State v. Flores ( 2016 )

This opinion was filed for record FILE
fN CLERK'S OFFICE
SUPREME COURT, STATE OF
at (Ju~--~n [tt?t(, WASHINGTON
SAN L. CARLSON
Supreme Court Clerk
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Petitioner, NO. 91986-1
v.
ENBANC
CODY RAY FLORES,
Filed _S_EP_1_~'i_2_o·J_6_
Respondent.
STEPHENS, J.-This case requires us to decide under what circumstances
officers making a lawful arrest may seize a companion ofthe arrestee in the absence of
reasonable suspicion to independently justify a Terri stop of the companion. We hold
that where officers have an objective rationale predicated on safety concerns to seize a
companion to secure the scene of the arrest, article I, section 7 of the Washington State
Constitution allows for the seizure, so long as it remains reasonable in scope and
duration. Based on this holding, we reverse the Court of Appeals and hold that evidence
of the gun taken from Cody Flores during his brief seizure should not have been
suppressed.
1 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868,20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).
State v. Flores (Cody Ray), 91986-1
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2
On November 2, 2013, the Moses Lake Police Department dispatched all
available patrol officers to an address in Moses Lake. An anonymous source3 had
reported that Giovanni Powell was at that address and had pointed a gun at someone's
head. Officer Kyle McCain was first to arrive at the scene. McCain was familiar with
Powell, had seen pictures of him holding firearms, knew he was in a gang, and knew
he was a material witness to a Spokane homicide.4 While en route, dispatch informed
McCain (and other officers who were following him) that "Powell had a warrant out
for his arrest in the Spillman police information system. This warrant was later
confirmed after Powell was stopped." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 60.
2
Except where indicated, the facts established by the trial court are unchallenged and
thus are verities on appeal. See State v. Hill, 123 Wash. 2d 641, 644, 870 P.2d 313 (1994).
3
Flores assigned error to the trial court's finding of fact 2.1, which referred to the
source as "she." See Resp't's Br. at 16; Clerk's Papers (CP) at 59. Flores argues "[t]here
was nothing in the record to support the finding that the caller was a female who stated that
she wished to remain anonymous." Resp't's Br. at 16. Testimony supports the statement
that the caller wanted to remain anonymous. See Verbatim Report of Proceedings (Jan. 15,
2014) (VRP) at 67, 87. However, Flores is correct that there is nothing in the record to
support a finding that the caller was female. This aspect of finding of fact 2.1 is not binding
on appeal. See Hill, 123 Wash. 2d at 647.
4
Flores also challenged finding of fact 2.2, arguing that the language is misleading.
Resp't's Br. at 20. McCain testified that he is familiar with Powell, has "seen pictures of
him holding firearms or friends of his holding firearms," and had "knowledge that [Powell
is] in a gang called the Base Block" VRP at 69. McCain stated he "believe[d] that
[Powell] was a material witness" to a shooting incident in Spokane. Id. There is sufficient
evidence to support a finding that McCain was familiar with Powell and knew that Powell
was in pictures holding firearms, was associated with gang members, and was a material
witness to a homicide in Spokane. There is not sufficient evidence to support that Powell
was involved in a gang homicide. See CP at 60 (fmding of fact 2.2 states Powell "was a
material witness in a gang homicide in Spokane"). This aspect of finding of fact 2.2 is not
binding on appeal. See Hill, 123 Wash. 2d at 647.
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State v. Flores (Cody Ray), 91986-1
Officer McCain arrived at the reported address less than five minutes from the
time of the call, around 4:40 p.m. He observed Powell, whom he recognized, and
another person (later identified as Flores) walking down the street together. McCain
did not recognize Flores and did not have an individualized, articulable reason to
suspect Flores of criminal activity. Officers testified they were concerned that Flores
posed a threat to their safety because of "his association and close proximity to Powell
within a few minutes of a report of Powell pointing a gun at someone's head." !d.
McCain "parked across the street from Powell and Flores, got out ofhis car, drew
his side arm, held it pointed at the ground, and ordered ... Powell to stop." !d. Both
Flores and Powell stopped. McCain ordered Powell and Flores to drop to their knees
with their hands up, a position of disadvantage. Powell and Flores were talking, so
"McCain ordered Powell to move away from Flores." !d. Powell complied, moving
about six feet away. McCain then "ordered Powell to walk backwards towards him
with his hands up." !d.
As this was occurring, other officers arrived, including Officer Paul Oiumette.
!d. In total, there were approximately five officers on the scene. All had their guns
drawn and held at the "low ready" position. !d. "While Officer McCain was securing
Powell[,] Officer Oiumette ordered Flores to walk backwards towards him with his
hands up." !d. at 61. "As he was walking backwards towards Officer Oiumette[,]
Flores told the Officer he had a gun. This statement was not in response to a question
from Officer Oiumette." !d. Oiumette told Flores to keep walking backward and they
would deal with the gun in a minute. Once Flores got to Oiumette, Oiumette asked
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State v. Flores (Cody Ray), 91986-1
where the gun was. Flores responded that it was in his pants. Oiumette removed and
secured the gun. !d. The State charged Flores with first degree unlawful possession of
a firearm.
Flores brought a CrR 3.6 motion to suppress all evidence of the gun, arguing that
Oiumette's command to walk backward constituted a second seizure that was not
predicated on articulable suspicion that Flores was involved in criminal activity. See
id. at 12-17 (Flores's CrR 3.6 motion). Judge John Knodell granted the motion to
suppress "the gun found on ... Flores and his statements pertaining to it," concluding
that "[p]ursuant to RAP 2.2(b)(2) ... the practical effect of this order is to terminate
the case." ld. at 62. Judge Evan Sperline then dismissed the charges without prejudice.
ld. at 67. The State appealed, and Division Three of the Court of Appeals affirmed.
State v. Flores, 188 Wn. App. 305,351 PJd 189 (2015). The State petitioned this court
for review, which we granted. Statev. Flores, 184 Wn.2d 1019,361 P.3d 747 (2015).
ANALYSIS
The primary question in this case is whether it is always a violation of article I,
section 7 of the Washington State Constitution for an officer to seize the nonarrested
companion of an arrestee to secure the scene of an arrest. The Washington State
Constitution protects individuals from unlawful searches and seizures. WASH. CONST.
art. I, § 7 (''No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded,
without authority oflaw."); see also State v. Harrington, 167 Wash. 2d 656, 663, 222 PJd
92 (2009) ("Because searches and seizures incontrovertibly disturb private affairs,
article I, section 7 envelops search and seizure."). It is well established that article I,
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State v. Flores (Cody Ray), 91986-1
section 7 "grants greater protection to individual privacy rights than the Fourth
Amendment." Harrington, 167 Wash. 2d at 663 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. IV). There
is almost an absolute bar to warrantless seizures, with only limited, ')ealously guarded
exceptions." State v. Valdez, 167 Wash. 2d 761, 773, 224 P.3d 751 (2009).
