Thurston Cnty. Ex Rel. Snaza v. City of Olympia ( 2019 )

This opinion was fiied for record
IN CLERKS OFFICE
aiFRBME COURT. STATE OF MAafflWTOM S"AA. OfvTI/fAr QOi^
a,- WAR 1 4 2019
&iki'Justice SUSAN L. CARLSON
SUPREME COURT CLERK
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
THURSTON COUNTY,ex rel,
JOHN SNAZA,THURSTON
COUNTY SHERIFF,
No. 95586-7
Appellants,
V.
En Banc
CITY OF OLYMPIA,CITY OF
LACEY,CITY OF TUMWATER,and
CITY OF YELM,
Respondents, Filed 1 4 2019
CITY OF TENINO,
Respondent Intervenor.
Gonzalez, J.—We are asked to decide whether, in the absence of a
prior interiocai agreement, a county is entitled to seek reimbursement from
cities for the cost of medical services provided to jail inmates who were (1)
arrested by city officers and (2) held in the county jail on felony charges. We
conclude it is not and accordingly affirm.
Thurston County v. City ofOlympia, No. 95586-7
Background
In Washington State, cities, towns, and counties are empowered to
enact criminal codes, employ law enforcement officers, and operate jails.
See generally WASH. CONST, art. XI, §11; ROW 39.34.180(1). These
activities carry costs, much of which is borne on the local level. See WASH.
Courts,A Guide to Washington State Courts 24(12th ed. 2011);' see
also Wash. Courts Court Funding Task Force, Courts of Limited
Jurisdiction Delivery of Services Workgroup:Final Report 9-10
(Oct. 12, 2004).^ Local governments have a great deal of discretion in how
to provide these services. See chs. 3.30, 3.46, 3.50, 35.20, 39.34 RCW.
Currently, cities, towns, and counties are "responsible for the
prosecution, adjudication, sentencing, and incarceration of misdemeanor and
gross misdemeanor offenses committed by adults in their respective
jurisdictions, and referred from their respective law enforcement agencies."
RCW 39.34.180(1). They can carry out these responsibilities directly,
through their own courts, law enforcement agencies, and jails, or through
agreements with other jurisdictions. Id. Generally, counties are responsible
for the costs associated with felony prosecutions; cities and towns are
'http://www.courts.wa.gov/newsinfo/content/pdf/CourtGuide20I I.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZP33-SF3G].
^ http://www.courts.wa.gov/programs orgs/pos bia/tcfWorkGroupReport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VX4R-4MJV]
Thurston County v. City ofOlympia, No. 95586-7
responsible for the costs associated with misdemeanor and gross
misdemeanor prosecutions initiated by their own law enforcement agencies.
Id. ,- see also 1988 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 9, at 1-3. If cities and counties have
agreed to negotiate but cannot reach an agreement on how to allocate
criminal justice costs, either party may invoke binding arbitration. RCW
39.34.180(3). The attorney general has opined that cities and counties are
not required to enter into agreements. 2000 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2.
But while Washington allows a great deal of organizational flexibility
in delivering public services, the counties are the primary unit of local
government and "generally 'handle such state-directed functions as the
administration ofjustice.'" City ofAuburn v. Gauntt, 174 Wash. 2d 321, 325,
274 P.3d 1033 (2012)(internal quotation marks omitted)(quoting Sho Sato
& Arvo Van Alstyne,State and Local Government Law 6(1970)).
"[T]he general rule is that counties are burdened with the cost of
administering the criminal laws within their boundaries and, in the absence
of statutory authority, are not entitled to reimbursement from the State."
State V. Agren, 32 Wash. App. 827, 828, 650 P.2d 238(1982)(citing RCW
36.27.020(4); State v. Grimes, 7 Wash. 445, 35 P. 361 (1893)).
From time to time, some cities have repealed portions of their codes
that carried costs they no longer wished to bear. 1984 Final Legislative
Thurston County v. City ofOlympia, No. 95586-7
Report, 48th Wash. Leg., at 196; Gauntt, 174 Wash. 2d at 326 (citing City of
Medina v. Primm, 160 Wash. 2d 268, 278, 157 P.3d 379(2007)(plurality
opinion)). After a rash of cities repealed the costly portions oftheir criminal
codes, the legislature enacted the Court Improvement Act of 1984, which
(among many other things) prohibited cities from abolishing their municipal
courts and codes without first reaching an agreement with the county whose
district court would have to absorb resulting costs and cases. Laws OF 1984,
ch. 258, §§ 39, 201-210; 1984 Final Legislative Report, 48th Wash. Leg.,
at 196.
