Lowe's Home Ctrs., LLC v. Dep't of Revenue ( 2020 )


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  •  A    IN CLERK* OFFICE
    This opinion was
    fUFRBE COURT.SIXrE OF WKSHMOraM
    filed for record
    JAN t 6 2025-                                         ai^tLM.on               3^ao
    Susan L. Carlson
    Supreme Court Clerk
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    LOWE'S HOME CENTERS,LLC,
    No. 96383-5
    Petitioner,
    V.                                              En Banc
    DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,STATE OF
    WASHINGTON,
    Respondent.                    Filed      JAN >'.6 202C
    MADSEN,J.—This case concerns whether a retail seller, Lowe's Home Centers,
    may seek reimbursement of state sales taxes and B&O (business and occupation) taxes
    from the Department of Revenue(DOR)where Lowe's contracted with GE Capital
    Financial Incorporated and Monogram Credit Bank of Georgia (banks)to offer private
    label credit cards to its customers, and agreed to repay the banks for losses they sustained
    on defaulting customer accounts. RCW 82.08.050 provides that a seller must collect and
    remit sales taxes to the State. For sellers unable to recoup sales tax funds from buyers,
    RCW 82.08.037(1) provides that sellers may claim a deduction "for sales taxes
    No. 96383-5
    previously paid on bad debts, as that term is used in 26 U.S.C. Sec. 166." In a partially
    split decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial ofreimbursement.
    We hold that although the banks were involved in the credit transaction, Lowe's is
    still the seller burdened with the loss from its customers' defaults, including their
    nonpayment ofthe sales taxes. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals.
    FACTS
    Lowe's contracted with two banks to offer private label credit cards to Washington
    customers. The banks offered credit to cardholders who purchased Lowe's goods.
    Within two days of a credit purchase, the banks would send full payment and related
    sales taxes to Lowe's. Lowe's then remitted the taxes to DOR.
    The banks undertook the majority of the risk of defaulting cardholders, and
    Lowe's contracted to mitigate this risk by acting as guarantor. When credit card holders
    failed to repay the purchase price and sales tax, Lowe's agreed to reimburse the banks.
    The contract calculated Lowe's share of the banks' finance income by providing that
    Lowe's "shall be responsible for Net Write-Offs during such year up to a maximum of
    7.0% of Average Net Receivables." Clerk's Papers(CP)at 140. The contract termed
    these repayments "bad debt guarantees" and stated that Lowe's alone could claim bad
    debt relief. E.g., 
    id. at 454.'
    Each month the banks subtracted amounts it had written off
    as uncollectible(up to the 7.0 percent cap)from the amounts it could collect from
    cardholders.
    'The agreements specified that Lowe's and "not [the] Bank[s] shall have the right to claim any
    available sales tax deductions related to Net Write-Offs home by" Lowe's. CP at 454, 523, 613.
    No. 96383-5
    On its federal income tax returns, Lowe's claimed bad debt reductions based on its
    bank repayments. For its 2001-2009 state tax assessment period, Lowe's asked for the
    same deduction. Lowe's sought a refund of over $2.2 million. DOR denied the refund.
    After paying its tax assessment under protest, Lowe's appealed and sought
    reimbursement in superior court.
    On cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court agreed with DOR that
    Lowe's should not receive a sales tax deduction and dismissed the case. The Court of
    Appeals affirmed in a published split opinion. Lowe's Home Ctrs., LLC v. Dep't of
    Revenue, 
    5 Wash. App. 2d
    211, 242-43, 
    425 P.3d 959
    (2018); 
    id. at 243(Maxa,
    J.,
    dissenting).
    Two amici submitted briefing. Kohl's Department Stores Inc. and the Council on
    State Taxation(COST)filed briefs in support of Lowe's petition for review; COST also
    filed a brief in support of Lowe's supplemental briefing.^
    ANALYSIS
    At issue is whether Lowe's is entitled to a refund of sales and B&O taxes because
    the banks reduced Lowe's profit share from credit card transactions to meet Lowe's
    obligation as guarantor of the banks' bad debt arising from the banks' contract with
    Lowe's account holders.