"Our analysis under article I, section 7 requires us to determine 'whether the
State unreasonably intruded into the defendant's "private affairs."'" State v. Mendez,
137 Wash. 2d 208, 219, 970 P.2d 722 (1999) (quoting State v. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 506,
510, 688 P.2d 151 (1984)), abrogated on other grounds by Brendlin v. California, 551
U.S. 249, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 168 L. Ed. 2d 132 (2007). The analysis focuses "'not on a
defendant's actual or subjective expectation of privacy but, as we have previously
established, on those privacy interests Washington citizens held in the past and are
entitled to hold in the future."' !d. (quoting State v. White, 135 Wash. 2d 761, 768, 958
P.2d 982 (1998)). "The violation of [an individual's] right of privacy under article I,
section 7 automatically implies the exclusion of the evidence seized." State v. Afana,
169 Wash. 2d 169, 179, 233 P.3d 879 (2010). We review "conclusions oflaw from an
order pertaining to the suppression of evidence de novo." State v. Duncan, 146 Wash. 2d
166, 171,43 P.3d 513 (2002).
Under our state constitution, an individual is seized "when considering all the
circumstances, an individual's freedom of movement is restrained and the individual
would not believe he ... is free to leave or decline a request due to an officer's use of
force or display of authority." State v. Rankin, 151 Wash. 2d 689, 695, 92 P.3d 202 (2004).
''This determination is made by objectively looking at the actions of the law
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State v. Flores (Cody Ray), 91986-1
enforcement officer." Id. There is no doubt here that Flores was seized, and indeed,
the State concedes that he was seized when McCain stopped him and Powell and
ordered them into a position of disadvantage. See CP at 19 (State's Resp. to De£'s Mot.
to Suppress Under CrR 3.6).
Flores challenges his seizure as an unlawful Terry stop. See Resp't's Br. at 27-
46; Resp't's Answer to Pet. for Review at 13-16. Flores asserts that the seizure should
be analyzed in two parts: the initial seizure when McCain first ordered Flores into a
position of disadvantage, and a second seizure when Oiumette ordered Flores to move
back toward him. Resp't's Answer to Pet. for Review at 12. Although Flores does not
concede that McCain's initial detention ofhim was permissible, see Resp't's Br. at 33;
Resp't's Answer to Pet. for Review at 12, he contends that even if the initial seizure by
McCain was justified by the need to secure the scene ofPowell's arrest, that justification
"evaporated the moment that Powell, having complied with officer's directives that he
get down on his knees, continued to follow Officer McCain's orders .... At this point
in time, the scene was secured, Powell was safely under control, and there was no need
to further intrude on Flores' liberty by ordering him to walk backwards to the sound of
Officer Oiumette's voice." Resp't's Br. at 33. Flores insists that the second seizure
was investigatory and an unlawful Terry stop because the State failed to show it was
reasonable and necessary. Resp 't' s Answer to Pet. for Review at 15-16. Finally, Flores
argues that this court should hold that vehicle stop cases involving the rights of
passengers do not control cases where the companion and arrestee are pedestrians. Id.
at17-20.
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State v. Flores (Cody Ray), 91986-1
The State counters that Terry is inapplicable because officers did not seize Flores
for investigative purposes. Rather, the State argues that under State v. Parker, 139
Wash. 2d 486, 987 P.2d 73 (1999) (plurality opinion), and Mendez, McCain and Oiumette
acted within their authority to control the scene of an arrest when they directed Flores's
movements. See Pet. for Review at 4-6; Pet'r's Suppl. Br. to Pet. for Review at 3, 6-8.
The State contends that the circumstances here are not materially different from when
the driver of a car has been arrested and the police may order the passenger in or out of
the car to secure the scene of the arrest. See Pet. for Review at 4-5. Under Mendez, the
court should review the officer's actions for an '"objective rationale'" for seizing the
companion of an arrestee. !d. at 5-7. Under Parker, the fact of an arrest meets this test.
!d. at 5-6. Here, the State asserts the officers had an objective rationale. See id. at 6.
Furthermore, the court should apply a deferential standard when reviewing officers'
actions that are taken in the interest of safety. !d.
The American Civil Liberties Union of Washington (ACLU) filed an amicus
brief arguing that while the Court of Appeals was correct in suppressing the evidence,
it did not go far enough. The ACLU argues that under article I, section 7, there was no
justification to seize Flores in the first place because the State "failed to provide an
individualized objective rationale based on safety concerns." Br. of Amicus Curiae
ACLU of Wash. at 7. The ACLU also argues Mendez and Parker should not apply to
pedestrian cases. !d. at 2, 11-16.
Our precedent favors the State's argument. The risks that companions pose to
police attempting to arrest an individual are similar whether the companion and arrestee
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State v. Flores (Cody Ray), 91986-1
are in a car or on a sidewalk. The officer safety rationale that underlies our reasoning
in Mendez and Parker applies with equal force whenever officers make an arrest. We
therefore adopt the objective rationale test for when an officer may seize companions
to control the scene of an arrest. When that test is met, it is not a violation of article I,
section 7 for an officer to seize a nonarrested companion of an arrestee. The objective
rationale test was met under the facts of this case. We therefore reverse the Court of
Appeals and hold that the evidence of the gun should not have been suppressed.
I. Officers May Order a Nonarrested Companion of an Arrestee to a Position
Necessary to Secure the Scene of the Arrest
The court's decisions in Mendez and Parker provide a useful framework for
analyzing this case. In Mendez, the court addressed the scope of police officers'
authority over passengers in an automobile when the officers have probable cause to
detain the driver for a traffic infraction. In that case, two police officers stopped a car
that ran a stop sign. Mendez, 137 Wash. 2d at 212. As soon as the vehicle stopped,
Mendez, a passenger who had been in the front seat, got out and began walking away.
Approaching the vehicle, one of the officers told him to get back into the vehicle, but
Mendez turned, fumbled with his shirt, and continued walking away. He then ran and
was chased on foot by one ofthe officers. Mendez was arrested for obstructing a public
servant, and in the search incident to arrest, the officers found a marijuana pipe. Mendez
moved to suppress the evidence of the marijuana pipe.
This court examined the question under article I, section 7, explaining that we
must balance the privacy interests that Washingtonians held in the past and have a right
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State v. Flores (Cody Ray), 91986-1
to hold in the future "against concerns for officer safety during traffic stops." !d. at 219.
"Plainly, in any traffic stop, concerns about officer safety and control of the situation
are entirely relevant." Id.
The court concluded, "Washington's constitutional policy of greater protection
to the privacy of individuals in automobiles than the Fourth Amendment provides must
carry the day." !d. at 220. Although the court found that with regard to drivers, officers
have authority to "take whatever steps [are] necessary to control the scene, including
ordering the driver" in or out of the vehicle, it declined to adopt a categorical rule with
regard to passengers. !d. It explained,
A police officer should be able to control the scene and ensure his or her own
safety, but this must be done with due regard to the privacy interests of the
passenger, who was not stopped on the basis of probable cause by the police.