Our legislature has also created a related statutory framework to
regulate jails, the City and County Jails Act. Laws of 1977, ch. 316
(codified at ch. 70.48 RCW). Among other things, the legislature declared
its intent that "all jail inmates receive appropriate and cost-effective
emergency and necessary medical care." RCW 70.48.130(1). To that end,
the legislature has essentially set up a funding matrix. RCW 70.48.130. The
"governing unit" ofthe jail holding the inmate is initially responsible for
paying the costs of emergency and necessary health care, though the health
care authority is allowed to reimburse providers directly. RCW
70.48.130(1),(2). Jails are also directed to screen patients for ability to pay
for medical care, and governments are encouraged to enter into interlocal
Thurston County v. City ofOlympia, No. 95586-7
agreements to allocate costs. RCW 70.48.130(4)-(6). RCW 70.48.130 also
states that the governing unit that operates the jail "may obtain
reimbursement for the cost of such medical services from the unit of
government whose law enforcement officers initiated the charges on which
the person is being held in the jail." RCW 70.48.130(6). This general
language was part of the original 1977 act. Laws of 1977, ch. 316, § 13.
Thurston County(County) and the city of Olympia each operate their
own jails. The remaining cities in this case appear to have made contractual
arrangements to hold people prior to trial. The Thurston County jail does
not house anyone held only on a misdemeanor, and the Olympia city jail
does not house anyone held on a felony. Unlike many counties, the County
does not have an interlocal agreement with its cities allocating the costs
associated with medical care for those so held. See, e.g., Whatcom County v.
City ofBellingham, 128 Wash. 2d 537, 542, 909 P.2d 1303 (1996).
In 2016, the County sought reimbursement from the cities of Olympia,
Lacey, Tumwater, and Yelm (the Cities)"for medical costs incurred by
inmates held at the Thurston County Jail" on charges it contends were
"initiated" by "[city] law enforcement officers." Clerk's Papers at 130
(citing RCW 70.48.130(6)), 3. The documentation of the costs is
incomplete, but it appears that the County was generally seeking
Thurston County v. City ofOlympia, No. 95586-7
reimbursement for uncovered inmate medical costs from the city that
employed either the arresting officer or the municipal judge who issued the
arrest warrant.^ The Cities declined payment on the grounds that
'"municipalities are not subject to, nor liable for, health-care expenses for
felony inmates.'" Id. at 74(quoting exhibit not found in the record).
The County brought a declaratory judgment action contending that the
Cities were responsible for the costs of care and damages. The city of
Tenino was permitted to intervene. The case went before a visiting judge
sitting in Thurston County on cross motions for summary judgment. The
judge concluded that RCW 70.48.130(6) was ambiguous on its face but read
in context ofthe City and Counties Jails Act, the Court Improvement Act,
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (ch. 9.94A RCW),and the Interlocal
Cooperation Act(ch. 39.34 RCW)(among other scattered statutory
provisions), the legislature intended the otherwise-unmet cost of
incarceration should be imposed on the local government that laid the
charges, not the one that employed the arresting officer. She granted the
Cities' summary judgment motion and denied the County's. The County
sought direct review, which we granted. The Washington State Association
^ The County billed the Cities for costs related to inmates arrested on municipal warrants,
but in its statement of grounds for direct review it sought review of only costs related to
inmates arrested by city officers.
Thurston County v. City ofOlympia, No. 95586-7
of Counties and the Washington State Association of Municipal Attorneys
filed briefs in support of their respective members.
Analysis
This case is here on review of summary judgment, presenting only
questions of law. Our review is de novo. Howe v. Douglas County, 146
Wash. 2d 183, 188, 43 P.3d 1240(2002){ciXmg Rivett v. CityofTacoma, 123
Wash. 2d 573, 578, 870 P.2d 299(1994)).
The County contends that "the governing unit may obtain
reimbursement for the cost of such medical services from the unit of
government whose law enforcement officers initiated the charges on which
the person is being held in the jail," RCW 70.48.130(6), plainly means that
the costs are the responsibility of the employer of the arresting officer. The
Cities contend that the County is responsible for the costs associated with
prosecuting felonies, including the medical costs of inmates held on felony
charges. Resolving this question requires us to consider many interrelated
statutes.
