Brownell & LaMarche Administrative Permit - Decision on Motion ( 2024 )

VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT
Environmental Division Docket No. 23-ENV-00113
32 Cherry St, 2nd Floor, Suite 303,
Burlington, VT 05401
802-951-1740
www.vermontjudiciary.org
Brownell & LaMarche Administrative Permit
ENTRY ORDER
Title: Motion to Reconsider
Filer: Adam H. Miller, Esq.
Filed Date: July 1, 2024
No response filed.
The Motion is DENIED.
This matter involves an appeal of a Town of Williston Development Review Board decision
dated October 25, 2023, denying Craig Sampson’s (Appellant) appeal of Administrative Permit
24-0016 issued to Randee Brownell and Jo LaMarche (Applicants) for the repositioning of
Rosewood Drive, a shared private driveway located off Vermont Route 116 in Williston, Vermont.
This Court issued a merits decision on June 14, 2024, affirming the Administrative Permit as
issued.
Presently before the Court is Appellant’s motion to reconsider the Court’s June 14
Decision, specifically with respect to Question 4 of Appellant’s Statement of Questions. Question
4 asks:
Should application AP-24-0016 be rejected based on a material
misrepresentation pursuant to 24 V.S.A. § 4470a, because AP-24-
0016 proposes required safety improvements to lands Applicants
claim to own but that this Court held does not belong to the
[Applicant] in Beecher v. Brownell, No. 23-CV-03459 (Vt. Super. Ct.
Civ. Div. January 31, 2024) (Walsh, J.).
Statement of Questions (filed December 13, 2023; amended on May 1, 2024).
Discussion
Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) governs motions to alter or amend judgments. The
Court considers such motions to be an “extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly.”
Mountain Top Inn & Resort JO, No. 23-3-17 Vtec, slip op. at 1 (Vt. Super. Ct. Envtl. Div. Feb. 14,
2019) (Durkin, J.) (citation omitted). This Court will only grant a Rule 59(e) motion in order to:
“correct manifest errors of law or fact on which the decision was based, to allow the moving party
to present newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence, to prevent manifest injustice, or
to respond to an intervening change in the controlling law.” Id. at 2 (quoting In re Vanishing Brook
Subdivision, No. 223-10-07 Vtec, slip op. at 4 (Vt. Envtl. Ct. July 10, 2008) (Wright, J.) (quoting 11
C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2810.1 (2d ed. 1995)).
Importantly, Rule 59(e) motions are “not intended as a means to reargue or express
dissatisfaction with the Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law” and cannot “merely
repeat[] arguments that have already been raised and rejected by the Court.” Town Clarendon v.
Houlagans MC Corp. of VT., No. 131-10-17 Vtec, slip op. at 1 (Vt. Super. Ct. Envtl. Div. Apr. 10,
2014) (Walsh, J.); Appeal of Van Nostrand, Nos. 209-11-04 Vtec, 101-5-05 Vtec, slip op. at 4 (Vt.
Envtl. Ct. Dec. 11, 2006) (Durkin, J.).
Appellant’s motion seeks to relitigate an issue already determined by the Court and does
not cite to any grounds which would allow the Court to entertain such a motion. Appellant’s
motion to reconsider argues that Applicant’s administrative permit application does not comply
with the terms and conditions of the Discretionary Permit, and that this issue is intrinsic to
Appellant’s Question 4. However, this is precisely the same issue that the Court considered in its
June 14 Merits Decision. See Brownell & LaMarche Administrative Permit, No. 23-ENV-00133 slip
op. at 6–7 (Vt. Super. Ct. Envtl. Div. June 14, 2024) (Walsh, J.) (explaining that [t]o the extent that,
through Question 4, Appellant seeks to challenge the Administrative Permit’s compliance with
the terms and conditions of the Discretionary Permit, those issues are outside the scope of this
Question”).
Appellant’s motion cites to no manifest error of law or manifest injustice which would
enable this Court to reconsider our June 14 Decision. Nor does Appellant cite to any newly
discovered evidence or an intervening change in the law in his favor. In fact, the motion to
reconsider cites to many of the same cases which the Court cited in its June 14 Decision and
which supported our conclusions regarding Question 4.
Even if we were to consider Appellant’s motion to reconsider on the merits, the Court is
still not convinced that Question 4 intrinsically allows the Court to consider the Administrative
Permit’s compliance with the Discretionary Permit. Question 4 plainly asks whether there was a
material misrepresentation pursuant to 24 V.S.A. § 4470a. Nothing in this Question addresses
the relationship between the terms of either permit, nor does this Question cite to the relevant
provision in the Williston Development Bylaws which requires consistency between permits.
Accordingly, it was, and remains, outside of this Court’s jurisdiction to consider Appellant’s
arguments regarding the Administrative Permit’s compliance with the Discretionary Permit.
Appellant’s motion to reconsider does not remedy this fundamental jurisdictional issue.
For the foregoing reasons, we DENY Appellant’s motion to reconsider this Court’s June 14
Decision. Appellant’s motion relitigates an issue already determined by the Court and cites to
none of the four factors which would allow this Court to reconsider its previous conclusions.
Electronically signed July 17, 2024 pursuant to V.R.E.F. 9(D).
Thomas G. Walsh, Judge
Superior Court, Environmental Division