State v. A.M. ( 2019 )

This opinion was
yrrtTEIN CLERKS OFFICE
filed for record
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Susan L. Carlson
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GMIB'JUSJKE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
No. 96354-1
Respondent,
V. En Banc
A.M., a minor.
Petitioner. Filed SEP 1 2 2019
J
MADSEN,J.—^A.M., a juvenile, appeals an unpublished Court of Appeals decision
affirming her conviction for possession of a controlled substance. First, A.M. argues that
it was manifest constitutional error for the trial court to admit a detention center inventory
form where she signed a sworn statement indicating that a backpack, which was
discovered to contain methamphetamine, was her property because it violated her right
against self-incrimination. Second, A.M. argues that the affirmative defense of unwitting
possession is an unconstitutional burden-shifting scheme that violates her due process
rights.
No. 96354-1
We hold the admission of the inventory form is manifest constitutional error
because it violated her right against self-incrimination and warrants reversal because it is
not harmless error. Because we find reversible constitutional error, we decline to consider
A.M.'s due process argument and remand the case back to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FACTS
Background Facts
A.M. entered a Goodwill store with two other women, a juvenile and an adult,
pushing a shopping cart with a backpack in it. The adult woman put two Halloween
costumes in the cart, and A.M. opened the large pocket of the backpack to put the
costumes in. The loss prevention officer observed the entire incident on the security
cameras in the store. As the three women were leaving the store without paying for the
costumes, A.M. put the backpack on her back. The loss prevention officer stopped A.M.
just outside of the store. A.M. was detained and escorted to Goodwill's security room to
await police officers. When police arrived, they arrested A.M. for theft.
In a search incident to the arrest, police also searched the backpack and, in one of
the smaller outer pockets, found a prescription bottle that looked to be a marijuana
dispensary bottle filled with what appeared to be several little "baggies" inside. The
officer believed it was methamphetamine and took the baggies for further testing. The
substance was confirmed to be methamphetamine.
No. 96354-1
A.M. was booked in the juvenile detention center. At some point after her arrest,
but prior to being booked, A.M. invoked her Miranda^ rights. A.M. was required to sign
an inventory form accounting for her belongings, which read,"I have read the above
accounting of my property and money and find it to be accurate. I realize that property
not claimed within 30 days will be subject to disposal." Ex. Transmittal Certificate, Ex. 3.
When released, A.M. signed the same form, which stated,"I have received the above
listed property." Id. The backpack was listed in the inventory form as part of A.M.'s
belongings.
Procedural Facts
A.M. was charged with one count of third degree theft and one count of possession
of a controlled substance. Clerk's Papers(CP)at 54-55. The case proceeded to bench
trial. At trial, the State sought to admit the detention center inventory form, which
indicated the backpack was A.M.'s property. The trial court admitted the form over
defense counsel's objection.
A.M. also raised the imwitting possession affirmative defense. She testified that
she had no knowledge ofthe methamphetamine in the backpack and that she got the
backpack from the other juvenile's home. Verbatim Report ofProceedings(VRP)
(Feb. 14,2017) at 108. A.M. testified it was likely the other juvenile's or the adult
woman's backpack and not hers. Id. at 107-08. The trial court rejected A.M.'s unwitting
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602,16 L. Ed. 2d 694(1966).
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No. 96354-1
possession defense and convicted her of both counts. She was sentenced to two days of
custody with credit for time served and no probation.
A.M. appealed her possession of a controlled substance conviction. A.M. raised
for the first time on appeal that the admission of the inventory form was a violation of her
right against self-incrimination, and she also argued that the unwitting possession defense
was a violation of due process. The Court of Appeals declined to review her Fifth
Amendment claim, holding that even if there was error, it caused no prejudice to her case
and, as such, she does not meet the requirements for RAP 2.5(a)(3). See State v. A.M.,
No. 76758-5-1,(Wash. Ct. App. July 30, 2018)(unpublished),
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/767585.pdf. The court also rejected her due
process argument.
A.M. petitioned for review in this court on her due process claim and Fifth
Amendment claim. We granted review.
ANALYSIS
The asserted error is reviewable under RAP 2.5
A.M. argues that admitting the detention center inventory form violates her right
against self-incrimination. Trial counsel objected to the evidence on relevancy grounds,
and the exhibit was admitted. The Court of Appeals declined to review the issue because
it held that A.M. failed to meet the requirements of RAP 2.5(a)(3) when she failed to
show actual prejudice.
Ordinarily, we do not consider unpreserved errors raised for the first time on
review. State v. Scott, 110 Wn.2d 682, 685, 757 P.2d 492(1988). However, manifest
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No. 96354-1
errors affecting a constitutional right may be raised for the first time on appeal. RAP
2.5(a)(3); In re Dependency ofM.S.R., 174 Wn.2d 1, 11, 271 P.3d 234(2012). To
determine whether manifest constitutional error was committed there must be a
'"plausible showing by the [appellant] that the asserted error had practical and identifiable
consequences in the trial ofthe case.'" State v. O'Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 99, 217 P.3d 756(2009)(alteration in original)(internal quotation marks omitted)(quoting State v.
Kirkman, 159 Wn.2d 918, 935, 155 P.3d 125 (2007)).
RAP 2.5(a)(3) serves as a "gatekeeping function." State v. Lamar, 180 Wn.2d 576,
583, 327 P.3d 46 (2014). The purpose of the rule is different from actually reviewing the
claimed error. Id. "The requirements under RAP 2.5(a)(3) should not be confused with
the requirements for establishing an actual violation of a constitutional right or for
establishing lack of prejudice under a harmless error analysis if a violation of a
constitutional right has occurred." Id.Here, the Court of Appeals held that because the alleged error caused no prejudice,
it would not review the claim. However, RAP 2.5(a)(3) requires only that the defendant
make a plausible showing that the error resulted in actual prejudice, meaning there were
practical and identifiable consequences at trial. See id.It is well settled that article I, section 9 of the Washington State Constitution and
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution afford a defendant the right against
self-incrimination. When placing suspects in custody, police must advise them of their
right to remain silent and their right to an attorney before interrogation. See Miranda, 384
U.S. at 445. Absent a valid waiver, statements obtained from an individual in custody are
5
No. 96354-1
presumed to be involuntary and violate the Fifth Amendment. State v. Sargent, 111
Wn.2d 641, 648, 762 P.2d 1127 (1988). A person is "in custody" when her freedom of
movement is restricted. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 494-95, 97 S. Ct. 711, 50 L.
Ed. 2d 714(1977). An "interrogation" is "any words or actions on the part of the police
... that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response
from the suspect." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 64 L. Ed.
2d 297(1980)(footnote omitted).
When a defendant is placed in custody and has invoked her Miranda rights, any
words or actions on the part of the police that are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response violate the Fifth Amendment. Although certain standard intake
procedures may be required, we have held that using those procedures against a
defendant's will violates the Fifth Amendment. See State v. Juarez DeLeon, 185 Wn.2d
478, 487, 374 P.3d 95 (2016). For example, in DeLeon, the defendants were asked to fill
out a gang affiliation form as part of the jail's booking process. Id. at 484. At their trial,
the judge admitted the defendants' statements on the form over the objection of defense
counsel. Id. We held that while the questions were meant for the purpose of protecting
inmates from "real and immediate threats of violence," the defendants' Fifth Amendment
rights were violated by presenting those statements as evidence. Id. at 488-89.
A.M. meets the first part of RAP 2.5(a)(3) because the asserted error clearly
implicates her Fifth Amendment right. Moreover, A.M. makes a plausible showing that
the error had practical and identifiable consequences at trial because the trial court
admitted the evidence over the objection of counsel, albeit on different grounds. The
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No. 96354-1
error is manifest from the record. We thus proceed to the merits ofthe raised
constitutional error.
