State v. Saintcalle ( 2013 )

Fl LE
IN CLERKS OFFICE
atJPm:ME COURT, STI\TE OF WliSHtNGTON
AUG 01 2013
UPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
)
Respondent, ) No. 86257-5
)
V. ) En Bane
)
KIRK RICARDO SAINTCALLE, )
) Filed AUG 01 2013
Petitioner. )
)
WIGGINS, J.-This appeal raises important questions about race
discrimination in our criminal justice system. Kirk Saintcalle, a black man,
challenges his conviction for first felony degree murder because the State used a
peremptory challenge to strike the only black venireperson in his jury pool.
Saintcalle claims the peremptory strike was clearly racially motivated in violation
of the equal protection guaranty enshrined in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,
106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986). We disagree. Batson requires a finding
of purposeful discrimination, and the trial court's finding that there was no
purposeful discrimination here is not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm
Saintcalle's conviction.
However, we also take this opportunity to examine whether our Batson
procedures are robust enough to effectively combat race discrimination in the
selection of juries. We conclude that they are not. Twenty-six years after Batson,
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No. 86257-5
a growing body of evidence shows that racial discrimination remains rampant in
jury selection. In part, this is because Batson recognizes only "purposeful
discrimination," whereas racism is often unintentional, institutional, or
unconscious. We conclude that our Batson procedures must change and that we
must strengthen Batson to recognize these more prevalent forms of
discrimination.
But we will not create a new standard in this case because the issue has
not been raised, briefed, or argued, and indeed, the parties are not seeking to
advance a new standard. Applying Batson, we affirm the Court of Appeals.
FACTS
Kirk Saintcalle was convicted of one count of first degree felony murder and
three counts of second degree assault, all with firearm enhancements. Saintcalle
was accused of entering an apartment in the city of Auburn with two companions,
holding three people at gunpoint, and shooting and killing Anthony Johnson.
Saintcalle was sentenced to 579 months in prison.
During jury selection at Saintcalle's trial, the prosecution used a peremptory
challenge to strike the only black juror in the venire, juror 34, Anna Tolson. This
challenge came after the prosecution questioned juror 34 extensively during voir
dire-far more extensively than any other juror. Indeed, most of the prosecution's
interactions with jurors were quite brief, usually consisting of only a few short
questions, but not the interaction with juror 34. The State began questioning juror
34 after another juror made a comment about race:
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No. 86257-5
[JUROR 72]: I feel there are some areas of unfairness in our
system. I am aware, for example, that a jury of their peers [sic], yet as
you look around this panel, all of the faces are white.
[JUROR 34]: No, not quite.
(Laughter.)
[PROSECUTOR]: You know what, you kind of bring a very
important topic to light. If you were seated here in this chair and you
looked out at this panel, would you have any concern about whether or
not people are going to be able to relate to you or listen to you or feel
for you? Juror number-What is your number? Juror number 34, I am
going to ask you a little bit about your background. You work at the
YMCA?
[JUROR 34]: I work in a middle school.
[PROSECUTOR]: So tell me how that works. So you are a
counselor?
[JUROR 34]: Yes.
[PROSECUTOR]: Which means you see a whole lot.
[JUROR 34]: Yes.
[PROSECUTOR]: And where do you work? What school do you
work in?
[JUROR 34]: Do I really need to say that?
[PROSECUTOR]: How about you just tell me the city. Is it an
inner city school?
[JUROR 34]: Yes.
[PROSECUTOR]: You see a whole lot?
[JUROR 34]: Yes.
[PROSECUTOR]: I am interested to hear from you-1 mean, do
you have impressions about the criminal justice system?
[JUROR 34]: Yes.
[PROSECUTOR]: You are not going to hurt my feelings if you
talk about them a little bit. What are your thoughts?
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No. 86257-5
[JUROR 34]: Gosh, I feel like I am on the spot here.
But being a person of color, I have a lot of thoughts about the
criminal system. I see-1 have seen firsthand-and a couple people
have already mentioned that if you have money, you tend to seem to
work the system and get over. And regardless if you are innocent or
guilty, if you want to be innocent, your money says you are innocent.
And a person of color, even if you do have an affluent lawyer
who has the background, the finance to get you off, because you are a
person of color, a lot of times you are not going to get that same kind of
opportunities.
And especially with this person being a person of color and being
a male, I am concerned about, you know, the different stereotypes.
Even if we haven't heard anything about this case, we watch the news
every night. We see how people of color, especially young men, are
portrayed in the news. We never hardly ever see anyone of color doing
something positive, doing something good in their community.
So kind of like what the person behind me is saying, since most
of the people in this room are white, I am wondering what's running
through their mind as they see this young man sitting up here.
[PROSECUTOR]: Right. How about for you, do you think-1
mean, you've got a whole lot that you are feeling as you sit here and
that you are going to be asked to sit in judgment of somebody. How do
you think you are going to be able to handle that?
[JUROR 34]: I think number one, because I am a Christian, I
know I can listen to the facts and, you know, follow the judge's
instruction. But also it's kind of hard, and I haven't mentioned this
before because none of those questions have come up for me to
answer, but I lost a friend two weeks ago to a murder, so it's kind of
difficult sitting here. Even though I don't know the facts of this
particular case, and I would like to think that I can be fair because I am
a Christian, I did lose someone two weeks ago.
[PROSECUTOR]: Was that in Seattle?
[JUROR 34]: Yes.
[PROSECUTOR]: Was that [the] Tyrone case?
[JUROR 34]: Yes.
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Report of Proceedings (RP) (Mar. 9, 2009) at 65-68. After a stretch break, the
prosecutor resumed questioning juror 34:
[PROSECUTOR]: Juror number 34, I am going to move on to the
group, but I wanted to close the loop with you. You have a lot that is
going through your mind currently both that would give you a lot of
empathy for someone who is charged with a crime and also empathy
for someone who may be a victim of a crime. In that way, you may be
representative of the perfect juror.
At the same time, we don't put people in a position where it's
going to cause them a lot of emotional pain. At this point do you think
you could sit in this case and listen to the facts and make a decision
based solely on the evidence presented in trial here and be fair to both
sides?
[JUROR 34]: I'd like to think that I could be, but kind of what you
just mentioned just with the freshness and the rawness of the death of
a friend, I am wondering if that would kind of go through my mind. I like
to think that I am fair and can listen, be impartial, but I don't know. I
have never been on a murder trial and have just lost a friend two weeks
prior to a murder.
[PROSECUTOR]: What I am going to do, I am going to ask
questions. I am going to kind of move on to the rest of the group so
that you have time to think, and then we'll come back and ask you
maybe tomorrow to make your final decision about whether or not you
think you can be fair. I am sorry for your loss.
/d. at 69-70. The next day, a different deputy prosecuting attorney followed
up with juror 34:
[PROSECUTOR]: Go back to [a] couple [of] people juror number
34 sorry [to] focus on you again after yesterday but I just want to try
and go back [and] touch base with you. I know[] you mentioned
yesterday that you had some recent events in your life that may make it
difficult for you to serve as jurors [sic] in [this case]. Have you done
anymore thinking about that? How are you feeling today?
[JUROR 34]: Yes. I thought about it last night as well as this
morning. And, you know, my thought is I don't want to be a part of this
jury because of the situations, and the circumstances that I just went
through. But I'm thinking if ever I was put in a situation where I needed
twelve people who could be honest and look through all the facts or I
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No. 86257-5
guess I'm saying who could be like me I would want me. So
sometimes you have to do things that you don't want to do.
[PROSECUTOR]: I guess my only concern is do you feel like
maybe some of the emotions that dredge up could cloud your judgment
at all on either side. Either you know against the defendant, against
the State or I'm just concerned about that particular issue?
[Court inquires whether juror 34 would like to answer the
question in private, but juror 34 declines.]
[PROSECUTOR]: So is that something you can set aside or
worried at all about the emotions kind of clouding in? I mean, it's just
so new in terms of your life?
[JUROR 34]: I mean, I have never been in this situation where I
have lost someone. You just went to the funeral. He is young. Only
24. And to be called to jury duty to perhaps be on a jury of a murder
suspect. I don't know how I'm going to react. You know, I don't know.
I'm-I'm not an emotional person, but I'm thinking as we go through it,
and I hear the testimony, and I see the pictures, I don't know. I mean,
I'm just being honest. I don't know how I'm going to feel.
RP (Mar. 10, 2009) at 41-43.
After this exchange, the prosecution challenged juror 34 for cause. The
judge denied the challenge, and the prosecution announced its intent to exercise
a peremptory strike. At that point, Saintcalle raised a Batson challenge.
As required by Batson, the judge first found that Saintcalle had made a
prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination. Next, the prosecution
presented race-neutral reasons for striking juror 34: the reasons were (1) juror
34's "inattention" during voir dire and (2) the recent death of juror 34's friend. /d.
at 101-02. The prosecutor claimed to have spent "a lot of time watching juror 34"
and asserted that juror 34 was "very checked out." /d. at 101.
The judge denied the Batson challenge, stating on the record that he
accepted the recent death of juror 34's friend as a proper race-neutral reason for
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No. 86257-5
the strike. Near the end of jury selection, the prosecution peremptorily struck
juror 34, excusing her from the jury.
The prosecution also attempted to exercise a peremptory against the sole
Mexican-American juror in the venire, juror 10, but the judge sustained
Saintcalle's Batson challenge to that strike, rejecting each of the prosecutor's
proffered reasons as pretextual. /d. at 119-20.
After Saintcalle was convicted, he appealed, alleging that the peremptory
strike of juror 34 (Ms. Tolson) violated the Fourteenth Amendment's guaranty of
equal protection. The Court of Appeals rejected his argument finding there was
no purposeful discrimination and accepting the State's race-neutral explanation.
State v. Saintca/le, noted at 162 Wash. App. 1028, 2011 WL 2520000 (2011 ). We
granted review only on the Batson issue. State v. Saintca/le, 172 Wash. 2d 1020,
268 P.3d 224 (2011 ).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review Batson challenges for clear error, deferring to the trial court to
the extent that its rulings are factual. State v. Hicks, 163 Wash. 2d 477, 486, 181
P.3d 831 (2008) (citing State v. Luvene, 127 Wash. 2d 690, 699, 699, 903 P.2d 960(1995) (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 114
L. Ed. 2d 395 (1991 ))). Clear error exists when the court is left with a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. E.g., Ass'n of Rural
Residents v. Kitsap County, 141 Wash. 2d 185, 196, 4 P.3d 115 (2000).
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ANALYSIS
Race discrimination in courtrooms "raises serious questions as to the
fairness of the proceedings conducted there." Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
Co., 500 U.S. 614, 628, 111 S. Ct. 2077, 114 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1991 ).
Discrimination "mars the integrity of the judicial system and prevents the idea of a
democratic government from becoming a reality." /d.
It is crucial that we have meaningful and effective procedures for identifying
racially motivated juror challenges because "[r]acial discrimination in selection of
jurors harms not only the accused whose life or liberty they are summoned to try";
it also shamefully belittles minority jurors who report to serve their civic duty only
to be turned away on account of their race. Batson, 476 U.S. at 87. Perhaps
most damaging, racial discrimination "undermine[s] public confidence in the
fairness of our system of justice." 1 /d. at 87-88. Racial discrimination in the
qualification or selection of jurors offends the dignity of persons and the integrity
of the courts, and permitting such exclusion in an official forum compounds the
racial insult inherent in judging a citizen by the color of his or her skin.
Edmonson, 500 U.S at 628.
1
A recent report by Washington's Race and Equal Justice Task Force notes that "'bias
pervades the entire legal system in general and hence [minorities] do not trust the court
system to resolve their disputes or administer justice even-handedly."' TASK FORCE ON
RACE AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, PRELIMINARY REPORT ON RACE AND WASHINGTON'S
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM at 6 (2011) (alteration in original),
available at http://www.law.washington.edu/About/RaceTaskForce/preliminary
_report_race_criminaljustice_030111.pdf (quoting WASH. ST. MINORITY & JUSTICE
COMM'N, 1990 FINAL REPORT at xxi (1990), available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/
committee/pdf/TaskForce.pdf).
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Batson sets forth a three-part analysis for determining whether a
peremptory strike unconstitutionally discriminates based on race. First, the
person challenging the peremptory must "make out a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives
rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose." 2 Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-94.
Second, "the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a [race-]neutral
explanation" for the challenge. /d. at 97. Third, "the trial court then [has] the duty
to determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination." /d. at
98. If the trial court finds purposeful discrimination, the challenge should be
granted and the peremptory strike disallowed.
As part of the "purposeful discrimination" analysis, the Supreme Court has
established a comparative juror analysis. This entails examining whether the
proffered race-neutral explanation could apply just as well to a nonminority juror
who was allowed to serve. Mil/er-E/ v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241, 125 S. Ct.
2317, 162 L. Ed. 2d 196 (2005). A corollary is that disparate questioning of
minority jurors can provide evidence of discriminatory purpose because it creates
an appearance that an attorney is "fishing" for a race-neutral reason to exercise a
2
The State argued for the first time in its supplemental brief that we should repudiate the
bright line rule approved by a majority of this court that "a defendant establishes a prima
facie case of discrimination when . . . the record shows that the State exercised a
peremptory challenge against the sole remaining venire member of the defendant's
constitutionally cognizable racial group." State v. Rhone, 168 Wash. 2d 645, 659, 229 P.3d
752 (2010) (Alexander, J., dissenting) Rhone was a split decision, with a four-justice
lead opinion rejecting the proposed bright line rule, a four-justice dissent supporting it,
and Chief Justice Madsen concurring stating that "I agree with the lead opinion in this
case. However, going forward, I agree with the rule advocated by the dissent." /d. at
658 (Madsen, C.J., concurring). We grant Saintcalle's motion to strike the issue because
any statement about the Rhone bright line rule would be dictum in this case and because
the State failed to raise the issue in a timely manner. RAP 13.4(d).
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No. 86257-5
strike. /d. at 244-45; Reed v. Quarterman, 555 F.3d 364, 379 (5th Cir. 2009). We
do not allow prosecutors to go fishing for race-neutral reasons and then hide
behind the legitimate reasons they do find. This disproportionately affects
minorities.
Similarly, a proffer of pretextual reasons gives rise to an inference of race
discrimination, and a court's finding of discrimination against one juror is evidence
of discrimination against other jurors. Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 485,
478, 128 S. Ct. 1203, 170 L. Ed. 2d 175 (2008).
I. Batson in context
Since 1879, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that race
discrimination in the selection of jurors violates the Fourteenth Amendment's
guaranty of equal protection. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. (10 Otto)
303, 309-10, 25 L. Ed. 664 (1879). But to contextualize Batson we must look to
its origins.
Two decades before Batson, the United States Supreme Court held in
Swain v. Alabama that purposeful discrimination in the use of peremptory
challenges violates the equal protection clause. 380 U.S. 202, 223-24, 85 S. Ct.
824, 13 L. Ed. 2d 759 (1965), overruled by Batson, 476 U.S. 79. Under Swain, a
single act of racism was not sufficient to make out an equal protection claim; a
person alleging race discrimination had to prove a long-running pattern of
purposefully discriminatory acts. /d. at 221-22.
Swain did little to curb racial discrimination, establishing a "crippling burden
of proof" and leaving peremptories "largely immune from constitutional scrutiny."
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Batson, 476 U.S. at 92-93. Batson reexamined Swain in light of this reality,
rejecting Swain's "crippling burden" and establishing the now-familiar three-part
test for scrutinizing peremptories. /d. at 92-93, 97-98.
Twenty-six years later it is evident that Batson, like Swain before it, is failing
us. Mil/er-E/, 545 U.S. at 270 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("[T]he use of race- and
gender-based stereotypes in the jury-selection process seems better organized
and more systematized than ever before."). A growing body of evidence shows
that Batson has done very little to make juries more diverse or prevent
prosecutors from exercising race-based challenges. Justice Breyer explains,
concurring in Mil/er-E/ and citing a laundry list of sources concluding the same
thing:
Given the inevitably clumsy fit between any objectively
measurable standard and the subjective decisionmaking at issue, I am
not surprised to find studies and anecdotal reports suggesting that,
despite Batson, the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges
remains a problem. See, e.g., [David C.] Baldus, [George] Woodworth,
[David] Zuckerman, [Neil Alan] Weiner, & [Barbara] Broffitt, The Use of
Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: A Legal and Empirical
Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3, 52-53, 73, n. 197 (2001) (in 317
capital trials in Philadelphia between 1981 and 1997, prosecutors
struck 51% of black jurors and 26% of non black jurors; defense
counsel struck 26% of black jurors and 54% of nonblack jurors; and
race-based uses of prosecutorial peremptories declined by only 2%
after Batson); [Mary R.] Rose, The Peremptory Challenge Accused of
Race or Gender Discrimination? Some Data from One County, 23 LAW
AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 695, 698-699 (1999) (in one North Carolina
county, 71% of excused black jurors were removed by the prosecution;
81% of excused white jurors were removed by the defense); [Neely]
Tucker, In Moore's Trials, Excluded Jurors Fit Racial Pattern,
WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 2, 2001, p. A1 (in D.C. murder case spanning
four trials, prosecutors excused 41 blacks or other minorities and 6
whites; defense counsel struck 29 whites and 13 black venire
members); [George E.] Mize, A Legal Discrimination; Juries Aren't
Supposed to be Picked on the Basis of Race and Sex, But It Happens
All the Time, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 8, 2000, p. 88 (authored by judge
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No. 86257-5
on the D.C. Superior Court); see also [Kenneth J.] Melilli, Batson in
Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and Peremptory
Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 462-464 (1996) (finding
Batson challenges' success rates lower where peremptories were used
to strike black, rather than white, potential jurors); [Jeffrey S.] Brand,
The Supreme Court, Equal Protection and Jury Selection: Denying
That Race Still Matters, 1994 W1s. L. REV. 511, 583-589 (examining
judicial decisions and concluding that few Batson challenges succeed);
[Eric N. Einhorn] Note, Batson v. Kentucky and J.E.B. v. Alabama ex
ref. T B.: Is the Peremptory Challenge Still Preeminent? 36 BoSTON
COLLEGE L. REV. 161, 189, and n. 303 (1994) (same); [Jean] Montoya,
The Future of the Post-Batson Peremptory Challenge: Voir Dire by
Questionnaire and the 11Biind" Peremptory, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
981, 1006, nn. 126-127, 1035 (1996) (reporting attorneys' views on the
difficulty of proving Batson claims).
545 U.S. at 268-69. A recent report by the Equal Justice Initiative reaches the
same dire conclusion: peremptory challenges have become a cloak for race
discrimination. EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN JURY
SELECTION: A CONTINUING LEGACY (hereinafter EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE REPORT)
(Aug. 201 0), available at http://eji.org/eji/files/EJI%20Race%20and%20Jury%
20Report. pdf.
