State v. Brown ( 2019 )

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This opinion was
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RffREMS COUiTr. STATE OF VSNSmSKIt
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-^(XXa I^aAaA) Susan L. Carlson
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Supreme Court Clerk
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
No. 96884-5
Petitioner,
V. En Banc
DAVID JOSEPH BROWN,
Respondent. Filed PEC 2 6 2019
J
MADSEN,J.—We are asked to decide whether the phrase "when required" in
ROW 46.61.305(2) compels drivers to use their signal every time they turn or change
lanes on a roadway. We hold that it does. The plain language of ROW 46.61.305
requires drivers to ensure turns and lane changes are done safely and with an appropriate
turn signal. ROW 46.61.305(1). The phrase "when required" relates to the manner in
which the required signal is made—continuously during not less than the last 100 feet
traveled. ROW 46.61.305(l)-(2). Because David Brown did not signal continuously
while his vehicle turned left through an intersection, he violated RCW 46.61.305.
No. 96884-5
Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further
proceedings.
BACKGROUND
On the evening of March 22, 2015, Brown was driving his truck in Kennewick,
Washington. Clerk's Papers(CP)at 11, 73.' State patrol officers observed Brown turn
right onto a four-lane street. While turning, the left side tires of Brown's truck briefly
crossed the white dashed divider line before moving back into the correct lane.
Eventually, Brown activated his left turn signal and moved his truck left while the signal
blinked multiple times before shutting off. Brown again signaled his intent to change
lanes, moving into the designated left turn lane while the turn signal blinked twice and
then ceased. CP at 12; see also Ex. 1 (law enforcement dashboard camera recording).
Brown approached and stopped at a red light; he did not reactivate his left turn signal at
the light or while executing the left turn. State patrol officers had been driving behind
Brown through the lane changes and turn, and the officers initiated a traffic stop. After
his breath test showed 0.26 breath alcohol content. Brown was arrested for driving under
the influence.
In district court. Brown moved to suppress evidence gathered during the traffic
stop. Among other things, the State argued that Brown violated RCW 46.61.305 for
failing to continuously signal his intent to turn left. The court concluded that a driver is
'Brown and the State largely rely on the district court's findings of fact for the record in this
case. These findings were adopted by the superior court, and neither party challenged them
below. See State v. Brown,1 Wn. App. 2d 121, 127, 432 P.3d 1241 (2019). The findings are
therefore verities on appeal. State v. Hill, 123 Wn.2d 641, 644, 870 P.2d 313 (1994).
No. 96884-5
not required to reactivate a turn signal when entering a turn-only lane and, thus, the state
patrol officers had no cause to stop Brown. Without the breath alcohol concentration
evidence. Brown's case was dismissed. The district court denied reconsideration.
The State appealed, and the superior court upheld the district court's decision that
Brown's wide right turn and lane changes were proper but reversed the conclusion that he
did not need to continuously signal his intent to turn left under RCW 46.61.305. Brown
appealed only this holding. Br. of Appellant at 3-4(Wash. Ct. App. No. 35304-4-III
(2018))(assigning error to superior court holding on RCW 46.61.305). The Court of
Appeals reversed the superior court and concluded that .305 requires a signal only when
public safety is affected. Because Brown was in a turn-only lane that did notjeopardize
public safety, no signal was required. State v. Brown,7 Wn. App. 2d 121, 123, 135-36,
432 P.3d 1241 (2019). Chief Judge Lawrence-Berrey dissented, reasoning that a signal
must be continuous under the plain language of RCW 46.61.305. Id. at 140-42. The
State moved for discretionary review here, which we granted. State v. Brown, 193 Wn.2d
1025 (2019).
ANALYSIS
To determine whether Brown's failure to continuously signal his intent to turn
violated RCW 46.61.305, we must first interpret the phrase "when required" in RCW
46.61.305(2).
The meaning of a statute is a question of law we review de novo. Lake v.
