Master Plumbing v. Barlow ( 2024 )


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  • VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT                                                             CIVIL DIVISION
    Windsor Unit                                                                  Case No. 23-CV-05243
    12 The Green
    Woodstock VT 05091
    802-457-2121
    www.vermontjudiciary.org
    Master Plumbing and Heating, Inc.
    Plaintiff
    v.
    Trevor Barlow and Sheryl Backstrom
    Defendants
    Decision on Motion for Writ of Attachment
    Defendants Trevor Barlow and Sheryl Backstrom are the owners of a commercial building in
    Cavendish, Vermont. Prior to the floods of 2023, defendants contracted with plaintiff Master Plumbing
    and Heating, Inc. for plumbing renovations at the commercial building. Shortly after the work began,
    the building was devastated by floodwaters, and defendants asked plaintiff to assist with repairing the
    heating system. After plaintiff performed at least some work on a time-and-materials basis, defendants
    paid two invoices but refused to pay more. Plaintiff asserted a lien against the property and filed the
    present civil action to enforce the lien. 9 V.S.A. § 1924.
    Generally, the purpose of the mechanic’s lien is to permit contractors and subcontractors to
    “secure the payment” for their home-improvement work on real property. 9 V.S.A. § 1921(a); Newport
    Sand and Gravel Co. v. Miller Concrete Constr., Inc., 
    159 Vt. 66
    , 69 (1992). A contractor or
    subcontractor may assert the lien by giving written notice to the property owner and by filing a written
    memorandum with the town clerk within a specified period of time. 9 V.S.A. §§ 1921(b) & 1923; In re
    Cusson, 
    412 B.R. 646
    , 654 (D. Vt. 2009). A contractor must thereafter commence a civil action and
    obtain an attachment “[w]ithin 180 days from the time of filing such memorandum.” 9 V.S.A. § 1924;
    Filter Equipment Co., Inc. v. International Business Machines Corp., 
    142 Vt. 499
    , 501–02 (1983);
    Cusson, 
    412 B.R. at 654
    ; In re APC Construction, Inc., 
    132 B.R. 690
    , 694 (D. Vt. 1991).
    An attachment of real property is intended to be an “extraordinary remedy.” Brastex Corp. v.
    Allen International, Inc., 
    702 F.2d 326
    , 332 (2d Cir. 1983); Ruggieri-Lam v. Oliver Block LLC, 
    120 F.Supp.3d 400
    , 405 (D. Vt. 2015); Terranova v. AVCO Financial Services of Barre, Inc., 
    396 F.Supp. 1402
    , 1406–07 (D. Vt. 1975). Except under circumstances not present here, orders of approval are
    issued only after notice and an opportunity for a hearing, at which the moving party bears the burden
    of persuading the court that there is “a reasonable likelihood that the [movant] will recover judgment,
    including interests and costs, in an amount equal to or greater than the amount of the attachment over
    and above any liability insurance, bond, or other security shown by the [non-moving party] to be
    available to satisfy the judgment.” Vt. R. Civ. P. 4.1(b)(2); Ruggieri-Lam, 
    120 F.Supp.3d at 405
    ; Troy
    Boiler Works, Inc. v. Long Falls Paperboard, LLC, 
    2021 WL 8694355
     at *7 (D. Vt. Aug. 13, 2021). A
    Order                                                                              Page 1 of 4
    23-CV-05243 Master Plumbing and Heating, Inc. v. Trevor Barlow et al
    finding of a “reasonable likelihood” of success on the merits is intended to be “a realistic conclusion
    by the court on the basis of affidavits and other evidence presented at the hearing as to the actual
    probability of recovery by the [movant],” and the court must consider any modifying evidence and
    affirmative defenses offered by the non-moving party. Vt. R. Civ. P. 4.1, Reporter’s Notes—1973
    Amendment; Ruggieri-Lam, 
    120 F.Supp.3d 400
    , 405–09 (D. Vt. 2015); Vermont Federal Credit Union
    v. Richter, No. 2013-354, 
    2014 WL 3714629
     (Vt. Feb. 2014) (unpub. mem.); Wellford v. Eissmann,
    No. 747-10-09 Wrcv, 
    2010 WL 2259084
     (Vt. Super. Ct. Mar. 9, 2010) (Eaton, J.); The McKernon
    Group, Inc. v. Felten, No. 737-10-08 Wrcv, 
    2009 WL 6356593
     (Vt. Super. Ct. Jan. 16, 2009) (Eaton,
    J.).