It would be na'fve to assume Washington is somehow immune from this
nationwide problem. Our Race and Equal Justice Task Force concluded that
"[t]he fact of racial and ethnic disproportionality in [Washington's] criminal justice
system is indisputable." TASK FORCE ON RACE AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM,
PRELIMINARY REPORT ON RACE AND WASHINGTON'S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
(hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT) at 1 (2011),
available at http://www.law.washington.edu/About/RaceTaskForce/preliminary
_report_race_criminaljustice_030111.pdf.
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In over 40 cases since Batson, Washington appellate courts have never
reversed a conviction based on a trial court's erroneous denial of a Batson
challenge. See Suppl. Br. of Pet'r at 2, App. A (collecting cases). Saintcalle's
brief cites 42 Washington Batson cases, all of which affirm a trial court's denial of
a Batson challenge. Of those 42 cases, 28 involve the prosecution removing
every prospective juror of the same race as the defendant-usually one or two
black jurors. In only six of these cases were minority jurors permitted to serve,
and in eight it is unclear from the record whether minorities were permitted to
serve or not. This is rather shocking and underscores the substantial discretion
that is afforded to trial courts under Batson. And while this alone does not prove
that Batson is failing, it is highly suggestive in light of all the other evidence that
race discrimination persists in the exercise of peremptories.
In short, Batson, like Swain before it, appears to have created a "crippling
burden" making it very difficult for defendants to prove discrimination even where
it almost certainly exists.
II. The changing face of race discrimination
In part, the problem is that racism itself has changed. It is now socially
unacceptable to be overtly racist. Yet we all live our lives with stereotypes that
are ingrained and often unconscious, implicit biases that endure despite our best
efforts to eliminate them. 3 Racism now lives not in the open but beneath the
3
"The general findings, confirmed by hundreds of articles in peer-reviewed scientific
journals are that '[i]mplicit biases-by which we mean implicit attitudes and
stereotypes-are both pervasive (most individuals show evidence of some biases), and
large in magnitude, statistically speaking. In other words, we are not, on average or
generally, cognitively colorblind."' TASK FORCE REPORT, supra, at 19 (alteration in
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No. 86257-5
surface-in our institutions and our subconscious thought processes-because
we suppress it and because we create it anew through cognitive processes that
have nothing to do with racial animus.
Many scholars have written on the topic of unconscious prejudice and
implicit bias. 4 In one representative article, Antony Page, Batson's Blind-Spot:
Unconscious Stereotyping and The Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155
(2005), the author explains how unconscious biases are formed, why they persist,
and how they affect our decisionmaking:
In the late 1970s, ... as part of the "cognitive revolution,"
psychologists began to explore the notion that discrimination and other
forms of biased intergroup judgment may result from ordinary, routine
and completely normal cognitive mental processes. The results of this
research suggest that a basic way in which people try to understand
their world-categorization-can, of its own accord, lead to
stereotyping and discrimination.
/d. at 181 (footnotes omitted). Explaining how race discrimination results from
ordinary cognitive processes, he notes that "'[t]he human mind must think with the
aid of categories .... We cannot possibly avoid this process .... Life is just too
short to have differentiated concepts about everything."' /d. at 185 (quoting
GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 20, 173 (1954) (alterations in
original) (quoting Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit
Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465, 471 (201 0)).
4
See, e.g., Eva Paterson, Kimberly Thomas Rapp, & Sara Jackson, The ld, The Ego,
and Equal Protection in the 21st Century: Building upon Charles Lawrence's Vision To
Mount a Contemporary Challenge to the Intent Doctrine, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1175 (2008);
GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 20, 173 (1954); HOWARD J. EHRLICH, THE
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE 35 (1973); see Felicia Pratto & Oliver P. John,
Automatic Vigilance: The Attention-Grabbing Power of Negative Social Information, 61 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 380, 381 (1991 ).
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No. 86257-5
original)). So we use schemas, 5 categories, and cognitive shortcuts that lead us
to unknowingly discriminate: 6
Once stereotypes have formed, they affect us even when we are
aware of them and reject them. Stereotypes can greatly influence the
way we perceive, store, use, and remember information.
Discrimination, understood as biased decision-making, then flows from
the resulting distorted or unobjective information. The attorney
exercising the peremptory challenge will be unaware of this biased
information processing and so will be unaware of her gender- or race-
based discrimination ....
To put it simply, good people often discriminate, and they often
discriminate without being aware of it.
/d. at 160-61 (footnotes omitted). Compounding this problem is that stereotyping
is often part of our so-called "social heritage":
[S]tereotypes about ethnic groups appear as a part of the social
heritage of society. They are transmitted across generations as a
5
Social schemas can exist at any level of abstraction and along any
dimension, such as identity group (for example, race), character traits (for
'example, dominance), physical traits (for example, tall), social roles (for
example, occupation), or general person impressions. Whites in America may
attribute to blacks character traits such as laziness or hostility, physical traits
such as kinky hair, roles such as entertainer or drug-dealer, and an overall
negative person impression.
Page, supra, at 189.
6
People generally match and compare incoming information with the
most relevant schema or sub-schema. They then tend to order and process
new related stimuli in keeping with other elements of the schema. A schema
essentially operates as an implicit theory, which reflexively "directs the
perceiver's attention . . . mediates inferences . . . guides judgment and
evaluation; and ... fills in ... values for unexpected attributes." It is a way to
integrate new material into familiar understanding and a way to draw
conclusions beyond the information given. Not only do we assume the British
are reserved or that Canadians are funny (if they are), but we also expect the
British to act reserved and Canadians to be funny.
Page, supra, at 189-90 (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Eliot R. Smith,
Mental Representation and Memory, in 1 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 391, 404
(Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998)).
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No. 86257-5
component of the accumulated knowledge of society. They are as true
as tradition, and as pervasive as folklore. No person can grow up in a
society without having learned the stereotypes assigned to the major
ethnic groups.
HOWARD J. EHRLICH, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE 35 (1973).
Unconscious stereotyping upends the Batson framework. Batson is only
equipped to root out "purposefuf' discrimination, which many trial courts probably
understand to mean conscious discrimination. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 98. But
discrimination in this day and age is frequently unconscious and less often
consciously purposeful. That does not make it any less pernicious.
Problematically, people are rarely aware of the actual reasons for their
discrimination and will genuinely believe the race-neutral reason they create to
mask it. See Page, supra, at 175-77. Since Batson's third step hinges on
credibility, this makes it very difficult to sustain a Batson challenge even in
situations where race has in fact affected decision-making. /d.
More troubling for Batson is research showing that people will act on
unconscious bias far more often if reasons exist giving plausible deniability (e.g.,
an opportunity to present a race-neutral reason). In one fascinating study,
researchers tested peoples' unconscious desire to avoid contact with
handicapped persons. "In a carefully designed experiment, researchers found
that when offered a choice of two rooms in which movies were playing, people
avoided the room with a handicapped person, but only when doing so could
masquerade as a movie preference." TASK FoRCE REPORT, supra, at 19 (citing
Melvin L. Snyder et al., Avoidance of the Handicapped: An Attributional Ambiguity
Analysis, 37 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 2297, 2297, 2304 (1979)). But
16
No. 86257-5
when offered outright the choice of sitting next to a handicapped or
nonhandicapped person, people chose to sit by the handicapped person to
conceal their prejudice. /d.
None of this means we should turn a blind eye to the overwhelming
evidence that peremptory challenges often facilitate racially discriminatory jury
selection. Nor does it suggest we should throw up our hands in despair at what
appears to be an intractable problem. Instead, we should recognize the
challenge presented by unconscious stereotyping in jury selection and rise to
meet it.
Ill. The constitutional value of a diverse jury
We should also recognize that there is constitutional value in having
diverse juries, quite apart from the values enshrined in the Fourteenth
Amendment. Article I, section 21 of our state constitution declares, "The right of
trial by jury shall remain inviolate."
We have juries for many reasons, not the least of which is that it is a
ground level exercise of democratic values. The government does not get to
decide who goes to the lockup or even the gallows. Ordinary citizens exercise
that right as a matter of democracy. In England, the jury developed into juries of
one's peers, coming from one's community. This is the grand heritage of the jury
system.
But equally fundamental to our democracy is that all citizens have the
opportunity to participate in the organs of government, including the jury. If we
allow the systematic removal of minority jurors, we create a badge of inferiority,
17
No. 86257-5
cheapening the value of the jury verdict. And it is also fundamental that the
defendant who looks at the jurors sitting in the box have good reason to believe
that the jurors will judge as impartially and fairly as possible. Our democratic
system cannot tolerate any less.
From a practical standpoint, studies suggest that compared to diverse
juries, all-white juries tend to spend less time deliberating, make more errors, and
consider fewer perspectives. EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE REPORT, supra, at 6, 40-41.
In contrast, diverse juries were significantly more able to assess reliability and
credibility, avoid presumptions of guilt, and fairly judge a criminally accused. /d. at
41. "By every deliberation measure, ... heterogeneous groups outperformed
homogeneous groups." /d. These studies confirm what seems obvious from
reflection: more diverse juries result in fairer trials.
Thus, our Batson analysis should reflect not only the Fourteenth
Amendment's equal protection guarantee, but also the jury trial protections
contained in article I, section 21 of our state's constitution.
IV. What to do about Batson?
Race should not matter in the selection of a jury, but under current law it
often does. We conclude from this that we should strengthen our Batson
protections, relying both on the Fourteenth Amendment and our state jury trial
right.
We have a lot of flexibility to do so. The Batson framework anticipates that
state procedures will vary, explicitly granting states flexibility to fulfill the promise
of equal protection. Batson, 476 U.S. at 99-100 n.24 ("[W]e make no attempt to
18
No. 86257-5
instruct [state and federal trial] courts how best to implement our holding today.");
Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 168, 125 S. Ct. 2410, 162 L. Ed. 2d 129(2005) (recognizing that states have "flexibility in formulating appropriate
procedures to comply with Batson"); Hicks, 163 Wn.2d at 489-90 (same). Indeed,
the Batson procedure itself was born in state courts out of a growing sense that
Swain was failing. Batson, 476 U.S. at 82 n.1, 99.
Likewise, we have authority under federal law to pioneer new procedures
within existing Fourteenth Amendment frameworks. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S.
259, 273, 120 S. Ct. 746, 145 L. Ed. 2d 756 (2000) (states have "wide discretion,
subject to the minimum requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, to
experiment with solutions to difficult policy problems"); Dickerson v. United States,
530 U.S. 428, 438-38, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 147 L. Ed. 2d 405 (2000).
We can also extend greater-than-federal Batson protections to defendants
under the greater protection afforded under our state jury trial right, a fact we
recognized in Hicks. 163 Wn.2d at 492.
Justices Marshall and Breyer argue that the taint of racial discrimination on
peremptory challenges is so strong that the only way to remove it is to eliminate
the peremptory system altogether. Batson, 476 U.S. at 102-03 (Marshall, J.,
concurring); Mil/er-E/, 545 U.S. at 266-67, 273 (Breyer, J., concurring). That may
be so.
Justice Gonzalez's concurring heartfelt opinion argues for immediate
abolition of the peremptory challenge. We do not disagree with his call for the
need for a departure from the Batson framework, but we believe that such a major
19
No. 86257-5
change in trial procedure should be tested in the furnace of advocacy at the trial
and appellate levels, with the opportunity for input from a broad range of interests,
before we abandon a procedure that was adopted by Washington's first territorial
legislature over 150 years ago. "'[W]e are not in the business of inventing
unbriefed arguments for parties sua sponte .... "' In re Pers. Restraint of Coats,
173 Wash. 2d 123, 138, 267 P.3d 324 (2011) (quoting State v. Studd, 137 Wash. 2d
533, 547, 973 P.2d 1049 (1999)). Alternatively, as both we and Justice
Gonzalez's concurring opinion note, it might be more appropriate to consider
whether to abolish peremptory challenges through the rule-making process
instead of in the context of a specific case. See infra p. 23.
We have occasionally exercised our power to reach issues not raised by
the parties, but this case does not present any of the circumstances justifying
exercise of this discretionary power. The parties have not "ignore[d] a
constitutional mandate, a statutory commandment, or an established precedent."
City of Seattle v. McCready, 123 Wash. 2d 260, 269, 868 P.2d 134 (1994).
With respect to our concurring colleagues, we do not believe that our call
for new alternatives to the Batson analysis constitutes '"turn[ing] a blind eye,"'
'"throw[ing] up our hands in despair,"' or '"shrink[ing] from this challenge,"'
concurrence (Gonzalez, J.) at 2, nor are we reluctant to change the Batson
standard simply because the solution presents a difficult question, see
concurrence (Stephens, J.) at 1-2. Rather, we feel that now is the time to begin
the task of formulating a new, functional method to prevent racial bias in jury
20
No. 86257-5
selection. To do so, we seek to enlist the best ideas from trial judges, trial lawyers,
academics, and others to find the best alternative to the Batson analysis.
But it may instead be possible to address Batson's shortcomings in a more
targeted fashion. The main problem is that Batson's third step requires a finding
of "purposeful discrimination," which trial courts may often interpret to require
conscious discrimination. This is problematic because discrimination is often
unconscious. A requirement of conscious discrimination is especially
disconcerting because it seemingly requires judges to accuse attorneys of deceit
and racism in order to sustain a Batson challenge. See Robin Charlow, Tolerating
Deception and Discrimination After Batson, 50 STAN. L. REV. 9, 11 (1997) (noting
that one judge "had the uncomfortable feeling that she had just rendered an
official ruling that the attorney was lying to the court"). Imagine how difficult it
must be for a judge to look a member of the bar in the eye and level an
accusation of deceit or racism. 7 And if the judge chooses not to do so despite
misgivings about possible race bias, the problem is compounded by the fact that
we defer heavily to the judge's findings on appeal. Hicks, 163 Wn.2d at 486. A
strict "purposeful discrimination" requirement thus blunts Batson's effectiveness
and blinds its analysis to unconscious racism. 8 As a first step, we should
7
Likewise, "[m]any defense lawyers fail to adequately challenge racially discriminatory
jury selection because they are uncomfortable, unwilling, unprepared, or not trained to
assert claims of racial bias." EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE REPORT, supra, at 6.
8
It could be argued (although none of the parties makes this argument) that "purposeful
discrimination" already encompasses unconscious bias. This argument flows from the
idea that the "purposeful discrimination" requirement was never intended to be a proxy
for conscious intent or anything resembling a conscious mens rea, but rather a signpost
for distinguishing between discriminatory purpose and disproportionate impact. Before
Batson was decided, it was well established that disproportionate impact alone does not
21
No. 86257-5
abandon and replace Batson's "purposeful discrimination" requirement with a
requirement that necessarily accounts for and alerts trial courts to the problem of
unconscious bias, without ambiguity or confusion. For example, it might make
sense to require a Batson challenge to be sustained if there is a reasonable
probability that race was a factor in the exercise of the peremptory or where the
judge finds it is more likely than not that, but for the defendant's race, the
peremptory would not have been exercised. A standard like either of these would
take the focus off of the credibility and integrity of the attorneys and ease the
accusatory strain of sustaining a Batson challenge. This in turn would simplify the
task of reducing racial bias in our criminal justice system, both conscious and
unconscious.
However, a new, more robust framework should do more than simply
acknowledge that unconscious bias is a permissible consideration in the Batson
violate the equal protection clause. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240, 96 S.
Ct. 2040, 48 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1976). It could be argued that Batson's "purposeful
discrimination" requirement therefore meant not that the state's attorney need be found
intentionally racist, only that racial bias (conscious or unconscious, as the argument
would go) be the source of any disparate impact. This argument finds support in
scholarship and in the United States Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence
regarding jury selection. See, e.g., Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632, 92 S. Ct.
1221, 31 L. Ed. 2d 536 (1972) (finding that disproportionate exclusion of blacks in
subjective jury selection process was clearly discriminatory even with "no evidence that
the commissioners consciously selected by race"); Batson, 476 U.S. at 94 (citing
Alexander); see also Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 482, 74 S. Ct. 667, 98 L. Ed.
866 (1954) ("The result bespeaks discrimination, whether or not it was a conscious
decision on the part of any individual .... "); Ralph Richard Banks & Richard Thompson
Ford, (How) Does Unconscious Bias Matter?: Law, Politics, and Racial Inequality, 58
EMORY L.J. 1053, 1090-93 (2009) (concluding that "discriminatory purpose" includes
unconscious bias under current equal protection jurisprudence). This argument makes
sense, but we do not consider it here. The issue was not raised or decided below, the
trial court easily could have understood "purposeful discrimination" to include
unconscious bias, and the facts of this case simply do not compel a finding of purposeful
discrimination even if considering unconscious discrimination.
22
No. 86257-5
analysis. It should seek to eliminate this bias altogether or at least move us
closer to that goal. A new framework should give trial courts the necessary
latitude to weed out unconscious bias where it exists, without fear of reversal and
without the need to level harsh accusations against attorneys or parties. On the
other hand, it may be that Justices Marshall and Breyer are right and the problem
is so dire that the only solution is to eliminate peremptory challenges altogether.
See Batson, 476 U.S. at 102-03 (Marshall, J., concurring); Mil/er-E/, 545 U.S. at
266-67, 273 (Breyer, J., concurring).
A rule change of this magnitude might also be best made through the rule-
making process. This court possesses certain rule-making authority inherent in
its power to prescribe rules of procedure and practice, which is supplemented by
the Legislature. State v. Templeton, 148 Wash. 2d 193, 212-13, 59 P.3d 632 (2002).
We could certainly adopt a rule that would strengthen our procedures for Batson
challenges, and this may be the most effective way to reduce discrimination and
combat minority underrepresentation in our jury system. 9
V. Application to this case
As urgent as the need for a new framework may be, we cannot create one
in this case. Neither party has asked for a new standard or framework, nor have
they briefed or argued what that framework might be or how it would apply in this
case. The issue also was not raised or decided at the Court of Appeals or the trial
court. This means the record has not been developed in a way that will facilitate
9
Ironically, Justice Stephens's concurring opiniOn takes this opiniOn to task for
discussing possible solutions and then launches into a lengthy criticism of possible
solutions. Concurrence (Stephens, J.) at 2-5.
23
No. 86257-5
our review, nor have we obtained the benefit of input from amici, including
members of the bar and other stakeholders. It must wait for another case.
VI. The trial court did not clearly err by finding there was no purposeful
discrimination in this case
Instead, we apply Batson to this case and conclude that the trial court's
finding that there was no purposeful discrimination was not clear error. A trial
court's decision that a challenge is race-neutral is a factual determination based in
part on the answers provided by the juror, as well as an assessment of the
demeanor and credibility of the juror and the attorney. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98
n.21. The defendant carries the burden of proving purposeful discrimination. /d.
at 93. The trial judge's findings are "accorded great deference on appeal" and will
be upheld unless proved clearly erroneous. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S.