It was error to admit the inventory form
When A.M. was arrested by police, she invoked her Miranda rights.^ She was
unquestionably in custody when she was arrested at Goodwill and transported to the
juvenile detention center. Thus, any words or actions on the part of the police that were
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response violate the Fifth Amendment. A.M.
was required to sign an inventory form listing the backpack, which held the
methamphetamine.^ Above the signature lines were two statements: "I have read the
above accounting of my property and money and find it to be accurate. I realize that
property not claimed within 30 days will be subject to disposal" and "I have received the
above listed property." Ex. Transmittal Certificate, Ex. 3 (emphasis added).
While a standard intake form itself does not necessarily violate a defendant's Fifth
Amendment rights, the signed statement on the intake form violated A.M.'s right against
self-inerimination. She was clearly in custody, and signing the intake form was
involuntary. At trial, the juvenile center supervisor testified that the juvenile signs the
intake form after reviewing it with staff. VRP at 89(Feb. 14, 2017). Any refusal to sign
the form or disagreement with the inventory list by the juvenile would be noted on the
^ It is unclear exactly when she invoked her Miranda rights because defense counsel filed a
motion in limine to prevent any mention of A.M.'s invocation of her right, but it was sometime
after she was arrested but prior to her being booked at the detention center. See CP at 51-52;
VRP (Feb. 14, 2017) at 10-11, 60-61.
^ At trial, the detention center supervisor noted that the center's goal is to ensure people leave
with the items they came in with for "liability" purposes. VRP (Feb. 14, 2017) at 102-03.
No. 96354-1
sheet. Id. at 96. Requiring a juvenile to sign a form with that statement would be
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.
The manifest constitutional error was not harmless
Next, we consider whether the manifest error was harmless. A constitutional error
is harmless if"it appears 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not
contribute to the verdict obtained.'" State v. Brown, 147 Wn.2d 330, 341, 58 P.3d 889(2002)(internal quotation marks omitted)(quoting Aec/er v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 15,
119 S. Ct. 1827, 144 L. Ed. 2d 35 (1999)). "An error is not harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt where there is a reasonable probability that the outcome ofthe trial would have
been different had the error not occurred." State v. Powell, 126 Wn.2d 244, 267, 893 P.2d
615 (1995){citmg State v. Benn, 120 Wn.2d 631, 649, 845 P.2d 289 (1993)). "A
reasonable probability exists when confidence in the outcome of the trial is undermined."
Id.During closing arguments, when addressing the unwitting possession defense, the
prosecutor stated,"We know that she signed for the backpack, indicated it was her
property when she was booked in. We know that she signed for it again when she was
released, even though today she has testified that it wasn't her backpack." VRP at 118-
19. In essence, the prosecutor directly addressed and contradicted A.M.'s unwitting
possession defense by relying on the inventory form to support the conviction. Without
the admission of the intake form, the prosecutor would not have been able to use A.M.'s
statements in the form to refute her unwitting possession defense.
No. 96354-1
The State bears the burden of proving that the constitutional error was harmless.
DeLeon, 185 Wn.2d at 488. Here, the State argues there is overwhelming evidence that
"the property slip played no part in A.M.'s conviction." Suppl. Br. of Resp't at 5. The
State points to the trial court's oral findings and lack of reliance on the property sheet, as
well as the findings offact as "verities on appeal." Id. at 4-5.
At the conclusion of trial, the court stated:
Quite jfrankly, whether she removed the backpack or whether the
backpack went with her from detention really was not a big factor in my
case. It was only—-it was that she was the only one that was possessing the
backpack, and I don't find that there was unwitting possession in this
matter.
VRP (Feb. 22,2017) at 134. While the trial judge noted it was "a close case," she
"looked at a number of... things" and found that "the respondent was the only person
that was putting items in the backpack,[and] she was tlie one tliat walked out with the
backpack." Id. at 133-34. Thus, the State argues that their burden to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt A.M. would have still been convicted is satisfied.
But A.M. need prove only by a preponderance of the evidence the affirmative
defense of unwitting possession. See State v. Deer, 175 Wn.2d 725, 735, 287 P.3d 539(2012)(noting the affmnative defense "'ameliorates the harshness of a strict liability
crime.'"(quoting State v. Bradshaw, 152 Wn.2d 528, 538, 98 P.3d 1190 (2004))). A.M.
testified that the backpack was not hers and that she believed it belonged to one of tlie
other two women who were with her "[bjecause it came from their house" and she "[saw
the two women] bring it out of their house." VRP (Feb. 14, 2017) at 108. The State
relied on her property form to counter that testimony.
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No. 96354-1
Further, A.M. testified that she never looked into the outer pocket of the backpack
where the methamphetamine was found, and the evidence showed only that A.M. put the
costumes into the main pouch of the backpack. Id. She also testified that even though the
backpack was not her property, she took it from the detention center only because "it
belonged to my best friend and her family at the time." M at 110. When A.M. returned
the backpack to her friend, she confronted her friend, asking why the methamphetamine
was in the backpack. Id. A.M. testified that she never knew methamphetamine was in the
bag and that she had never seen the pill bottle or the little baggies before. Id. ?Lt\\\. In
sum, A.M. testified that the adult female put the children's costumes into the cart and that
A.M. placed the costumes into the large pocket of the backpack. Id. at 107-09. The
costumes were children's costumes, and A.M. had no children. See id. at 107 (indicating
the costumes were for the adult woman's children). No witness saw A.M. look into the
small side pocket where the drugs were found. The only testimony about ownership of
the backpack came from A.M., who said that it came from the adult female's home and
that A.M. did not own the backpack. A.M. also testified that the adult female was "under
the influence." Id. at 109.
At the conclusion of trial, the judge said she did not believe A.M."perjur[ed
herself]." VRP (Apr. 11, 2017) at 157. But the only evidence in the record that
reasonably contradicts unwitting possession of the methamphetamine is the admitted
inventory form signed by A.M. that indicates the backpack as her property. The
prosecutor referenced the fact that A.M. signed for the backpack as her own on at least
two different occasions in the record. See VRP (Feb. 14, 2017) at 118-19; VRP (Apr. 11,
10
No. 96354-1
2017) at 149. Even though the trial court said the inventory form was "not a big factor," it
did consider that evidence in making its decision. VRP (Feb. 22, 2017) at 134. Based on
a review of the entire record, it is difficult to say beyond a reasonable doubt, the trier
would reach the same conclusion absent the manifest constitutional error.
We hold the admission of the inventory form was manifest constitutional error in
violation of A.M.'s right against self-incrimination. As such, we reverse the lower
court's decision that the admission of the inventory form was proper.
Because we find there was reversible error here, we find delving into A.M.'s
due process argument is unnecessary and decline to address it.
CONCLUSION
Admission of the inventory form with the compelled statement was manifest
constitutional error in violation of A.M.'s right against self-incrimination. Because it is
unclear whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt absent the unconstitutional
evidence that A.M. committed the crime of possession of a controlled substance, we
reverse the Court of Appeals and remand the case back to the trial court for further
proceedings.
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No. 96354-1
WE CONCUR:
tC. A
y
12
State V. A.M.,^0. 96354-1
(Gordon McCloud, J., concurring)
No. 96354-1
GORDON McCLOUD,J.(concurring)—I agree with the majority that A.M.
asserts a manifest constitutional error subject to review under RAP 2.5. I further
agree that the asserted error—admission ofthe signed intake form—violated
A.M.'s article I, section 9 and Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination.