    Here, the credible evidence presented at the motion hearing established the following facts. As
    mentioned, defendants contracted with plaintiff to perform plumbing renovations at a commercial
    building, but the 2023 floods devastated the building shortly after the work began. In particular, the
    floods ruined the heating system. During the chaotic aftermath of the floods, defendants talked with
    plaintiff’s representatives about installing a new heating system at the building. Plaintiff’s
    representatives made at least some representations that the cost of a new heating system would be
    reasonable, and that financial assistance was potentially available from Efficiency Vermont. Firm plans
    were not made, however, and plaintiff did not provide a formal estimate. Instead, plaintiff began work
    on the new heating system on a time-and-materials basis, and promised to provide an estimate when it
    became available. Plaintiff thereafter performed some wall penetrations and began preparing the
    building for a new system. Plaintiff submitted two invoices to defendants in the amount of $19,412.50,
    which defendants paid. Plaintiff then continued working, and submitted more invoices for an
    additional $39,609.04. At that point, defendants repeated their request for an estimate, and were told by
    plaintiff’s representative that the cost would be in the “ballpark” of $165,000. Defendants found this
    unreasonable, and further discovered that plaintiff had not contacted Efficiency Vermont, and that
    Efficiency Vermont would provide only limited financial assistance for the project. Defendants
    ordered plaintiff to stop work and refused to pay the outstanding invoices. Defendants then found a
    different contractor to install a different heating system for the price of about $50,000. Plaintiff
    thereafter asserted its lien and filed the present action for collection of the invoiced amounts.
    At issue is whether plaintiff has shown a “reasonable likelihood” that it will prevail at trial on
    its claim for breach of contract. Plaintiff offered evidence sufficient to establish that the parties entered
    into a time-and-materials contract for the installation of a heating system, that plaintiff performed work
    on that contract, that plaintiff submitted an invoice pursuant to the contract in the amount of
    $39,609.04, and that defendants refused to pay the amounts due. A claim for breach of a construction
    contract is established by that evidence. VanVelsor v. Dzewaltowski, 
    136 Vt. 103
    , 105–06 (1978);
    Cass-Warner Corp. v. Brickman, 
    126 Vt. 329
    , 336–37 (1967).
    Defendants argue that no contract was formed because the estimate was never provided and
    accepted, that the work performed by plaintiffs was in anticipation of a contract rather than in
    performance of it, and that the risk of contract failure in this situation should have been borne by
    plaintiff, rather than by defendants. It is generally true that contracts are not formed until there has
    been a meeting of the minds on the essential terms of the bargain, Sweet v. St. Pierre, 
    2018 VT 122
    ,
    ¶¶ 13–15, 
    209 Vt. 1
    , and it is possible that, at a merits hearing, the court might see the evidence
    differently. Based upon the evidence presented at the attachment hearing, however, plaintiffs
    established by a preponderance of the evidence that the essential terms of a time-and-materials contract
    Order                                                                                   Page 2 of 4
    23-CV-05243 Master Plumbing and Heating, Inc. v. Trevor Barlow et al
    were agreed upon, and that they involved the installation of a heating system for the cost of materials
    plus agreed-upon rates for time. 1 Bruner & O’Connor on Construction Law § 2:29. Although the
    terms of the contract were sparse, the court was persuaded by the chaotic circumstances surrounding
    the formation of the agreement, and by the evidence that defendants paid the first two invoices
    submitted by plaintiff for its work. For these reasons, even after taking defendants’ modifying evidence
    into account, Felten, No. 737-10-08 Wrcv, 
    2009 WL 6356593
    , the court finds that plaintiff has
    established a “reasonable likelihood” that it will prevail at trial on its claim for breach of contract.