"The court's fundamental objective" when interpreting statutes "is to
ascertain and carry out the Legislature's intent, and if the statute's meaning
is plain on its face, then the court must give effect to that plain meaning as
an expression of legislative intent." Dep't ofEcology v. Campbell & Gwinn,
Thurston County v. City of Olympia, No. 95586-7
LLC, 146 Wash. 2d 1, 9-10, 43 P.3d 4(2002)(citing State v. JM,144 Wn.2d
472, 480, 28 P.3d 720 (2001)). "[T]hat meaning is discerned from all that
the Legislature has said in the statute and related statutes which disclose
legislative intent about the provision in question." Id. at 11. In statutory
interpretation,"we avoid a literal reading if it would result in unlikely,
absurd or strained consequences." Kitsap County v. Moore, 144 Wash. 2d 292,
297, 26 P.3d 931 (2001){oitingAlderwood Water Dist. v. Pope & Talbot,
Inc., 62 Wash. 2d 319, 321, 382 P.2d 639 (1963)).
At the time the City and Counties Jails Act was passed, "all criminal
proceedings [were] initiated by a complaint." Former JCrR 2.01(a)(1)
(1974); Laws of 1977, ch. 316. Law enforcement officers were empowered
to initiate charges for misdemeanors and gross misdemeanors on those
arrested by service of a citation and notice to appear in court. Former JCrR
2.01(b)(1)(1974); PlERCE's Code § 9148(Supp. 1927). Under that system,
a "citation and notice when signed by the citing officer and filed with a court
of competent jurisdiction shall be deemed a lawful complaint for the purpose
ofinitiating prosecution of the offense charged therein." Former JCrR
2.01(b)(4)(1974)(emphasis added)."^ But then, as now,law enforcement
^ Similar procedures exist under the current criminal rules for courts of limited
jurisdiction. Under current rules, a law enforcement officer can initiate misdemeanor and
gross misdemeanor charges in Washington by issuing a citation and notice to appear in
Thurston County v. City ofOlympia, No. 95586-7
officers could not initiate felony charges.^ Former JCrR 2.01(b)(1)(1974);
RCW 10.37.015(1). Then as now,that is a power reserved to the
prosecuting attorney or grand jury. CrR 2.1; RCW 36.27.020(4).
All this suggests that the legislature intended to apply RCW
70.48.130(6)to a narrow situation: to the medical costs of inmates held in
one government's jail on charges initiated by another government under the
procedures outlined by former JCrR 2.01(b)(1974). This narrow
interpretation is consistent with the words of the statute as they would have
been understood at the time and avoids the strange result of allowing a
county to shift the costs to a city that had only slight connection to the
decision to bring the charges that resulted in the person being held. It also
avoids conflating the statutory terms "initiates the charges" with "arrest."
Narrowly construing RCW 70.48.130(6) to apply to situations where a
person is actually held on only misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor charges
is also consistent with the larger statutory context. RCW 70.48.130(6)
appears within a larger statutory scheme that contemplates cities and
counties will bear their own costs either through providing the services
court. CrRLJ 2.1(b)(1). "When signed by the citing officer and filed with a court of
competent jurisdiction, the citation and notice shall be deemed a lawful complaint for the
purpose of initiating prosecution." CrRLJ 2.1(b)(5).
^ Officers can, of course, arrest on probable cause of a felony, but the charging decision is
left to the prosecutor. RCW 10.37.015(1).
Thurston County v. City ofOlympia, No. 95586-7
directly or through interlocal agreements. RCW 70.48.130 itself makes
clear that an interlocal agreement takes precedent over reimbursement under
RCW 70.48.130(6). Critically, a related statute, RCW 39.34.180, provides
in relevant part that
[e]ach county, city, and town is responsible for the prosecution,
adjudication, sentencing, and incarceration of misdemeanor and gross
misdemeanor offenses committed by adults in their respective
jurisdictions, and referred from their respective law enforcement
agencies, whether filed under state law or city ordinance, and must
carry out these responsibilities through the use of their own courts,
staff, and facilities, or by entering into contracts or interlocal
agreements under this chapter to provide these services. Nothing in
this section is intended to alter the statutory responsibilities of each
county for the prosecution, adjudication, sentencing, and incarceration
for not more than one year of felony offenders, nor shall this section
apply to any offense initially filed by the prosecuting attorney as a
felony offense or an attempt to commit a felony offense.
RCW 39.34.180(1). Reading RCW 70.48.130(6) to allow a county to shift
all ofthe unpaid costs of felony inmate medical care to its cities merely
because a city officer made the arrest or a municipal judge issued the
warrant would undermine this and related statutes, which contemplate
governments are responsible for the criminal justice costs created by their
agents' charging decisions. It also would create a perverse incentive for
counties not to negotiate with their nearby municipalities to make deliberate
and thoughtful allocation of resources, in violation of the general spirit—if
not the letter—of the Interlocal Cooperation Act.