Wash. Const, art. I, § 9; U.S. Const, amend. V. And I agree that on this record,
those errors were not harmless. I therefore join the majority's analysis of that issue
in full.
I write separately because I believe that we must reach the pressing issue
that the majority declines to address: the ongoing criminalization of innocent
conduct in Washington's war on drugs, as permitted by two ofthis court's
decisions. See RAP 13.4(b)(3),(4). In State v. Cleppe, 96 Wn.2d 373, 635 P.2d
435 (1981), and State v. Bradshaw, 152 Wn.2d 528, 98 P.3d 1190(2004), this
court held that the legislature intended basic drug possession, RCW 69.50.4013,' to
' RCW 69.50.401(d) was the statute interpreted in 96 Wn.2d at 375.
RCW 69.50.4013 is that statute recodified. Laws OF 2003, ch. 53, §§ 331, 334.
1
State V. y4.M, No. 96354-1
(Gordon McCloud, J., concurring)
be a strict liability felony. As a result, the State never needs to prove that a
defendant knowingly possessed drugs when it prosecutes basic drug possession
cases. And without having proved knowing possession, the State may seek—and a
court may impose—a sentence of up to five years' imprisonment and a $10,000
fine. RCW 69.50.4013(2); RCW 9A.20.021(l)(c). Along with those sanctions
come the social stigma of felony drug possession and its attendant collateral
consequences.
Though grievously wrong, Cleppe and Bradshaw are now settled law, and I
am obliged to follow the statutory interpretation that they provide. A statute's
settled interpretation does not, however, insulate the statute from a test of its
constitutional validity. I would hold that the settled interpretation of Washington's
basic drug possession statute offends due process insofar as it permits heavy
criminal sanctions for completely innocent conduct. RCW 69.50.4013. This is
especially true where, as here, the defendant is a juvenile.
Analysis
I. Our Settled Law Provides That Washington's Basic Drug Possession
Statute Contains No Mens Rea Element of Any Kind
In Cleppe and Bradshaw, this court held that a defendant may be convicted
of possession of a controlled substance—Washington's low-level drug possession
offense—even if the defendant was unaware that they possessed drugs. This
State V. AM,No. 96354-1
(Gordon McCloud, J., concurring)
holding extended to both knowledge of possession itself and knowledge that the
substance possessed was, in fact, a drug. Accordingly, all that is required for
conviction is the fact of possession, knowing or unknowing.
Cleppe and Bradshaw dramatically departed from statute, common law, and
traditional methods of interpretation, and they were incorrect when they were
decided. But having been on the books so long, without legislative revision, they
are now the law of the land. Our doctrine of legislative acquiescence compels that
conclusion.
A. Courts Always Read a Mens Rea Element into a Criminal
Statute—Unless the Legislature Expressly States Its Intent To
Create a Strict Liability Crime
American courts have long recognized that guilt requires a criminal mindset,
or mens rea. This "contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when
inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and
persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a
consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and
evil." Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250, 72 S. Ct. 240, 96 L. Ed. 2d
288 (1952). A criminal offense is "generally constituted only from concurrence of
an evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing hand." Id. at 251. This understanding
"took deep and early root in American soil." Id. at 252.
State V. A.M., No.96354-1
(Gordon McCloud, J., concurring)
Because "'[t]he existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the
exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence,'" Staples v.
United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 128 L. Ed. 2d 608(1994)
(alteration in original)(quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422,
436,98 S. Ct. 2864, 57 L. Ed. 2d 854(1978)), courts apply "a longstanding
presumption, traceable to the common law," that every statutory offense contains a
mens rea element, Rehaifv. United States, U.S. , 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2195, 204
L. Ed. 2d 594(2019)(citing United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64,
72, 115 S. Ct. 464, 130 L. Ed. 2d 372(1994); Morissette, 342 U.S. at 256-58).
"We apply the presumption in favor of scienter even when Congress does not
specify any scienter in the statutory text." Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2195 (citing
Staples, 511 U.S. at 606)(possessing firearms); see also Elonis v. United States,
U.S. _,135 S. Ct. 2001, 2009-11,192 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2015)(making threats);
Posters 'N' Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513, 522, 114 S. Ct. 1747, 128
L. Ed. 2d 539(1994)(selling drug paraphernalia); United States v. Int'I Minerals
& Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 559-60, 91 S. Ct. 1697, 29 L. Ed. 2d 178(1971)
(shipping hazardous materials); Morissette, 342 U.S. at 263-64(converting federal
property to one's own use); State v. Anderson, 141 Wn.2d 357, 366, 5 P.3d 1247(2000)(possessing firearms); State v. Martin, 73 Wn.2d 616, 624-25,440 P.2d 429State V. A.M.^ No. 96354-1
(Gordon McCloud, J., concurring)
(1968)(leaving the scene of a vehicle collision). This presumption in favor of
mens rea becomes stronger as the offense's penalties become harsher. Rehaif, 139
S. Ct. at 2197; Anderson, 141 Wn.2d at 364. The common law's demand for a
mens rea is even strong enough to displace a statute's "most natural grammatical
reading." X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 68-69.^
Of course, this is notjust the common law; it is common sense. Strict
liability offenses have the potential to criminalize innocent conduct. To avoid that
unjust result, legal thinkers across the ideological spectrum support the
presumption in favor of mens rea. See John G. Malcolm,Morally Innocent,
Legally Guilty: The Casefor Mens Rea Reform, 18 FEDERALIST Soc'y Re:v. 40
(2017); Br. of Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in
Supp. of Pet'r, Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2195(No. 17-9560).^ And "[t]he cases in
^ The presumption, of course, is just a presumption. The legislature may rebut the
presumption with an express statement that makes its intent to create a strict liability
offense clear. For example, the legislature could state that "'[t]his section shall not be
construed to require the [State] to prove a state of mind with respect to any element of the
offense defined in this section.'" John G. Malcolm,Morally Innocent, Legally Guilty:
The Casefor Mens Rea Reform, 18 FEDERALIST SOC'Y REV.40,45(2017)
[https://perma.cc/N37B-FUCP].
^ A bipartisan group of federal lawmakers has even pushed to codify the United
States Supreme Court's practice of reading mens rea into silent or ambiguous criminal
statutes. See Matt Ford, Could a Controversial Bill Sink Criminal-Justice Reform in
Congress?, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 26, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.eom/politics/archive/2017/10/will-congress-reform-criminal-
intent/544014/; John Villasenor, Over-criminalization and Mens Rea Reform: A Primer,
5
State V. ^.M,No. 96354-1
(Gordon McCIoud, J., concurring)
which [the United States Supreme Court has] emphasized scienter's importance in
separating wrongful from innocent acts are legion." Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2196-97
(citing cases).
B. Our State Legislature Reinforced That Rule by Directing
Washington Courts To Interpret Washington Penal Statutes
against the Backdrop of the Common Law
In Washington, courts must "supplement all penal statutes of this state" with
"[t]he provisions of the common law relating to the commission of crime and the
punishment thereof "insofar as not inconsistent with the Constitution and statutes
of this state." RCW 9A.04.060. We have held that compliance with this directive
permits the courts to rely on the common law to determine the elements of crimes.
See State V. Chavez, 163 Wn.2d 262, 273-74, 180 P.3d 1250 (2008). Indeed,"the
judiciary would be acting contrary to the legislature's legitimate, express
expectations, as well as failing to fulfill judicial duties, if the courts did not employ
long-standing common law definitions to fill in legislative blanks in statutory
crimes." State v. David, 134 Wn. App. 470, 481, 141 P.3d 646 (2006).
