State v. Patric ( 1964 )

Donworth, J.

John Patric appeals from a judgment and sentence imposed for his conviction of the offense of signing a name other than his true name to an initiative petition.

The League of Women Voters of Washington qualified, under RCW 29.79.010, to solicit signatures of registered voters of the state of Washington in sufficient numbers to be presented to the Secretary of State for his canvass and determination whether proposed Initiative Measure No. 211 should be placed on the general election ballot November 6, 1962. The league prepared printed petition forms in accordance with the law, and distributed them in various public places where interested voters would be afforded an opportunity to voluntarily sign the proposed form, which contained spaces for 20 signatures.

One such form was placed on the counter in the office of the sheriff for Snohomish County, which contained a direction to the “petition carrier” to “Return this petition as soon as possible to: Mrs. E. A. Glasgow, 712 Wetmore, Everett, Washington.”

May 1, 1962, at about 5:15 p.m., John Patrie was in the sheriff’s office and, in the presence of Officer Gwynn Symmes, signed the form as “Hugo N. Frye, 301D Free Press Park, Snohomish.” The signed document, which contained only one additional signature, was delivered by Officer Symmes to Chief Criminal Deputy Roy Lee Arp. The officer, believing that a felony had been committed, delivered the signed instrument to the prosecuting attorney.

May 21, 1962, the prosecuting attorney filed an information charging John Patrie as follows:

“That he, the said John Patrie, in the County of Sno-homish, State of Washington, on or about the 1st day of May, 1962, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously did sign an initiative petition, to-wit: Initiative Petition No. 211, with other than his true name, to-wit: the name of Hugo N. Frye, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of Washington.”

He pleaded not guilty. A jury was impaneled. John Patrie appeared pro se.

At the trial, it was established that John Patrie signed the proposed initiative petition as alleged, “Hugo N. Frye,” and that he was a registered voter and registered to vote under the name of John Patrie. When exhibit No. 1, the proposed initiative petition, was offered in evidence, he objected to its admission on several grounds, among them, “I challenge the validity of this document.” He testified that he signed the name as he did because it was his pen name; that most people knew him by his pen name, and that he never intended to defraud the Secretary of State or anyone.

The jury returned the following verdict:

“We, the jury, duly empanelled and sworn in the above entitled and numbered cause, do find the defendant, John Patrie, guilty of the -crime of signing an initiative petition with other than true name.”

After the verdict was received, a third party procured counsel who represented appellant on the argument of post-trial motions and when sentence was imposed.

The defendant’s motions for arrest of judgment and for a new trial were denied. From the probationary judgment and sentence of a maximum of 10 years’ confinement in the state penitentiary¹ imposed upon the verdict, John Patrie appeals.

The statute under which appellant was tried and convicted is RCW 29.79.440, which provides:

“Every person who signs an initiative or referendum petition with any other than his true name shall be guilty of a felony.”

This appeal presents a single issue: Was the evidence sufficient to sustain the verdict? We think not.

The plea of not guilty placed upon the state the duty to prove all the elements of the offense. An essential element to be established by the state was that John Patrie unlawfully signed an initiative petition. The evidence conclusively established that the document which John Patrie signed never reached the status of a legal petition.

RCW 29.79.010 provides the method by which an organization can qualify to solicit signatures. RCW 29.79.120 provides, in part:

“When the person or organization proposing any initiative measure . . . has secured upon any such initiative petition the signatures . . . they may submit said petition to the secretary of state for filing in his office.”

RCW 29.79.220 provides, in part:

“Upon filing ... an initiative petition for submission of a measure to the people, the secretary of state shall canvass the names of the petition. ...”

RCW 29.79.240 provides:

“The secretary of state shall, while making the canvass, keep a record of all names appearing on an initiative . . . petition which are not registered voters . . . and shall report the same to the prosecuting attorneys of the respective counties where the names were signed to the end that prosecutions may be had for such violations of this chapter.”

Exhibit No. 1 was never delivered to the League of Women Voters. The League of Women Voters never presented exhibit No. 1 to the Secretary of State as an official petition in support of its initiative measure. Under the cited sections of the law, only the League of Women Voters could give the signed document the status of a petition, and then only when the league elected to use it by filing it with the Secretary of State.

June 29, 1962, the league did present the petitions which it contended contained the required number of names of registered voters.² These were canvassed by the Secretary of State, and the initiative was certified and placed upon the November 6, 1962, election ballot. The document referred to as exhibit No. 1, by statute, never became a petition in support of any initiative.

Further, the law does not authorize a sheriff or a prosecuting attorney to canvass the signatures on a petition for an initiative. This duty to canvass the petitions devolves upon the Secretary of State and applies only to those petitions which qualified organizations or persons choose to deliver to him for that purpose. The state failed to establish that exhibit No. 1 was a legal initiative petition; hence, the name “Hugo N. Frye” written thereon by John Patrie did not constitute an offense within the purview of the statute (RCW 29.79.440).

The trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion in arrest of judgment.

The judgment and sentence is reversed, and the cause remanded with instructions to enter judgment of dismissal.

Ott, C. J., and Weaver, J., concur.

Hamilton, J., concurs in the result.

1 The execution of the judgment and sentence was suspended and appellant was placed on probation for 3 years, conditioned upon his compliance with five specified terms and conditions. One condition was that appellant serve 20 days in the Snohomish County jail.

2 A person could remove his name from a petition any time prior to its being filed with the Secretary of State.