An officer must therefore be able to articulate an objective rationale predicated
specifically on safety concerns, for officers, vehicle occupants, or other citizens,
for ordering a passenger to stay in the vehicle or to exit the vehicle to satisfy
article I, section 7. This articulated objective rationale prevents groundless
police intrusions on passenger privacy. But to the extent such an objective
rationale exists, the intrusion on the passenger is de minimis in light of the larger
need to protect officers and to prevent the scene of a traffic stop from descending
into a chaotic and dangerous situation for the officer, the vehicle occupants, and
nearby citizens.
I d.
To meet this objective rationale standard, an officer need not meet the standard
required for a Terry stop. Id. "Terry must be met if the purpose of the officer's
interaction with the passenger is investigatory. For purposes of controlling the scene of
the traffic stop and to preserve safety there, we apply the standard of an objective
rationale." Id.
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State v. Flores (Cody Ray), 91986-1
The court provided a list of nonexclusive factors that may warrant an officer
controlling the movement of a passenger. !d. at 220-21. These factors include "the
number of officers, the number of vehicle occupants, the behavior of the occupants, the
time of day, the location of the stop, traffic at the scene, affected citizens, or officer
knowledge ofthe occupants." !d. at 221. Emphasizing the flexibility of this analysis,
the court concluded that "[t]he inquiry into the presence or absence of an objective
rationale requires consideration of the circumstances present at the scene of the traffic
stop." !d.
Under the facts in Mendez, the officers did not satisfy the objective rationale test.
!d. at 222-26. One of the officers testified that "he had no suspicions Mendez had
engaged or was about to engage in criminal conduct." !d. at 224. "Neither officer
testified that Mendez's actions in reaching inside his clothing aroused any suspicion.
Besides, Mendez did not reach inside his clothing until after he had been seized by [the
officer's] command to return to the car." !d. "'Obviously, once an individual is
"seized," no subsequent events or circumstances can retroactively justify the
"seizure."' !d. (quoting State v. Stinnett, 104 Nev. 398, 760 P.2d 124, 126 (1988)).
The officers were unable to clearly articulate a reason to order Mendez to stay in the
car. Mendez "was already walking away when he was told to stop," the stop took place
in broad daylight, there were no specific safety concerns at the scene, the officers ''had
control of the situation as the driver remained where he was directed," and he had not
committed any crime. !d. at 225-26. Thus, there was no objective rationale that the
officers could articulate to justify Mendez's seizure. Although the officers were unable
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State v. Flores (Cody Ray), 91986-1
to meet the objective rationale test, the court was clear that the situation could have been
different ''had Mendez remained standing by the passenger side door, had he behaved
in any way the police viewed as threatening or potentially dangerous, or had the scene
at the traffic stop required him to stay in the vehicle." Jd. at 225.
The same year the court decided Mendez, it also decided Parker. See id. at 214
n.2 (distinguishing Mendez from Parker). In Parker, the court considered "whether the
personal belongings of nonarrested vehicle passengers are subject to search incident to
the arrest ofthe driver." 139 Wash. 2d at 489. In a plurality decision, the court held that
"the arrest of one or more vehicle occupants does not, without more, provide the
'authority of law' under article I, section 7 of our state constitution to search other,
nonarrested vehicle passengers, including personal belongings clearly associated with
such nonarrested individuals." Id. at 502-03; see id. at 518 (Alexander, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part) ("While I agree with the majority's conclusion that if officers
of the law 'know' that a container belongs to a passenger it may not be searched incident
to the arrest ofthe driver, I disagree that the officers should be similarly inhibited if they
merely 'should know."'); see also State v. Horrace, 144 Wash. 2d 386, 392, 28 P.3d 753
(200 1) (describing Parker's holding).
Both the lead and one of the concurring opinions in Parker recognized "that
under certain circumstances nonarrested individuals may pose a threat to officer safety
in an arrest situation." 139 Wash. 2d at 501, 516-17 (Talmadge, J., concurring). To
protect officer safety and individuals' article I, section 7 rights, the court "engage[s] in
a delicate balancing of interests, weighing safety and evidentiary concerns against the
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State v. Flores (Cody Ray), 91986-1
basic notion that the people of this state enjoy a measure of privacy that is, and will
forever be, unassailable." !d. at 501. "As against the privacy interests of a nonarrested
individual, the balance has already been struck." Id. Although companions may pose
a danger to law enforcement, officers may not engage in a full search of a nonarrested
companion; instead, any search of the companion "is limited to ensure officer safety
only and must be supported by objective suspicions that the person searched may be
armed or dangerous." Id. at 501-02. The lead opinion concluded, however, that,
whether or not articulable suspicion exists sufficient to justify a pat down for weapons,
the circumstance of an arrest falls squarely within the rule of Mendez. Thus, a vehicle
stop and arrest in and of itself provides officers an objective basis to ensure their safety
by '"controlling the scene,"' including ordering passengers in or out of the vehicle as
necessary. Id. at 502. A concurrence stated that the risks nonarrested passengers may
pose to law enforcement "can be addressed under Mendez or pursuant to Terry." Id. at
516-17 (Talmadge, J., concurring).
The situations presented in Mendez and Parker are analogous to the facts of this
case. Flores argues that automobile cases are unique because we have developed a line
of vehicle-specific jurisprudence. One of the primary justifications is the mobility of
vehicles. See, e.g., Statev. Day, 161 Wn.2d889, 897, 168 P.3d 1265 (2007)(explaining
that "Terry has also been extended to traffic infractions, 'due to the law enforcement
exigency created by the ready mobility of vehicles"' (quoting State v. Johnson, 128
Wash. 2d 431,454,909 P.2d 293 (1996)); State v. Patterson, 112 Wn.2d 731,774 P.2d
10 (1989) (recognizing a vehicle's potential mobility as one exigent circumstance, but
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State v. Flores (Cody Ray), 91986-1
holding there must be additional exigencies to justify a warrantless search of a parked,
unoccupied vehicle). However, the court in Mendez and Parker was not concerned
with the mobility of the vehicle, but with the threat that companions in the vehicle--
those who are close in proximity to the subject ofthe stop--pose to officers. In Mendez,
we described our test as "predicated specifically on safety concerns," 137 Wash. 2d at 220,
and in Parker we noted that "the search incident to arrest exception functions primarily
to achieve [officer safety]," 139 Wash. 2d at 499. Because the analysis in Mendez and
Parker centered on safety concerns rather than the location ofthe stop, it should not be
restricted to traffic stops, but is equally applicable in cases like this one where an
arrestee is accompanied by companions at the time of the arrest.
This conclusion is common sense, as the potential danger at an arrest scene does
not turn on whether people are sitting together in a car or walking side by side on a
sidewalk. Companions in either circumstance could, for example, be concealing a
weapon that could be used against the arresting officer. Cf Horrace, 144 Wash. 2d at
395-98 (recognizing a vehicle passenger's close proximity to a driver making
unexplained movements and the passenger's bulky jacket that the officer believed
capable of concealing a weapon were factors that helped justify a frisk ofthe passenger).