Washington courts must therefore follow the long-standing common law
practice of reading mens rea into criminal offenses, absent express legislative
Brookings Institution (Dec. 22, 2015),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2015/12/22/over-criminalization-and-mens-rea-
reform-a-primer/ [https://perma.cc/Z88L-ETGU].
State V. AM,No. 96354-1
(Gordon McCloud, J., concurring)
intent to the contrary. Doing so is "not inconsistent with the Constitution and
statutes of this state." RCW 9A.04.060. Rather, as the United States Supreme
Court has indicated, following that rule avoids a confrontation with the
constitution. Staples, 511 U.S. at 616-19; Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150,
80 S. Ct. 215,4 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1959)(citmg Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225,
78 S. Ct. 240, 2 L. Ed. 2d 228 (1957)).
C. Cleppe and Bradshaw Did Not Follow the Common Law Rule
That We Always Interpret a Mens Rea Element into a Criminal
Statute
Cleppe and Bradshaw departed from the common law rule and, with it, from
legislative intent.
1. The Drug Possession Statute Is Silent on Mens Rea
RCW 69.50.4013(1), the basic drug possession statute, states, "It is unlawful
for any person to possess a controlled substance . . . ." The statute makes no
mention ofthe mindset that must accompany the possession. Cf RCW 9A.08.010
(defining "intent," "knowledge," "recklessness," and "criminal negligence"). But
neither does the statute expressly provide that the State need not prove a state of
mind. Cf supra p. 5 n.2. Thus, applying the common law's presumption in favor
of mens rea, as the legislature has directed, the statute should be read to require
some showing of a guilty mind.
State V. yl.M, No. 96354-1
(Gordon McCloud, J., concurring)
Such a reading is consistent with the statute's context. See Dep't ofEcology
V. Campbell & Gwinn LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 11-12, 43 P.3d 4(2002)(holding that a
statute's context bears on its plain meaning). In State v. Boyer, this court
interpreted another drug statute within the same chapter ofthe revised code.
91 Wn.2d 342, 588 P.2d 1151 (1979). That statute made it '"unlawful for any
person to manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a
controlled substance.'" Id. at 344(quoting RCW 69.50.401(a)). We held that the
statute's partial silence required us to construe mens rea as part of the offense. We
said:
The issue is whether guilty knowledge, an understanding of the
identity of the product being delivered, is a part of the crime. The
intent language in the statute does not appear to resolve this issue
since that language, rather, addresses a different question, whether or
not there is an "intent to manufacture or deliver." The language of the
statute thus provides no guidance on the issue before us. However,
without the mental element of knowledge, even a postal carrier would
be guilty of the crime were he innocently to deliver a package which
in fact contained a forbidden narcotic. Such a result is not intended by
the legislature. Accordingly, absent express legislative language to
the contrary, we find in the context of this statute, its history and
language, that guilty knowledge is intrinsic to the definition of the
crime itself. Guilty knowledge must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt in conviction of this defendant under the statute.
Id. Accordingly, if a defendant truly believes that the cocaine he handed to his
neighbor was baking powder, he has not committed the offense and cannot be
convicted. The basic drug possession statute should be read the same way. See
8
State V. y4.M, No. 96354-1
(Gordon McCloud, J., concurring)
Morissette, 342 U.S. at 269 (doubting the likelihood of"one crime without intent
[being] smuggled into a section whose dominant offenses do require intent").
2. Cleppe Did Not Apply the Rule of Statutory
Interpretation Requiring the Court To Read a Mens Rea
Element into the Drug Possession Statute
But Cleppe did not follow Boyer, the common law presumption in favor of
mens rea, or the legislature's directive to apply the common law. Rather, faced
with the basic drug possession statute's silence on mens rea, the Cleppe court
looked to legislative history. 96 Wn.2d at 378-80. And that legislative history
drove the court's conclusion that "the legislative intent is clear"—mens rea is not
an element of the offense of basic drug possession, despite the offense being a
felony crime. Id. at 380. For all the reasons described above, that interpretation
was at odds with legislative intent and the court's usual methods of statutory
interpretation.
In reviewing the statute's legislative history, the court notably departed from
the accepted methods of statutory interpretation in another way as well: it failed to
apply the rule of lenity. The rule of lenity requires that '"ambiguity concerning the
ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.'" United States v.
Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347,92 S. Ct. 515, 30 L. Ed. 2d 488(1971)(quoting Rewis v.
United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812, 91 S. Ct. 1056, 28 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1971)). "This
State V. A.M., No. 96354-1
(Gordon McCloud, J., concurring)
principle is founded on two policies that have long been part of our tradition. First,
'a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world
will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. To make
the warning fair, so far as possible the line should be clear.'" Id. at 348 (quoting
McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27, 51 S. Ct. 340, 75 L. Ed. 816 (1931)).
"Second, because of the seriousness of criminal penalties, and because criminal
punishment usually represents the moral condemnation of the community,
legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity. This policy embodies
'the instinctive distaste against men languishing in prison unless the lawmaker has
clearly said they should.'" Id. (quoting Henry J. Friendly,Benchmarks 209
(1967)). Thus, because we resort to legislative history only when a statute is
ambiguous, Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wn.2d at 12, but we resolve ambiguous
criminal statutes in favor of the defendant(and against the drafter—the State)
under the rule of lenity,'^ we should not rely on legislative histoiy to interpret
criminal statutes when the rule of lenity suffices. The Cleppe court's decision to
do so was error.^
4 State V. Weatherwax, 188 Wn.2d 139, 153-56, 392 P.3d 1054 (2017); In re Pers.
Restraint ofHopkins, 137 Wn.2d 897, 901, 976 P.2d 616 (1999).
^ Cleppe also may have inappropriately disregarded another canon of statutory
interpretation: avoiding absurd results. See State v. Fe/a, 100 Wn.2d 636, 641, 673 P.2d
185 (1983)(citing Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. Dep't ofLabor & Indus., 98 Wn.2d 102,
10
State V. A.M.,lSo. 96354-1
(Gordon McCloud, J., concurring)
The departure from the usual rules of statutory interpretation is also evident
in Cleppe's adoption of an extratextual,judicially constructed, affirmative defense.
In conflict with its erroneous conclusion that the legislature intended basic drug
possession to be a strict liability felony, the Cleppe court created an affirmative
defense of unwitting possession out of whole cloth. 96 Wn.2d at 380-81. We
justified that creation as a way to "ameliorate[] the harshness" caused by our
mistaken view of legislative intent. Mat 381. We reasoned;
That unwitting possession has been allowed as an affirmative
defense in simple possession cases may seem anomalous. If guilty
knowledge or intent to possess are not elements of the crime, of what
avail is it for the defendant to prove his possession was
unwitting? Such a provision ameliorates the harshness of the almost
strict criminal liability our law imposes for unauthorized possession of
a controlled substance. If the defendant can affirmatively establish his
"possession" was unwitting, then he had no possession for which the
law will convict. The burden of proof, however, is on the defendant.
Id. at 380-81. Without citation to authority and contrary to legislative intent,
"[tjhis [was]judicial legislation in its most direct form." City ofKennewick v.
Day, 142 Wn.2d 1, 16, 11 P.3d 304(2000)(Talmadge, J., concurring). Notably,
had we followed the appropriate methodology to interpret the statute, and read a
653 P.2d 626 (1982); Whitehead v. Dep't ofSac. & Health Servs., 92 Wn.2d 265, 595
P.2d 926 (1979)). As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, it would be "not
merely odd, but positively absurd" to conclude that a felony statute criminalizes
unwitting conduct. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 69.
11
State V. A.M.,^0. 96354-1
(Gordon McCloud, J., concurring)
mens rea into that statute from the start, we would never have been in the position
of performing this legislative act.
For this multitude of reasons, Cleppe was incorrectly decided.