352, 364, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395 (1991). Deference to trial court
findings is critically important in Batson cases because the trial court is much
better positioned than an appellate court to examine the circumstances
surrounding the challenge. Further, deference is important because trial judges
must have some assurance that the rest of the trial will not be an exercise in
futility if it turns out an appellate court would have ruled on a Batson challenge
differently.
Here, we find no clear error in the trial court's determination that the
prosecution had a valid race-neutral reason to peremptorily strike Ms. Tolson. Ms.
Tolson said she might have trouble sitting on the jury of a murder trial because
someone she knew had recently been murdered:
24
No. 86257-5
I mean, I have never been in this situation where I have lost
someone. You just went to the funeral. He is young. Only 24. And to
be called to jury duty to perhaps be on a jury of a murder suspect. I
don't know how I'm going to react. You know, I don't know. I'm-I'm
not an emotional person, but I'm thinking as we go through it, and I
hear the testimony, and I see the pictures, I don't know. I mean, I'm
just being honest. I don't know how I'm going to feel.
RP (Mar. 10, 2009) at 43. In light of Ms. Tolson's statements throughout voir dire,
we defer to the trial court's factual finding that the prosecutor was justified in
believing there was a realistic possibility that she might have been "lost" as a juror
before the end of the case. The record does not compel a contrary conclusion.
The trial court observed the juror and agreed that she was having difficulties.
Losing jurors during a lengthy trial is always a possibility, and justice is not served
when a mistrial is declared or a juror is unable to view and process the evidence.
Here, it was entirely reasonable for the court to conclude that the prosecutor's
concerns were legitimate and race-neutral, and there was no clear error. We
affirm the trial court's finding that there was no purposeful discrimination.
We do, however, acknowledge that Ms. Tolson was questioned far more
than any other juror, perhaps in part because she was black. This conclusion is
supported by a statistical analysis of the prosecution's voir dire that appears in
Appendix A, attached to this opinion. 10 These statistics are rather striking, and in
general, disparate questioning of minority jurors can provide evidence of
10
The charts in Appendix A track two relevant measures of prosecutor questioning: (1)
the number of questions asked of each juror by the prosecution and (2) the total number
of words spoken (by both prosecutor and venireperson) in direct interaction with each
prospective juror. Totals do not include statements or questions made by the prosecutor
to the venire at large that were not directed to any particular juror. Totals omit voir dire
by defense counsel and individual questioning conducted outside the presence of the full
venire.
25
No. 86257-5
discriminatory purpose because it can suggest that an attorney is "fishing" for a
race-neutral reason to exercise a strike. See Mil/er-E/, 545 U.S. at 241; Reed v.
Quarterman, 555 F.3d 364, 379 (5th Cir. 2009). However, disparate questioning
does not itself prove purposeful discrimination. In some cases, there may be
good reasons to question minority jurors more than nonminority jurors. Here, for
example, the prosecutor began by eliciting Ms. Tolson's views on race in the
criminal justice system and later spoke with her regarding the recent death of her
friend. These were legitimate topics to explore. 11 We defer to the trial court that
the disparate questioning in this case, while it may have been motivated in part by
race, did not necessarily amount to purposeful discrimination.
We also acknowledge that the prosecution attempted to strike the only
Mexican-American juror in the venire, juror 10. RP (Mar. 10, 2009) at 119-20.
And while it is true that a court's finding of discrimination against one juror is
evidence of discrimination against others, it does not follow that one Batson
violation necessarily implies another. Snyder, 552 U.S. at 478.
Under Batson, we defer to the trial court's ruling.
11
The chief justice's concurring opinion criticizes our reference to statistics of the number
of questions asked of Ms. Tolson compared with the other jurors, asking why additional
questions were asked and "many other factors" and disclaiming any reliance on
statistics. Concurrence (Madsen, C.J.) at 5-6. This criticism is particularly inapt in light
of this opinion's extensive quotations from the voir dire of Ms. Tolson, id. at 3-6, 25, and
one statement that disparate questioning does not itself prove purposeful discrimination.
26
No. 86257-5
CONCLUSION
Racial inequalities permeate our criminal justice system and present
important moral issues we all must grapple with. Twenty-six years after Batson, it
is increasingly evident that discriminatory use of peremptory challenges will be
difficult to eradicate. We should not shrink from this challenge, but this is not the
case to address it. It must wait for another day to determine how to adapt Batson
to the realities of continuing race discrimination and fulfill the promise of equal
protection.
We affirm the Court of Appeals.
27
No. 86257-5
WE CONCUR.
~--------~------~
28
No. 86257-5
APPENDIX A
Questions Total Words of
Juror Number Asked Interaction
1 6 155
4 4 102
5 1 16 Total Words of Interaction
7 5 151
10 5 159 ?
11 12 535 80
79
12 5 127 72
13 7 190 70
16 2 88 69
20 2 55 67
22 6 98 66
23 65
2 88
62
24 5 147 60
26 1 26 55
27 11 521 52
29 5 166 so
32 6 301 49
46
33 4 137 44
34 17 1165 43
36 14 389 42
39 1 89 39
42 3 103 36
43 34 ~
3 128
33
44 7 258 32
46 4 228 29
49 9 456 27
50 1 44 26
52 9 362 24
23
55 4 125 22
60 2 108 20
62 5 118 16
65 1 20 13
66 6 407
67 4 168
10
69 4 149 7
70 1 6 5
72 2 40 4
79 2 75 1
80 3 36 0 500 1000 1500
? ~- ''"'"~' ..•.
2
·-·~-~ '"'"••''~"- Yo<'.-
140
Grand Total 193 7676
1
No. 86257-5
Juror 34 Compared to Average
Questions Asked (Total Words)
Average
?
80 Juror 34
79 0 500 1000 1500
72
70
69 · - -
67 ~--
66 Juror 34 Compared to Average
65 (Questions Asl476 U.S.
79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 69 (1986), is used to make the assessment whether
purposeful discrimination occurred. In the first of the Batson three-step analysis, the
defendant must make a prima facie showing that a peremptory challenge was made on the
basis of the venire member's race. Then, in accord with the Batson analysis, the State
must offer a race-neutral explanation for the use of the peremptory challenge and, finally,
the trial judge must make a determination as to whether racial discrimination occurred.
Batson's framework continues to apply to identify the constitutional equal
protection violations that it was intended to reach, those involving purposeful
discrimination. But as the Court advised, state courts have some flexibility to develop
procedures to comply with Batson. Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 168, 125 S. Ct.
No. 86257-5
Madsen, C.J. (concurring)
2410, 162 L. Ed. 2d 129 (2005); see State v. Hicks, 163 Wash. 2d 477,489-90, 181 P.3d 831(2008). Recently, for example, in State v. Rhone, 168 Wash. 2d 645, 229 P.3d 752 (2010),
five members of the court agreed that the defendant can establish the prima facie case
when the record shows that the prosecution exercised a peremptory challenge against the
only remaining member of the venire who is in the same constitutionally cognizable
racial group as the defendant. ld. at 661 (Alexander, J., dissenting); id. at 658 (Madsen,
1
C.J., concurring). I agreed with the Rhone dissent on this point, but also said that this
means of establishing the prima facie case should be applied only in future cases, going
forward. I d. Thus, since the present case arose before Rhone was issued, the alternative
approach set out in the dissent in Rhone is not at issue.
Beyond the constitutional inquiry, which is aimed at purposeful discrimination,
there are growing concerns about unconscious and implicit racial biases that could also
affect jury selection. Both the lead opinion and some of the concurrences consider such
concerns at some length.
But the constitutional test from Batson is intended to reach purposeful
discriminatory exercise of the peremptory challenge "based on either the race of the juror
or the racial stereotypes held by the party." Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59, 112
1
Among other things, the lead opinion in Rhone observed that the Court in Batson overruled a
prior test focusing on systematic discrimination. Rhone, 168 Wn.2d at 652 n.4 (discussing
Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 269-70, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 162 L. Ed. 2d 196 (2005); Batson;
and Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S. Ct. 824, 13 L. Ed. 2d 759 (1965), overruled by
Batson, 476 U.S. 79). The Court noted that in cases decided after Swain, it had "recognized that
a defendant may make a prima facie showing of purposeful racial discrimination in selection of
the venire by relying solely on the facts concerning its selection in his case." Batson, 476 U.S. at
95.
2
No. 86257-5
Madsen, C.J. (concurring)
S. Ct. 2348, 120 L. Ed. 2d 33 (1992). We have not been asked to reassess or modify the
Batson approach or to address any policy-based nonconstitutional analyses or
nonpurposeful discrimination based on race during jury selection. 2 Nonetheless, both the
lead opinion and Justice Gonzalez's concurrence discuss possible approaches to address
implicit or unconscious discrimination and Justice Gonzalez calls for abolishment of
peremptory challenges to resolve the problem.
The peremptory challenge is an important "state-created means to the
constitutional end of an impartial jury and a fair trial." I d. at 58; accord State v. Latham,
100 Wash. 2d 59, 70, 667 P.2d 56 (1983) (the peremptory challenge "is an important and
substantial right which protects a party's constitutional right trial by jury") (citing Smith
v. Kent, 11 Wash. App. 439, 523 P.2d 446 (1983)). Eliminating the peremptory challenge
would be an enormous change in our system and certainly one the court should not
consider lightly and certainly should not implement sua sponte.
In my view, the analysis in this case should be limited to the issues raised by the
parties. The case should be decided under Batson's "purposeful discrimination"
constitutional standard and should not be a forum for discussing how to counter
"implicit" or "unconscious" discrimination when these questions have not been raised by
the parties. The danger inherent in such discussions is the probability that the court will
2
As the lead opinion notes, "[n]either party has asked for a new standard or framework, nor have
they briefed or argued what that framework might be or how it would apply in this case," the
issue was not raised or decided at the Court of Appeals, and amici, the bar, and other
"stakeholders" have not provided any input. Lead opinion at 23-24. The lead opinion also says
that this case does not present circumstances calling for exercise of our discretionary power to
reach issues not raised by the parties. !d. at 20.
3
No. 86257-5
Madsen, C.J. (concurring)
not be fully and completely informed, despite all best efforts, about all aspects of the
matter when we have only our own investigation, research, and analysis to consider. The
rich tradition of briefing in appellate courts ensures not only that we consider the issues
that the parties raise but that we are well informed. The range of resources expands
tremendously when, rather than our own research and that provided by the parties, we
have in addition input from other interested entities-when a new court rule is proposed,
for example.
Here, when the prosecutor used a peremptory challenge to dismiss jury venire
member Ms. Anna Tolson, the only black member of the venire, the defendant objected
and established a prima facie case of discrimination. The prima facie case was easily
made because the prosecutor singled this juror out, making it abundantly clear that he did
so on the ground that, because of her race, she would have a different viewpoint from the
rest of the venire. The judge appropriately required the prosecutor to explain why the
peremptory challenge was exercised and then found that the prosecutor was justified in
believing there was a realistic possibility that Ms. Tolson might be lost as a juror before
the trial concluded, especially since she had very recently lost someone who was
murdered. The judge's ruling was not an abuse of discretion.
Finally, I offer a brief comment on the lead opinion's appended charts totaling the
number of questions and words with respect to each prospective juror. We are not a
group of qualified statisticians. One does not have to look very far to find a significant
mistake made by this court when attempting to resolve a question in a case involving
4
No. 86257-5
Madsen, C.J. (concurring)
statistics. In a prosecution for murder, in which DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) evidence
was an important part of the State's case, we originally rejected the State's expert's
testimony that the defendant's DNA was a 1 in 19.25 billion "match" to the forensic
sample. We concluded that this was basically an assertion that the defendant was the
only person with this DNA profile because the 19.25 billion figure was almost four times
the population of the earth. State v. Buckner, 125 Wash. 2d 915, 890 P.2d 460 (1995). On
reconsideration, we recognized our error: "Contrary to our original view in this case, we
now recognize that a profile probability of 1 in 20 billion or other number greater than the
earth's population may be admissible, as the state of forensic DNA analysis allows for
such probabilities." State v. Buckner, 133 Wash. 2d 63, 66, 941 P.2d 667 (1997). The
mistaken first opinion had, in fact, been singled out as a bad example of statistical
analysis of forensic DNA typing. Comm. on DNA Forensic Science: An Update, Nat'l
Research Council, The Evaluation of Forensic DNA Evidence (Nat'l Acad. Press 1996).
Without knowing what topics were discussed, why additional questions were
asked, whether individual prospective jurors had personal characteristics that may have
affected the number of questions asked (hearing difficulties, comprehension levels, etc.)
or personal tendencies such as to respond at length or to ask repeatedly for clarification,
and likely many other factors, it is insufficient to count questions or individual words.
While a marked difference in questioning may suggest discrimination, I would not rely
5
No. 86257-5
Madsen, C .J. (concurring)
on charts to show discrimination based on the number of questions asked or the length of
the interactions with individuals during voir dire. 3
I concur in the result reached in the lead opinion but write separately to express
disagreement with going beyond the arguments of the parties.
3
Although the lead opinion notes that there are limitations to relying on statistics, inclusion of
detailed graphs and pie charts suggests the opposite.
6
No. 86257-5
Madsen, C.J. (concurring)
7
State v. Saintcalle (Kirk Ricardo)
No. 86257-5
STEPHENS, J. (concurring)-Between Justice Wiggins's lead opmwn,
Chief Justice Madsen's and Justice Gonzalez's concurring opinions, and Justice
Chambers's dissenting opinion, thousands of words have been written in this case.
Only a fraction speak to the actual result: the court affirms Kirk Saintcalle' s
conviction, finding no violation of equal protection under Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986). I concur in this result.
I write separately to sound a note of restraint amidst the enthusiasm to craft a
new solution to the problem of the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges
during jury selection. The difficulties inherent in this area have long been
recognized, but it is easier to name the ,problem than to solve it. See Jeffrey Bellin
& Junichi P. Semitsu, Widening Batson's Net to Ensnare More than the
Unapologetically Bigoted or Painfully Unimaginative Attorney, 96 CORNELL L.
REv. 1075, 1106-08 (2011) (surveying plans to reform the peremptory challenge,
but noting most "are unlikely to resonate beyond the academy and particularly
unlikely to resonate with legislatures who must implement any such reform
State v. Saintcalle (Kirk Ricardo), 86257-5 (Stephens, J. Concurrence)
proposal"); Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional
Remedies, 77 WASH. U. L. Q. 713, 796 (1999) (admitting that reform in this area
"is easier said than done"). Perhaps the reluctance of both the lead opinion and
Justice Gonzalez's concurrence to adopt the solutions they suggest belies this
concern. 1
Before embracing any new solution, I think it is important to carefully
consider our authority as a court sitting in review. We are not acting in our rule-
making capacity. And, obviously it is not our role to legislate. We should not
skim over the question of what is involved in changing the Batson standard (as
Justice Wiggins favors), eliminating peremptory challenges entirely (as Justice
Gonzalez advocates), or exercising our inherent supervisory power to fashion rules
to address "the pernicious effect of unconscious racism" (as Justice Chambers
suggests). Dissent (Chambers, J.) at 2. Because the issue is entirely unbriefed, we
are not adequately informed on all sides of the question. I offer a few observations
that give me pause.
First, the rule announced in Batson is narrow, placing a constitutional limit
on the exercise of peremptory challenges based on a finding of purposeful
1
It is also noteworthy that neither of these opinions would find a satisfactory
solution to the discrimination problem in the rule proposed by the dissent in State v.
Rhone, 168 Wash. 2d 645, 659, 229 P.3d 752 (2010) (Alexander, J., dissenting). Under that
rule, the Batson threshold of purposeful discrimination would remain and parties would
retain the right to exercise peremptory challenges; however, the party proposing to strike
"the only remaining minority member of the defendant's cognizable racial group or the
only remaining minority in the venire," would be required to provide a race-neutral
reason for doing so. Id. at 663 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
-2-
State v. Saintcalle (Kirk Ricardo), 86257-5 (Stephens, J. Concurrence)
discrimination? Under controlling precedent from the United States Supreme
Court, this is the reach of the federal equal protection clause to invalidate a party's
exercise of peremptory challenges, whether such challenges are authorized by
statute or court rule or both. Justice Wiggins suggests that "our Batson analysis
should reflect not only the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guaranty, but
also the jury trial protections contained in article I, section 21 of our state's
constitution." Lead opinion at 18. I am unsure what this means, and no one has
suggested that our state jury trial right requires restricting or eliminating the use of
peremptory challenges. To the contrary, courts have consistently recognized
peremptory challenges as integral to "assuring the selection of a qualified and
unbiased jury." Batson, 476 U.S. at 91; State v. Vreen, 99 Wash. App. 662, 666-68,
994 P.2d 905 (2000) (recognizing defendant's exercise of for-cause and
peremptory challenges as part of right to fair trial and impartial jury under federal
Sixth Amendment and article I, sections 21 and 22 of our state constitution); State
v. Rhone, 168 Wash. 2d 645, 654, 229 P.3d 752 (2010) (noting Batson did not
transform "a shield against discrimination into a sword cutting against the purpose
of a peremptory challenge"). Thus, it may be as valid an argument to say that the
state jury trial right enshrines peremptory challenges as to say it restricts them.
2
This is consistent with other areas of discrimination law, most notably
employment law from which the Batson three-part, burden-shifting analysis is drawn.
See Batson, 476 U.S. at 94 n.18 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973)); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S.
567, 577, 98 S. Ct. 2943, 57 L. Ed. 2d 957 (1978) (noting that the McDonnell Douglas
framework "is merely a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of
common experience as it bears on the critical question of discrimination").
-3-
State v. Saintcalle (Kirk Ricardo), 86257-5 (Stephens, J. Concurrence)
Second, the solutions proposed by both the lead opmwn and Justice
Gonzalez's concurrence go far beyond invalidating peremptory challenges that
violate the equal protection rights of litigants and jurors recognized in Batson and
its progeny. We should therefore at least acknowledge the existence of a
subconstitutional "right" of litigants to participate in jury selection by exercising
both for-cause and peremptory challenges. Justice Gonzalez's concurrence seems
to assume that peremptory challenges are wholly within our purview to eliminate.
But, we are not the only branch of government concerned with fairness and
impartiality in jury trials. Among the statutes in play is RCW 2.36.080, which
addresses jury selection and provides in relevant part:
(3) A citizen shall not be excluded from jury service in this state on
account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status.
(4) This section does not affect the right to peremptory challenges
underRCW 4.44.130.
While the procedural mechanism for exercising juror challenges in criminal cases
has largely moved from statute to court rule, the general provisions in chapter 2.36
RCW apply and the court rules in several instances incorporate or restate the
statutory framework. See CrR 6.4. How we could deny a litigant a constitutionally
valid exercise of peremptory challenges secured by statute or court rule is an
unexamined question.
The most thorough discussion in Washington case law of what the "right" to
peremptory challenges means is the Court of Appeals opinion in Vreen, 99 Wn.