    ^ Kohl's notes that its own litigation conceming bad debt relief in Thurston County has been
    consolidated with a case from Macy's, and the matter has been stayed pending our resolution of
    this case.
    No. 96383-5
    DOR urges us to deny the reimbursement. The plain language of our state bad
    debt provisions requires a taxpayer to satisfy four requirements: (1)be a seller(2)
    making sales at retail and (3) entitled to a refund for sales taxes previously paid on bad
    debts(4)that are federally deductible. ROW 82.08.037(1); see also WAC
    458-20-196(3)(a). DOR argues that Lowe's fails to satisfy the plain language of.037(1)
    because Lowe's fully recovered sales tax funds and incurred no bad debt.
    Lowe's counters that state bad debt relief relies exclusively on federal bad debt
    relief. Because Lowe's received a federal deduction, Lowe's contends that it qualifies for
    a state deduction. Lowe's further contends that its contractual payments to the banks
    covering the banks' losses qualify as "sales taxes previously paid" under .037(1).
    Standard of Review
    We review summary judgment orders de novo. Sheehan v. Cent. Puget Sound
    Reg'l Transit Auth., 
    155 Wash. 2d 790
    , 796-97, 
    123 P.3d 88
    (2005). Taxes are presumed to
    be valid, and the burden is on the taxpayer to prove the tax is incorrect. Avnet, Inc. v.
    Dep't ofRevenue, 
    187 Wash. 2d 44
    , 49-50, 
    384 P.3d 571
    (2016)(plurality opinion)(citing
    Lamtec Corp. v. Dep't ofRevenue, 
    170 Wash. 2d 838
    , 43, 
    246 P.3d 788
    (2011)); Ford
    Motor Co. V. City ofSeattle, 
    160 Wash. 2d 32
    , 41, 
    156 P.3d 185
    (2007). The taxpayer
    seeking a refund has the burden to prove that DOR incorrectly assessed the tax and that it
    is entitled to a refund. ROW 82.32.180. We look to substance rather than form when
    determining tax classifications. First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Dep't ofRevenue, 
    144 Wash. 2d 300
    , 303, 27 P.3d 604(2001). To qualify for a tax exemption, a taxpayer must
    No. 96383-5
    demonstrate that the exemption clearly falls within the scope of a tax deduction statute.
    TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. Dep 't ofRevenue, 
    170 Wash. 2d 273
    , 196-97, 
    242 P.3d 810
    (2010). If ambiguity exists in an exception or deduction provision, courts strictly
    construe the provision against the taxpayer. 
    Avnet, 187 Wash. 2d at 50
    (citing Simpson Inv.
    Co. V. Dep-t ofRevenue, 
    141 Wash. 2d 139
    , 149-50, 
    3 P.3d 741
    (2000)).
    Lowe's and DOR agreed before the Court of Appeals and reaffirmed here that
    there are no issues of material fact. Lowe's, 
    5 Wash. App. 2d
    at 223. We must decide
    whether, as a matter of law, Lowe's is entitled to a sales tax refund under ROW
    82.08.037.
    Sales Tax
    Washington imposes sales tax on retail purchases. ROW 82.08.020. A buyer
    must pay sales tax to the seller, and the seller must remit the tax to DOR,even if the
    seller does not collect that tax at the point of sale. White v. State, 
    49 Wash. 2d 716
    , 724-25,
    306 P.2d 230(1957)(sellers must remit the tax whether or not they collect it); AARO
    Med. Supplies, Inc. v. Dep't ofRevenue, 
    132 Wash. App. 709
    , 716, 
    132 P.3d 1143
    (2006).
    "The amount of tax, until paid by the buyer to the seller or to the department, constitutes
    a debt from the buyer to the seller." ROW 82.08.050(8).
    Under Washington law, a seller who collects sales tax from a buyer over time
    must hold those funds in trust and must remit them to DOR. ROW 82.08.050(2)-(3). A
    seller cannot use sales tax funds for other purposes; if a seller fails to remit the funds for
    any reason, the seller is personally liable. 