3. Endorsed C/e/?/?e's Error
We nonetheless reaffirmed Cleppe 23 years later when we decided
Bradshaw. We again looked to legislative history to guide our decision.
Bradshaw, 152 Wn.2d at 532-33, 537. And we again endorsed our judicially
constructed affirmative defense because it "ameliorates the harshness of a strict
liability crime." Id. at 538 (citing Cleppe, 96 Wn.2d at 380-81). We rejected the
notion that "legislative direction to dispense with criminal intent must be crystal
clear." Id. at 540 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
We also stood by Cleppe in the face oftwo new arguments. We held that
"possession" is not a term of art that incorporates loiowledge. Id. at 538 (declining
to loWow State v. Hornaday, 105 Wn.2d 120, 125, 713 P.2d 71 (1986), which held
that "possession" "clear[ly], plain[ly] and unambiguous[ly]" requires knowledge of
the substance being possessed). And we held that the fact that Washington was
one of only two states to allow convictions for basic drug possession without proof
of knowledge did not require rethinking C/e/Tpe. Id. at 534-35. We reached that
conclusion in spite of the fact that the legislature modeled its drug statutes on a
12
State V. A.M., No. 96354-1
(Gordon McCloud, J., concurring)
uniform act and directed us to interpret the statutes '"to effectuate [the] general
purpose to make uniform the law.'" Id. (quoting RCW 69.50.603).
Finally, we repeatedly suggested that the legislature had acquiesced in our
holding in Cleppe. Id. at 533, 535, 537, 539. We noted that "[sjince Cleppe, the
legislature has amended [the basic drug possession statute] seven times and has not
added a mens rea element." Id. at 533 (citing session laws). Accordingly, we
upheld Cleppe's erroneous interpretation.
D. The Legislature Has Acquiesced in Cleppe's and Bradshaw's
Interpretation of the Drug Possession Statute
This court follows the rule that the legislature's failure to amend a statute
after we interpret it shows that the legislature agrees with our interpretation. As
Judge Korsmo has explained:
The purpose of statutory construction is to give effect to the meaning
of legislation. Once a court has construed a statute, the legislative
branch is free to clarify its intent by altering the statute if it sees fit.
If it does not do so, then we presume the legislature is satisfied with
the interpretation. At some point, legislative acquiescence in the
interpretation is assumed. When that point is reached, courts
essentially lose the ability to change their mind about what the statute
means.
City ofFederal Way v. Koenig, 167 Wn.2d 341, 352, 217 P.3d 1172(2009)
(Korsmo, J. Pro Tem., concurring)(footnote and citations omitted). At that point.
13
State V. A.M., No. 96354-1
(Gordon McCIoud, J., concurring)
"[t]he legislative process . . . becomes the sole method of changing the statute's
interpretation." Id.In Buchanan v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, for example, we
adhered to a long-standing interpretation of a statute, despite many reasons to
doubt its correctness. 94 Wn.2d 508, 617 P.2d 1004(1980). We began by
expressing concern that we had employed an improper methodology when we first
interpreted the statute. Id. at 511; see also id. at 514 (Rosellini, J., concurring)
(noting that the interpretation rendered in the previous case was "perhaps not
adhering to the exact letter of the enactment"). We also recognized that the United
States Supreme Court subsequently reached "[a]n opposite result. . . construing an
identical federal statute." Id. at 509-10 (citing United Mine Workers v. Gihhs, 383
U.S. 715, 86 S. Ct. 1130, 16 L. Ed. 2d 218 (1966)). We nonetheless declined to
revisit our established interpretation. Because 22 legislative sessions had come
and gone over 17 years without the legislature amending the statute, we held that
"it was and is the policy of the legislature to concur in" the established rule. Id.at511.
If the passage oftime and legislative amendments are the sole
considerations, the case for acquiescence is even stronger here. Thirty-eight years
have passed since this court decided Cleppe. Bradshaw reaffirmed Cleppe, and 15
14 "
State V. /i.M, No. 96354-1
(Gordon McCIoud, J., concurring)
years have passed since we decided Bradshaw. Additionally, the legislature, or the
people acting through the initiative, have amended the basic drug possession
statute 11 times since Cleppe.^ Many of the most recent amendments have
deescalated Washington's war on drugs. E.g., Laws OF 2013, ch. 3 (Initiative
502). But neither the people nor the legislature have corrected our error and
clarified that mens rea is an element that the State must prove in basic drug
possession prosecutions. Against the backdrop of those amendments and over that
long period of time, the legislature's and the people's continuing inaction on
Cleppe and Bradshaw is considered silent assent under our case law. See 1000
Friends of Wash. v. McFarland, 159 Wn.2d 165, 181-82, 149 P.3d 616(2006)
(plurality opinion); id. at 190(Madsen, J., concurring).
The case for acquiescence takes on even greater strength in light of the
number of basic drug possession cases that move through Washington courts and,
correspondingly, the number of times we have relied on Cleppe and Bradshaw in
other cases. See, e.g.. Day, 142 Wn.2d at 10-11; State v. Staley, 123 Wn.2d 794,
799, 872 P.2d 502(1994); see also State v. Schmeling, 191 Wn. App. 795, 801,
^ See Laws of 2017, ch. 317, § 15; LAWS of 2015 2d Spec. Sess., ch. 4, § 503;
Laws OF 2015, ch. 70, § 14; Laws of 2013, ch. 3, § 20 (Initiative 502); Laws of 2003,
ch. 53, §§ 331, 334; Laws OF 1998, ch. 290, § 1; Laws of 1998, ch. 82, § 2; Laws of
1997, ch. 71, § 2; Laws of 1996, ch. 205, § 2; Laws of 1989, ch. 271, § 104; Laws of
1987; ch. 458, §4.
15
State V. A.M.,^0. 96354-1
(Gordon McCloud, J., concurring)
365 P.3d 202(2015); State v. Sanders, 66 Wn. App. 380, 389-90, 832 P.2d 1326(1992); State v. Adame, 56 Wn. App. 803, 806-09, 785 P.2d 1144(1990); State v.
Knapp, 54 Wn. App. 314, 773 P.2d 134 (1989). So the legislature's and the
people's silence cannot be attributed to the obscurity of our decisions. Cleppe and
Bradshaw struck at the heart of our criminal law and social policies. The
legislative silence is thus all the more deafening. AccordKoenig, \61 Wn.2d at
353-54(Korsmo, J. Pro Tem., concurring).
Still, there are at least two qualifications to this conclusion. First, it is
debatable whether a finding of legislative acquiescence is constitutionally
permissible when the text of a criminal statute cannot support the court's long
standing interpretation using ordinary principles of statutory interpretation. Rather,
due process might require reinterpretation of the statute because "fair warning
concerning conduct rendered illegal" is foundational to our justice system.
Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427, 105 S. Ct. 2084, 85 L. Ed. 2d 434(1985)(citing Bass, 404 U.S. at 348). The United States Supreme Court has
avoided this question by correctly holding that a silent statute unambiguously
includes a mens rea element. See Staples, 511 U.S. at 619 n.l7; Liparota, 471 U.S.
at 427 (citing cases).
16
State V. ^.M,No. 96354-1
(Gordon McCloud, J., concurring)
Second, assuming that legislative acquiescence is constitutionally
permissible in this situation, it is unclear whether acquiescence in Cleppe and
Bradshaw, cases involving adult offenders, extends to cases involving juveniles.