In both situations, when an officer is attempting to execute an arrest warrant, those close
to the subject pose a potential safety risk. Cf id.; State v. Kennedy, 107 Wash. 2d 1, 12,
726 P.2d 445 (1986) (In an investigative vehicle stop, "the officer may search for
weapons within the investigatee's immediate control. We also recognize that such a
limited search applies to any companion in the car because that person presents a similar
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State v. Flores (Cody Ray), 91986-1
danger to the approaching officer. The front seat of the car is in the immediate control
of a passenger seated next to the driver."); Verbatim Report of Proceedings (Jan. 15,
2014) (VRP) at 75 (McCain testified that he moved Powell away from Flores because
he "didn't want them speaking to each other or passing anything from one person to the
other").
There is no sensible basis to compartmentalize Mendez and Parker as "vehicle"
cases and to create a separate line of"pedestrian" cases. As explained, the fact that the
seizures in Mendez and Parker occurred in the vehicle context was not central to the
analysis. To determine which standard we use to evaluate the legality of a seizure, we
do not focus on the seizure's location; rather, we focus on its purpose. See, e.g.,
Mendez, 137 Wash. 2d at 220 ("Terry must be met if the purpose of the officer's
interaction with the passenger is investigatory. For purposes of controlling the scene of
the traffic stop and to preserve safety there, we apply the standard of an objective
rationale."). Where the stop is for investigative purposes, we require officers to meet
the Terry standard of individualized, reasonable, articulable suspicion. See, e.g., State
v. Fuentes, 183 Wash. 2d 149, 352 P.3d 152 (2015) (applying the Terry standard to
determine whether officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to engage in
two investigative stops outside an apartment complex); Horrace, 144 Wash. 2d at 394
(applying Terry, a pedestrian case, to determine the validity of a stop-and-frisk of a
vehicle passenger because the officer's conduct was "investigatory''). However, when
a stop is conducted to effectuate an arrest, we require a valid arrest warrant or probable
cause. See State v. Massey, 68 Wash. 2d 88, 89, 411 P.2d 422 (1966) (describing the
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State v. Flores (Cody Ray), 91986-1
general rules for a warrantless arrest); State v. Manning, 57 Wash. 2d 327, 329, 356 P.2d
721 (1960) ("the issuance of the [arrest] warrant is authority to not only apprehend a
defendant but to continue his custody as the case may be"). Yet another standard exists
when an officer engages in a purported social contact. In those situations, we determine
if the contact was in fact a seizure----rather than merely a social contact-based on
whether a reasonable person would believe he was not free to leave. See, e.g., State v.
Young, 135 Wash. 2d 498, 513-14,957 P.2d 681 (1998) (holding shining a spotlight on an
individual "did not amount to such a show of authority a reasonable person would have
believed he or she was not free to leave" and thus was not a seizure). As these cases
demonstrate, the standard we use to evaluate the legality of a seizure is determined by
the purpose of the seizure. We therefore reject Flores's argument that we should ignore
the objective rationale test established in Mendez and Parker because those were
"vehicle" cases.
Because the situations contemplated in Mendez and Parker are analogous to the
one presented here, we follow the analysis developed in those cases. However, we
reject the State's argument that Parker established a per se rule that the fact of an arrest
is sufficient to satisfY Mendez's objective rationale test. See Pet. for Review at 5-6. The
statement in the lead opinion that arguably supports this proposition was not joined by
either of the concurring justices and, thus, is not binding law. See Parker, 139 Wash. 2d
at 502. Furthermore, this court has characterized that statement as supplying but one
factor officers may consider as part of the objective rationale test, without suggesting
that an arrest by itself satisfies the officers' burden. See Horrace, 144 Wash. 2d at 393
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State v. Flores (Cody Ray), 91986-1
("[t]he lead opinion in Parker noted that the arrest of another vehicle occupant supplied
a significant facto,;' in meeting the objective rationale test (emphasis added)); State v.
Reynolds, 144 Wash. 2d 282, 288-89, 27 P.3d 200 (2001) (the lead opinion in Parker
"recognized that the arrest of a vehicle occupant (a circumstance not present in Mendez)
supplied an additional factor that an officer could consider when controlling the scene
of a vehicle stop" (emphasis added)). We therefore consider an arrest to be a factor
officers may take into account when assessing whether they have an objective rationale
for seizing companions to control the scene. 5
5
Were we to agree with the State, we would, in effect, be adopting a variation of
the "automatic companion rule." Under the automatic companion rule, "[a]11 companions
of the arrestee within the immediate vicinity, capable of accomplishing a harmful assault
on the officer, are constitutionally subjected to the cursory 'pat-down' reasonably
necessary to give assurance that they are unarmed." United States v. Berryhill, 445 F.2d
1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 1971). Under this rule, an officer may conduct a frisk for weapons of
an arrestee's companions without individualized, articulable suspicion of criminal activity
or dangerousness. See, e.g., Owens v. Commonwealth, 291 S.W.3d 704,709-12 (Ky. 2009)
(describing and adopting the automatic companion rule for vehicle passengers when the
driver has been arrested and the passengers have been lawfully removed from the vehicle);
Perry v. State, 927 P.2d 1158, 1163-64 (Wyo. 1996) (describing and adopting automatic
companion rule when there was a lawful arrest and a justifiable concern for officer safety).
We reject the automatic companion rule as inconsistent with our precedent and with the
rule we announce today. See, e.g., Mendez, 137 Wash. 2d at 220; cf, e.g., United States v.
Bell, 762 F.2d 495, 498-99 (6th Cir. 1985) (rejecting the automatic companion rule because
"we have serious reservations about the constitutionality of such a result under existing
precedent" and noting that "we do not believe that the Terry requirement of reasonable
suspicion under the circumstances has been eroded to the point that an individual may be
frisked based upon nothing more than an unfortunate choice of associates" (citation
omitted)); State v. Lemert, 843 N.W.2d 227, 233 (Minn. 2014) (rejecting the automatic
companion rule in the Fourth Amendment context, finding that "although being a
companion to an arrestee is part of the totality of the circumstances, the Fourth Amendment
does not provide for an automatic search of an arrestee's companion"). Contrary to the
dissent's characterization, our holding does not create any new "exception" to the Fourth
Amendment or article I, section 7.
