pepin v. pepin granite ( 2024 )


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  • Atos feos ot pole] 17
    VE SUPE. OP evry
    A er Aye Purp pee "ye
    STATE OF VERMONT:
    SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL DIVISION
    Washington Unit 2011 SEP iA By b Docket No. 613-9-15 Wuev
    Raymond C. Pepin
    Plaintiff
    c ~ 4
    ve ' | L. i i
    Pepin Granite, Inc.
    Defendants
    ’
    ORDER
    Regarding Document Production and Motion for Attorney Fees (MPR 7)
    In this case, Plaintiff Raymond C. Pepin has sought production of certain business
    records of Defendant Pepin Granite, Inc., pursuant to 11A V.S.A. §§ 16.02-16.04. -He also had
    the apparent ability to seek production of the same records in ongoing discovery in his pre-
    existing lawsuit against Pepin Granite in Chittenden Civil Division. The pleading that started
    this case included a letter itemizing the business records sought. Defendant immediately took
    the position that this entire case was filed in bad faith because there is nothing that Plaintiff could
    get here that was not as readily available to him in the ordinary course of the Chittenden case.
    Nevertheless, in February 2016, Attorney Kolitch for Defendant and Attorney Luna, Plaintiff's
    counsel at the inception of this case (for both this case and the Chittenden case), agreed that
    certain information would be produced. That agreement is reflected in e-mails between counsel
    and clearly set forth the identical list of business records that appears with the original pleading
    in this case.
    Responsive documents then were produced, principally by the corporation’s longtime
    accountant directly to Plaintiff's prior counsel and his. expert accountant. The reasonable
    appearance in the record of this case was that the records request in this case, regardless of
    whatever may have been unfolding in discovery for the Chittenden case, had been satisfied.
    At an August 1, 2016 status conference, Judge Tomasi questioned whether there. was
    anything left to produce or whether this case could be dismissed. Plaintiff's new counsel,
    Attorney Weatherly, expressed frustration that, as he viewed it, Attorney Kolitch was refusing to
    certify that all responsive documents in Defendant’s possession had been produced, though he
    did not purport to have any basis for drawing any contrary conclusion. Judge Tomasi said that it
    appeared to him that Attorney Kolitch had represented that nothing was left to produce.
    Attorney Kolitch then accounted for the apparent disconnect as follows: most of the production
    was handled. by the corporation’s longtime accountant directly to Attorney Luna (no longer
    representing Plaintiff) and Plaintiff's accountant and that production did not go through her. She
    therefore could not specifically say that this or that document had been produced for lack of
    personal knowledge, though the purport of her presentation seemed to be that her belief was that
    everything had been produced. There was no reason to think that the document request had not
    been responded to fully and in good faith and she did not indicate that anything responsive had
    been withheld. Attorney Weatherly did not concede that the request had been satisfied. Judge
    Tomasi directed the parties to confer about whether Plaintiff needed anything else and resolve
    the matter expeditiously.
    The case remained on the docket without action until the court scheduled a status
    conference that took place on March 30, 2017. The status had not changed. At the end of the
    conference, the court attempted to structure a resolution to the impasse. Attorney Weatherly was
    ordered to confer with his client and identify with specificity by a specified date any items that
    had been requested but not produced. Attorney Kolitch was to respond point by point by a
    followup specified date.
    Attorney Weatherly did not, however, identify anything specific that was requested but
    not produced. Rather, he did the opposite: he provided information about what was produced
    and again reiterated that only Defendant knows what it possesses but has not produced.!
    Attorney Weatherly’s list of what was produced cannot simply be compared with the list
    of what was requested originally to see- what remains to be produced. The record has clear
    representations now from both Attorney Kolitch and the accountant who handled most of the
    production that accounts for the entire records request. For each item on the list, there are clear
    representations that everything responsive was produced, does or did not exist, or was in
    someone else’s possession. Nothing responsive to the original request is reported as withheld.
    Plaintiff apparently remains unsure whether his request was responded to completely but
    has not identified anything he wants that he did not get that may be in Defendant’s possession.
    The court required him to identify any remaining such items at the status conference on March
    30, 2017, but he has not done so. Defendant has made clear representations that everything
    responsive in Defendant’s possession has been produced. There is no evidence or indication that
    Defendant has failed to respond fully. The court accepts Defendant’s representations and
    concludes that Plaintiff's original request has been satisfied.
    - Accordingly, document production in this case is complete.
    Defendant’s motion for attorney fees (MPR 7) is denied. It was filed prematurely, before
    document production matters were finally resolved.
    ' Attorney Weatherly also again asserted, “Long past due at this time is a response or objection to Petitioner’s
    - Application, and it is now Respondent's burden under the Court's ruling to show, if it can, an improper purpose in
    the filing of the Application.” Plaintiff's Memorandum Regarding Status of Document Production 3 (filed May 4,
    2017) (emphasis added). However, the events of this case quickly overtook those aspects of the September 30, 2015
    order to which Attorney Weatherly presumably refers and made a formal response moot. At least since Defendant’s
    February 2016 agreement with Attorney Luna and subsequent production of documents, no other response,
    objection, or showing of improper purpose by Defendant has been needed. Since that time, there has been no
    resistance to production and there has never been any evidence of deficiencies in production.
    2
    If either party intends to seek attorney fees on any basis, appropriate motions shall be
    filed within 10 days or any right to fees will be treated as waived and this case will be dismissed
    with prejudice.
    So ordered.
    Dated at Montpelier, Vermont this 1S day of September 2017,
    View Yves rol
    Mary Miles Teachout
    Superior Judge
    

Document Info

Filed Date: 3/1/2024

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/1/2024