The reason is that the legislature sometimes treats juveniles as the victims in drug
crimes, not the perpetrators. For example, RCW 69.50.406 makes it a felony for
an adult to distribute drugs to a juvenile. Each distribution to each juvenile is a
separate crime because each juvenile is a victim ofthis offense. State v. Vanoli,
86 Wn. App. 643, 651-52, 937 P.2d 1166 (1997). Another statute, RCW
69.50.435(l)(a)-(d), enhances penalties for committing certain drug offenses in a
school, on a school bus, or within 1,000 feet of a school or school bus stop. We
have held that such penalties further the State's "legitimate goal of keeping drug
dealers away from schoolchildren," who are vulnerable potential victims. State v.
Leyve Coria, 120 Wn.2d 156, 172, 839 P.2d 890 (1992). "[I]t is the children in the
areas who are being shielded from the harmful effects of drug crimes." Id. at 173.
In light of this, it is important to remember that "the United States Supreme
Court, federal courts, and Washington courts have held that when the legislature
enacts a statute designed for the protection of one class—here, children . ..—it
shows the legislature's intent to protect members of that class from criminal
liability" when they are the victims of the very behavior that the legislature sought
17
State V. A.M., No. 96354-1
(Gordon McCIoud, J., concurring)
to punish. State v. Gray, 189 Wn.2d 334, 349, 402 P.3d 254(2017)(Gordon
McCloud, J., dissenting)(citing Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 119, 53 S.
Ct. 35, 77 L. Ed. 206(1932); City ofAuburn v. Hedlund, 165 Wn.2d 645, 652, 201
P.3d315 (2009)).
Here, A.M. testified that she was a victim. She stated that the blue backpack
containing the methamphetamine did not belong to her; it came from the home of
her friend and her friend's mother. Verbatim Report ofProceedings(VRP)(Feb.
14, 2017) at 108. A.M. further testified that she returned the blue backpack to the
friend's family after she was released from juvenile detention. Id. at 110. The
court did not discredit A.M.'s testimony. VRP (Apr. 11, 2017) at 152, 157-58.
Instead, it stated that it did not think that A.M. was a liar or that she had committed
perjury. Id. Her testimony alone was just not sufficient in the court's view to
carry her burden of proving the unwitting possession defense. Id.
Gebardfs rule of interpretation provides that the legislature intended A.M.,
a victim, to be immune from prosecution for the receipt and possession of that
methamphetamine. Cleppe and Bradshaw do not suggest otherwise. So it is
possible that the legislature both acquiesced in basic drug possession being a strict
liability offense and intended that juvenile victims not be subject to its
ensnarement. Stated differently, it is doubtful that the legislature can presume both
18
State V. A.M., No. 96354-1
(Gordon McCloud, J., concurring)
that the child is a victim in the situation where an adult provides her with drugs
and that the child is a fully informed actor, wary of being taken advantage of in
this manner.
Given our case law, however, I proceed on the assumption that the
legislature acquiesced in Cleppe's and Bradshaw's interpretation of RCW
69.50.4013, that the acquiescence to that interpretation extends to situations such
as this one where a juvenile has been victimized, and that the theory of legislative
acquiescence is constitutionally permissible."^
^ There is arguably a third reason that justifies revisiting Cleppe and Bradshaw in
spite of the legislature's silence: Washington now appears to be the only state that does
not require the State to prove knowing possession beyond a reasonable doubt. As noted,
Washington, along with North Dakota, was one of only two jurisdictions that did not read
a mens rea element into basic drug possession when we decided Bradshaw in 2004.
152 Wn.2d at 534. But North Dakota has since amended its law. See N.D. Cent. Code
§§ 19-03.l-23(7)(a), 12.1-02-02(l)(e)(requiring North Dakota prosecutors to prove
willful possession). Thus, it appears to be fully within our capacity "to make uniform the
law," as the legislature has directed, RCW 69.50.603, by overruling Cleppe and
Bradshaw.
While adhering to that legislative mandate is certainly important, I do not consider
North Dakota's change of law a sufficient reason to revisit Cleppe and Bradshaw.
Bradshaw took into account Washington's outlier status. 152 Wn.2d at 534-35.
Becoming the only state, instead of one of only two states, does little to strike at
Bradshaw's legal underpinnings. See W.G. Clark Constr. Co. v. Pac. N.W. Reg'l Council
ofCarpenters, 180 Wn.2d 54, 66, 322 P.3d 1207(2014)(noting that the court may
reconsider prior decisions "when the legal underpinnings of our precedent have changed
or disappeared altogether"(citing cases)).
19
State V. A.M.,"^0. 96354-1
(Gordon McCloud, J., concurring)
11. The Strict Liability Drug Possession Statute Is Not an
Unconstitutional Burden-Shifting Scheme
The effect of the legislature's acquiescence is that the State need only prove
the fact of possession beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant, however, may
raise the affirmative defense of unwitting possession, which the defendant must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence. A.M. challenges this arrangement on
the basis that it shifts the burden of disproving knowledge to her, thereby violating
her Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. U.S. CONST, amend. XIV. Her
challenge fails because it rests on the incorrect premise that knowledge is an
element of the offense.
"The State is foreclosed from shifting the burden of proof to the defendant
only 'when an affirmative defense does negate an element of the crime.'" Smith v.
United States, 568 U.S. 106, 110, 133 S. Ct. 714, 184 L. Ed. 2d 570(2013)
(quoting Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 237, 107 S. Ct. 1098, 94 L. Ed. 2d 267(1987)(Powell, J., dissenting)). "Where instead it 'excuse[s] conduct that would
otherwise be punishable,' but 'does not controvert any of the elements of the
offense itself,' the Government has no constitutional duty to overcome the defense
beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (alteration in original)(quoting Dixon v. United
States, 548 U.S. 1, 6, 126 S. Ct. 2437, 165 L. Ed. 2d 299 (2006)). In State v. W.R.,
this court applied those principles and held that in rape prosecutions, the State must
20
State V. A.M., No. 96354-1
(Gordon McCloud, J., concurring)
prove lack of consent beyond a reasonable doubt because consent negates rape's
"forcible compulsion" element. 181 Wn.2d 757, 766-67, 336 P.3d 1134(2014).
Assuming that the legislature has acquiesced in Cleppe's and Bradshaw's
interpretation of the basic drug possession statute, the offense has a single element:
possession. Unwitting possession does not negate that element; rather, possession
readily "coexist[s]" with unwitting possession. W.R., 181 Wn.2d at 765.
Accordingly, unwitting possession is not an affirmative defense that
unconstitutionally shifts the burden of proof when possession is the only element
of the offense.
III. The Strict Liability Drug Possession Statute Exceeds the Legislature's
Authority and Offends the Fourteenth Amendment Right to Due
Process
The question remains, however, whether the legislature acted within its
power when it made basic drug possession a strict liability felony. To be sure, the
legislature may create strict liability offenses. However, there is a limit to the
legislature's power to criminalize innocent conduct. Given that Washington's
basic drug possession statute not only sweeps in a wide range of innocent conduct
but also authorizes a felony conviction punishable by up to five years in prison and
a $10,000 fine, I would hold that creation of this strict liability offense, with these
21
State V. A.M., No. 96354-1
(Gordon McCIoud, J., concurring)
consequences, and without a public welfare rationale, exceeds the legislature's
power.
A. The Legislature May Create Strict Liability Offenses—within
Limits
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged that the
legislative branch has authority to enact strict liability crimes. Although such
crimes are "disfavored," Staples, 511 U.S. at 606 (citing Liparota, 471 U.S. at
426), especially as the prescribed punishment ratchets up, id. at 618, they are not
wholly prohibited. See, e.g.. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 284-85,
64 S. Ct. 134, 88 L. Ed. 48 (1943); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 254, 42
S. Ct. 301,66 L. Ed. 604(1922). And we too have said that "[t]he Legislature may
create strict liability crimes," Anderson, 141 Wn.2d at 361 (citing State v. Rivas,
126 Wn.2d 443, 452, 896 P.2d 57(1995)), even though they are "generally
disfavored," id. at 363 (citing State v. Bash, 130 Wn.2d 594, 606, 925 P.2d 978(1996)(plurality opinion)).
