palin v. menard ( 2024 )

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STATE OF VERMONT
SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL DIVISION
; 2:
Washington Unit 719 APR2b PL 3b Docket No. 378-6-17 Wney
ROYAL PALIN
Plaintiff
Vv.
LISA MENARD et al.
Defendants
DECISION
CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Royal Palin is currently serving a federal sentence in federal prison. At some
point prior to his federal sentence, he served a term of imprisonment in Vermont. He served the
maximum incarcerative portion of his Vermont sentence and was released on probation. He
apparently engaged in the conduct giving rise to his federal sentence during this period of
probation. His claims in this case are twofold. His first claim is that the Vermont DOC should
have released him 17 days earlier than it did. His second claim is that the DOC did not provide
effective programming and mental health treatment for him while he was incarcerated, did not
prepare him to be successful once he was released, and did not properly care for him, or
reincarcerate him, while he was on probation, causing him to abuse drugs and reoffend. Among
other things, Mr. Palin seeks substantial monetary damages in this case, as compensation for the
money he would have earned were he not incarcerated. Defendants include the State of Vermont
as well as numerous DOC agents or officials. Mr. Palin has filed a motion for summary
Judgment apparently addressing both claims. Defendants have filed two summary judgment
motions. The first addresses any healthcare-related claims. The second addresses any other
claims Mr. Palin may have raised.
Mr. Palin’s summary judgment motion
Mr. Palin’s summary judgment motion is denied for lack of compliance with Rule 56, A
summary judgment motion must be supported by a statement of undisputed facts with citations to
admissible evidence in the record. V.R.C.P. 56(c)(1), (2). Mr. Palin did not file any such
statement. To the extent that Mr. Palin claims that he could not submit such a statement because
Defendants did not comply with his discovery requests completely enough, the court notes that
he never presented any disputes about lack of compliance with discovery to the court.. He also
does not explain with any specificity what evidence Defendants failed to produce and how it
prevented him from submitting his own statement of undisputed facts to support his motion. Mr.
Palin’s motion for summary judgment is denied.
Release from Vermont custody
Mr. Palin’s claim based on serving an additional 17 days in Vermont custody is unclear.
Mr. Palin‘evidently was in Vermont custody serving time in “work camp,” where he could earn
good time. He asked the DOC to recalculate his sentence consistent with a Bennington trial
court decision. The DOC did so and moved up his maximum release date to one or two days
later. Upon doing so, the DOC also awarded him the most good time it could, eliminating the
balance of his incarcerative sentence, and he was promptly released to probation. When he was
returned to incarceration from probation, he filed suit in Rutland County seeking whatever good
time he believed he had earned prior to probation but had not already been applied to his
sentence.” The DOC then apparently credited his post-probation term with that good time.
Having already gotten the benefit of all the time (whether time served, good time, or time off due
to DOC policy regarding a Bennington court decision) and having litigated this matter already in
Rutland County, no remaining claim is apparent to the court or articulated with enough clarity by
Mr. Palin to require any further response from Defendants. Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment on this issue.
Other claims
Any other legal claims attempted to be raised in this case are unclear. Defendants have
reviewed his pleadings and other filings and drawn inferences as to what those legal claims
might be. They have sought summary judgment on those claims as identified by them.!
The court’s review of Mr. Palin’s pleadings and other filings shows that he does not think
that he was treated fairly by Vermont DOC during his incarceration, both as to mental health
treatment and programmatic needs. He also does not think that the DOC did a good enough job
preparing him for life on probation once his incarcerative sentence maxed out. He further
believes that those charged with supervising his probation similarly did not make effective
efforts at helping him with housing, substance abuse issues, and other mental health needs. The
narrative he portrays implies that he believes that his subsequent criminal behavior and
incarceration were all but a foregone conclusion due to the lack of any effective interventions by
the DOC or its officials or agents. This may not be inaccurate as to what happened, but it does
not mean that he has a legal claim for compensation.
The question is whether he has identified a right recognized under Vermont law that is a
valid legal basis fora claim, and secondly whether he has come forward with enough evidence to
support going to trial on such a claim. Vermont’s pleading standard is exceptionally minimal.
See Bock v. Gold, 2008 VT 81, § 4, 184 Vt. 575 (“the threshold a plaintiff must cross in order to
meet our notice-pleading standard is ‘exceedingly low’”); Colby v. Umbrella, Inc., 2008 VT 20,
{ 13, 184 Vt. 1 (‘The complaint is a bare bones statement that merely provides the defendant
with notice of the claims against it.”). The “bare bones statement” that might satisfy that
' Defendants have described possible claims, and legal theories about those claims, that they believe Mr. Palin might
possibly be trying to raise in this casc. They are all inferences drawn from the allegations of the narrative Mr. Palin
has presented in the complaint. As the court cannot conclude from Mr. Palin’s own submissions that these are his
claims, the court declines to address all the possible claims proposed by Defendants.
2
pleading standard is not enough in relation to a Rule 56 summary judgment motion.
As described in one treatise:
[Rule 56] . . . has operated to prevent the system of extremely simple pleadings
from shielding claimants without real claims; in addition to proving an effective
means of summary action in clear cases, it serves as an-instrument of discovery in
its recognized use to call forth quickly the disclosure on the merits of either claim
or defense on pain of loss of the case for failure to do so,
10A Wright & Miller et al., Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil 4th § 2712 (4th ed.) (quoting
Clark, Code Pleading (2d ed. 1947) § 88, at 566.). Mr. Palin’s motion for summary judgment
and his filings in opposition to Defendants’ summary judgment motions do not demonstrate any
triable issue on any identified legal claim any better than his initial pleading does. The general
narrative of his experiences is insufficient for summary judgment purposes.
The record does not set forth legal claims sufficient for the court to determine whether it
includes evidence sufficient to demonstrate any triable issue. In these circumstances, Rule 56
must operate to prevent Vermont’s lenient pleading standard from shielding a claimant unable to
demonstrate that he possesses a “teal claim.” See V.R.C.P. 1. Defendants are entitled to
summary judgment.
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Palin summary judgment motion is denied. Defendants’
summary judgment motions are granted.
Dated at Montpelier, Vermont this 20" “day of April 2019.
“ Vee We, Ne crete St
Mary. Miles Teachout
Superior Judge