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State v. Flores (Cody Ray), 91986-1
We hold that when executing an arrest, officers may serze nonarrested
companions to control the scene of the arrest if they can articulate an objective rationale
predicated specifically on safety concerns for the officers, the arrestee, his or her
companions, or other citizens. Factors that warrant an officer seizing companions
include (but are not limited to) the arrest, the number of officers, the number of people
present at the scene of the arrest, the time of day, the behavior of those present at the
scene, the location of the arrest, the presence or suspected presence of a weapon, officer
knowledge of the arrestee or the companions, and potentially affected citizens. See
Mendez, 13 7 Wash. 2d at 221. This is not an exhaustive list, and no one factor by itself
justifies an officer's seizure of nonarrested companions. See id. When determining
whether there is an objective rationale, the court should look at all the circumstances
present at the scene of the arrest. See id. 6
6
In Terry, the United States Supreme Court considered statistics showing the danger
police officers face. 392 U.S. at 23-24 & n.21. It considered similar statistics when it held
that a police officer may order the driver out of a lawfully stopped vehicle, Pennsylvania
v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110,98 S. Ct. 330, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1977), and when it extended
this rule to vehicle passengers, Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413, 117 S. Ct. 882, 137
L. Ed. 2d 41 (1997). We therefore find it appropriate to note that officers face serious risks
not only during traffic stops/pursuits, but also in arrest situations. Between 2005 and 2014,
a total of 505 officers were feloniously killed. See 2014 Law Eriforcement Officers Killed
& Assaulted tb1.21, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://www.tbi.gov/about-
us/cjis/ucr/leoka/2014/tables/table- 21- - fk
Ieos -circumstance-at-scene-of-incident- 2005
-2014.xls [https://perma.cc/S64R-V9CE]. Of those, 95 were killed in an arrest situation
and 93 were killed during a traffic pursuit/stop. Id. In 2014 alone, 48,315 officers were
assaulted. Id. at tbl.74, https://www.tbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/leoka/2014/tables/table
74_Ieos_as ltd_circum_at_scene_of_incident_by_population_group_and_percent_cleared
_2014.xls [https://perma.cc/X6KH-2J52]. Of those, 7,343 were assaulted while attempting
other arrests and 4,022 were assaulted during a traffic pursuit/stop. Id. While we consider
police deaths and injuries, we are also cognizant of the fact that police practices may be
biased against a particular community and that "no shortage of seemingly routine
-17-
State v. Flores (Cody Ray), 91986-1
As this court discussed in Mendez, the objective rationale test is different from
Terry's reasonable suspicion of criminal activity requirement. See id. Officers'
authority to intrude into an individual's privacy is likewise limited in scope and
duration; they may control the movements of nonarrested companions only to control
the scene of the arrest. To further engage in an investigatory interaction such as a pat
down, officers must meet the individualized Terry standard of "reasonable, articulable
suspicion, based on specific, objective facts, that the person seized has committed or is
about to commit a crime." Duncan, 146 Wash. 2d at 172 (emphasis omitted); see Mendez,
137 Wash. 2d at 220; Horrace, 144 Wash. 2d at 393. Similarly, to engage in a protective pat
down, officers must be able to point to particular facts that provide '"reasonable
grounds to believe the person is armed and dangerous.'" State v. Bee Xiong, 164 Wash. 2d
506, 511, 191 P.3d 1278 (2008) (quoting State v. Galbert, 70 Wash. App. 721, 724-25,
855 P.2d 310 (1993)); see also Horrace, 144 Wash. 2d at 394.7 This, again, is a different,
more individualized standard than the objective rationale test. Finally, officers may not
create an exigency that would then give them reason to search or seize the companion.
Cf. Terry, 392 U.S. at 32 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("Any person, including a policeman,
is at liberty to avoid a person he considers dangerous. If and when a policeman has a
stops ... end[] in physical hann or even death." Recent case, State v. Kelly, 95 A.3d 1081
(Conn. 2014), 128 HARV. L. REv. 1003, 1009 (2015). As noted, courts must carefully
consider the circumstances of each case.
7 Notably, the trial court relied on cases involving investigatory searches or pat
downs. See, e.g., State v. Adams, 144 Wash. App. 100, 181 P.3d 37 (2008) (addressing a
Terry search of a vehicle passenger). The trial court did not address the objective rationale
analysis of Mendez and Parker in either its letter ruling or its CrR 3.6 order. See CP at 55-
57, 61-62.
-18-
State v. Flores (Cody Ray), 91986-1
right instead to disarm such a person for his own protection, he must first have a right
not to avoid him but to be in his presence.").
Requiring officers to articulate an objective rationale for seizing nonarrested
individuals to control the scene of an arrest strikes the proper balance between safety
considerations and individual privacy rights under article I, section 7. Cj Mendez, 137
Wash. 2d at 219. First, an officer's seizure of nonarrested companions is limited to
controlling the movement of those companions only insofar as is justified to control the
scene of the arrest and ensure safety. Cj State v. Chacon Arreola, 176 Wn.2d 284,294,
290 P.3d 983 (2012) ("each ... investigative stop must be justified at its inception and
must be reasonably limited in scope-based on whatever reasonable suspicions legally
justified the stop in the first place"). Any intrusion into the companions' privacy is
therefore "de minimis in light of the larger need to protect officers and to prevent the
scene ... from descending into a chaotic and dangerous situation for the officer, ...
nearby citizens," and those present at the scene ofthe arrest. Mendez, 137 Wash. 2d at
220. Second, requiring officers to point to specific concerns at an arrest scene ensures
that no person sacrifices constitutional privacy rights because of "mere proximity to
others independently suspected of criminal activity." State v. Thompson, 93 Wash. 2d 838,
841, 613 P.2d 525 (1980); see also State v. Broadnax, 98 Wn.2d 289,295, 654 P.2d 96
(1982), abrogated on other grounds by Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S.
Ct. 2130, 124 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1993). Requiring an objective rationale allows the court
to determine whether the detention was merely harassing or arbitrary. See State v.
Belieu, 112 Wash. 2d 587, 601-02,773 P.2d 46 (1989).
-19-
State v. Flores (Cody Ray), 91986-1
II. Applying the Objective Rationale Analysis, the Seizure of Flores Was
Justified and the Evidence of the Gun Should Not Be Suppressed
Applying the objective rationale test, we find that McCain justifiably seized
Flores to secure the scene ofPowell 's arrest, and that Oiumette' s actions were a justified
continuation of that initial seizure. We reject Flores's contention, embraced by the
Court of Appeals, that the seizure must be analyzed as two events: an initial seizure by
McCain, and then a Terry stop beginning when Oiumette called Flores back. See
Resp't's Answer to Pet. for Review at 12; Flores, 188 Wash. App. at 316-17. Although
a permissible contact can ripen into an impermissible seizure, see Harrington, 167
Wash. 2d at 670 (explaining a "progressive intrusion, culminating in seizure, runs afoul of
the language, purpose, and protections of article I, section 7''), we do not fmd that to be
the case here. There was but one seizure, and both McCain and Oiumette's actions
were justified by the ongoing need to control the scene of Powell's arrest. 8
Although an anonymous tip standing alone may not be sufficient to support a
Terry stop (a determination we need not make), 9 officers do not need to ignore
8
We emphasize that courts must review an officer's actions under the totality of the
circumstances to determine if a seizure is made with the authority of law and is of
reasonable scope and duration. See Mendez, 137 Wash. 2d at 221. Depending on the facts of
the case, this may require an examination of the circumstances as a sequence or an
examination of specific actions each officer takes. Compare Harrington, 167 Wash. 2d 656
(holding that cumulatively police action resulted in an unlawful seizure although the initial
encounter was a social contact), with State v. Russell, 180 Wash. 2d 860, 872, 330 P.3d 151
(2014) (holding that "while the initial protective frisk was permissible, the officer violated
Russell's constitutional rights when he removed a small container from his pocket and
searched it without a warrant").