But as the United States Supreme Court held in Lambert and Papachristou
V. City ofJacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S. Ct. 839, 31 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1972), the
Fourteenth Amendment places limits on this power. In Lambert, a Los Angeles
ordinance made it a crime for felons "to be or remain in Los Angeles for a period
of more than five days without registering" with the city. 355 U.S. at 226. "No
22
State V. A.M., No. 96354-1
(Gordon McCloud, J., concurring)
element of willfulness [was] by terms included in the ordinance nor read into it by
the California court as a condition necessary for a conviction." Id. at 227.
Although ignorance of the law does not generally excuse a person's conduct,Int'l
Minerals, 402 U.S. at 563, the United States Supreme Court held that the
petitioner's conviction violated her Fourteenth Amendment right to due process
because living in Los Angeles was purely passive and in no way blameworthy:
"Violation of[the ordinance's] provisions is unaccompanied by any activity
whatever, mere presence in the city being the test," Lambert, 355 U.S. at 229.
Later, in Papachristou, the United States Supreme Court held that the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibited a vagrancy ordinance that "makes criminal
activities which by modem standards are normally innocent." 405 U.S. at 163.
For example, the ordinance outlawed habitual "nightwalking." Id. But the United
States Supreme Court rejected that broad assertion of legislative authority over
such innocent conduct. Id. at 171. Innocent insomniacs "often walk at night,
perhaps hopeful that sleep-inducing relaxation will result." Id. at 163. Such night
walks, along with the equally outlawed '"wandering or strolling,"' "are historically
part of the amenities of life as we have known them." Id. at 164. In the Court's
23
State V. ^.M,No. 96354-1
(Gordon McCloud, J., concurring)
view, legislative fiat was not enough to render innocent conduct guilty, and the
ordinance was "plainly unconstitutional."^ Id. at 171.
Likewise, the Louisiana Supreme Court enforced limits on the legislature's
power in State v. Brown, 389 So. 2d 48, 51 (La. 1980), striking down a statute
identical to Washington's. The Louisiana statute "ma[de] it unlawful for any
person 'unknowingly . . .' to possess a controlled dangerous substance." 389 So.
2d at 49. The state Supreme Court recognized that "[a]lthough strict liability
offenses do exist in the criminal law and do not in all instances offend
constitutional requirements, these are limited in number and of a nature different
from the statute being challenged here." Id. at 50. That statute permitted an
individual to unknowingly receive a controlled substance from a third party "and
subsequently [be] convicted . . . without ever being aware of the nature of the
substance he was given." Id. at 51. The court held that such a conviction "does
indeed offend the conscious [sic]" and "'unlcnowing' possession of a dangerous
drug cannot be made criminal." Id.-, accord People v. Estreich, 212 A.D. 698,
700-01, 75 N.Y.S.2d 267(1947)(holding that a statute that criminalizes
^ Although the United States Supreme Court relied on the Fourteenth
Amendment's protection against vague criminal statutes to reach its'holding in
Papachristou, and A.M. does not frame her appeal as a vagueness challenge, the premise
ofPapachristou—that there are limits on the State's criminal legislative authority—is
nonetheless applicable.
24
State V. A.M., No. 96354-1
(Gordon McCloud, J., concurring)
unknowing receipt of stolen property "is without the power of the Legislature" and
violates the Fourteenth Amendment).
In contrast to these unconstitutional, scienterless statutes stand
constitutionally permissible, scienterless public welfare offenses. Though these
strict liability offenses were unknown at common law, the United States Supreme
Court accepted them as a necessary response to urbanization, industrialization, and
increasingly powerful machinery. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 253-54. The offenses
therefore most frequently "relat[e] to pure food and drugs, labeling, weights and
measures, building, plumbing and electrical codes, fire protection, air and water
pollution, sanitation,[and] highway safety . . . ." State v. Turner, 78 Wn.2d 276,
280, 474 P.2d 91 (1970). Accordingly, scienter may be omitted from a regulatory
or criminal offense when a person or business opts to engage in conduct that, if not
performed with care, could result in harm to vulnerable third parties. E.g., United
States V. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672-73, 95 S. Ct. 1903, 44 L. Ed. 2d 489(1975)
(holding that an executive who failed to remedy a contamination-causing rodent
infestation in his company's food warehouse could be held criminally liable
without proof of mens rea). Critically, the conscious decision to engage in such
potentially high-stakes conduct is thought to place the doer on reasonable notice to
take care. Staples, 511 U.S. at 607; Posters 'N' Things, 511 U.S. at 522.
25
State V. AM,No. 96354-1
(Gordon McCIoud, J., concurring)
B. Washington's Strict Liability Drug Possession Statute Exceeds
the Limits on the State's Authority Because It Imposes Felony
Consequences for Innocent Conduct
The public welfare justification for permitting the removal of scienter from
the State's burden of proof—and therefore running the risk of punishing innocent
conduct—does not apply to Washington's basic drug possession law, though. The
purpose of Washington's basic drug possession law is not to "heighten the duties
of those in control of particular industries, trades, properties or activities that affect
public health, safety or welfare." Morissette, 342 U.S. at 254. Its purpose is
instead substantively criminal.^ And because unlawful possession may be both
passive and unwitting, as in Lambert, there may be nothing to place the possessor
on reasonable notice to take care to avoid possessing a controlled substance.
^ To be sure, the narcotics statute in Balint was deemed a public welfare offense.
See 258 U.S. at 253-54. However, that statute "must be understood in context. It
predated the era during which all possession and sale of drugs came to be regarded as
serious crimes. Aside from its penalty, it fairly can be characterized as a regulation."
United States V. Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F. Supp. 485, 507(E.D.N.Y. 1993). Balint \Xse\f
noted that the primary focus of the statute was taxation. 258 U.S. at 253. It just so
happened to have an "incidental purpose" of regulating drugs. Id. By contrast, the
punitive focus of Washington's drug statutes becomes unmistakably clear when one takes
into account that disparities in drug enforcement are one of the primary drivers of the
"color gap" in Washington's courts, prisons, and jails. Research Working Group of the
Task Force on Race and the Criminal Justice System, Preliminary Report on Race and
Washington's Criminal Justice System, 35 SEATTLE U. L. Rev. 623,627-28,651-53
(2012).
26
State V. A.M., No. 96354-1
(Gordon McCloud, J., concurring)
This is especially true with respect to A.M. A.M. was not involved in
business activities with significant third-party effects that would have put her on
notice to take care to protect those third parties from harm. Rather, A.M. was
involved in the business of being a child: She came to Goodwill with an adult. At
Goodwill, that adult handed A.M. a child's monkey costume and a child's ladybug
costume, both to be worn by the adult's children on Halloween. VRP (Feb. 14,
2017) at 28, 51, 107. A.M. placed the costumes inside a blue backpack. VRP
(Feb. 14, 2017) at 28; Clerk's Papers(CP)at 37. An employee saw A.M. leave the
store wearing the blue backpack. VRP (Feb. 14, 2017) at 29; CP at 37. This
conduct—a juvenile's possession of drugs at the behest of an adult—does not place
the public welfare at risk. Cf. Anderson, 141 Wn.2d at 365 (stating that unwitting
possession of firearms does not pose a risk to third parties). Instead, the risk that
accrued was a risk to A.M.—namely,that she might have discovered the drugs and
become a user herself. Cf. RCW 69.50.406,.435(l)(a)-(d); Leyve Coria, 120
Wn.2dat 172-73.