Woodcreek Homeowners Ass'n, 169 Wn.2d 516, 526, 243 P.3d 1283(2010)(citing
No. 96884-5
Rozner v. City ofBellevue, 116 Wn.2d 342, 347, 804 P.2d 24 (1991)). "Our fundamental
purpose in construing statutes is to ascertain and carry out the intent ofthe legislature.
We determine the intent of the legislature primarily from the statutory language. In the
absence of ambiguity, we will give effect to the plain meaning of the statutory language."
In re Marriage ofSchneider, 173 Wn.2d 353, 363, 268 P.3d 215 (2011)(citations
omitted). In determining whether a statute conveys a plain meaning,"that meaning is
discerned from all that the Legislature has said in the statute and related statutes which
disclose legislative intent about the provision in question." Dep't ofEcology v. Campbell
& Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 11, 43 P.3d 4(2002).
An undefined term is "given its plain and ordinary meaning unless a contrary
legislative intent is indicated." Ravenscroft v. Wash. Water Power Co., 136 Wn.2d 911,
920-21, 969 P.2d 75 (1998). If the statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable
interpretation, it is ambiguous and the court "may resort to statutory construction,
legislative history, and relevant case law for assistance in discerning legislative intent."
Christensen v. Ellsworth, 162 Wn.2d 365, 373, 173 P.3d 228 (2007).
RCW 46.61.305 states:
When signals required—Improper use prohibited. (1)No person shall
turn a vehicle or move right or left upon a roadway unless and until such
movement can be made with reasonable safety nor without giving an
appropriate signal in the manner hereinafter provided.
(2) A signal of intention to turn or move right or left when required
shall be given continuously during not less than the last one hundred feet
traveled by the vehicle before turning.
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(Emphasis added.) "When required" is not defined in section .305 or Title 46. Brown
contends the phrase implies there are instances when signaling is not required. Suppl. Br.
of Resp't at 6-7; Br. of Appellant at 7(Wash. Ct. App. No. 35304-4-III (2018)). Thus, he
argues, interpreting RCW 46.61.305 as always requiring a signal renders the phrase
meaningless. The Court of Appeals largely agreed, noting that we must construe statutes
to give effect to all the language used. Brown,1 Wn. App. 2d at 135 (citing Cannabis
Action Coal. v. City ofKent, 180 Wn. App. 455, 477, 322 P.3d 1246 (2014)). Because
the words "when required" were used, lawmakers contemplated circumstances when turn
signals are not required. Id. at 136. To that end, the Court of Appeals read .305(1) as
concerned primarily with public safety. Id. Consequently, the court reasoned that a
signal under .305(2) is required only when public safety is implicated by .305(1). Id. If a
turn can be made safely without a signal, no signal is required. Id. Because Brown was
in a turn-only lane and no other traffic was affected, he could safely turn and no signal
was needed. Id.
The plain language of.305(1) sets out two requirements: safe movement and use
of an appropriate signal. See State v. Lemus Lemus, 103 Wn. App. 94, 99, 11 P.3d 326(2000)("Paraphrased in the affirmative, RCW 46.61.305(1) plainly means that the driver
must make a lane change safely and with an appropriate signal."). The signal
requirement in .305(1) is modified by the prepositional phrase "in the manner hereinafter
provided." Subsection .305(2) then describes the manner of signaling: a signal of
intention to turn or move when required shall be given continuously for not less than the
No. 96884-5
last 100 feet traveled by a vehicle. This provision sets out the manner of giving a turn
signal; it does not describe when a signal is required.
As the State explains, signaling is always required on roadways. Pet. for Review
at 7-8. RCW 46.61.305 does not regulate movement on other types of roads, such as
private roads or parking lots. In the unrelated State v. Brown, a driver turned right out of
a parking lot without signaling. 119 Wn. App. 473, 475, 81 P.3d 916 (2003). The Court
of Appeals explained that the plain language of.305(1) applies to vehicles moving or
turning upon a roadway, not onto a roadway. Id. The Brown court recognized that RCW
46.61.305 contains different requirements for vehicles traveling on different types of
roads. Pet. for Review at 7-8. Thus,"when required" has meaning; signals are required
when a turn or lane change is executed on a roadway.