App. 662. At his trial, the defendant, Vreen, who is African-American, attempted
-4-
State v. Saintcalle (Kirk Ricardo), 86257-5 (Stephens, J. Concurrence)
to exercise a peremptory challenge to remove the sole African-American member
of the jury pool. The State objected under Batson, and the court rejected Vreen's
stated race-neutral reason for the juror's removal-that the juror was a pastor and
retired serviceman and therefore of "an authoritarian mind-set." !d. at 665-67.
Vreen appealed his conviction, contesting the denial of his peremptory challenge.
On appeal, the State conceded that the trial court erred in sustaining its Batson
objection but argued that the erroneous denial ofVreen's peremptory challenge did
not require reversal in the absence of prejudice. !d. at 667-68. The Court of
Appeals disagreed, noting that "the interplay of challenges for cause and
peremptory challenges . . . assures [a] fair and impartial jury." Id. at 668. It
concluded that "[a]lthough the denial of a peremptory challenge may not be an
issue of constitutional dimension, it is, nevertheless, an important right." !d.
Based on the violation ofthis right, the court granted Vreen a new trial. !d. at 671;
accord State v. Bird, 136 Wash. App. 127, 133-34, 148 P.3d 1058 (2006) (following
Vreen and granting new trial where defendant was wrongly denied peremptory
challenge). I, for one, would like to know more about how the principles discussed
in Vreen and similar cases inform our consideration of possible solutions to the
problem of discrimination in jury selection.
As noted, my purpose today is to sound a note of restraint. We held to the
Batson standard in Rhone, and we do so again today. I do not criticize my
colleagues for embracing an opportunity to explore a thorny issue, but I believe
there are better avenues than judicial opinions to do so.
-5-
State v. Saintcalle (Kirk Ricardo), 86257-5 (Stephens, J. Concurrence)
-6-
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
No. 86257-5
GONZALEz, J. (concurring)-This splintered court is unanimous about one
thing: Racial bias in jury selection is still a problem-"Solutions to the Problem, Of
Course, wait." 3 Langston Hughes, Dinner Guest: Me, in THE COLLECTED WORKS
OF LANGSTON HUGHES 173 (Arnold Rampersad ed., 2001 ). Batson challenges have
not ended racial bias in jury selection. Only once has a race-based Batson challenge
resulted in reversal in Washington. See State v. Cook, No. 67332-7-I (Wash. Ct. App.
May 28, 2013). With the exception of Justice Chambers, my colleagues recast their
unwillingness to act as virtuous restraint. Lead opinion at 2; concurrence (Madsen,
C.J., joined by J.M. Johnson, J.) at 3-4; concurrence (Stephens, J., joined by C.
Johnson and Fairhurst, JJ.) at 1.
There are half-measures that may reduce the amount of bias in the jury
selection process, such as tighter control of questioning based on the federal court
model or reduction of the number of peremptory challenges that may be exercised. I
believe, however, it is time to abolish peremptory challenges. Peremptory challenges
are used in trial courts throughout this state, often based largely or entirely on racial
stereotypes or generalizations. See infra pp. 15-29. As a result, many qualified
1
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
persons in this state are being excluded from jury service because of race. At the
same time, trial and appellate courts cannot reliably identify which particular
challenges involve racial discrimination and which do not. See infra pp. 30-34.
Moreover, the use of peremptory challenges contributes to the historical and ongoing
underrepresentation of minority groups on juries, imposes substantial administrative
and litigation costs, results in less effective juries, and unfairly amplifies resource
disparity among litigants-all without substantiated benefits. See infra pp. 38-52.
The peremptory challenge is an antiquated procedure that should no longer be used.
As the lead opinion rightly states, we must "recognize the challenge presented .
. . and rise to meet it." Lead opinion at 17. We must not "turn a blind eye," "throw up
our hands in despair," or "shrink from this challenge"-but that is precisely what the
majority of this court does in this case. Lead opinion at 17, 27; lead opinion at 2;
concurrence (Madsen, C.J., joined by J.M. Johnson, J.) at 1, 3; concurrence (Stephens,
J., joined by C. Johnson and Fairhurst, JJ.) at 1, 5. Petitioner Kirk Saintcalle
complains that racial discrimination was behind the use of a peremptory challenge at
his trial and also points out that our current procedural framework is failing to address
this ongoing problem. He is right about the ongoing failure of our procedural
framework. The majority of this court acknowledges the problem, but does nothing
about it. Yet this court has a duty to ensure that the trial procedures it oversees and
maintains do not propagate racial discrimination. We can fix this problem directly.
We should abolish peremptory challenges in our courts.
2
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
That said, although the peremptory challenges at Saintcalle's trial constituted
error, Saintcalle is not entitled to reversal of his conviction. Given that trial courts
throughout the state have been allowing peremptory challenges in good faith to this
point, and because peremptory challenges are not always harmful or pernicious, the
erroneous allowance of a peremptory challenge does not warrant reversal in every
case. See, e.g., Creech v. City ofAberdeen, 44 Wash. 72, 73-74, 87 P. 44 (1906)
(erroneous allowance of peremptory held harmless); cf Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S.
148, 157, 129 S. Ct. 1446, 173 L. Ed. 2d 320 (2009) (noting the significance of a
"court's good-faith error"). Instead, reversal is warranted on appeal only if the trial
court (1) acted in bad faith in allowing the challenge or (2) allowed the challenge in
good faith but failed to comply with Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712,
90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986).
One of the reasons why we must abolish peremptory challenges is because it is
too difficult to identify the presence of racial discrimination under Batson in any
given case and thus, too difficult to identify the individual cases that warrant reversal.
In this particular case, the trial court acted in good faith and did not commit clear error
in allowing the challenge to prospective juror Tolson. Thus, I concur in the judgment
because under the appropriate framework for deciding this case, Saintcalle is not
entitled to reversal of his conviction.
3
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
I. A DUTY TO ACT
We must address the ongoing problem of racial discrimination in the use of
peremptory challenges. Otherwise, we ignore our duty to resolve disputes fully,
fairly, and effectively and to ensure that trial procedures in this state promote justice
and comply with the federal and state constitutions.
In order to fully, fairly, and effectively adjudicate Saintcalle's claim we must
address the presence of racial discrimination within our jury selection procedures.
The primary duty of this court is "to see that justice is done in the cases which come
before it, which fall within its jurisdiction." 0 'Connor v. Matzdorff, 76 Wash. 2d 589,
600, 458 P.2d 154 (1969); see also RAP 1.2(a), (c); 7.3. Accordingly, this court has
"frequently recognized it is not constrained by the issues as framed by the parties" and
will "reach issues not briefed by the parties if those issues are necessary for decision."
City of Seattle v. McCready, 123 Wash. 2d 260, 269, 868 P.2d 134 (1994) (citing cases);
State v. Aho, 137 Wash. 2d 736, 740-41, 975 P.2d 512 (1999) (citing cases); Hall v. Am.
Nat'l Plastics, Inc., 73 Wash. 2d 203, 205, 437 P.2d 693 (1968) (noting that courts
"frequently decide crucial issues which the parties themselves fail to present" (citing
cases)). In other words, we will resolve whatever legal issues must be resolved to
properly adjudicate the claims and issues raised on appeal. In this case, Saintcalle has
complained that the prosecutor in his case was allowed to exercise a racially
discriminatory peremptory challenge. See Suppl. Br. ofPet'r at 3. Saintcalle argues
4
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
GonzaJez, J. concurring
that "'[r]acial iniquities permeate Washington's criminal justice system,"' 1 that this
state has "fail[ ed] to enforce the Equal Protection Clause under Batson," and that
"'[t]he dearth of recent cases in which courts have actually found racial discrimination
in jury selection suggests not that such discrimination doesn't occur, but that the
judiciary has failed to identify and remedy it. "'2 !d. at 3-4. Accordingly, this case
does bring into question the underlying validity of peremptory challenges and the
proper framework for reviewing the use of such challenges, even if Saintcalle has not
explicitly requested that we alter our court rules or jury selection process. In order to
justly and properly resolve Saintcalle's claim, we must address the deeply flawed
procedural and appellate framework in which it arose.
Instead, today this court fails to ensure that none of our trial procedures
propagate injustice. We have "inherent power to govern court procedures" as "a
necessary adjunct of the judicial function." City of Seattle v. Hesler, 98 Wash. 2d 73, 80,
653 P.2d 631 (1982); see also RCW 2.04.190; State v. Gresham, 173 Wn.2d 405,428-
29, 269 P.3d 207 (2012); State v. Templeton, 148 Wash. 2d 193, 212, 59 P.3d 632(2002); Marine Power & Equip. Co. v. Indus. Indem. Co., 102 Wash. 2d 457, 461, 687
P.2d 202 (1984); State v. Fields, 85 Wash. 2d 126, 129, 530 P.2d 284 (1975); State v.
Smith, 84 Wn.2d 498,501-02,527 P.2d 674 (1974); State ex rel. Foster-Wyman
1
Quoting TASK FORCE ON RACE AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, PRELIMINARY REPORT ON
RACE AND WASHINGTON'S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 7 (2011) (alteration in original).
2
Quoting Bidish Sarma, Commentary, When Will Race No Longer Matter in Jury Selection? 109
MICH. L. REV. First Impressions 69, 72 (2011) (alteration in original), available at
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/109/sarma2.pdf.
5
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
Lumber Co. v. Superior Court, 148 Wash. 1, 4-12, 267 P. 770 (1928). This well-
established authority includes the power to create, modify, or waive court rules, see
GR 90)(1); O'Connor, 76 Wn.2d at 595-97, 600, as well as the power to exercise
supervisory authority over the courts of this state, see State v. Bennett, 161 Wash. 2d
303, 317-18 & n.l1, 165 P.3d 1241 (2007). Our authority in this context is plenary
and thus our procedural rules "cannot be abridged or modified by the legislature,"
Smith, 84 Wn.2d at 502, although the legislature may supplement our procedural rules
by statute, see Gresham, 173 Wn.2d at 428. In accordance with our primary duty to
seek justice in the cases that come before us, and because '"[n]o rule ofthis court was
ever intended to be an instrument of oppression or injustice,'" we have "suspended the
rules where justice demanded it." 0 'Connor, 76 Wn.2d at 595-96 (quoting State v.
Brown, 26 Wash. 2d 857, 865, 176 P.2d 293 (1947)); see, e.g., id. at 596, 600 (excepting
indigents from court rule and statute imposing filing fee); cf Sackett v. Santilli, 146
Wash. 2d 498, 504, 47 P.3d 948 (2002) (noting this court cannot "contradict the state [or
federal] constitution by court rule").
The use of peremptory challenges in our courts is exactly the type of trial court
practice over which we have inherent and ongoing authority. See State v. Tharp, 42
Wn.2d 494,501,256 P.2d 482 (1953) ("[T]he selection ofthejury is procedural.");
see also Fields, 85 Wn.2d at 129. There is no constitutional requirement that
peremptory challenges be included within our trial procedures. See, e.g., Rivera v.
Illinois, 556 U.S. 148, 152, 129 S. Ct. 1446, 173 L. Ed. 2d 320 (2009); Georgia v.
6
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 57, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 120 L. Ed. 2d 33 (1992) (citing cases);
State v. Persinger, 62 Wash. 2d 362, 365-:66,382 P.2d 497 (1963); Crandall v. Puget
Sound Traction, Light & Power Co., 77 Wash. 37, 40, 137 P. 319 (1913). Thus,
peremptory challenges continue to be used in our courts only insofar as we allow them
to be used.
If we truly are unsure of the appropriate way to address the ongoing racial
discrimination within our jury selection procedures, we should ask for further
briefing. See RAP 10.6(c), 12.1(b). But as is explained below, the need to abolish
peremptory challenges "is so apparent that additional briefing is unnecessary." Aha,
13 7 Wn.2d at 741 (noting that in a rare case in which "briefing is not necessary to full
and fair resolution of the issue" we can "decide the issue without additional briefing"
(citing cases)). Even if we might eventually be able to devise a framework that
incorporates peremptory challenges in some form while adequately addressing the
problems described below, we should at the very least abolish the use of peremptory
challenges until that time. Again, to the extent that members of this court remain
unsure, the proper course of action is to request further briefing, not to ignore the
problem.
II. THE NEED TO ABOLISH PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
We must abolish peremptory challenges in the courts of this state. Our system
of voir dire and juror challenges, including causal challenges and peremptory
challenges, is intended to secure impartial jurors who will perform their duties fully
7
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
and fairly. In practice, however, litigants generally use peremptory challenges to
remove qualified and fair jurors whom they deem likely to favor the other side in a
close case. Many such challenges are based on nothing more than racial stereotypes
or generalizations. But there is no accurate and reliable way to identify which
peremptory challenges are based on race and which are not. In addition, peremptory
challenges contribute to the underrepresentation of minority groups on juries, impose
substantial administrative costs, result in less effective juries, and amplifY resource
disparity in litigation-without any substantiated benefits.
The peremptory challenge was first created in England to serve purposes that
are now irrelevant and outdated, and it was adopted in the Washington Territory
without substantial debate, at a time when racial minorities and women were
completely ineligible for jury service. Peremptory challenges have been used in
Washington since that time but without any serious consideration of their usefulness,
and they remain an optional trial procedure subject to our plenary oversight. To
prevent ongoing violations of the federal and state constitutions, and more generally
as a matter of policy, we should abolish peremptory challenges in this state.
Many jurists and scholars have called for the elimination of peremptory
challenges but no jurisdiction in the United States has been willing to be the first to
take that necessary step. See, e.g., Flowers v. State, 947 So. 2d 910, 937-39 (Miss.
2007). It should be remembered that in 1911, Washington became only the second
state in the nation to allow women to serve on juries. See Joanna L. Grossman,
8
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257~5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
Women's Jury Service: Right of Citizenship or Privilege of Difference?, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 1115,1135 n.118 (1994) (citing LAWS OF 1911, ch. 57,§ 1). Priortothattime,
the Supreme Court of the Washington Territory proved unwilling to break free from
the long standing and entrenched legal tradition of all-male juries. See Harland v.
Territory, 3 Wash. Terr. 131, 137, 13 P. 453 (1887) (Turner, J.), overruling
Rosencrantz v. Territory, 2 Wash. Terr. 267, 5 P. 305 (1884); see also Rosencrantz, 2
Wash. Terr. at 278-79,281 (Turner, J., dissenting) (arguing that trial by jury at
common law properly required "the jury should be composed of men" because
"inherent and acquired differences between himself and wife in mental and physical
constitution ... will continue to operate to give the husband paramount authority in
the household ... until an upheaval of nature has reversed the position of man and
woman in the world"). A long standing but antiquated legal tradition should never
blind us to the paramount need to ensure that our trial procedures are just. Nor should
any progress we have made blind us to the need for further progress. See id. at 278-79
("It is said that the rights of the weaker sex ... are more regarded than in the days of
Blackstone; and that the theory of that day ... has been exploded by the advanced
ideas of the nineteenth century. This may be true. No man honors the sex more than
I. None has witnessed more cheerfully the improvement in the laws of the States, and
particularly in the laws of this Territory, whereby many of the disabilities of that day
are removed from them .... I cannot say, however, that I wish to see them perform
the duties of jurors."). It is time once again for Washington to shed an antiquated and
9
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
unjust rule and to lead the nation in the pursuit of justice and equality in jury
selection.
1. Voir Dire and Juror Challenges
To understand the role of peremptory challenges in jury selection, we must first
consider the purposes and general framework of jury selection as a whole. The
underlying goal of the jury selection process is "to discover bias in prospective jurors"
and "to remove prospective jurors who will not be able to follow [] instructions on the
law," and thus, to ensure an impartial jury, a fair trial, and the appearance of fairness.
State v. Davis, 141 Wash. 2d 798, 824-26, 10 P.3d 977 (2000). The jury selection
process includes the questioning of jurors during voir dire and the exercise of causal
and peremptory challenges to remove individual prospective jurors from the venire,
until a sufficient number of qualified jurors have been designated for service in the
case. See CrR 6.3, 6.4, 6.5; CR 47; RCW 4.44.120-.250. The nature and scope of
voir dire is left largely to the discretion of the trial court. See, e.g., Skilling v. United
States,_ U.S._, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2917, 177 L. Ed. 2d 619 (2010); Davis, 141
Wn.2d at 825. We have noted that the scope of this process "should be coextensive
with its purpose." State v. Laureano, 101 Wash. 2d 745, 758, 682 P.2d 889 (1984),
overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 111 Wash. 2d 124, 132-33, 761 P.2d 588(1988).
Challenges for cause are the primary method of excluding prospective jurors
from service. Unlike peremptory challenges, for which no reason need be given,
10
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
challenges for cause require a showing to the satisfaction of the trial court that a
particular juror is unqualified for service in the case. A "general" causal challenge
alleges that a prospective juror is unqualified to serve in any case because of
insufficient age, lack of citizenship, lack of local residency, inability to sufficiently
communicate or comprehend, disenfranchisement, or a substantial and material
insufficiency in mind or body. See RCW 4.44.150, .160; RCW 2.36.070; see also
CrR 6.4( c )(1 ), (2). A "particular" causal challenge alleges that a prospective juror is
unqualified to serve in the particular case before the court, due to a blood relation,
other special relationship, or personal interest that renders the prospective juror
unqualified as a matter of law ("implied bias"); or due to inability to be impartial in
fact ("actual bias"); or due to some bodily condition that renders the juror unable to
serve in the particular case. See RCW 4.44.150, .170, .180, .190; see also, e.g., State
v. No/tie, 116 Wash. 2d 831, 838, 809 P.2d 190 (1991). Jurors also may be excused
"upon a showing of undue hardship, extreme inconvenience, public necessity, or any
reason deemed sufficient by the court .... " RCW 2.36.100(1); State v. Roberts, 142
Wash. 2d 471, 519, 14 P.3d 713 (2000).
One primary purpose of the voir dire process is to determine whether
prospective jurors harbor "actual bias" and are thus unqualified to serve in the case.
See, e.g., Tharp, 42 Wn.2d at 499. To be free from actual bias, a juror must be able to
( 1) set aside personal beliefs, opinions, or values insofar as is necessary to follow the
law and decide the case fairly, see, e.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722, 81 S. Ct.
11State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
1639,6 L. Ed. 2d 751 (1961); State v. Moody, 18 Wash. 165, 169-70, 51 P. 356(1897); (2) adjudicate disputed factual issues based solely on the evidence that is
allowed and presented at trial, see, e.g., Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2913; State v. Patterson,
183 Wash. 239, 246, 48 P.2d 193 (1935); and (3) be free from the undue influence of
any special relationships or personal interests (even if such relationships or interests
do not qualify as implied bias), see Stinson v. Sachs, 8 Wash. 391, 393, 36 P. 287(1894).
In any given case, the appropriate resolution of a challenge for actual bias is
left to the discretion of the trial court. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. (8
Otto) 145, 155,25 L. Ed. 244 (1878); Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2923-24; State v. Gilcrist,
91 Wash. 2d 603, 611, 590 P.2d 809 (1979). A deferential standard of review is
appropriate for two primary reasons. First, an adjudication of actual bias usually will
incorporate factual findings and a consideration of the totality of the circumstances.
See Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1036 n.12, 104 S. Ct. 2885, 81 L. Ed. 2d 847(1984); Patterson, 183 Wash. at 244-45. For example, a juror's mere assertion that
she or he is impartial (or is overly biased) is not dispositive, in part because jurors
may not fully appreciate or accurately state the nature of their own biases. See, e.g.,
Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2925; Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424-25, 105 S. Ct. 844,
83 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1985); Patterson, 183 Wash. at 245; Moody, 18 Wash. at 169.
Second, there is no rule of general applicability that can be effectively constructed to
govern determinations of actual bias. See Irvin, 366 U.S. at 724-25 (noting that
12
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
'" [i]mpartiality is not a technical conception"' and there is no "'ancient and artificial
formula"' or "'particular tests'" by which to determine actual bias (quoting United
States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145-46, 57 S. Ct. 177, 81 L. Ed. 78 (1936))). In some
cases, whether a given juror must be excluded will be "'fairly debatable"' and thus
will remain subject to the trial court's discretion. State v. Sisouvanh, 175 Wash. 2d 607,
624, 290 P.3d 942 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Walker v.
Bangs, 92 Wash. 2d 854, 858,601 P.2d 1279 (1979)); compare Gilcrist, 91 Wn.2d at
611 (in suit brought by two prison inmates, no abuse of discretion in refusing to
exclude grounds keeper of junior college who had previously worked with some
inmates taking classes and "didn't like the way the inmates 'conducted themselves'
there or 'the way they took care of equipment'"), with Beach v. City of Seattle, 85
Wash. 379, 384, 148 P. 39 (1915) (in suit by plaintiffs injured in transit from social
dance, no abuse of discretion in excluding juror who "was decidedly opposed to
dances"). But in other cases, the need to excuse a juror for actual bias will be so
apparent that the trial court's refusal to do so will be deemed an abuse of discretion.
See, e.g., State v. Parnell, 77 Wash. 2d 503, 507-08, 463 P.2d 134 (1970) (abuse of
discretion in failing to exclude juror who had attended criminal defendant's
preliminary hearing and then gave an "obviously hostile answer" to defense counsel's
question on the subject), overruled on other grounds by State v. Fire, 145 Wash. 2d 152,
163,34 P.3d 1218 (2001).
13
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
The allowance of causal challenges remains the primary method by which we
ensure impartial juries in this state. There is no limit on the number of causal
challenges allowed. The basis for a causal challenge must be specified and proved, in
order to create a sufficient record for appeal, to avoid "sharp practice" and to serve the
ends of justice. State v. Biles, 6 Wash. 186, 188, 33 P. 347 (1893); see State v. Lloyd,
138 Wash. 8, 14-15, 244 P. 130 (1926) (rules of evidence apply); RCW 4.44.240. In
contrast, litigants are afforded a limited number of peremptory challenges and
generally need not specify any reasons for such challenges. See CrR 6.4(e)(1); RCW
4.44.130, .140. The use of peremptory challenges is intended to supplement our
overarching framework of excluding unqualified jurors for cause.
2. Peremptory Challenges in Practice
The actual use of peremptory challenges within our jury selection process
presents a divergence between theory and practice. In theory, peremptory challenges
are supposed to further the goal of an impartial jury. See Press-Enterprise Co. v.
Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510 n.9, 104 S. Ct. 819, 78 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1984) ("The
process is to ensure a fair impartial jury, not a favorable one."); State v. Larkin, 130
Wash. 531, 533,228 P. 289 (1924), aff'd, 132 Wash. 698,232 P. 695 (1925). In
practice, however, litigants simply use peremptory challenges to remove the
prospective jurors they perceive to be least favorable to their position, regardless of
whether such prospective jurors possess biases so severe as to render their
participation unfair. See, e.g., Larkin, 130 Wash. at 533; see also, e.g., JAMES J.
14
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
GOBERT & WALTER E. JORDAN, JURY SELECTION: THE LAW, ART, AND SCIENCE OF
SELECTING A JURY xii (2d ed. 1990) ("Attorneys on each side [] vie to choose jurors
favorably disposed .... The key is to identify subconscious partiality, since blatantly
partial jurors will in effect identify themselves and can be challenged for cause.");
WALTER F. ABBOTT, ANALYTIC JUROR RATER 1, 21 ( 1987); 2 ANN FAGAN GINGER,
JURY SELECTION IN CIVIL & CRIMINAL TRIALS§ 18.2, at 1022 (1985) ("Despite its
theoretical function, the voir dire is in reality a contest between the two adversaries
toward the goal of selecting the jury that is most favorable to [either] side.").
The reason trial attorneys are so concerned with favoritism in jury selection is
because most cases that go to trial are close cases. When the likely outcome is clear,
parties tend to settle, either to avoid the costs of litigation or to obtain some other
benefit, such as a lenient sentencing recommendation. Cf V. HALE STARR & MARK
MCCORMICK, JURY SELECTION at 3-3 (4th ed. 2010) (vast majority of cases settle).
Further, judges generally do not allow cases to go to trial unless there is a reasonable
factual dispute for the jury to resolve. See CR 56; CrR 8.3(c). The only exception is a
criminal case involving overwhelming evidence of guilt, which still must go to a jury.
But if a case is not close, then the subtle biases of each juror almost certainly will not
affect the final verdict. See ABBOTT, supra, at 112; GOBERT & JORDAN, supra, at xii.
The task of determining the favorability of jurors is difficult, in part because of
the limited information available about each juror and his or her relevant knowledge,
beliefs, opinions, and values, and also because of the difficulty of predicting a given
15
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
individual's likely beliefs and opinions about any particular case. See STARR &
McCORMICK, supra, at 16-12. There is only limited time to extract relevant
information during voir dire. Jurors sometimes conceal or are ignorant about their
own biases, and answers are sometimes incomplete, misleading, or false. See Ginger,
supra, at 1034, 1095; GOBERT & JORDAN, supra, at 117, 459. Some attorneys
conduct external investigations to learn more about the members of the venire, but this
is often impossible, impractical, unreliable, or unethical. See GOBERT & JORDAN,
supra, at 106-27. Although directly relevant information does sometimes become
available-as in cases involving challenges for cause-most of the time even directly
relevant information does not actually disclose the extent of a particular juror's
underlying bias. In other words, the significance of such information usually remains
at least fairly debatable if not entirely ambiguous or immaterial.
With limited information and time, and a lack of any reliable way to determine
the subtle biases of each prospective juror, attorneys tend to rely heavily on
stereotypes and generalizations in deciding how to exercise peremptory challenges.
See, e.g., TED A. DONNER & RICHARD K. GABRIEL, JURY SELECTION: STRATEGY AND
SCIENCE 1-7 to 1-8 (3d ed. 2007); JEFFREY T. FREDERICK, MASTERING VOIR DIRE
AND JURY SELECTION 24 (1995); STARR & MCCORMICK, supra, at 17-6. This
phenomenon is endemic. See, e.g., STARR & McCORMICK, supra, at 16-7 ("Since
widely-accepted, strongly-fixed, deeply-rooted stereotypes allow speedy evaluations
and judgments, and since the legal system constantly places lawyers in situations that
16
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
require them to exercise peremptory challenges quickly, demographic stereotypes
have become the obligatory foundation for decisionmaking injury selection."). The
precise way that stereotypes or generalizations are used, however, depends upon the
resources and sophistication of each trial attorney.
The majority of attorneys rely on instinct, lore, and anecdotal experience-used
in combination with whatever information about prospective jurors is obtained prior
to and during voir dire-to guide the use of peremptory challenges. See GOBERT &
JORDAN, supra, at 77; STARR & McCORMICK, supra, at 7-6. These attorneys tend to
rely heavily on speculative and unfounded stereotypes and generalizations that
masquerade as insight or wisdom; indeed, the "old lawyer's lore" passed down from
one generation to the next is rampant with such dubious and sweeping declarations.
STARR & MCCORMICK, supra, at 5.1-5; see, e.g., ROBERT A. WENKE, THE ART OF
SELECTING A JURY 70-71,76-77, 84-85 (1979) (recommending that civil plaintiffs
seek out "[r]elatively unskilled goverrunent workers" and that civil defendants seek
out "[c]hildless persons," among other unsupported generalizations); Frederick, supra,
at 23 (collecting examples). Often this approach involves the application of a simple
and straightforward stereotype concerning a single demographic characteristic. See,
e.g., STARR & McCORMICK, supra, at 5.1-4 ("Williams ... reduced [the jury pool] by
following his own guidelines: 'strike Scandinavians (too pro-government), keep Irish
(pro-underdog)' .... "(quoting Evan Thomas, The Man to See: Edward Bennett
Williams-Legendary Trial Lawyer, Ultimate Insider, WASHINGTON MONTHLY (Oct.
17
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
1991))). Sometimes the attorney instead relies on stereotypes or generalizations
concerning a synthesis of multiple characteristics. See, e.g., WENKE, supra, at 76
("Older members of minority groups tend to be conservative and prosecution-minded
if they have had longtime stable careers."); id. at 69 ("[S]eekjurors who identify with
your client, who tend to have similar characteristics."); see also ABBOTT, supra, at 12
(same).
Attorneys with more resources and greater sophistication have gone from using
simplistic old lawyer's lore to using jury consultants and applying social science
methods to jury selection. The field of jury consultation emerged in the 1970s and
grew dramatically in the 1980s and 1990s as various methods and principles of social
psychology were applied to trial strategy with apparent success. See STARR &
MCCORMICK, supra, at 5.1-13 to 5 .1-36; DONNER & GABRIEL, supra, at 5-6 to 5-11.
Jury consultants now use a variety of techniques to assist trial attorneys injury
selection, including community surveys, mock juries, and focus groups. See, e.g.,
STARR & MCCORMICK, supra, at 7-1 to 16-32; GOBERT & JORDAN, supra, at 78.
Based on some or all of these various methods, jury consultants usually develop a
"statistical profile" to assist the trial attorney specifically in the exercise of
peremptory challenges. STARR & McCORMICK, supra, at 16-3 (noting that this
statistical profile is "[ o ]ne of the primary reasons trial attorneys hire jury/trial
consultants"); GOBERT & JORDAN, supra, at 89; see also Ginger, supra, at 1106
(providing example of model juror profile for hypothetical police misconduct case).
18
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
The statistical profile often is complex and reflects the synthesis of a number of
demographic and other characteristics. See STARR & MCCORMICK, supra, at 7-47
("Regression analysis, interaction analysis, or discriminant analysis are the statistical
programs most frequently used to develop these profiles."). The profile will be used
to select which jurors to challenge and often will guide the attorney's strategies and
questioning during voir dire. See GOBERT & JORDAN, supra, at 90. Attorneys also
sometimes use jury consultants "to evaluate juror nonverbal responses to voir dire
questioning and to identify the likely group dynamics of the jury." !d. at 456
(footnote omitted). Some attorneys instead try to utilize social science methods on
their own and on a smaller scale, without incurring the substantial expense of a
professional jury consultant. See, e.g., DONNER & GABRIEL, supra, at 6-25; GOBERT
& JORDAN, supra, at 103-105; see also ABBOTT, supra, at 22 (providing a universal
"juror rater" for practitioners to use in any case based on "an ambitious effort to
obtain systematically collected social science data on American values and
characteristics").
Attorneys who employ these social science methods still rely heavily on
stereotypes or generalizations. Judgments made about each individual prospective
juror are based on information collected about other individuals. In other words, each
prospective juror is presumed to be similar in relevant respects to those individuals
who contributed to the available statistical data and possessed some of the known
characteristics of the prospective juror. See, e.g., ABBOTT, supra, at 58. Although
19
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
these generalizations are based on more than mere intuition or anecdote, they remain
speculative as applied to any particular prospective juror. Further, a great deal of
judgment must be exercised in collecting relevant data (e.g., whom to ask, what to
ask, and how to ask it), in deciding how to interpret the data, and also in applying the
results. See STARR & MCCORMICK, supra, at 5.1-17; ABBOTT, supra, at 78; DONNER
& GABRIEL, supra, at 6-24. It is perhaps not surprising then to find that "empirical
studies testing the predictive value of scientific jury selection have produced
inconclusive findings." Franklin Strier & Donna Shestowsky, Profiling the Profilers:
A Study of the Trial Consulting Profession, Its Impact on Trial Justice, and What, if
Anything, To Do About It, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 441,458-64 (discussing and collecting
studies); see also Dru Stevenson, Jury Selection and the Coase Theorem, 97 IOWA L.
REV. 1645, 1653 n.38 (2012) (same); Reid Hastie, Is Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire
an Effective Procedure for the Selection ofImpartial Juries?, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 703,
718-20 (1991) (same).
In sum, attorneys using a wide variety of approaches to jury selection all rely
heavily on stereotypes and generalizations to guide the use of peremptory challenges,
in an attempt to obtain the most favorable jury possible in any given case. Rough and
rapid judgments about prospective jurors are made based on whatever characteristics
are observable or otherwise known and which the attorney believes are relevant in
some way. Prospective jurors are then excused based solely on such superficial
judgments, notwithstanding the fact that whatever directly relevant information is
20
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
available either provides no indication that the prospective juror is unqualified or
provides some indication that is only fairly debatable at best.
3. Racial Discrimination in Peremptory Challenges
Unsurprisingly, peremptory challenges often are motivated by racial
stereotypes and generalizations. The perception of race still heavily influences many
social observations and judgments in our society. Regardless ofwhether an attorney
uses intuition, old lawyer's lore, or jury consultation, we should not be surprised to
find that the resultant judgments about prospective jurors are based in whole or in part
on race. Indeed, the existing evidence discussed below shows that racial
discrimination is prevalent in the use of peremptory challenges in Washington and
elsewhere, and our current legal framework necessarily fails to address this problem.
Peremptory challenges can be racially discriminatory in numerous ways. First,
a peremptory challenge can be based on a straightforward, race-based stereotype or
generalization. For example, an attorney might seek to remove a prospective juror
because of an antiquated belief that a member of the prospective juror's racial group
must be or probably is unable to adequately serve as a juror due to insufficient
integrity, intelligence, or judgment. See, e.g., Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 598-
99,55 S. Ct. 579,79 L. Ed. 1074 (1935); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. (13 Otto) 370,
402, 26 L. Ed. 567 (1880) (Field, J., dissenting). As another example, an attorney
might challenge a prospective juror due to a belief that a member of the prospective
juror's racial group necessarily or probably has a certain belief, opinion, or value that
21
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
renders the prospective juror relatively unfavorable. See, e.g., Howard v. Senkowski,
986 F.2d 24, 25 (2d Cir. 1993) (prosecutor believed that the fact that prospective
jurors were black "made them sympathetic to the defendant"); McCormick v. State,
803 N.E.2d 1108, 1111 (Ind. 2004) (prosecutor speculated that prospective juror
would find it difficult passing judgment against a member of his own racial group);
Frederick, supra, at 23-24. Straightforward racial stereotypes also can involve a
synthesis of multiple characteristics, only one of which is race. See Leahy v. Farman,
177 F. Supp. 2d 985, 997 (N.D. Cal. 2001) ("My experience is that native Americans
who are employed by the tribe are ... somewhat suspicious of the system."); Payton
v. Kearse, 329 S.C. 51, 55-56 & n.l, 495 S.E.2d 205 (1998) (party using peremptory
challenge against alleged "'redneck"' was "sterotyp[ing] a subgroup of the white
race"); Owens v. State, 531 So. 2d 22,24 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (stereotype
involving age, single status, and race). Various straightforward racial stereotypes and
generalizations remain prevalent today. See STARR & McCORMICK, supra, at 17-4
("Given the strength of the beliefs people, including trial lawyers, assign for the effect
of race on decision-making, it is nearly impossible to convince them that in many
cases, race plays a far less significant role than expected."); Alafair S. Burke,
Prosecutors and Peremptories, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1467, 1468 & n.2 (2012).
Second, a peremptory challenge can be based on a simple or complex statistical
juror profile that incorporates race as an indicator offavorability. It appears to be
common practice today to track race as a relevant demographic characteristic in
22
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
developing statistical juror profiles. See STARR & McCORMICK, supra, at 7-6, 7-35,
17-19; DONNER & GABRIEL, supra, at 6-23; GOBERT & JORDAN, supra, at 82;
ABBOTT, supra, at 13, 48-50. Race currently does correlate, at least roughly, to
various beliefs, opinions, and values held in our society. See, e.g., STARR &
McCORMICK, supra, at 16-23, 17-5 (noting for example that "people of color are
twice as likely as whites to believe that 'race relations in the United States are poor"');
see also Matt Haven, Reaching Batson's Challenge Twenty-Five Years Later:
Eliminating the Peremptory Challenge and Loosening the Challenge for Cause
Standard, 11 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER& CLASS 97,97 (2011). But the
modern view among at least some jury consultants is that in jury selection today,
"[r]ace almost never profiles, except in cases specifically referring to racial issues"
and "[r]ace seems to be an ever decreasing factor in determining reactions to case
issues." STARR & MCCORMICK, supra, at 16-3; see also DONNER & GABRIEL, supra,
at 1-6 to 1-7. Race no longer regularly "profiles" in part because jury consultants
have begun identifying other characteristics in each case-primarily life
experiences-they believe to be far more predictive of whether a prospective juror is
favorable. STARR & McCORMICK, supra, at 16-3, 17-4 to 17-6. At the same time,
attorneys remain skeptical and resistant to the notion of excluding race from
consideration as a potential indicator offavorability. See id. at 7-6, 17-4; cf ABBOTT,
supra, at 2 (noting prior "widespread agreement that demographic and social
characteristics ... are likely to determine values which affect the responses of jurors
23
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
to the case"). Further, most attorneys do not have the time or resources to have
consultants identify the particular life experiences that might be more effective at
indicating favorability in a given case. See id. at 16-6 to 16-8, 16-21 to 16-26;
GOBERT & JORDAN, supra, at 105; Stevenson, supra, at 1654 n.39; cf ABBOTT,
supra, at 49 (race included in universal profiler). The use of race in statistical juror
profiling remains an ongoing practice.
Third, a peremptory challenge can be based on the desire to obtain a particular
racial dynamic on the jury as a whole. See, e.g., Miesner v. State, 665 So. 2d 978,
980-81 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (prosecutor '"wanted a balanced jury"' and thus
'"wanted some white people on the jury'" (some emphasis omitted)). Although the
common "tendency in selecting a jury is to 'consider each juror on his or her individual
merits," the more sophisticated attorneys, and particularly those employing social
science methods, also consider group dynamics. GOBERT & JORDAN, supra, at 451,
456; see Frederick, supra, at 155-57. But when an attorney uses a peremptory
challenge in an attempt to obtain a particular group dynamic with regard to race, the
attorney is engaging in a distinct form of racial discrimination.