    Id. A seller
    making a credit sale to a customer
    No. 96383-5
    who later defaults in payment will have remitted sales tax to the State that it could not
    collect from a customer. E.g., Puget Sound Nat'I Bank v. Dep't ofRevenue, 
    123 Wash. 2d 284
    , 287, 
    868 P.2d 127
    (1994); James A. Amdur, Armotation, Recovery ofSales Taxes
    Paid on Bad Debts, 
    38 A.L.R. 6th 255
    , § 2(2008).
    The former sales tax and B&O tax administrative rule reiterated that under RCW
    82.08.037 and RCW 82.04.4284, sellers are entitled to a credit, refund, or deduction for
    sales or B&O taxes previously paid on "bad debts" under section 166 ofthe Internal
    Revenue Code, and the former rule further provided that taxpayers "may claim the credit
    or refund for the tax reporting period in which the bad debt is written off as uncollectible
    in the taxpayer's books and records and would be eligible for a bad debt deduction for
    federal income tax purposes." Former WAC 458-20-196(2)(a),(3)(a)(2005).^ The
    policy behind this statute is to "provide relief to vendors" left holding uncollectible sales
    tax. Home Depot USA, Inc. v. Dep't ofRevenue, 
    151 Wash. App. 909
    , 917, 
    215 P.3d 222
    (2009)(citing Amdur,supra).
    As noted, RCW 82.08.037(1) has four requirements: a taxpayer must(1) be a
    seller(2) making sales at retail and (3) entitled to a refund for sales taxes previously paid
    on bad debt(4)that is federally deductible.'^ Lowe's and DOR do not dispute that
    ^ DOR amended WAC 458-20-196 in 2010 with no change to the relevant language. But,
    effective July 29, 2018, DOR again amended the rule, deleting the reference in former WAC
    458-20-196(2)(a) to claiming a refund "for the tax reporting period in which the bad debt is
    written off as uncollectible in the taxpayer's books and records." See WAC 458-20-196(2)
    (effective July 2018). The parties do not address this amendment made after the assessment
    period.
    In 2003, the legislature altered the text of.037(1) as follows: "A seller is entitled to a credit or
    refund for sales taxes previously paid on debts which are ((deductible as worthless for federal
    No. 96383-5
    Lowe's has satisfied requirements one, two, and four. The parties' dispute involves the
    meaning ofrequirement four, as well as whether it satisfies requirement three. Lowe s
    asserts,"Washington Iook[s] exclusively to federal law and standards relating to bad debt
    losses" to determine state deductions. Pet. for Review at 12. Therefore, they assert a
    federal deduction automatically meets state requirements.
    Federal Bad Debt Deduction
    26 U.S.C. § 166(a)(1) allows as a deduction "any debt which becomes worthless
    within the taxable year." It permits a deduction for "bad debts owed to the taxpayer" and
    states that for this purpose, bad debt shall be taken into account as a deduction for debts
    that become worthless. 26 C.F.R. § 1.166-l(a). Only a bona fide debt arising from a
    debtor-creditor relationship based on a valid and enforceable obligation to pay a fixed
    sum of money qualifies. 26 C.F.R. § L166-l(c).
    If a taxpayer agrees in the course of business to act as a guarantor of a debt
    obligation and makes a payment of principal or interest in discharge ofthat obligation as
    a guarantor, that payment is "treated as a business debt becoming worthless in the taxable
    year in which the payment is made." 26 C.F.R. § I.I66-9(a). A taxpayer's payment
    discharging its agreement to act as a guarantor of an obligation will be treated as
    worthless debt if the agreement was entered into in the course ofthe taxpayer's trade or
    income tax purposes)) bad debts under 26 U.S.C. Sec. 166. as amended or renumbered as of
    January 1. 2003." Laws of 2003, ch. 168, § 212(underlined text was added to the session law
    and language in double parentheses was deleted). The 2003 language was in effect during
    Lowe's sales tax assessment period for which it seeks reimbursement(2001-2009). The 2003
    language change did not materially affect the federal deductibility requirement under .037(1).
