Davila v. Deml ( 2024 )

7ermont Superior Court
Filed 06/20/24
Washington Unit
VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT KY
VE CIVIL DIVISION
Washington Unit Case No. 23-CV-03062
65 State Street
Montpelier VT 05602
802-828-2091
www.vermontjudiciary.org
Julio Davila v Nicholas Deml
Opinion and Order on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment
The uncontested summary judgment record establishes that Plaintiff JJulio Davila
absconded from furlough in Vermont, and a Commissioner's warrant for his arrest was
issued. See 28 V.S.A. § 808e(b). While at large, he picked up new charges in
Massachusetts, and was arrested and incarcerated there in part, due to the Vermont
warrant. When the Massachusetts charges were resolved in his favor, he was released
from Massachusetts custody and returned to Vermont custody. The Vermont
Department of Corrections ("DOC") stopped giving Mr. Davila credit on his Vermont
sentence when he absconded and did not resume giving him credit until he was returned
to Vermont custody. In this case, Mr. Davila claims that he is entitled to credit on his
Vermont sentence while in Massachusetts custody from the moment he was arrested in
Massachusetts. The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment addressing
whether Mr. Davila is entitled to any credit against his Vermont sentence related to his
incarceration in Massachusetts.
The Court makes the following determinations.
I. Procedural Standard
Summary judgment procedure is "an integral part of the... Rules as a whole,
which are designed 'to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every
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action.’” Morrisseau v. Fayette, 164 Vt. 358, 363 (1995) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986)). Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence in the
record, referred to in the statements required by Vt. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1), shows that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. Vt. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Gallipo v. City of Rutland, 163 Vt. 83, 86 (1994)
(summary judgment will be granted if, after adequate time for discovery, a party fails to
make a showing sufficient to establish an essential element of the case on which the
party will bear the burden of proof at trial). The Court derives the undisputed facts from
the parties’ statements of fact and the supporting documents. Boulton v. CLD
Consulting Engineers, Inc., 2003 VT 72, ¶ 29, 175 Vt. 413, 427. A party opposing
summary judgment may not simply rely on allegations in the pleadings to establish a
genuine issue of material fact. Instead, it must come forward with deposition excerpts,
affidavits, or other evidence to establish such a dispute. Murray v. White, 155 Vt. 621,
628 (1991). Speculation is insufficient. Palmer v. Furlan, 2019 VT 42, ¶ 10, 210 Vt. 375,
380. Where, as here, there are cross-motions for summary judgment, the parties
opposing summary judgment “are entitled to the benefit of all reasonable doubts and
inferences.” Montgomery v. Devoid, 2006 VT 127, ¶ 9, 181 Vt. 154, 156.
II. Analysis
Generally, inmates are entitled to sentence credit for time spent on furlough. See
28 V.S.A. § 726 (“Each day an offender is supervised in a conditional reentry program
shall be counted as one day served for the total effective sentence.”). Obviously, once an
inmate absconds, he is no longer being supervised on furlough and is not otherwise
incarcerated. Thus, when Mr. Davila absconded from furlough, the DOC stopped giving
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him sentence credit. Mr. Davila does not object to that. He argues, instead, that, once he
was arrested in Massachusetts, the Vermont DOC was required to start giving him credit
again under both 28 V.S.A. § 808e(c) and 13 V.S.A. § 7031(c). The Court is not
persuaded.
Once Mr. Davila absconded, he was no longer being supervised on furlough for
purposes of 28 V.S.A. § 726, and the DOC properly stopped crediting him as though he
were being supervised at that point. Mr. Davila relies in the first instance on 28 V.S.A. §
808e(c), which provides: “A person for whom an arrest warrant is issued pursuant to this
section [after absconding] shall not earn credit toward service of the person’s sentence for
any days that the warrant is outstanding.” Mr. Davila contends that the warrant in his
case was no longer outstanding once he was arrested in Massachusetts. He then takes
the statute to mean that, once the warrant is no longer outstanding, no matter the
circumstances, the DOC must resume giving the inmate sentence credit.
Section 808e(c), however, does not speak affirmatively as to when sentence credit
resumes after a furloughee absconds. It merely says that there can be no credit between
when the warrant issued and when the abscondee is taken back into custody. There is no
allegation that the DOC violated § 808e(c) in that regard. Had Mr. Davila been arrested
in Vermont, then his Vermont incarceration and supervision would have resumed, and it
would be true that his right to sentence credit would have as well. But that is not what
happened in this case. Section 808e(c) merely prohibits sentence credit in certain
circumstances. Mr. Davila turns it on its head by interpreting it as an affirmative
declaration to award proactively credit in circumstances where credit would not
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otherwise be appropriate. Nowhere does Mr. Davila claim that he was under DOC
supervision while incarcerated in Massachusetts.
Mr. Davila additionally maintains that he is entitled to credit while incarcerated
in Massachusetts under 13 V.S.A. § 7031(c). That statute provides: “If any such person is
committed to a jail or other place of detention to await transportation to the place at
which his or her sentence is to be served, his or her sentence shall commence to run from
the date on which he or she is received at the jail or the place of detention.” He claims
that when he was arrested in Massachusetts, he promptly waived extradition, and
thereafter was just waiting to be returned to Vermont. This argument completely
distorts the basic and undisputed facts of this case.
The undisputed record shows that Mr. Davila’s incarceration in Massachusetts
lasted as long as his Massachusetts charges did. He was not simply waiting to be
returned to Vermont. He was also waiting for his Massachusetts charges to be resolved
and subject to $20,000 bail in that jurisdiction. As a result, his Vermont sentence was
not the only basis for his detention in Massachusetts.
Under such circumstances, Vermont law is clear: “Where a Vermont defendant
seeks presentence credit for days spent in custody in another jurisdiction, he bears the
burden of establishing that the charge on which sentence is imposed was the sole basis of
the custody at issue.” State v. Coe, 150 Vt. 448, 452 (1988) (emphasis added). Mr. Davila
simply cannot make that showing in this case. Accordingly, even if Plaintiff were
somehow correct as to his interpretation of Section 808e(c), Coe would preclude him from
receiving credit under the circumstances of this case.
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Ultimately, Mr. Davila has failed to prove that the DOC improperly failed to give
him sentence credit during his incarceration in Massachusetts.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Davila’s summary judgment motion is denied; the
State’s is granted.
Electronically signed on Wednesday, June 19, 2024, per V.R.E.F. 9(d).
_______________________
Timothy B. Tomasi
Superior Court Judge
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