Finally, a peremptory challenge can be based on unconscious racial bias. In
other words, race can subconsciously motivate a peremptory challenge that the
attorney genuinely believes is race-neutral. See lead opinion at 13-17. As one
example among many, an attorney might exercise a peremptory challenge based
solely on his "gut feeling," unaware that the race of the challenged juror caused or
24
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
substantially contributed to the gut feeling. As another example, an attorney might
believe that the basis of her challenge is a prospective juror's answer to a particular
question, unaware that she would neither have asked the question nor have brought
the challenge against that prospective juror had he been of a different race. In such
circumstances, the challenge is motivated at least in part by underlying racial bias, and
thus, is racially discriminatory.
The racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges is occurring regularly
throughout this state. Even after Batson, substantial portions of lawyers, judges, and
court personnel throughout Washington observed that, to varying degrees, attorneys
"use peremptory challenges systematically to eliminate minorities from juries."
WASHINGTON STATE MINORITY AND JUSTICE TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT 45, 52,
216, 218, 220, 226-27, 234, 240 (Dec. 1990), available at
http://www.courts.wa.gov/committee/pdf/TaskForce.pdf. Most concerning is that a
full42.6 percent of surveyed lawyers reported that prosecutors in Washington either
"sometimes" or "often" use peremptory challenges to systematically exclude
minorities from juries. See id. at 226. This collective observation cannot be brushed
aside and is not surprising given the degree to which racial stereotypes and
generalizations are relied upon in jury selection generally and in the use of
peremptory challenges specifically. It would be naYve to think that trial attorneys have
abandoned all race-related lore or completely excluded race as a factor when applying
social-scientific methods to jury selection. See, e.g., Michael E. Withey, The
25
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257~5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
Importance of Connecting with the Jury, in THE JURY: LATEST TECHNIQUES FOR
SELECTING AND PERSUADING JURIES 2, 2-3 (Wash. State Trial Lawyers Ass'n,
Continuing Legal Educ. May 16, 2001) (on file with the Washington State Law
Library) (set of legal education materials provided to lawyers throughout Washington
explaining the concept of a jury survey and noting that "[m]ost surveys will test
attitudes toward issues by certain demographic characteristics, including gender, age,
[and] race'). Race continues to play a significant role in the use of peremptory
challenges in Washington.
Evidence from other jurisdictions confirms that racial discrimination in the use
of peremptory challenges is widespread. Numerous studies in other states have
consistently and uniformly shown a significant influence of race on the use of
peremptory challenges in actual practice. Racial disparities in peremptory usage have
been documented in the courts of Alabama, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Texas. See EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, ILLEGAL RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION: A CONTINUING LEGACY 14 (2010) (noting
studies finding substantial racial disparities in peremptory usage in Alabama, Georgia,
and Louisiana); Catherine M. Grosso & Barbara O'Brien, A Stubborn Legacy: The
Overwhelming Importance ofRace in Jury Selection in 173 Post-Batson North
Carolina Capital Trials, 97 IOWAL. REV. 1531, 1538-40 & n.55 (2012) (discussing
studies of peremptory challenge usage finding racial disparities in Illinois, Louisiana,
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Texas). Many of these studies have found that
26
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
even after controlling for numerous other potentially relevant factors, race remains
highly determinative of peremptory usage. See GROSSO & O'BRIEN, supra, at 1533,
1547, 1552-54 (review of capital trials in North Carolina finding that even after
controlling for 65 other variables, "a black venire member had 2.48 times the odds of
being struck by the state as did a venire member of another race"); STARR &
McCORMICK, supra, at 17-7 to 17-8 (discussing a comprehensive review of criminal
trials in Dallas finding widespread racial disparities and also finding that '"no factor
reduced the importance of race"' (quoting Steve McGonigle et al., Jurors' Race A
Focal Point For Defense: Rival Lawyers Reject Whites at Higher Rate, THE DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Jan. 24, 2006)); David C. Baldus et al., The Use ofPeremptory
Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 3, 46, 60, 72, 121 (2001) (review of Philadelphia capital murder cases
finding that even after controlling for numerous variables "venire member race was a
major determinant in the use of peremptories").
Laboratory studies provide even further evidence that racial discrimination
underlies the use of peremptory challenges. In one recent study, attorneys were
presented with a criminal trial scenario along with descriptions of two prospective
jurors and were instructed to decide as a prosecutor which of the two prospective
jurors to challenge peremptorily. See Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton,
Race-Based Judgments, Race-Neutral Justifications: Experimental Examination of
Peremptory Use and the Batson Challenge Procedure, 31 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 261,
27
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
266-67 (2007). In one condition, the first prospective juror was depicted as white and
the second prospective juror as black; in a second condition, the races were reversed
but the underlying information remained the same. !d. When the first profile was
black, attorneys chose to challenge that prospective juror 79 percent of the time; when
that same profile was white, attorneys challenged that prospective juror only 43
percent of the time. !d. at 267. Likewise, when the second profile was depicted as
black, attorneys challenged that prospective juror 57 percent of the time; when that
same profile was white, attorneys challenged that prospective juror only 21 percent of
the time. !d. Thus the attorneys, acting as prosecutors, were significantly more likely
to challenge a juror profile when it was depicted as a black prospective juror as
opposed to a white prospective juror, all else being equal. The experimenters also
found similar effects among college students and law students. !d. Further, the
experimenters asked each participant to explain his or her choice of whom to strike.
A full 96 percent of participants cited relevant underlying substantive information
from either profile as "their most important justification," and only 8 percent of the
attorneys (and an even smaller proportion of college students and law students) cited
race as being influential at all. !d. at 267-68 (explaining that respondents "cited as
their most important justification either Juror# 1 's familiarity with police misconduct
or Juror #2's skepticism about statistics"). The experimenters rightly concluded that
their study "provides clear empirical evidence that a prospective juror's race can
influence peremptory challenge use and that self-report justifications are unlikely to
28
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
be useful for identifying this influence .... " !d. at 269. The experimenters also noted
that the findings "are strikingly similar in direction as well as magnitude to
conclusions of archival analyses of real peremptory use." !d. (citations omitted).
Other laboratory studies have found similar effects of race on the use of peremptory
challenges. See GROSSO & O'BRlEN, supra, at 1536-38 (discussing studies).
Case-by-case adjudication and appellate review under Batson cannot effectively
combat the widespread racial discrimination that underlies the use of peremptory
challenges throughout this state, and thus, such racial discrimination will continue
unabated under our current framework. Batson requires a complaining party to make
a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination, and whenever such a prima facie case
has been made, Batson requires the proponent of the challenge to identify his or her
reasons. See lead opinion at 9. If the proponent's alleged reasons are lawful, the trial
court then must adjudicate whether the challenge is in fact unlawfully discriminatory,
and that determination will be reversed on appeal only if it is clearly erroneous. See
lead opinion at 9-10, 22-23. For numerous reasons, this framework has been and will
continue to be largely ineffective at combating racial discrimination in the use of
peremptory challenges in Washington.
First, many racially discriminatory peremptory challenges remain unchallenged
and are never subjected to judicial review. In some such cases, the presence of racial
discrimination remains entirely imperceptible to the opposing party and trial judge,
and thus, no objection is raised and the issue is never addressed. Even when racial
29
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
discrimination becomes sufficiently apparent to warrant an objection, opposing parties
often decide not to object. See STARR & MCCORMICK, supra, at 17-15, 17-18, 17-19
(reporting results of a nationwide survey of trial attorneys, including Washington
attorneys); EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra, at 6. Some attorneys are concerned
about alienating other prospective jurors or upsetting opposing counsel or the judge;
others do not have strong feelings about keeping the challenged prospective juror on
the venire and thus accept the peremptory challenge; still others will not raise an
objection unless the racial discrimination is already sufficiently obvious to satisfy a
denianding trial judge; and some attorneys do not raise a Batson objection because
they are engaging in racial discrimination themselves. See STARR & McCORMICK,
supra, at 17-18 to 17-19 ('"What's good for the goose is good for the gander. We're
taking off one race as fast as they can take off the other. If we challenge them, they
will challenge us."' (quoting survey answers)). Trial judges overseeing such cases
might remain unaware of the appearance of racial discrimination or might simply
want to avoid inviting substantial complications and administrative costs when no
party has objected and judicial review probably would be fruitless. All of this remains
deeply concerning, however, because racial discrimination in the use of peremptory
challenges harms not only litigants but also "the excluded jurors and the community at
large." Powers v. Ohio, 499, U.S. 400, 406, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 113 L. Ed. 2d 411(1991). Under our current framework, many racially discriminatory peremptory
challenges evade review entirely.
30
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
Second, even if an objection is made, plausible race-neutral reasons are quite
easy to conjure up in any given case, regardless of whether the peremptory challenge
is actually based on racial discrimination and regardless of whether such racial
discrimination is conscious or unconscious. See, e.g., STARR & MCCORMICK, S'upra,
at 17-11 (quoting one forthright prosecutor as saying, "Very frankly, any attorney
worth his salt can make up something to get over a Batson challenge. And, literally,
[prosecutors] do make it up. We do." (alterations in original) (quoting McGonigle, et
al., supra); SOMMERS & NORTON, supra, at 263 ("Many researchers have
demonstrated that people can offer compelling explanations for their behavior even
when unaware of the factors-such as race-that are actually influential."). Attorneys
are trained to identify distinctions and to provide explanations for conduct. To
overcome a Batson challenge based on alleged racial discrimination, an attorney
merely has to "be careful not to give a reason that also [applies to a prospective juror
of another race] against whom [the attorney does] not exercise a peremptory." Nancy
S. Marder, Batson Revisited, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1585, 1591 (2012); see also, e.g.,
People v. Randall, 283 Ill. App. 3d 1019, 1025-26,671 N.E.3d 60 (1996) (deriding
"the charade that has become the Batson process," noting that "[t]he State may
provide the trial court with a series of pat race-neutral reasons," and citing numerous
cases involving a slew of such reasons). Proffered reasons sometimes involve subtle
observations about a prospective juror's appearance or demeanor, which are easily
alleged but often extremely difficult to scrutinize. See EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE,
31
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
supra, at 18; Marder, supra, at 1591-92. Further, race often will be one of many
factors actually motivating a challenge, and thus, race-neutral reasons will be readily
available to be included in a true but incomplete explanation. See SOMMERS &
NORTON, supra, at 269. It would be na'ive to think that attorneys do not rely on
readily available and plausible race-neutral reasons to circumvent Batson. Under our
current framework, plausible race-neutral reasons remain readily available and
regularly invoked.
Third, there usually is no way for a trial court to accurately and reliably
determine whether a given peremptory challenge is racially discriminatory. As noted
above, proffered race-neutral reasons are almost always plausible, but not always real
or comprehensive. The circumstances surrounding a given challenge usually will not
resolve the inquiry, and trial judges may be hesitant to question the integrity or self-
awareness of counsel. See lead opinion at 20. Further, social science research tells us
that trial judges generally are unable to accurately and reliably determine credibility
based on demeanor alone, regardless of their confidence in doing so. See, e.g., Paul
Ekman & Maureen O'Sullivan, Who Can Catch a Liar?, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 913,
913-17 (Sept. 1991) (experimenters presented video clips of individual persons
describing feelings about a movie each was allegedly watching; trial judges performed
only slightly better than chance in determining who was lying about watching the
movie, and confidence was not correlated to performance); see also, e.g., Saul M.
Kassin, Human Judges of Truth, Deception, and Credibility: Confident But
32
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
Erroneous, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 809 (2002). In addition, trial courts generally do not
have the time or resources to review the record in-depth or to conduct statistical
analysis prior to resolving a Batson objection. Such a review of the record rarely
would provide clarity anyhow. Cf SOMMERS & NORTON, supra, at 269 ("We
observed bias against Black venire members only when examining decisions made by
several participants; indeed, for any given participant, we are unable to determine
whether the peremptory was influenced by race or whether the justification provided
was valid. Only in the aggregate does evidence of racial bias emerge .... "). Under
our current framework, trial courts cannot reliably identify individual instances of
racial discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges.
Fourth, there is no way for appellate courts to provide sufficiently meaningful
review on appeal. An appellate court is in an even worse position than the trial court
to determine whether a particular peremptory challenge was racially discriminatory.
Although an appellate court can conduct a searching review of the cold record and
undertake statistical analysis as appropriate, see lead opinion, App. A, such review
rarely will provide an answer. Even if the appellate court's searching review uncovers
inconsistencies between the race-neutral explanation and the proponent's treatment of
other prospective jurors, the comparable characteristics of the other prospective jurors
might have escaped not only the notice of the trial court but also the notice of the
attorney, who was faced with the complexities and pressures of navigating voir dire
and jury selection. It will be difficult if not impossible to determine whether the
33
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
attorney overlooked a comparable juror while crafting a post hoc explanation for the
challenge or instead, overlooked that same comparable juror when invoking the
challenge in the first place. Under our current framework, appellate review remains
ineffectual.
Finally, too many unanswered questions remain under Batson, which will
continue to cause much confusion and impose substantial litigation costs, all without
addressing the underlying problem. See, e.g., DONNER & GABRIEL, supra, at 23-30
("Since Batson was decided, the trial and appellate courts have struggled with the
scope of its application."). For example, it remains unclear exactly which groups are
to be protected from discrimination in jury selection. To date, the United States
Supreme Court has applied the Batson framework only to discrimination "on the basis
of race, ethnicity, or sex." Rivera, 556 U.S. at 153. The extent to which such
protection extends to other groups remains to be determined. See, e.g., DONNER &
GABRIEL, supra, at 3-17 to 3-18, 23-46 (age, disability, religion); Mary A. Lynch, The
Application ofEqual Protection to Prospective Jurors with Disabilities: Will Batson
Cover Disability-Based Strikes?, 57 ALB. L. REV. 289 (1993) (disability); Kathryne
M. Young, Outing Batson: How the Case of Gay Jurors Reveals the Shortcomings of
Modern Voir Dire, 48 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 243 (2011) (sexual orientation); Maggie
Elise O'Grady, A Jury of Your Skinny Peers: Weight-Based Peremptory Challenges
and the Culture ofFat Bias, 7 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 47 (2011) (weight); Note, Due
34
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
Process Limits on Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenges, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1013,
1020 (1989) (noting that "courts have pointedly disagreed" on these issues).
As a second example, it remains unclear how to determine whether a prima
facie case has been established, and in particular, how that determination should be
reviewed on appeal. The United States Supreme Court has explained that a prima
facie case is established whenever the circumstances "permit the trial judge to draw an
inference that discrimination has occurred." Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162,
170, 125 S. Ct. 2410, 162 L. Ed. 2d 129 (2005). The Court in Johnson emphasized
that trial courts should not be "engaging in needless and imperfect speculation when a
direct answer can be obtained by asking a simple question." !d. at 172, 173. Thus, it
would appear that a trial court's discretion is relatively limited at the first step of the
Batson inquiry: technically, discrimination is inferable any time that the eventual
composition of the jury could change in a relevant way as a result of the disputed
challenge. But the Court in Johnson did not explicitly spell out such a lenient
standard, and in dicta we have since interpreted the prima facie case requirement as
being more demanding and have emphasized that the trial court's determination at
step one of Batson is discretionary. See State v. Thomas, 166 Wash. 2d 380, 397-98, 208
P.3d 1107 (2009); State v. Hicks, 163 Wash. 2d 477,490-93, 181 P.3d 831 (2008).
Understandably, we have had some difficulty determining the precise outer limits of
that discretion, see State v. Rhone, 168 Wash. 2d 645, 229 P.3d 752 (2010), and such
struggles are bound to continue under our current framework with no end in sight, see,
35
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
e.g., State v. Meredith, 173 Wash. 2d 1031, 275 P.3d 303 (2012) (accepting review "on
the issue of the scope of the bright line rule articulated in [Rhone]").
As a third example, it remains unclear just how direct or substantial the
influence of race must be in order to render a peremptory challenge racially
discriminatory under Batson. Mere reliance on "statistical support" does not
immunize a peremptory challenge from attack, and any attorney using peremptory
challenges must "look beyond the surface before making judgments about people that
are likely to stigmatize as well as to perpetuate historical patterns of discrimination.''
J.E.B.v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 139 n.11, 114 S. Ct. 1419, 128 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1994).
But if a detailed and complex statistical juror profile includes race among a wide
variety of other factors, is a resulting challenge necessarily racially discriminatory
under Batson? What if the attorney would have challenged the same prospective juror
even if the prospective juror's race had not matched the complex and otherwise
matching profile? Or more generally, what if the attorney has two separate and
independently sufficient reasons for the challenge, only one of which is based on
race? See Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, Adoption and Application of "Tainted"
Approach or "Dual Motivation" Analysis in Determining Whether Existence of Single
Discriminatory Reason for Peremptory Strike Results in Automatic Batson Violation
When Neutral Reasons Also Have Been Articulated, 15 A.L.R.6TH 319 (2012). What
if the attorney investigates race but race does not end up as a factor on the eventual
statistical profile used? Or what if the attorney considers the potential significance of
36
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
race in order to identify other relevant characteristics that eventually guide her
peremptory usage? Cf STARR & McCORMICK, supra, at 16-25 ("[L]ook at race and
its subcategories and at the case issues to identify any life experience or attitude that
might cause concern injury selection." (emphasis omitted)). What if, based on a
statistical profile, an attorney focuses some of his voir dire questioning on members of
a particular race, and then unearths compelling race-neutral reasons to challenge some
of them, as predicted by the profile? These questions all reflect the complex nature of
peremptory challenges in actual practice and present difficulties that our current
framework may not be equipped to handle.
As a final example, it remains unclear whether unconscious racial
discrimination is prohibited under Batson. See lead opinion at 19-20 & n.8.
Unconscious racial discrimination is extremely inequitable, harmful, and unjust-but
also fairly ubiquitous and relatively blameless at an individual level. Unconscious
bias is not easily deterred, because the biased individual is not aware of its presence.
Further, it is nearly impossible for any observer to identify the presence of
unconscious bias in any particular instance. See, e.g., SOMMERS & NORTON, supra, at
269. That said, if peremptory challenges based on unconscious racial bias are
prohibited, and if trial courts are made aware of the prevalence of unconscious bias in
general, they might be relatively more likely to scrutinize proffered race-neutral
explanations and to fully appreciate the potential presence of racial discrimination in
the use of peremptory challenges. See lead opinion at 21. Still, any gains would be
37
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
modest at best. And regardless, the distinction between conscious and unconscious
bias would remain largely irrelevant on appeal, because circumstantial evidence of
unconscious bias and circumstantial evidence of conscious bias generally is the same
evidence, and only in the rarest of cases will a finding of unconscious bias (or lack
thereof) be compelled while a finding of conscious bias (or lack thereof) is not. It
should be clear by now that unconscious bias is simply one problem among many.
Focusing on any such secondary problem simply distracts from the overarching need
to abolish peremptory challenges entirely.