    The parties do not disagree.
    No. 96383-5
    business or transaction for profit, the taxpayer was subject to an enforceable legal duty to
    make the payment, and the agreement was entered into before the obligation became
    worthless. 26 C.F.R. § 1.166-9(d).
    Relevant Cases
    To resolve this case, the parties refer us primarily to two tax refund cases: Puget
    Sound National Bank, 123 Wn.2d284, md Home Depot USA, 
    151 Wash. App. 909
    . In
    Puget Sound National Bank, car dealers entered into installment contracts with buyers.
    When the dealers and buyers entered into the contracts, the dealers had to pay DOR the
    sales tax due on the purchase price of the car. Puget Sound Nat'I 
    Bank, 123 Wash. 2d at 285
    ., When Puget Sound National Bank(PSNB)purchased the installment contracts from
    the dealers, it paid the dealers the balance due on the installment contracts, including the
    uncollected portion of sales tax, and the dealers assigned to the bank all their rights in the
    installment contracts. In that case, after assignment, buyers defaulted on their payments,
    and PSNB repossessed the cars, selling them at a loss and writing off the loss as
    worthless debt for federal tax purposes. 
    Id. at 286.
    PSNB unsuccessfully petitioned
    DOR for a tax refund on the income tax loss as the assignee ofthe installment sales
    contracts under ROW 82.08.037. The sales tax refund statute, ROW 82.08.037, permitted
    a refund if the seller was(1) a person (2) making sales at retail and (3) was entitled to a
    refund for sales taxes previously paid on debts that are deductible as worthless for federal
    income tax purposes. 
    Id. at 286-87.
    This court affirmed that a "seller" is every person
    making sales at retail or retail sales to a buyer or consumer and that a "person" includes
    No. 96383-5
    an assignee. 
    Id. at 287.
    It determined that PSNB,as assignee, was a person and took a
    worthless debt deduction for federal income tax purposes relating to the installment
    contract. 
    Id. Further, although
    the dealer and not PSNB made the retail sales, the court
    observed that no statute or public policy prohibited the assignment of a sales tax refund.
    
    Id. at 288-91.
    The court held that an assignment carries with it the rights and liabilities of
    the assigned contract and applicable statutory rights and liabilities, so when the dealers
    assigned the installment contracts to PSNB,the bank assumed all the dealers rights and
    liabilities related to the contracts. 
    Id. at 293.
    Consequently, under RCW 82.08.037, the
    status ofPSNB included the dealers' tax attribute of"making sales at retail," and PSNB,
    as assignee, was entitled to a sales tax refund. 
    Id. In Home
    Depot,the retailer and financier. General Electric Capital Corporation,
    agreed it would issue Home Depot credit cards to Home Depot customers. The
    agreement between the financier and Home Depot provided that the financier was the
    exclusive owner of the credit card accounts and bore the risk of credit losses on the
    accounts, and that Home Depot had no interest in the accounts or indebtedness ofthe
    credit card program the financier had created. The financier made all decisions regarding
    customer eligibility for the credit cards, and it set the finance charges, fees, and all other
    terms of the credit card accounts. The financier paid Home Depot bonuses in
    consideration for the agreements. Home Depot daily transmitted the credit card sales to
    the financier, which then paid Home Depot the proceeds on the sales, including retail
    sales taxes, minus charges for service fees. Home Depot deducted the service fees it paid
    No. 96383-5
    the financier as a business expense on its federal tax return. The financier took the bad
    debt deduction under section 166 for defaulted Home Depot accounts on its federal
    income tax return. Under RCW 82.08.037, Home Depot sought a refund of sales tax that
    it paid on defaulted transactions made on the credit card that it had contracted with the
    financier to establish. It argued that a seller is entitled to a sales tax refund for sales taxes
    previously paid on debts that are deductible by any company as worthless for federal
    income tax purposes so long as the seller/sales tax refund claimant shows that it actually
    bore the risk of loss from the defaulted debt. Home 
    Depot, 151 Wash. App. at 915
    . DOR
    denied the refund.