Indeed, as the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized, a statute such as
Washington's sweeps in entirely innocent conduct. Brown, 389 So. 2d at 51. A
person might pick up the wrong bag at the airport, the wrong jacket at the concert,
or even the wrong briefcase at the courthouse. Or a child might carry an adult's
27
State V. A.M., No. 96354-1
(Gordon McCloud, J., concurring)
backpack, not knowing that it contains the adult's illegal drugs. All this conduct
is innocent; none of it is blameworthy. Cf. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 69(warning against criminalizing a store clerk's unwitting distribution of child
pornography when the clerk "returns an uninspected roll of developed film
[containing child pornography] to a customer"); Staples, 511 U.S. at 614-15(refusing to read statute to "impose criminal sanctions on a class of persons whose
mental state . . . makes their actions entirely innocent"). '"As these examples
illustrate, even people who are normally diligent in inspecting and organizing their
possessions may find themselves unexpectedly in violation of this law, and without
the notice necessary to defend their rights.'" State v. Adkins, 96 So. 3d 412, 432
(Fla. 2012)(Perry, J., dissenting)(quoting lower court's decision). Such lack of
notice, itself a result of the criminalization of innocence, is precisely what
Truly, the examples abound. Other instances of innocent possession include "a
letter carrier who delivers a package containing unprescribed Adderall; a roommate who
is unaware that the person who shares his apartment has hidden illegal drugs in the
common areas of the home; a mother who carries a prescription pill bottle in her purse,
unaware that the pills have been substituted for illegally obtained drugs by her teenage
daughter, who placed them in the bottle to avoid detection." State v. Adkins, 96 So. 3d
412, 432(Fla. 2012)(Perry, J., dissenting)(citing lower court's decision). Still "[o]ther
examples of innocent possession spring easily and immediately to mind: a driver who
rents a car in which a past passenger accidentally dropped a baggie of[drugs] under the
seat;... a helpful college student who drives a carload of a friend's possessions to the
friend's new apartment, unaware that a stash of heroin is tucked within those possessions;
an ex-wife who is framed by an ex-husband who planted cocaine in her home in an effort
to get the upper hand in a bitter custody dispute." Id. "The list is endless." Id.28
State V. A.M., No. 96354-1
(Gordon McCloud, J., concurring)
prompted the United States Supreme Court to strike down the vagrancy ordinance
in Papachristou.
The State's promise, made at oral argument, that it will not prosecute the
innocent is not enough to solve this problem.^' "Where, as here, there are no
standards governing the exercise of the discretion granted by the ordinance, the
scheme permits and encourages an arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the
law." Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 170. The state and federal constitutions promise
Washingtonians the rule oflaw, not the unfettered discretion ofthe local
prosecutor.
Of course, this might not be a problem if there were other elements of the
offense that included a mens rea element. Seemingly uniquely, Washington's drug
statute eliminates mens rea in its entirety. Even when the United States Supreme
Court has permitted "strict liability" offenses, the Court has still required proof"at
least that the defendant know that he is dealing with some dangerous or deleterious
substance." Staples, 511 U.S. at 607 n.3 (citing Minerals, 402 U.S.
at 563-64). For example, the "strict liability" statute in United States v. Freed
required the defendant to have knowledge "that the instrument possessed was a
" Wash. Supreme Court oral argument. State v. A.M., No. 96354-1 (May 28,
2019), at 34 min., 48 see., to 36 min., 23 sec., video recording by TVW, Washington
State's Public Affairs Network, https://www.tvw.org/watch/?eventID=2019051105.
29
State V. AM,^o.96354-1
(Gordon McCIoud, J., concurring)
firearm"—meaning that the defendant must have Icnowledge of the possession
itself, even if federal prosecutors need not prove that the defendant knew the
possessed firearm was unregistered. 401 U.S. 601, 607, 91 S. Ct. 1112, 28 L. Ed.
2d 356(1971)(citing Sipes v. United States, 321 F.2d 174, 179 (8th Cir. 1963));
see id. at 612(Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). This approach, unlike
Washington's,"avoid[s] . . . impos[ing] a rigorous form of strict liability." Staples,
511 U.S. at 607 n.3 (citing 7 Minerals, 402 U.S. at 563-64); see also Brown,
389 So. 2d at 50-51 (recognizing that an offense completely lacking in any mens
rea element is materially different from the offense in Freed).
Moreover, there might not be any problem if conviction for basic drug
possession did not impose harsh consequences and brand the defendant a felon.
Freed, 401 U.S. at 613 n.4 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment)(acknowledging
that the legislature may create strict liability offenses '"where the penalty is
relatively small, where conviction does not gravely besmirch,'" and where other
requirements are met(quoting Holdridge v. United States, 282 F.2d 302, 310 (8th
Cir. I960))). But that is exactly what Washington's statute does. A basic drug
possession conviction is generally a class C felony, which can result in up to five
years' imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. RCW 69.50.4013(2);
RCW 9A.20.021(l)(c). Numerous collateral consequences—affecting basic
30
State V. A.M., No. 96354-1
(Gordon McCloud, J., concurring)
aspects of life, such as housing, government benefits, and professional licensure—
follow. See generally Michael Pinard & Anthony C. Thompson, Offender Reentry
and the Collateral Consequences ofCriminal Convictions: An Introduction,
30 N.Y.U. Rev.L.& Soc. Change 585(2006); Tarra Simmons, Transcending the
Stigma ofa Criminal Record: A Proposal to Reform State Bar Character and
Fitness Evaluations, 128 Yale L. J. F. 759(2019). And "drug offenses 'are
subjected to more and harsher collateral consequences than any other eategory of
crime.'" Pinard & Thompson,supra, at 588 (quoting Gabriel J. Chin,Race, the
War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences ofCriminal Conviction,6 J.
Gender,Race & Just. 253,259(2002)).
In my view, the harsh consequences ofthis statute, paired with the innocent
conduct that it criminalizes, and the lack of a public welfare rationale render the
statute unconstitutional in violation ofthe Fourteenth Amendment.
The state constitutional prohibition on cruel punishment, WASH.CONST, art. I,
§ 14, or the federal prohibition on cmel and unusual punishment, U.S. CONST, amend.
VIII, might provide another basis for relief. Cf. Wash. Supreme Court oral argument,
supra, at 19 min., 32 sec. to 20 min., 5 sec.; and 21 min., 32 sec. to 22 min., 48 sec.;
Lambert, 355 U.S. at 231 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)(recognizing that"a cruelly
disproportionate relation between what the law requires and the sanction for its
disobedience may constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment" to the United States
Constitution). But see State v. Schmeling, 191 Wn. App. at 797-801 & nn.3-4 (holding
that convictions under the basic drug possession statute do not violate the Eighth
Amendment but noting that no Washington Constitution article I, section 14 argument
was raised). But A.M. presents her claim as a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim,
and Lambert identified the Fourteenth Amendment as the basis for striking down the
31
State V. A.M., No. 96354-1
(Gordon McCloud, J., concurring)
Conclusion
This court must grapple with its own errors. Cleppe's and Bradshaw's
statutory interpretation cannot be justified. Their saving grace is the legislature's
inaction. But even if Cleppe and Bradshaw do reflect legislative intent, their result
remains impermissible under the Fourteenth Amendment. The legislature carmot
declare a broad swath of innocent conduct felonious when no public welfare
rationale exists.
I respectfully concur.
strict liability ordinance at issue in that case. So 1 have addressed A.M.'s claim within
that framework.
32
State V. y4.M, No. 96354-1
(Gordon McCloud, J., concurring)
33