9
For a thorough discussion of when an informant's tip may be the basis for a Terry
stop, see State v. Z.U.E., 183 Wash. 2d 610, 352 P.3d 796 (2015). As noted, the State does
not rely on the anonymous tip to justify the seizure of Powell and Flores.
-20-
State v. Flores (Cody Ray), 91986-1
information that implicates their safety when there is a lawful basis to arrest an
individual. Cf State v. Russell, 180 Wash. 2d 860,869,330 P.3d 151 (2014) ("We would
undermine the purposes of Terry and create unjustifiable risks if we hold that an officer
in the field must ignore specific facts that indicate potential danger."). McCain and
Oiumette could, therefore, consider the fact that there may have been a gun present
when assessing what they needed to do to control the scene ofPowell's arrest. Although
dispatch did not indicate whether Powell was alone (the tip appears to have mentioned
only Powell), when McCain arrived at the scene, Powell and Flores were walking down
the street together in close proximity. CP at 59-60. McCain arrived at the scene less
than five minutes after dispatch received the tip. Id. at 60. He was the only officer on
the scene at that point. See id.; VRP at 72-73. McCain recognized Powell. VRP at 67-
68. McCain had seen pictures of Powell or his friends holding firearms, and had
information that he was at the scene of a fight in which one of his best friends was shot
and killed. !d. at 69-70. The stop occurred after 4:30p.m. in November. !d. at 66.
When McCain ordered Powell to stop, both he and Flores halted, and they remained
together. CP at 60. Based on these facts, McCain had an objective rationale to seize
Flores to secure the scene ofPowell's arrest.
Oiumette, who received the same dispatch information as McCain, arrived on
the scene after Flores was put in a position of disadvantage away from Powell. See
VRP at 86-87; CP at 60. When Oiumette arrived, McCain was calling Powell back
toward him. See VRP at 87, 91; CP at 61. McCain's focus was on Powell. See VRP
at 78. There is no evidence that Powell was already secured when Oiumette focused
-21-
State v. Flores (Cody Ray), 91986-1
on Flores and told him to begin walking toward Oiumette. CP at 61 ("While Officer
McCain was securing Powell[,] Officer Oiumette ordered Flores to walk backwards
towards him with his hands up."). Oiumette testified that he told Flores to walk back
because he did not know what McCain had observed when he got there, and because
he was concerned there was a firearm. See VRP at 88. Although Oiumette also stated,
"[I]t appeared to me [Flores] was involved in [the firearm incident] somehow," id., this
statement alone does not turn his legitimate control of Flores's movements to secure
the scene of the arrest into an investigatory stop.
While Flores was walking back toward Oiumette, he volunteered that he had a
gun. CP at 61. This admission was not made in response to any questioning or
prompting by Oiumette. See id. Once Flores volunteered that he had a gun, Oiumette
had reasonable suspicion to further detain Flores and seize the gun. See, e.g., State v.
King, 89 Wash. App. 612, 949 P.2d 856 (1998) (officer conducting a consensual search
of a house could temporarily seize individual and gun for officer safety).
Officers McCain and Oiumette had an objective rationale predicated on safety
concerns that justified temporarily seizing Flores to control the scene ofPowell's arrest.
Because Flores was not unlawfully seized, we reverse the Court of Appeals and hold
that evidence of the gun should not have been suppressed.
CONCLUSION
We reverse the Court of Appeals. Flores was seized as part of the officers'
attempt to control the scene of Powell's arrest. Because the officers had an objective
-22-
State v. Flores (Cody Ray), 91986-1
rationale predicated specifically on safety concerns, the seizure was lawful. The
evidence of the gun should not have been suppressed.
-23-
Statev. Flores (Cody Ray), 91986-1
WE CONCUR:
(}
-----
-24-
State v. Flores (Cody Ray), No. 91986-1
(Gordon McCloud, J., dissenting)
No. 91986-1
GORDON McCLOUD, J. (dissenting)-" Generally, warrantless searches and
seizures are unconstitutional," though there are '"a few jealously and carefully
drawn exceptions."' State v. Gatewood, 163 Wash. 2d 534, 539, 182 P.3d 426 (2008)
(quoting State v. Ladson, 138 Wash. 2d 343, 349, 979 P.2d 833 (1999) (quoting State
v. Hendrickson, 129 Wash. 2d 61, 70, 917 P.2d 563 (1996))).
Before today, these exceptions were all based on good, previously recognized, ·
objective reasons for detaining an individual. This was the case under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. E.g., United States v. Cortez, 449
U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981) ("investigatory stop must be
justified by some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to
be, engaged in criminal activity"). It was also the case under article I, section 7 of
the Washington State Constitution. State v. Kennedy, 107 Wash. 2d 1, 12-13, 726 P.2d
445 (1986) (search of front seat of suspect's car was "similar to a Teny[lJ frisk" and
1 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).
1
State v. Flores (Cody Ray), No. 91986-1
(Gordon McCloud, J., dissenting)
therefore "reasonable" under article I, section 7); State v. Horrace, 144 Wash. 2d 386,
394, 28 P.3d 753 (2001) (embracing its search analysis as consistent with article I,
section 7 protections: "to justify the intrusion of a limited pat-down search, 'the
police officer must be able to point to specific facts which ... reasonably warrant
that intrusion"' (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21)).
Even Terry, which recognized a new exception to the warrant requirement in
1968, required objective reasons for detaining or frisking a specific individual:
Terry limited its new "reasonable suspicion" of criminal activity exception to
situations where the officer's suspicion about an individual was objectively
reasonable. 392 U.S. at 21-22 (In determining whether a search or seizure is
reasonable, "it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard:
would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search
'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was
appropriate?"). In Washington, we have always applied that Terry exception the
same way; we have limited it to situations where the officer possesses objectively
reasonable suspicion that the suspect has committed or is about to commit a crime.
State v. Duncan, 146 Wash. 2d 166, 172-73, 43 P.3d 513 (2002) (under Fourth
Amendment and article I, section 7, a seizure requires "a reasonable, articulable
2
State v. Flores (Cody Ray), No. 91986-1
(Gordon McCloud, J., dissenting)
suspicion, based on specific, objective facts, that the person seized has committed or
is about to commit a crime" (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21)).
It is therefore not surprising that our court has also limited the Terry exception
to objectively reasonable, particularized suspicion about an individual. Our state
constitution has always been interpreted to provide more protections for an
individual's right to privacy, not less. State v. Byrd, 178 Wash. 2d 611, 616, 310 P.3d
793 (2013) ("[a]rticle I, section 7 is more protective of individual privacy than the
Fourth Amendment").