Brown offers a conceivable but not reasonable interpretation of.305's "when
required" when the phrase is read in context with subsection (1). Lake, 169 Wn.2d at 526(plain meaning is discerned from the ordinary meaning of the language and the context of
the statute in which that provision is found); Burton v. Lehman, 153 Wn.2d 416, 423, 103
P.3d 1230(2005)("[A] statute is not ambiguous merely because different interpretations
are conceivable."). Brown's interpretation conflates .305(1) and (2). It also merges the
safety requirement with the signal requirement-—^presumably no turn or lane change will
be executed unless it can be done safely, and a turn or lane change done safely will never
require a signal.
No. 96884-5
Brown's interpretation also ignores its implications for public safety. One purpose
of a turn signal is to alert other drivers and pedestrians of one's intent to change lanes as
well as to turn right or left. See ROW 46.61.305(1). Brown's interpretation relies on
driver perception but does not account for the perceptions of other drivers and
pedestrians. Blind corners and unprotected left turns with oncoming traffic abound;
pedestrians may or may not cross streets depending on the presence of a car's turn signal;
and, failing to signal may lead other drivers to think it safe to change lanes or turn
themselves.
Brown would presumably argue that his reading of.305 covers these situations
because a lane change or turn must always be done safely. That is, when other traffic or
pedestrians are present, public safety is implicated and a signal is required. But such an
interpretation presumes the driver is aware of other traffic or pedestrians. Tragically, this
is not always the case. See, e.g.,Niven v. MacDonald,72 Wn.2d 93, 431 P.2d 724(1967)
(a driver failed to look for possible traffic immediately before beginning a left turn across
a passing lane and collided with another vehicle); Nat'L SAFETY COUNCIL,
Understanding the Distracted Brain 2(2012)(distracted drivers may look at but
not see objects); CHRISTOPHER Chabris & Daniel Simons,The Invisible Gorilla 22-
26(2010)(noting that humans often fail to notice unexpected objects in plain sight
known as "inattentional blindness"). Leaving the decision to use a signal to the
perception of individual drivers undermines the ultimate purpose of traffic laws:
preventing accidents and encouraging highway safety. See Pudmaroffv. Allen, 138
No. 96884-5
Wn.2d 55, 65, 977 P.2d 574(1999)(citing RCW 46.90.005); see also EDWARD C.
Fisher, Vehicle Traffic Law 41 (Robert L. Donigan ed., 1961)(motor vehicle laws are
meant to prevent accidents and promote the safe and orderly flow of traffic). The State's
interpretation, on the other hand, recognizes that whenever a driver intends to turn or
change lanes, a signal is required—eliminating the potential for "driver error," as
described above.
The plain language of RCW 46.61.305 is sufficiently clear to discern legislative
intent. The phrase "when required" refers to the manner of providing a required signal
whenever a driver is traveling on a roadway. Here, Brown signaled once to enter the left-
tum-only lane. While the turn-only lane may have indicated to drivers behind Brown
(i.e., the state patrol ear)that he intended to turn, neither nearby nor oncoming traffic was
alerted because Brown did not continuously signal. A turn-only lane has markings on the
street, but they may not be visible to oncoming traffic—^made more obscure by the cars
covering them and by the time of day, 10 p.m. in this case.
This interpretation of.305(2) is bolstered by the unrelated State v. Brown, as well
as cases from other jurisdictions. In State v. Fasteen, 2007 ND 162,^ 10, 740 N.W.2d
60,63, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the phrase "when required" in its
nearly identical signaling provision "refers to the giving of a signal as an intention to turn
or move right or left 'upon a roadway' as required under subseetion (1)."^ The Supreme
2 N.D. Cent. Code § 39-10-38 (1987):
1. No person may turn a vehicle or move right or left upon a roadway unless and
until such movement can be made with reasonable safety without giving an
appropriate signal in the manner hereinafter provided.