10
Thurston County v. City ofOlympia, No. 95586-7
Reading RCW 70.48.130(6) narrowly is also consistent with relevant
case law concerning allocation of criminal justice costs. See, e.g., Moore,
144 Wash. 2d at 293; Harrison Mem 'I Hosp. v. Kitsap County, 103 Wash. 2d 887,
893, 700 P.2d 732(1985)(county responsible for medical costs of inmate
transported to a hospital after a suicide attempt). In Moore, for example, a
county and a city filed a writ of mandamus against the Office ofPublic
Defense, contending it should reimburse local governments for the cost of
RALJ appeals. 144 Wash. 2d at 293. The writ was based on a statute that said:
When a party has been judicially determined to have a constitutional
right to obtain a review and to be unable by reason of poverty to
procure counsel to perfect the review all costs necessarily incident to
the proper consideration of the review including preparation of the
record, reasonable fees for court appointed counsel to be determined
by the supreme court, and actual travel expenses of counsel for
appearance in the supreme court or court of appeals, shall be paid by
the state. Upon satisfaction of requirements established by supreme
court rules and submission of appropriate vouchers to the clerk ofthe
supreme court, payment shall be made from funds specifically
appropriated by the legislature for that purpose.
RCW 4.88.330 (emphasis added). Based on the plain language of the
statute, the local governments "contend[ed] that the state, not local
governments, should pay the costs of indigent misdemeanant appeals."
Moore, 144 Wash. 2d at 294. We rejected the argument on the grounds that it
ignored the larger statutory and constitutional framework. At the time RCW
4.88.330 came to its current form, in 1975,"[cjourts of limited jurisdiction
11
Thurston County v. City ofOlympia, No. 95586-7
were not courts of record and relief from their decisions was by trial de novo
in superior court. The county or city paid the expense associated with a trial
de novo." Id. at 295 (citing State v. Badda,66 Wn.2d 314,402 P.2d 348
(1965)). Five years later, the legislature enacted chapter 3.02 RCW,which
put review of courts oflimited jurisdiction into the superior court under rules
promulgated by this court. Laws of 1980, ch. 162. We promulgated the
RALJ rules in response the next year. Moore, 144 Wash. 2d at 295 n.l (citing
4B Lewis H. Orland & Karl B.Tegland, Washington Practice: Rules
Practice RALJ 1.1, at 212(5th ed. 1997)). While the specific statutory
language in isolation might have allowed the cost shifting, reading those
words in context, we found the law did not allow the municipalities to shift
costs to the State. Instead, we concluded that the law "places the
responsibility for municipal and district court expenses on the local political
subdivisions. The state and counties share the expenses of superior courts,
and the state pays the expenses of the Supreme Court and Courts of
Appeals." Id. at 297.
Essentially, the County contends that "whose law enforcement
initiated the charges on which the person is being held" means "whose law
enforcement officers arrested the person" because "initiate" means "begin"
and charges begin with an arrest. But "initiated the charges on which the
12
Thurston County v. City ofOlympia, No. 95586-7
person is being held" is an awkward and unlikely way to say "arrested the
person being held." The County relies heavily on a 2005 attorney general
opinion that concluded that in the absence of an interlocal agreement or
other financially liable parties,"the government unit responsible for
operating the jail is entitled to reimbursement for necessary medical
treatment from the government unit whose officers made the arrest" for costs
accrued between the time of an arrest and the time the arrestee is booked
into a jail. 2005 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 8, at 1. This opinion in turn relied
heavily on an informal opinion letter. Id. at 2 n.1. But neither the formal
nor the informal letter analyzed the overarching statutory scheme, the court
rules, or practice in 1977.
We note that other opinions of the attorney general have found that a
city was not responsible for the care, housing, board, and booking costs of
prisoners held by a county merely because the city officer made the arrest.
2004 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 4; 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 21. The 1980 opinion
suggests the proposition is faintly ridiculous. "What if instead, the arrests
were made by the Washington State Patrol? Would that mean the state
would then be liable for the costs of confinement pending trial? Clearly
not." 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 21, at 3 (footnote omitted). "[W]hat if(as is
also possible) the actual arrest was made by a private citizen who was a first-
13
Thurston County v. City ofOlympia, No. 95586-7
hand witness to the commission of the crime? Would the county then be able
to bill that private citizen for the resulting costs of confinement? Obviously
not." Id. We agree.
Conclusion
Based on the statutory language as it would have been understood at
the time and based on the overarching statutory context, we conclude that
the County is not entitled to seek reimbursement from the Cities for the cost
of medical services provided to inmates the County holds in its own jail on
felony charges brought by its own prosecutors, regardless of who made the
arrest. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court.
14
Thurston County v. City ofOlympia, No. 95586-7
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WE CONCUR:
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