Today, however, the majority holds for the first time that law enforcement
officers can seize an individual just like John Terry~an individual on a city
sidewalk~without "individualized" suspicion and without "articulable facts"
supporting individualized suspicion, based on that officer's subjective statement of
purpose rather than on objectively reasonable facts. Majority at 15-17. This holding
creates a new exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, and we
don't have the power to create it--only the Supreme Court does. It's also a new
exception to our court's consistent statements, for decades, that article I, section 7
provides more protection for individual privacy rights than the Fourth Amendment.
I therefore respectfully dissent.
3
State v. Flores (Cody Ray), No. 91986-1
(Gordon McCloud, J., dissenting)
ANALYSIS
I. The Terry Exception Requires an Objective Analysis and
Individualized Suspicion
In Terry, the United States Supreme Court created a new exception to the
warrant requirement. It held that law enforcement officers may briefly stop an
individual if they have "'reasonable, articulable suspicion, based on specific,
objective facts, that the person seized has committed or is about to commit a crime."'
Gatewood, 163 Wash. 2d at 539 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Duncan, 146 Wash. 2d at
172 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21)).
As the majority correctly explains, this court in Mendez 2 did adopt a rule that
provides less privacy protection, but only in certain limited circumstances. Under
the Mendez rule, police may detain an individual during a traffic stop just because
he or she is present at a scene where officers have "safety concerns for [themselves],
the arrestee, companions, or other citizens." Majority at 17. The Mendez rule
relieves officers of the duty to articulate individualized suspicion before detaining
those present at the scene of a traffic stop. It thus carves out a narrow exception to
the warrant requirement. The question in this case is whether we should expand the
narrow Mendez exception quite a bit further, to the factual situation presented in
2
State v. Mendez, 137 Wash. 2d 208, 220, 970 P.2d 722 (1999), abrogated on other
grounds by Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 168 L. Ed. 2d 132 (2007).
4
State v. Flores (Cody Ray), No. 91986-1
(Gordon McCloud, J., dissenting)
Terry-the city streets-and do so because of the officer's subjective statement of
purpose for the stop rather than because of objective facts.
II. The Majority Overturns the Most Important Prerequisites To Applying
the Terry Exception: Objectively Reasonable Facts and Individualized
Suspicion
When this court adopted the Mendez rule, the only United States Supreme
Court cases it cited were those addressing traffic stops. Mendez, 137 Wash. 2d at 214-
21 (citing Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 412-14, 117 S. Ct. 882, 137 L. Ed. 2d
41 (1997); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-11,98 S. Ct. 330,54 L. Ed.
2d 331 (1977) (per curiam)). While these cases cite to some common Fourth
Amendment principles, 3 their reasoning primarily reflects concerns unique to the
traffic stop context. In particular, they identify two entirely car-specific reasons that
officers may order drivers or passengers out of a validly stopped vehicle without
meeting the Terry standard: (1) the order is a '"de minimis"' additional intrusion
relative to the stop itself and (2) weapons are easily concealed in car passenger
compartments. Wilson, 519 U.S. at 412-14 (quoting Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111).
3
For example, the United States Supreme Court's cases on traffic stops cite the
general Fourth Amendment principle that individual privacy protections must be balanced
against "the public interest." Wilson, 519 U.S. at 413; Mimms, 434 U.S. at 109 (quoting
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 45 L. Ed. 2d 607
(1975)).
5
State v. Flores (Cody Ray), No. 91986-1
(Gordon McCloud, J., dissenting)
The majority's decision to apply the Mendez rule to pedestrians ignores this
reasoning and the limits it implies. 4 First, a Terry-like stop is far from a de minimis
intrusion. See Utah v. Strieff, _U.S. _, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070, 195 L. Ed. 2d 400
(2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("The indignity of a stop is not limited to an
officer telling you that you look like a criminal. The officer may next ask for your
'consent' to inspect your bag or purse without telling you that you can decline. See
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 438, 111 S. Ct. 2383, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389 (1991).
Regardless of your answer, he may order you to stand 'helpless, perhaps facing a
wall with [your] hands raised.' Terry, 392 U.S., at 17, 88 S. Ct. 1868. Ifthe officer
thinks you may be dangerous, he may then 'frisk' you for weapons." (alteration in
original) (citation omitted)). Second, weapons are less easy to conceal without a
glove compartment.
The majority's decision to apply the Mendez rule to the Terry situation also
ignores United States Supreme Court precedent in more relevant contexts. While
4
In this way, the majority's analysis conflicts in principle with at least one previous
decision. See Duncan, 146 Wash. 2d at 173-74 (declining to extend the Terry stop exception
to the warrant requirement beyond traffic violations to other civil infractions because
"[ t]raffic violations create a unique set of circumstances that may justify this extension of
Terry, but which may not be appropriate for other civil infractions"; noting "the
diminishment of privacy interests" in vehicles '"due to the law enforcement exigency
created by the ready mobility of vehicles"' (quoting State v. Johnson, 128 Wash. 2d 431, 454,
909 P.2d 293 (1996))).
6
State v. Flores (Cody Ray), No. 91986-1
(Gordon McCloud, J., dissenting)
that Court has never directly answered the question presented here-whether
officers may detain an arrestee's companion on a public street, absent the reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity required under Terry-it has addressed two closely
related questions. In Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 92-94, 100 S. Ct. 338, 62 L.
Ed. 2d 238 (1979), the Court held that police may not search or seize individuals
merely because they are present at a public location subject to a search warrant. And
in Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276 (1990),
the Court held that officers conducting an in-home arrest may do a protective sweep
of the home only if articulable facts suggest that other people are present and pose a
safety threat. In each of these cases, the State argued just what our State argues in
this case: that when officers conduct a valid search and seizure (in those cases,
pursuant to a warrant), Terry's standard of reasonable, articulable, and
individualized suspicion should not apply to protect nearby people or places. 5 And
in each of these cases, the Court rejected that argument. Buie, 494 U.S. at 334
5
Buie, 494 U.S. at 330 ("[T]he State of Maryland[] argues that, under a general
reasonableness balancing test, police should be permitted to conduct a protective sweep
whenever they make an in-home arrest for a violent crime."); Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 94 ("the
State. contends that the Terry 'reasonable belief or suspicion' standard should be made
applicable to aid the evidence-gathering function of the search warrant ... to permit
evidence searches of persons who, at the commencement of the search, are on 'compact'
premises subject to a search warrant, at least where the police have a 'reasonable belief
that such persons 'are connected with' drug trafficking and 'may be concealing or carrying
away the contraband"').
7
State v. Flores (Cody Ray), No. 91986-1
(Gordon McCloud, J., dissenting)
(outside arrestee's immediate grab area, Fourth Amendment protections at site of
home arrest are "no more and no less than was required in Terry"); Ybarra, 444 U.S.
at 94 ("the Terry exception does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than
reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to be frisked, even though that
person happens to be on premises where an authorized narcotics search is taking
place").