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No. 96884-5
Court of Kansas held its identical signaling statute^ requires "anyone turning a vehicle
must provide 'an appropriate signal'—^namely, a turn signal given continuously for at
least 100 feet before the turn. The statute does not provide any exception to this rule."
State V. Greever, 286 Kan. 124, 138, 183 P.3d 788 (2008); see also State v. Lawman,82
Ohio App. 3d 831, 835,613 N.E.2d 692(1992); State v. Kelly, 229 Or. App. 461,472,
211 P.3d932(2009).
The three cases Brown cites in support of his argument are distinguishable because
the signaling statutes at issue in those cases contain meaningfully different language than
ROW 46.61.305. In Grindeland v. Montana, section 61-8-336(1) of the Montana Code
Annotated stated that a person shall not turn a vehicle "'without giving an appropriate
signal... in the event any other traffic may be affected by such movement.'" 306 Mont.
262,265, 32 P.3d 767(2001)(alteration in original). The statute specifically ties giving
an "appropriate signal" to "in the event any other traffic may be affected by" a turn. Id.RCW 46.61.305(1) lacks this "other traffic affected" language. The same is true for
United States v. Mariscal—the Arizona signaling statute at issue there contained the
same language as Montana, that "'[a] person shall not so turn any vehicle without giving
2. A signal ofintention to tum or move right or left when required must be given
continuously during not less than the last one hundred feet[30.48 meters]
TRAVELED BY THE VEHICLE BEFORE TURNING.
^ Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-1548(1974)provides in relevant part:
(a) No person shall tum a vehicle or move right or left upon a roadway unless and
until such movement can be made with reasonable safety, nor without giving
an appropriate signal in the manner hereinafter provided.
(b) A signal ofintention to tum or move right or left when required shall be given
continuously during not less than the last one hundred (100)feet traveled by
the vehicle before tuming.
No. 96884-5
an appropriate signal in the manner provided by this artiele in the event any other traffic
may be affected by the movement.'" 285 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2002)(alteration in
original)(quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 28-754(A)). United States v. Caseres contains the
same language as Arizona and is similarly distinguishable. 533 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir.
2008)(citing Cal. Veh. Code § 22107). Suppl. Br. of Resp't at 8-9.''
CONCLUSION
The plain language ofROW 46.61.305 requires a driver to signal his or her intent
to turn or change lanes on a roadway. The phrase "when required" relates to the manner
in which that signal is made. Brown did not continuously signal his intent to turn left;
therefore he violated ROW 46.61.305. This is the only issue before the court.
Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Brown also cites Bowers v. State, 221 Ga. App. 886,473 S.E.2d 201 (1996), in support. Suppl.
Br. of Resp't at 6. Bowers, like Grindeland, Mariscal, and Caseras, is distinguishable from
Washington's signaling statute. At issue in Bowers was Georgia Code Annotated § 40-6-123.
Subsection (a) ofthe statute is similar to RCW 46.61.305(1): "No person shall . . . change lanes
or move right or left upon a roadway unless and until such movement can be made with
reasonable safety. No person shall so tum any vehicle without giving an appropriate and timely
signal in the manner provided in this Code section." Subsection(b) of the Georgia code,
however, contains important differences to RCW 46.61.305(2). Subsection 40-6-123(b) provides
that a signal "to tum right or left or change lanes when required shall be given continuously for a
time sufficient to alert the driver ofa vehicle proceeding from the rear in the same direction or a
driver of a vehicle approaching from the opposite direction." (Emphasis added.) Unlike -123(b),
.305(2)'s "when required" lacks language specifying its purpose to alert oncoming and
proceeding vehicles.
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No. 96884-5
WE CONCUR:
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