In sum, our current framework will continue to engender confusion and
needless administrative and litigation costs, while racial discrimination in the use of
peremptory challenges-both conscious and unconscious-continues unabated.
4. The Additional Costs ofPeremptory Challenges
The use of peremptory challenges is harmful in this state not only because of
the ongoing racial discrimination involved, but also because of a wide variety of other
resulting injustices-with no substantiated benefits. In particular, the use of
peremptory challenges contributes to the historical and ongoing underrepresentation
of minority groups on juries, broadly increases administrative and litigation costs,
results in less effective and less socially beneficial juries, and amplifies resource
disparities in litigation. On the other hand, the use of peremptory challenges produces
no substantiated systemic benefits.
38
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
First, the use of peremptory challenges contributes to the underrepresentation
of minority groups on juries, even in the absence of purposeful discrimination. Racial
minorities in particular are underrepresented on juries for a wide variety of reasons,
including the use of peremptory challenges. See, e.g., HIROSHI FUKURAI ET AL.,
RACE AND THE JURY: RACIAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE
3-4, 34, 40-42 (1993) (collecting studies and identifying various causes that have a
"cumulative effect"); WASHINGTON STATE CENTER FOR COURT RESEARCH, JUROR
RESEARCH PROJECT: REPORT TO THE WASHINGTON STATE LEGISLATURE 5-6, 18
(Dec. 24, 2008) (showing underrepresentation of various racial minorities injury
pools in Clark, Des Moines, and Franklin counties), available at
http://www.courts.wa.gov/wsccr/docs/Juror%20Research%20Report%20Final.pdf.
This ongoing underrepresentation reflects a history of complete exclusion from jury
service and subsequent resistance to efforts at inclusion. See Rosencrantz, 2 Wash.
Terr. at 278 (Turner, J., dissenting) (noting that "trial by jury at common law"
required '"free and lawful men"' as jurors, and "if he be a slave or bondman, this is
defect of liberty"); James Forman, Jr., Juries and Race in the Nineteenth Century, 113
YALE L.J. 895, 910 (2004) ("It is believed that 1860 was the first year in which
African Americans served on juries, in either the North or the South."); Fukurai et al.,
supra, at 14-15 ("Over the next 100 years, litigated cases overwhelmingly viewed
blacks as inferior, and this inferiority was ensured by structural conditions imposed in
the jury selection process to limit the number of black jurors."). More recently, the
39
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
Washington State Jury Commission reported that there remains in Washington "a
perception that jury service has been reserved for certain segments of our society,"
which "increases alienation of the excluded segments and increases resentment by
those who [believe] they are summoned too many times." WASHINGTON STATE JURY
COMM'N, REPORT TO THE BOARD FOR JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 3 (July 2000),
availableathttp://www.courts.wa.gov/committee/pdf/Jury_Commission_Report.pdf.
The commission concluded that "special efforts should be made to increase
participation in jury service by sectors of society that traditionally have not
participated fully, particularly young people and minority communities." Id. Yet the
use of peremptory challenges only contributes to the recognized and continuing
underrepresentation of minority groups. Each peremptory challenge leveled against a
member of a minority group has a relatively greater exclusionary effect because each
such challenge removes a greater percentage of that minority group from jury service.
Further, many characteristics or life experiences that attorneys perceive as
unfavorable, but which do not render a prospective juror unqualified for service, may
be relatively more common (or seen as more common) among various minority
groups. See, e.g., GROSSO & O'BRIEN, supra, at 1541 & n.63 (noting that striking all
persons with a relative in prison could disproportionately exclude racial minorities).
Especially when combined with ongoing racial discrimination, these factors show that
peremptory challenges are a powerful contributor to the ongoing underrepresentation
of minority groups on juries.
40
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
Second, peremptory challenges impose substantial administrative and litigation
costs. More prospective jurors must be called upon to appear for service, disrupting
the lives of many who never actually serve on a jury. Litigants spend much time and
money determining how best to exercise peremptory challenges, not in order to ensure
the constitutional requirement of an impartial jury, but rather to obtain as favorable a
jury as possible. See, e.g., Stevenson, supra, at 1654 n.39 (noting the exorbitant cost
of jury consultation). Further, courts and litigants continue to spend inordinate
amounts of time and money, both at trial and on appeal, adjudicating myriad claims
and arguments under the generally unwieldy and ineffective Batson framework.
Allowing the use of peremptory challenges imposes all of these costs on our justice
- -- --
system.
Third, peremptory challenges result in juries that are less effective and less
productive. Allowing the use of peremptory challenges tends to exclude people with
diverse viewpoints and experiences who are qualified to serve as jurors. See, e.g.,
GOBERT & JORDAN, supra, at 272. Yet inclusion and diversity should be considered
extremely important goals of the jury system at a systemic level, in addition to the
fundamental requirement of impartiality. See WASHINGTON STATE JURY COMM'N,
supra, at 3. As the lead opinion rightly points out, such inclusion and diversity is
highly beneficial, advancing fairness and the appearance of fairness, and promoting
more effective and reflective juries. See lead opinion at 17 -18; see also Marder,
supra, at 1604 & nn.l19-21 ("[T]hey can correct each other's mistaken notions,
41
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
broaden each other's perspectives, and suggest different ways of looking at the
evidence."). Increased diversity and inclusion on juries also has the potential to
motivate civic engagement in the community. See Andrew E. Taslitz, The People's
Peremptory Challenge and Batson: Aiding the People's Voice and Vision Through the
"Representative" Jury, 97 IOWAL. REV. 1675, 1709-10 (2012) (discussing "one of
the largest studies on juries and democracy"). Allowing the use of peremptory
challenges takes us further away from the important goals of inclusion and diversity.
Fourth, the use of peremptory challenges amplifies underlying resource
disparity among litigants in a way that brings fundamental fairness into question. This
problem arises because thorough jury consultation is quite expensive and available
only to wealthy litigants. See, e.g., Strier & Shestowsky, supra, at 474-76. Although
the actual efficacy of jury consultation is somewhat dubious, insofar as even a modest
advantage can be obtained in the use of peremptory challenges, the result is a
potentially slanted jury and a widening of "the already -substantial advantage of the
wealthy." Id. at 463-64, 474. Such an imbalance injury selection is especially
antithetical to the notion of an impartial jury and "creates an untoward public
perception of the jury being manipulated by psychological devices, in essence, high-
tech jury tampering." I d. at 472-73 (footnote omitted); see also STARR &
MCCORMICK, supra, at 5.1-34; GOBERT&JORDAN, supra, at 118,453. Normally,
resource disparity affects each side's ability to convince the adjudicator of its position,
42
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
not the ability to select the adjudicator in the first place. The latter is a far more
fundamental, and in this context an entirely avoidable, problem.
In stark contrast to the numerous and substantial harms resulting from the use
of peremptory challenges, the procedure has no material benefits. Various benefits
have been identified in theory, but these alleged benefits remain unsupported,
specious, or de minimis and clearly outweighed by related costs. See, e.g., Morris B.
Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A Trial Judge's Perspective,
64 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 812-13 (1997) ("Although there is no shortage of academic
and judicial generalizations about the importance of the peremptory challenge, there
have been remarkably few efforts to articulate precisely why the peremptory
challenge is so important." (footnote omitted)).
The primary benefit alleged to result from the use of peremptory challenges is
jury impartiality. But as already discussed, attorneys use peremptory challenges to
exclude unfavorable jurors, not to obtain an impartial jury. Peremptory challenges are
used to remove prospective jurors who are qualified but who the attorney believes will
be relatively unfavorable in what is probably a close case. This has nothing to do with
furthering impartiality in our justice system.
Moreover, peremptory challenges are generally ineffective even for the
adversarial purpose of excluding unfavorable jurors. Regardless of their intentions,
and notwithstanding attorneys' collective confidence in their own ability to identify
unfavorable or secretly partial jurors, studies of actual peremptory usage show that
43
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
attorneys generally are ineffective at doing so, and laboratory experiments confirm
that finding. See Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should Be
Abolished, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 369, 413 (1992) (citing studies); Marder, supra, at 1596-
98 (same).
In one preeminent study of actual peremptory usage in real criminal trials,
prospective jurors who were removed by peremptory challenge were then formed into
shadow juries to observe the trials from which they had been excused. See Hans
Zeisel & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Effect ofPeremptory Challenges on Jury and
Verdict: An Experiment in a Federal District Court, 30 STAN. L. REV. 491, 498-500
(1978). The experimenters were then able to determine whether the attorneys had
reliably excused those jurors who would have voted against them entering
deliberations. See id. at 513-18. The results were "not impressive." !d. at 517.
Overall, "attorney performance was highly erratic," with substantial fluctuations from
one case to the next. ld. In the aggregate, prosecutors "made about as many good
challenges as bad ones," defense counsel fared only "slightly better," and the results
brought into question "the role of peremptory challenges in furthering the
constitutionally prescribed goal oftrial by an impartial jury." ld. at 517-18.
In another prominent experiment, a mock criminal trial was first conducted and
then numerous practicing attorneys (primarily prosecutors and defense counsel asked
to take up their usual roles) were presented with video of the voir dire. See Norbert L.
Kerr et al., On the Effectiveness of Voir Dire in Criminal Cases with Prejudicial
44
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
Pretrial Publicity: An Empirical Study, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 665, 672-79 (1991). The
attorneys then reported "how likely they were to use a peremptory challenge" on
individual prospective jurors, estimated "which way the juror[ s] would lean in the
trial," and then were asked to guess how many of their own predictions were correct.
!d. at 677-78. The attorneys reported that the simulation was fairly realistic. See id. at
679. But a comparison of attorney ratings to actual juror performance in the mock
trial found that "defense attorneys would have done no worse in exercising their
peremptory challenges had they simply flipped coins," while prosecutors' ratings
"were weakly, but only marginally, correlated with juror behavior," and both groups
"grossly overestimated their actual rate of success." !d. at 685, 688-89.
These results should not be surprising. As noted, most lawyers rely on
intuition, lore, and anecdotal experience in exercising peremptory challenges. But in
practice attorneys rarely if ever can actually confirm the effectiveness of their
decisions concerning peremptory challenges. Thus, anecdotal experience and lore in
this context are based on nothing more than intuition, which is entirely arbitrary,
erratic, and unreliable without any sort of regular experiential validation. See Marder,
supra, at 1596-97. Over time, well-established psychological tendencies-such as
confirmation bias (the tendency to look for confirmation but not falsification of our
hypotheses) and selective information processing (the tendency to readily accept
confirming evidence but devalue contradictory evidence)-likely entrench attorneys'
preexisting biases, including closely held racial stereotypes and generalizations, and
45
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
give attorneys false confidence in the effectiveness of their decisions concerning
peremptory challenges. See, e.g., Burke, supra, at 1480-81.
Even the use of jury consultation shows only mixed results, probably because
of the various subjective judgments that must be made and the unreliability of using
superficial statistical analysis to make individual judgments about complex human
beings. See supra, pp. 20-21. And insofar as jury consultation actually can provide a
modicum of relative advantage to a litigant, it remains available only to the most
wealthy, and thus, works against fairness and impartiality rather than for it.
The notion that impartiality is furthered by allowing litigants to exercise
arbitrary and unsupported juror challenges, based on nothing more than whim or
generalization, is a farce. We must recognize that it is difficult if not impossible to
detect juror bias except in clear cases, that most biases do not render jurors
unqualified, and that the solemnity of the proceedings and substance of deliberations
will help to ensure just verdicts from our juries. See Marder, supra, at 1601-06;
DONNER & GABRIEL, supra, at 10-18; Taslitz, supra, at 1709-10. If there is sufficient
evidence that a juror is unqualified, that evidence should be presented to the trial court
and ruled upon. Otherwise, the juror should be allowed to serve.
The remaining arguments in support of peremptory challenges fare no better.
For example, some have argued that the peremptory challenge "provides a ready
corrective for errors by a judge in refusing to grant a challenge for cause." GOBERT &
JORDAN, supra, at 217. Yet a trial judge refusing to grant a challenge for cause
46
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
abuses his or her discretion only if the juror's partiality is abundantly clear, which will
be relatively rare, and an abuse of discretion in such circumstances will be rarer still.
If appropriate, the standards governing challenges for cause can be addressed directly.
But allowing litigants to make unsupported and arbitrary challenges to prospective
jurors in order to avoid the mere potential for unreasonable decisions by our trial
courts would be senseless.
Others have seen potential value in peremptory challenges as a way to "remove
a juror whom [the attorney] has offended by a probing voir dire or by an unsuccessful
challenge for cause .... " Ginger, supra, at 1054 n.16. But this argument assumes
that attorneys must alienate prospective jurors in order to conduct effective voir dire,
which is false. Any relevant concerns can be adequately addressed with questioning
from the trial court, more delicate questioning or ingenuity from the attorneys, or
proceedings outside the presence of the jury, when appropriate. Regardless, both
sides remain on equal footing, and the attorneys can be expected to effectively
navigate the process. Even if an attorney happens to alienate a prospective juror
during voir dire, an alienated juror is not necessarily biased to any material degree.
Similarly, some have noted that allowing peremptory challenges permits
"attorneys to choose jurors about whom they feel comfortable," thus allowing the
attorneys to be more effective advocates. GOBERT & JORDAN, supra, at 272. But
someone who works as a trial advocate should be able to overcome performance
anxiety, and any subtle increase in attorney discomfort in a given case is of no
47
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, I. concurring
moment. Again, both sides remain on equal footing, and attorneys can be expected to
advocate effectively-even before jurors whom they perceive as hostile.
Still others have advocated for peremptory challenges on the ground that
parties are "consequently more likely to be accepting of the jury's verdict." GOBERT
& JORDAN, supra, at 271. But allowing causal challenges provides litigants more than
enough involvement injury selection and adequately ensures fairness and impartiality.
The argument also ignores that peremptory challenges interfere with the appearance
of fairness in numerous respects, are essentially capricious, and engender disrespect
for the legal system in part due to the ongoing presence of racial discrimination and
underrepresentation of minority groups on juries. See, e.g., EQUAL JUSTICE
INITIATIVE, supra, at 28-30; Marder, supra, at 1609 & n.144; James H. Coleman, Jr.,
The Evolution ofRace in the Jury Selection Process, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 1105, 1108
(1996); WASHINGTON STATE JURY COMM'N, supra, at 3.
Yet another argument in favor of peremptory challenges is that without them
attorneys will spend more time asserting and arguing causal challenges, thus
increasing administrative and litigation costs. But attorneys already have more than
enough incentive to argue causal challenges whenever possible, in order to conserve
the limited number of peremptory challenges available to them. Further, attorneys are
able to raise causal challenges only when there is some objective reason to believe
that a juror cannot be impartial, and trial courts can easily control the process to avoid
unnecessary costs and delays. This argument also ignores the relatively greater costs
48
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
that peremptory challenges impose, including the need to call more prospective jurors
who never serve, the needless time and money litigants spend on determining how to
exercise peremptory challenges, and the ongoing costs of litigating the Batson
framework.
A final argument in favor of peremptory challenges is that they prevent
extremists from getting onto juries and thus, avoid more hung juries and the need for
costly retrials. But true extremists are excused for cause if there is evidence to
establish their extremism, and if such extremism remains hidden, the unreliable and
inaccurate use of peremptory challenges will fare no better at removing the extremism
from the jury. Moreover, the solemnity of the proceedings and the substance of
deliberations might help to overcome the initial presence of extremism on the jury. In
any event, hung juries are relatively rare, notwithstanding the fact that most trials
present close cases. See PAULA L. HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., ARE HUNG JURIES A
PROBLEM? 25 (National Center for State Courts, National Institute of Justice, 2002)
(finding average hung jury rate of 6.2 percent in 30 jurisdictions across the United
States), available at
http://ncsc. contentdm. oclc. org/cdm/single item/co llection/j uries/id/2 7/rec/2.
In sum, the substantial costs of allowing the use of peremptory challenges are
numerous, well-established, and deeply concerning, while the alleged benefits are
unsupported, specious, or de minimis.
49
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
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5. A Brief History of the Peremptory Challenge
The case for abolishing peremptory challenges becomes even more compelling
after considering the origin of the procedure and its history in Washington.
The peremptory challenge first appeared in England during the 13th century.
See William T. Pizzi & Morris B. Hoffman, Jury Selection Errors on Appeal, 38 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1391, 1412 (2001); see also Hoffman, supra, at 817-19. Historians
believe that the practice originated in English criminal trials because causal challenges
made by the King were deemed royally infallible; in response, criminal defendants
were provided with a reasonable number of challenges of their own for which no
cause would be required. See Pizzi & Hoffman, supra, at 819; Broderick, supra, at
371-72; Pizzi & Hoffman, supra, at 1412. Others have also suggested that
peremptory challenges originally were "actually a kind of shorthand challenge for
cause in small English villages and towns, where it was commonplace for ... cause
disqualifications to be obvious to all." Pizzi & Hoffman, supra, at 1412. In either
case, "peremptory challenges antedated the notion of jury impartiality by some 200
years .... " Id. at 1439. Although the need to offset royal infallibility eventually
became outdated, the practice of allowing litigants in each case a limited number of
peremptory challenges remained a long standing tradition in England that eventually
50
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
was adopted in the United States without much debate or fanfare. See Hoffman,
supra, at 823-25. 3
The peremptory challenge was adopted in the Washington Territory shortly
after the territory's formation, without any record of substantive debate on the topic.
The first legislature of the territory passed comprehensive codes of civil and criminal
procedure, both of which provided for the use of peremptory challenges among
myriad other procedural matters. See LAWS OF 1854, at 100-29, 129-221; see also id.
at 118, 165. The legislative journals reveal that these comprehensive procedural
codes were discussed primarily in legislative committees; both codes were passed
swiftly, with only "sundry amendments" made during the legislative process. See
HOUSEJOURNAL,lst Sess., at 71, 73,77-78, 80 (Wash. Terr. 1854); COUNCIL
JOURNAL, 1st Sess., at 134-35, 137, 149, 150-51, 153, 160 (Wash. Terr. 1854). There
is no record of any debate or deliberations regarding peremptory challenges. At the
3
Although the peremptory challenge became a long standing tradition in England, the
practice was eventually abolished in that country in 1988. See, e.g., Nancy S. Marder,
Two Weeks at the Old Bailey: Jury Lessons from England, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 537,
553 & n.50 (2011) ("England had the peremptory and eliminated it, and does not seem
any worse off for having eliminated it." (footnote omitted) (citing Criminal Justice
Act, 1988, ch. 33, § 188(1) (Eng.)). The comparison is informative, but it is
admittedly imperfect because the English jury system does not strictly require jury
unanimity for a guilty verdict. See id. at 579-80 ("After the jury has deliberated for at
least two hours and has reported to the judge that it is having difficulty reaching a
unanimous verdict, the judge can decide to accept a [super-majority] verdict ... if
there is a vote of 11-1 or 10-2."). English prosecutors may also use a "standby"
procedure that is in effect similar to a peremptory challenge, but prosecutors rarely
exercise standbys. Nancy S. Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremptory Challenges and the
Roles of the Jury, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1041, 1102-03 & n.262 (1995).