This Fourth Amendment precedent is highly relevant to the question presented
here, yet neither the State nor the majority acknowledges it. By contrast, federal
circuit courts have applied Ybarra to hold that Terry-requiring reasonable,
articulable, and individualized suspicion-is a constitutional minimum protecting an
arrestee's companion. E.g., United States v. Flett, 806 F.2d 823, 827 (8th Cir. 1986)
(applying Terry's "totality of the circumstances analysis" to frisk of individual
present at the scene of arrest (a private residence); rejecting a less protective standard
as "in direct opposition to the Supreme Court's directions in both Terry and
Ybarra"); United States v. Bell, 762 F.2d 495, 499 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding Terry
standard limited frisk of individual riding in car when officers arrested driver on
felony warrant (quoting Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 92-93)). While some federal cases have
adopted the "automatic companion rule," permitting officers to frisk an arrestee's
8
State v. Flores (Cody Ray), No. 91986-1
(Gordon McCloud, J., dissenting)
companion without any particularized safety justification whatsoever, 6 these cases
predate Ybarra and have been called into question on that basis. 7 The majority of
federal cases addressing the automatic companion rule have applied the Terry
standard instead. 8
These cases, not cases addressing traffic stops, should guide our analysis here.
The majority's contrary conclusion, that officers may detain an arrestee's companion
about whom they have no individualized suspicion, conflicts in principle with
Ybarra's holding that the State may not justify an invasion of individual privacy on
6
E.g., United States v. Poms, 484 F.2d 919,922 (4th Cir. 1973)(per curiam); United
States v. Berryhill, 445 F.2d 1189, 1192-93 (9th Cir. 1971).
7 See Commonwealth v. Ng, 420 Mass. 236,238 n.2, 649 N.E.2d 157 (1995) ("There
is language in opinions of the Supreme Court ... that casts doubt on the propriety of the
bright-line Berryhill rule." (citing Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 91)); Bell, 762 F.2d at 498 ("We
decline to adopt an 'automatic companion' rule, as we have serious reservations about the
constitutionality of such a result under existing precedent.").
8
E.g., United States v. McKie, 292 U.S. App. D.C. 419,422, 951 F.2d 399 (1991)
(because stop was justified by reasonable suspicion consistent with Terry, "[t]his [was] not
... a 'mere propinquity' case and [court] need not take a position on the 'automatic
companion' rule to decide it"); Flett, 806 F.2d at 827 (companion search limited by Terry);
Bell, 762 F.2d at 499 (same); United States v. Tharpe, 536 F.2d 1098, 1101 (5th Cir. 1976)
("We need not go so far as the Ninth Circuit's rule of general justification conferring
categorical reasonableness upon searches of all companions of the arrestee .... We simply
hold that where there was good reason for an officer to apprehend that he was in a position
of real danger from companions ... that officer's pat-down search is compatible with
Terry."), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179, 1184 (5th
Cir. 1987).
9
State v. Flores (Cody Ray), No. 91986-1
(Gordon McCloud, J., dissenting)
the basis of "a person's mere propinquity to others independently suspected of
criminal activity." 444 U.S. at 91.
The majority implicitly recognizes this conflict by declining to adopt an
automatic companion rule. See majority at 15-16 & n.5 (rejecting the State's
argument that "the fact of an arrest is sufficient to satisfy Mendez's objective
rationale test" as "a variation of the 'automatic companion rule'"). As the majority
acknowledges, such a rule would assign guilt by association. Majority at 16 n.5.
Neither the state nor federal constitution permits this. See State v. Fuentes, 183
Wash. 2d 149, 161, 352 P.3d 152 (2015) (defendant's presence at suspected drug
dealer's apartment "late at night in a high-crime area" did not justify Terry stop);
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S. Ct. 673, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570 (2000)
(individual's presence in high crime area is not independently sufficient to justify a
Terry stop (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357
(1979))); Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 94 ("The 'narrow scope' of the Terry exception does
not permit a frisk for weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at
the person to be frisked, even though that person happens to be on premises where
an authorized narcotics search is taking place.").
But the majority refuses to do what other courts rejecting the automatic
companion rule have done: apply the Terry standard. While I agree that officers
10
State v. Flores (Cody Ray), No. 91986-1
(Gordon McCloud, J., dissenting)
need not "ignore information that implicates their safety" at the scene of an arrest,
majority at 20-21, I also agree with the federal courts in Flett, 806 F.2d at 827, and
Bell, 762 F.2d at 499, that the Terry standard strikes the proper balance between
safety and individual privacy at the scene of an arrest outside the car context. The
standard that the majority applies instead poses significant logical and practical
problems.
The source of these problems is that the majority replaces Terry's (and
Ybarra's, and Buie's) objective analysis with total deference to the officer's
subjective belief. It does so by mischaracterizing all of our previous article I, section
7 cases as focusing on the officer's stated "purpose" for the stop (rather than on the
location of the stop). Majority at 14 (contrasting what officers may do "'[f]or
purposes of controlling the scene of the traffic stop'" with what they may do when
"engag[ing] in ... investigative stops" (quoting Mendez, 137 Wash. 2d at 220)), 15
("these cases demonstrate[ ] the standard we use to evaluate the legality of a seizure
is determined by the purpose of the seizure").
But these cases never allowed exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement or article I, section 7's "authority of law" requirement based on the
officer's subjective "purpose." Instead, they based their analysis on an objective
analysis of the intrusiveness ofthe stop.
II
State v. Flores (Cody Ray), No. 91986-1
(Gordon McCloud, J., dissenting)
How intrusive was the stop in this case? As discussed above, it was highly
intrusive-as intrusive as the stop in Terry itself, which led to the Terry prerequisites
to such a stop.
The majority's footnote explaining the dangers generally faced by law
enforcement does not change this. That footnote's statistics certainly show that law
enforcement in general is a dangerous profession. But a Terry stop must by justified
by objectively reasonable facts supporting individualized suspicion, not by
generalities. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37, 121 S. Ct. 447, 148
L. Ed. 2d 333 (2000) ("[a] search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence
of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing"); State v. Jorden, 160 Wash. 2d 121, 130,
156 P.3d 893 (2007) (article I, section 7 prohibits law enforcement from checking
names in motel registry for outstanding warrants absent "individualized or
particularized suspicion").
III. The State Conceded That Terry Was Not Satisfied
I would therefore apply Terry's analysis to this stop. The trial court found the
anonymous tip insufficient to justifY a Terry stop; the State did not assign error to
that finding on appeal. Pet'r's Suppl. Br. at 5 ("The State never argued this case as
a valid Terry stop, instead arguing Mendez!Parker.").
12
State v. Flores (Cody Ray), No. 91986-1
(Gordon McCloud, J., dissenting)
CONCLUSION
Instead of adopting the majority's rule~which creates a new exception to the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement and article I, section 7's privacy
protections~! would follow the analysis applied in Bell and Flett. Under this
analysis, officers must comply with Terry at the scene of an arrest. Because the State
conceded in the trial court that Flores' detention did not satisfy Terry's standard, I
would affirm the Court of Appeals' decision to uphold dismissal. I therefore
respectfully dissent.
13
State v. Flores (Cody Ray), No. 91986-1
(Gordon McCloud, J., dissenting)
14