garcia has
presented sufficient evidence on such issues to get to a jury.1
The next argument presented by the Company is that issue preclusion bars Garcia’s
claims, based upon the dismissal of an earlier lawsuit in this court. One of the elements
required to establish such preclusion is that “ the issue is the same as the one raised in the
later action.” Trepanier v. Getting Organized, Inc., 155 Vt. 259, 265 (1990). The earlier
lawsuit here, as the court has previously ruled, was limited to the enforcement of a
settlement agreement. It did not raise the same claims as this case. Ruling on Motion to
Dismiss at 3 (Feb. 4, 2016)(Toor, J.). Whether it was governed by 21 V.S.A. § 675 is not
the point. The only claim asserted was that recommendations made in an April 2010
doctor’s report had not been properly disputed as required by the agreement, and thus
had to be approved. Nothing about that narrow claim is duplicative of the issues here,
which relate to the period after March 2011. The claims here are not precluded.
Finally, the Company asserts that Garcia is limited to her remedies under the
workers’ compensation statute, 21 V.S.A. § 622. Although some courts have reached that
1 For this reason, the court does not address Garcia’s alternate “continuing tort” argument.
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conclusion—see, e.g., DeOliveira v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 870 A.2d 1066, 1072-75 (Conn.
2005)—the court is not persuaded that Vermont law compels such a result. As Judge
Sessions has noted, there are numerous cases “in which workers’ compensation carriers
have been found liable to employees for bad faith handling of workers’ compensation
claims.” Racine, 980 F. Supp. at 747 (citing cases). As other courts have noted, “[a]ny
liability for injuries occasioned by [bad faith claim processing] cannot be deemed liability
for injuries arising out of the course of employment.” Travelers Ins. Co. v. Savio, 706 P.2d
1258, 1265 (Colo. 1985). Savio goes on to say that “a bad faith claim is not subject to
‘compensation’ or any other remedy under the Act. Savio certainly need not exhaust an
administrative remedy that is in fact nonexistent.” Id. at 1269; see also Hayes v. Aetna
Fire Underwriters, 609 P.2d 257, 261 (Mont. 1980)(“an intentional or bad faith tort that
arises, not out of the worker’s employment, but after his employment has ceased” is not
barred by the statute).
Although the Vermont Supreme Court has not directly addressed a bad faith denial
claim such as this, its decisions support the same result. The Court has held that tort
claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress “arise under the common law, not
under the Workers’ Compensation Act, which contains no remedy for alleged insurance
company misconduct or for alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress by the
carrier.” Demag v. American Insurance Companies, 146 Vt. 608 (1986), see also
Wentworth v. Crawford & Co., 174 Vt. 118, 126 (2002)(claims that do not arise during the
employment relation are not barred by the exclusivity provision of the statute).
The Company also contends that even if the claim is not barred by exclusivity,
Garcia was required to exhaust administrative remedies under the statute, citing
Wentworth. However, there are no citations to record facts proffered in support of this
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assertion by the Company, and Garcia contests it. See SMF # 47 and response thereto.
There are thus no undisputed facts on which the court can grant summary judgment. 2
In its reply memorandum, the Company raises an entirely new argument: that a
January 2015 settlement with Broadspire released all claims against the Company. A reply
is not the place to assert entirely new bases for summary judgment, and the court is
tempted to decline to address such late-raised issues. However, in the interest of resolving
the issue now rather than at the time of drafting jury instructions, the court will address
the argument. The court rejects it because the settlement did not provide for the release
of claims against Farm Family, only against Broadspire. Def. Ex. E ¶ 3.1. It expressly stated
that it would not “affect or impair any rights, claims, causes of action, or remedies of
GARCIA in respect of FARM FAMILY CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY.” Id.Order
The motion for summary judgment is denied. The case will be scheduled for a
pretrial conference and jury draw.
Dated at Burlington this 28th day of August, 2019.
___________________
Helen M. Toor
Superior Court Judge
2 In any case, Wentworth did not involve a bad faith claim against an insurer. The claim was against a
vocational rehabilitation firm, and involved an alleged failure to provide adequate rehabilitation services.
Because the Plaintiff failed to seek a replacement provider as specifically allowed in the workers’
compensation rules, the court held that she should have exhausted that process before coming to court. Id.,174 Vt. at 124. No such express process exists for resolving bad faith claims. The Demag analysis—that there
is no remedy for a tort claim such as this in the statutory process—makes clear that there also can be no
exhaustion required for such a claim.
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Notifications:
Robert B. Luce (ERN 2961), Attorney for Plaintiff Katheryn "Kitty" Garcia
Kaveh S. Shahi (ERN 2339), Attorney for Defendant Farm Family Insurance Company
Richard Grant Osborn (ERN N/A), Attorney for party 1 Co-Counsel
Kaveh S. Shahi (ERN 2339), Attorney for Interested Person Julie Lavin
Mark F. Werle (ERN 2687), Attorney for Interested Person Broadspire Services, Inc.
Mark F. Werle (ERN 2687), Attorney for Interested Person Jeffrey Garcia
Robert B. Hemley (ERN 2941), Attorney for party 2 Co-Counsel
Erin M. Moore (ERN 9710), Attorney for party 3 Co-Counsel
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