51
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
time, racial minorities and women were completely excluded from participation on
juries. See Forman, supra, at 910; Aaron H. Caplan, The History of Women's Jury
Service in Washington, in WASH. ST. B. NEWS, Mar. 2005, at 13.
The original code provisions from the Washington Territory governing the use
of peremptory challenges have remained essentially unchanged and unquestioned
from the time they were adopted until now. These procedural provisions were still in
place when Washington became a state, at which point they were ostensibly adopted
by our state constitution as part of a broad incorporation of territorial laws in force at
the time. See CONST. art. XXVII,§ 2. The sole substantive alteration to these
provisions came in 1969 and related to the number of peremptory challenges available
to multiple parties on the same side of a case. See LAws OF 1969, 1st Ex. Sess., ch.
3 7, § 1, ch. 41, § 1. There is no record of any related discussion or debate concerning
the wisdom of maintaining the peremptory system generally. See, e.g., HousE
JOURNAL, 41st Leg., Reg. Sess.,at 162-63 (Wash. 1969) (debate concerned equal
distribution of challenges among parties and extent of judicial review).
In 1973, this court adopted its first set of comprehensive criminal court rules,
including a provision allowing for the exercise of peremptory challenges. See former
CrR 6.4(a) (1973). The Criminal Rules Task Force, which originally drafted and
recommended the rules for adoption, provided substantial commentary and
explanation regarding many of its proposed rules. See generally CRIMINAL RULES
TASK FORCE, WASHINGTON PROPOSED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (May 15,
52
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
1971 ). Regarding the sole provision allowing for the continued use of peremptory
challenges, however, the task force simply cited to the relevant preexisting statutes,
without further discussion. See id. at 102. Thus, the use of peremptory challenges in
this state was allowed to continue, but once again, without substantive debate or
discussion concerning the propriety of the procedure.
It is time to consider whether peremptory challenges actually should be part of
our jury selection process.
6. The Need To Abolish: Preventing Constitutional Violations
Peremptory challenges must be abolished in order to put an end to the racial
discrimination that underlies their use throughout this state. The exercise of a
peremptory challenge based on race violates the constitutional requirement of equal
protection of laws. See, e.g., Powers, 499 U.S. at 409. Specifically, a defendant has
"the right to be tried by a jury whose members are selected by nondiscriminatory
criteria," id. at 404, and a prospective juror has "the right not to be excluded from [a
jury] on account of race," id. at 409. Peremptory challenges based on race directly
violate these constitutional rights.
As already discussed, judicial review of individual peremptory challenges is
ineffective and cannot address the ongoing constitutional violations occurring
throughout this state. Because this court has plenary authority over trial procedures,
we should abolish peremptory challenges in order to deter those violations.
53
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
Abolishing peremptory challenges is constitutionally required, given the need
to prevent racial discrimination and the lack of any justification for allowing
peremptory challenges. When a given policy creates a systematic risk of racial
discrimination, the "question is at what point that risk becomes constitutionally
unacceptable." Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36 n.8, 106 S. Ct. 1683, 90 L. Ed. 2d
(1986); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 308-09, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 95 L. Ed. 2d 262(1987). The point at which such a risk becomes constitutionally unacceptable
obviously depends upon the ostensible justifications and need for the given policy or
practice. Compare McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 311,313 (risk that some juries were
discriminating in capital sentencing held constitutionally acceptable because of the
importance of trial by jury, the need to maintain discretion in the criminal justice
system, and the presence of safeguards), with United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570,
581-83, 88 S. Ct. 1209,20 L. Ed. 2d 138 (1968) (policy held unconstitutional,
regardless of intent, because it posed risk of chilling the exercise of basic
constitutional rights and did so "needlessly"). In this case, the policy of allowing
peremptory challenges creates a substantial risk of racial discrimination, has the
"inevitable effect" of excluding some citizens from jury service on the basis of race,
and has no substantiated benefits. Jackson, 390 U.S. at 581. There is simply no need
for litigants to be able to exclude prospective jurors without reason. But we need not
even decide whether the policy of allowing peremptory challenges is unconstitutional
54
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
in itself because our plenary authority in this area already obliges us to abolish
peremptory challenges in pursuit of justice.
7. The Need To Abolish: Preventing Other Injustices
In addition to the need to prevent racial discrimination, this court must abolish
peremptory challenges in order to eliminate all of the other substantial costs the
practice imposes upon our justice system. The disproportionate exclusion of minority
groups from jury service, for example, is of great concern. Jury participation is
critically important to the functioning and legitimacy of our government. The use of
juries validates the justice system through community participation, provides a check
against governmental abuses of power, educates citizens and promotes civic
engagement, and promotes integration and mutual understanding across social groups.
See Powers, 499 U.S. at 406-07; Taslitz, supra, at 1685, 1687, 1698, 1700, 1709-10
("A racially diverse jury ... will [] humble criminal-justice-system leaders and their
agents before subordinate group members, who are treated for the moment as full and
equal members of the People. In this way, [inclusion] amplifies the egalitarian effects
of ocular justice."). All of these purposes are substantially thwarted when minority
groups are disproportionately excluded from jury service. Members of excluded
groups also can be emotionally harmed, and the appearance of fairness is considerably
eroded. See supra p. 48. The elimination of peremptory challenges is also needed to
reduce wasteful administrative and litigation costs, to promote more effective juries,
55
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
and to prevent the amplification of resource disparity in jury selection. See supra pp.
40-42. To further all of these purposes, we must abolish peremptory challenges.
8. Going Forward
Abolishing peremptory challenges will bring us only one step closer to justice.
As a general matter, we must continue to oversee the rules of procedure in this state,
ensure that such rules are fair and effective, and see that justice is done in each and
every case within our jurisdiction. If we finally abolish peremptory challenges and
thus resolve the myriad problems associated that procedure, we should then turn our
attention to whether our overarching framework of causal challenges needs
improvement or clarification. We should also engage in our formal rule-making
process in order to consider additional proposals for improving jury selection,
including ways to further the goals of inclusion and diversity.
But we should not leave the current system in place while trying to devise such
solutions. The use of peremptory challenges in our legal system has never been
shown to be beneficial in any way. In stark contrast, the grave problems the practice
causes are ongoing, before us, and must be addressed. Such grave problems will
continue even if we begin a formal attempt to devise a better solution. Further, a
better solution is highly unlikely to ever appear; numerous alternatives to abolishing
peremptory challenges already have been proposed, but none appear promising. See,
e.g., Jean Montoya, The Future of the Post-Batson Peremptory Challenge: Voir Dire
by Questionnaire and the "Blind" Peremptory, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 981 (1996)
56
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
(proposing entirely written voir dire and peremptory challenges); Jeb C. Griebat,
Peremptory Challenge by Blind Questionnaire: The Most Practical Solution for
Ending the Problem ofRacial and Gender Discrimination in Kansas Courts While
Preserving the Necessary Function of the Peremptory Challenge, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 323 (2003) (proposing written questionnaires and peremptory challenges prior
to live voir dire); Brian W. Stoltz, Rethinking the Peremptory Challenge: Letting
Lawyers Eriforce the Principles ofBatson, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1034, 104 7 (2007)
(proposing a convoluted "peremptory block system"). Even if we do eventually
identify and adopt a better solution, the current system simply cannot stand and thus,
should not be maintained in the meantime.
If we do not abolish peremptory challenges, we should at least take steps to
augment the effectiveness of the current jury selection process under Batson. For
example, we could require trial courts to conduct questioning directly and to impose a
strict relevance requirement for any questions submitted by the attorneys, with an
exception for special circumstances or when the trial judge has established her or his
own declared rules to govern the relevant interests at stake. Cf State v. Roberts, 142
Wash. 2d 471, 519, 14 P.3d 713 (2000) (litigants not entitled to conduct "their own voir
dire of every prospective juror"); STARR & McCORMICK, supra, at 2-21 ("In federal
cases, 70 percent of voir dire is conducted by judges."). There are numerous costs and
benefits associated with greater control and questioning by trial judges, see, e.g.,
GOBERT & JORDAN, supra, at 326-27; STARR & MCCORMICK, supra, at 19-4, but
57
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
greater control will at least limit the ability of attorneys to go fishing for pretextual
race-neutral reasons and will also generally limit the availability of such reasons and
properly shift the focus to causal as opposed to peremptory challenges. That said,
limiting available information might also promote the greater use of stereotypes and
generalizations-underscoring once again the need to eliminate peremptory
challenges entirely.
In sum, the need to abolish peremptory challenges is abundantly clear.
III. APPLICATION
Although the allowance of peremptory challenges at Saintcalle's trial should be
considered trial error, Saintcalle himself is not entitled to reversal of his conviction.
Because trial courts throughout this state have been allowing peremptory challenges
in good faith until now, and because a peremptory challenge is only a small part of the
entire trial process and is not innately harmful or pernicious, the erroneous allowance
of a peremptory challenge does not warrant reversal in every case. See Creech, 44
Wash. at 73-74; Rivera, 556 U.S. at 157; cf N Pac. Ry. v. Herbert, 116 U.S. 642,
646, 6 S. Ct. 590, 29 L. Ed. 755 (1886) (erroneous allowance of causal challenge held
harmless); State v. Larkin, 130 Wash. 531, 533, 228 P. 289 (1924) (same); State v.
Williams, 132 Wash. 40, 46, 231 P. 21 (1924) (same). Reversal is warranted on
appeal only if the trial court (1) acted in bad faith in failing to follow the law or (2)
allowed a peremptory challenge in good faith but failed to comply with the Batson
framework.
58
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
In Saintcalle's case, the trial court acted in good faith and did not commit clear
error in allowing the peremptory challenge of prospective juror Tolson. First, the trial
court clearly acted in good faith because at the time of Saintcalle' s trial, peremptory
challenges were allowed under the law. Second, the record does not compel a :finding
that the prosecutor's challenge of prospective juror Tolson was racially
discriminatory. The record discloses that the parties obtained written questionnaires
from the prospective jurors prior to voir dire and that the written responses contained
substantive information. See Verbatim Report ofProceedings (VRP) (Mar. 10, 2009)
at 119. The record also reveals that the prosecutor was aware of certain facts about
Ms. Tolson that were not divulged during voir dire-including some facts related to
the recent death of her friend. See Transcript of Proceedings (TP) (Mar. 9, 2009) at
66, 68; VRP at 101-02. If Ms. Tolson revealed in her questionnaire that her friend
had recently been murdered, that would reasonably explain why she was questioned
extensively. And once thoroughly questioned, Ms. Tolson expressed serious doubts
about her ability to serve on the jury-doubts that were far more substantial than those
of any other juror. See TP at 70 ("I like to think that I am fair and can listen ... but I
don't know. I have never been on a murder trial and have just lost a friend two weeks
prior to a murder."); VRP at 43 ("I don't know how I'm going to react. ... [A]s we
go through it, and I hear the testimony, and I see the pictures, I don't know.").
Unfortunately, the questionnaires were not made part of the record. With that
material omission in mind, we must affirm the trial court's decision because the
59
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
burden of proof is on Saintcalle and the record "fails to affirmatively establish an
abuse of discretion." Sisouvanh, 175 Wn.2d at 619 (citation omitted).
The trial court did subsequently find that the prosecutor attempted to strike a
different prospective juror based on race, which the trial court should have considered
as relevant to the previous challenge against Ms. Tolson. However, Saintcalle did not
ask the trial court to reconsider its prior ruling. Further, even keeping in mind the
prosecutor's subsequent racial discrimination, it still was not clear error for the trial
court to find that the earlier challenge to Ms. Tolson was race-neutral.
Based on a review of the record, I cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in
allowing the prosecutor's peremptory challenge and excusing Ms. Tolson from the
jury. Applying the appropriate legal framework to this case-that is, reviewing the
allowance of a peremptory challenge as error, subject to reversal only in cases
involving bad faith or failure to comply with Batson-Saintcalle is not entitled to
reversal of his conviction.
IV. CONCLUSION
The time has come to abolish peremptory challenges. The use of this procedure
propagates racial discrimination, contributes to the historical and ongoing
underrepresentation of minority groups on juries, imposes needless administrative and
litigation costs, results in less effective juries, amplifies resource disparity in jury
selection, and mars the appearance of fairness in our justice system. It provides no
material benefits.
60
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
The compelling need to abolish peremptory challenges is no secret. Numerous
jurists throughout the nation repeatedly have recognized the need to eliminate this
"anathema to our democracy." Broderick, supra, at 371; Mark W. Bennett,
Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection, 4 HARV. L. & POL'Y
REV. 149, 166 (2010) (N.D. Iowa); Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333,342, 126 S. Ct. 969,
163 L. Ed. 2d 824 (2006) (Breyer and Souter, JJ., concurring); Morgan v.
Commonwealth, 189 S.W.3d 99, 115 (Ky. 2006) (Graves, J., concurring), overruled
on other grounds by Shane v. Com., 243 S.W.3d 336 (Ky. 2007); John Paul Stevens,
Foreword, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 907 (2003) (U.S.); Commonwealth v. Maldonado,
439 Mass. 460, 468, 788 N.E.2d 968 (2003) (Marshall, C.J., Greaney and Spina, JJ.,
concurring); Wamgetv. State, 67 S.W.3d 851,860 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (Meyers,
J., concurring); State v. Buggs, 581 N.W.2d 329,343 (Minn. 1998) (Page, J.,
dissenting); Minetos v. City Univ. ofNew York, 925 F. Supp. 177, 183 (S.D.N.Y.
1996); Hoffman, supra; Parker v. State, 219 Ga. App. 361, 364, 464 S.E.2d 910(1995) (Pope, J., concurring); Thorson v. State, 653 So. 2d 876, 896 (Miss. 1994)
(Sullivan, Pittman, and Banks, JJ., concurring); Gilchrist v. State, 97 Md. App. 55, 78,
627 A.2d 44 (1993) (Wilner, C.J., concurring); People v. Bolling, 79 N.Y.2d 317, 325,
591 N.E.2d 1136 (1992) (Bellacosa, J., Wachtler, C.J., and Titone, J., concurring);
Alen v. State, 596 So. 2d 1083, 1086 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (Hubbart, J.,
concurring); Theodore McMillian & Christopher J. Petrini, Batson v. Kentucky: A
Promise Unfulfilled, 58 UMKCL. REv. 361,374 (1990); State v. Johnson, 722
61
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
S.W.2d 62, 66 (Mo. 1986) (Donnelly, J., concurring); Batson, 476 U.S. at 102
(Marshall, J., concurring).
At the same time, no jurisdiction in the United States has been willing to be the
first to take the necessary step of abolishing peremptory challenges. See Flowers, 947
So. 2d at 938 (Miss. 2007). But mere idle threats will not curb any of the myriad
problems associated with peremptory challenges-problems which are ongoing and
significant. Cf id. at 939 ("While we neither abolish peremptory challenges, nor
adopt a limited voir dire rule, nor make any specific changes to our peremptory
challenge system, we are inclined to consider such options if the attorneys of this
State persist in violating the principles of Batson by racially profiling jurors."). The
same can be said of "wait[ing] for another case" or some future better rule to come as
the court does here. Lead opinion at 24; concurrence (Madsen, C.J., joined by J.M.
Johnson, J.) at 1, 3; concurrence (Stephens, J.,joined by C. Johnson and Fairhurst, JJ.)
at 1, 5. It appears true that "overcoming negative sentiment among judicial actors
might present the biggest hurdle to implementation of this proposed reform." Maisa
Jean Frank, Challenging Peremptories: Suggested Reforms to the Jury Selection
Process Using Minnesota as a Case Study, 94 MINN. L. REv. 2075,2101 (2010). This
court should not be blinded by tradition, see J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 142 n.15, and must
recognize that "a single courageous state" is always first to act, New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,311, 52 S. Ct. 371,76 L. Ed. 747 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
62
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
Gonzalez, J. concurring
dissenting). The time has come for Washington to finally abolish the peremptory
challenge.
63
No. 86257-5
l
64
State v. Saintcalle (Kirk Ricardo)
No. 86257-5
CHAMBERS, J.* (dissenting) -Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.
Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986), was a great, symbolic step forward in providing
equal justice under law. But Batson, sadly, has remained primarily symbolic. In
practice, Batson merely requires the machinery of justice pause, consider whether a
preemptory challenge was racially motivated, find a plausible sounding,
nondiscriminatory reason to dismiss a juror, and move on. Batson was doomed
from the beginning because it requires one elected person to find that another
elected person (or one representing an elected person) acted with a discriminatory
purpose. This has proved to be an impossible barrier. Further, Batson, by design,
does nothing to police jury selection against unconscious racism or wider
discriminatory impacts. I am skeptical-given that we have never reversed a
verdict on a Batson challenge-that it does much to police discriminatory purpose
itself.
Batson ignores the fact that discrimination is discrimination whether it is
purposeful or not. It ignores the fact that discrimination is real whether it is done
with racist intent or not. It ignores the fact that the minority juror who is removed
because of discrimination is denied the right to participate in one of the two most
fundamental democratic processes of our nation. We have learned something from
history, and this case gives us an opportunity to show it.
*Justice Tom Chambers is serving as a justice pro tempore of the Supreme Court pursuant to
Washington Constitution article IV, section 2(a).
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
I believe Justice Alexander was right in State v. Rhone, 168 Wash. 2d 645, 229
P.3d 752 (2010). Following his dissent, I would hold that a prima facie case of
discrimination is established when the sole remaining venire member of a
constitutional cognizable racial group is peremptorily challenged. !d. at 661
(Alexander, J., dissenting). I would do this, not under Batson, but under our
inherent supervisory power and based on our own understanding of the pernicious
effect of unconscious racism on a fair system of justice. See State v. Bennett, 161
Wash. 2d 303, 305, 165 P.3d 1241 (2007); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle
Sch. Dist. No. 1, 149 Wash. 2d 660, 674-75, 72 P.3d 151 (2003) (citing State ex rel.
Citizens Against Mandatory Bussing v. Brooks, 80 Wash. 2d 121, 128-29, 492 P.2d
536 (1972) (finding the difference between de facto and de jure discrimination
constitutionally insignificant), overruled on other grounds by Cole v. Webster, 103
Wash. 2d 280, 288, 692 P.2d 799 (1984))).
I do not believe it would be wise of this court to abandon peremptory
challenges altogether. Peremptory challenges are important in ensuring fair trials
because jurors are sometimes not candid or fail to understand they have deep
seated prejudices that may not be easily developed during voir dire to support a
for-cause challenge.
In this case, I am simply not convinced that Kirk Saintcalle received a fair
trial before a truly representative jury. I would reverse and remand for a new trial.
I respectfully dissent.
2
State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5
3