    Defendants assert a right to setoff for defective workmanship. See Battenkill Constr. Co., Inc.
    v. Haig’s, Inc., 
    133 Vt. 503
    , 504–05 (1975) (explaining that a defendant may “reduce the plaintiff’s
    claimed damages by proving that the services were unskillfully or negligently performed”). Defendants
    argue in particular that plaintiff performed wall perforations that were either unnecessary or
    unworkmanlike, and that these perforations had to be repaired later, by other contractors. It was
    unclear to the court at the motion hearing, however, whether the repairs were needed because the other
    contractor chose a different type of heating system, or because the perforations were undertaken in an
    unnecessary or unworkmanlike manner. At trial, expert testimony will be needed to elucidate the point.
    Trombly Plumbing & Heating v. Quinn, 
    2011 VT 70
    , ¶ 14, 
    190 Vt. 552
     (mem.). For purposes of the
    attachment hearing, defendants did not establish a reasonable likelihood of an offset based upon
    defective workmanship.
    Defendants also assert that the heating system chosen by plaintiff was unreasonable, and cost
    too much. Again, expert testimony will be needed at trial to establish the proposition. As present, the
    court knows only that plaintiff’s plan cost in the “ballpark” of $165,000, and that a different plan cost
    about a third as much. No comparative information was offered, and the court does not know what
    were the differences between the two plans, nor whether plaintiff’s plan represented a departure from
    industry standards, nor whether plaintiff’s plan was unreasonable for some other reason. Quinn, 
    2011 VT 70
    , ¶ 14, 
    190 Vt. 552
     (mem.). As such, the court cannot make predictive findings about whether
    plaintiff’s choice was a breach of contract, nor about whether plaintiff made a material
    misrepresentation when its representative said that the cost of the system would be “reasonable.” At
    present, there is no evidentiary framework or standard for evaluating that statement.
    Defendants argue finally that plaintiff misrepresented the amount of assistance that would be
    provided by Efficiency Vermont. Here, again, the evidence was not sufficient to establish the
    proposition. As far as the court could tell from the evidence presented, Efficiency Vermont is a third-
    party entity that functions in either a governmental or quasi-governmental role by encouraging certain
    types of renovation work through financial incentives. It was not explained to the court how the
    incentives work, and it was unclear whether the financial-assistance programs are organized through
    the contractor or instead through applications made by the property owner. If the programs are
    organized through the contractor, and the contractor told the client “I will obtain financial assistance
    for you from Efficiency Vermont,” and then failed to do so, that would be one thing. But if the
    programs function through applications made by a property owner, and the contractor told the client
    that “financial assistance might be available from Efficiency Vermont,” and the client never followed
    up with the entity, that would be another. It was the court’s impression from the evidence that this
    situation was more like the latter. A different impression might be established on the merits, after an
    opportunity for discovery, but, for purposes of the attachment hearing, defendants did not establish a
    Order                                                                               Page 3 of 4
    23-CV-05243 Master Plumbing and Heating, Inc. v. Trevor Barlow et al
    reasonable likelihood that a material misrepresentation occurred here. Felten, No. 737-10-08 Wrev,
    
    2009 WL 6356593
    .
    At this time, however, the court does not find a reasonable likelihood that plaintiff will prevail
    on a claim for a withholding penalty under 9 V.S.A. § 4007(b). At least on the basis of the information
    presented thus far, defendants' withholding bears a reasonable relation to the value of their claims, and
    their claims have been asserted in good faith. Birchwood Land Co., Inc. v. Ormond Bushey & Sons,
    Inc., 
    2013 VT 60
    , { 29, 
    194 Vt. 478
    ; Fletcher Hill, Inc. v. Crosbie, 
    2005 VT 1
    , 1 8, 
    178 Vt. 77
    .
    For these reasons, the court will issue an order of approval in the principal amount of
    $39,609.04, together with costs of $300.00 and estimated prejudgment interest as of today's date in the
    amount of $3,240.30, for a total approved amount of $43,149.34.
    Electronically signed on Tuesday, July 16, 2024 pursuant to V.R.E.F. 9(d).
    H. Dickson Corbett
    Superior Court Judge
    Vermont Superior Court
    Filed 07/16/24
    Windsor Unit
    Ordet                                                                                         Page 4 of 4
    23-CV-05243 Master Plumbing and Heating, Inc. v. Trevor Barlow et al
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 23-cv-5342

Filed Date: 7/25/2024

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 7/26/2024