    In affirming DOR,the Court of Appeals noted that RCW 82.08.037 required a
    "seller" to be a person making sales at retail who was entitled to a refund for sales taxes
    previously paid on debts that are deductible as worthless for federal income tax purposes.
    M at 919. It also recognized that a seller could include an original seller's assignee and
    that an original seller could assign the tax attribute of"making sales at retail" to a
    financing entity, making it eligible for a sales tax refund. 
    Id. It observed
    that Home
    Depot sold goods and made sales at retail, but it held that it was not "entitled to a refund
    for sales taxes previously paid on debts that are deductible as worthless for federal
    income tax purposes" because that requirement applied only to seller-claimants that incur
    the deductible debt. 
    Id. at 918-19.
    The court reasoned that Home Depot sold all of its
    interest in the credit card accounts to the financier, thereby surrendering both its right to
    deduct losses on the credit card accounts as bad debt and its ability to claim a refund for
    10
    No. 96383-5
    the defaulted debt. 
    Id. at 920.
    Thus, Home Depot no longer had authority to deduct
    customer defaults on the cards as bad debt or to seek the sales tax refund. 
    Id. The Home
    Depot court found this holding consistent with other state laws and
    with federal bad debt statute 26 U.S.C. § 166, which ties the sales tax refund to a valid,
    existing debt between a seller and a buyer that the seller can no longer collect from the
    buyer and that is an enforceable obligation arising from a debtor-creditor relationship. 
    Id. at 920-21.
    The court observed that when a buyer purchased an item on a Home Depot
    card. Home Depot paid the sales tax due to DOR,creating a statutory debt due from the
    buyer to the seller. Home Depot. But, immediately after the sale, when Home Depot
    submitted the charge to the financier and the financier reimbursed Home Depot for the
    purchase price and sales tax payment,the statutory debt between Home Depot and the
    buyer ceased to exist, and the buyer no longer owed Home Depot anything because the
    buyer's statutory debt, as well as the underlying debt for the purchase price, was
    discharged. At that point. Home Depot no longer held any debt that was "directly
    attributable to its sales tax payment to" DOR. 
    Id. at 922.
    Importantly, the court noted that Home Depot no longer had any right to collect
    unpaid sums from the buyer and could not legally seek repayment from the buyer for any
    loss due to the buyer's later default because Home Depot sold all its rights to the Home
    Depot card account to the financier, further demonstrating that the statutory sales tax debt
    was no longer connected to Home Depot. 
    Id. The court
    held that although RCW
    82.08.037 did not explicitly require bad debts to be deductible by the refund claimant.
    11
    No. 96383-5
    state and federal tax laws demonstrated that "the party seeking the deduction must be the
    one holding the bad debt as well as the one to whom repayment on such a debt would be
    made." Id.(citing Alabama,Indiana, and Oklahoma cases). Home Depot was promptly
    paid in full, including sales tax, and was not the party who wrote offthe receivable as
    uncollectible to get a sales tax refund, so its argument failed. 
    Id. The court
    rejected
    Home Depot's argument that in setting agreed service fees that the financier paid to
    Home Depot,the parties incorporated the anticipated bad debt expenses into their pricing
    calculations, and so Home Depot suffered actual loss, because it would allow Home
    Depot a sales tax refund for an ordinary business expense. 
    Id. at 923-24.
    Simply
    "because someone can deduct the unpaid sales tax as a bad debt does not transform an
    ordinary business expense or loss into a refundable sales tax debt" under RCW
    82.08.037. 
    Id. at 924.
    Relying on Home Depot,DOR,here, argues that Lowe's profit share reductions
    qualified as bad debt from a guarantor loss under section 1.166-9, but they did not qualify
    as retail sales or B&O tax bad debt under state law because they did not constitute bad
    debt directly attributable to the retail sale for "sales taxes previously paid" and "written
    off as uncollectible." Instead, DOR argues, the guaranteed profit share reduction covered
    the banks' credit account losses. And once Lowe's collected the taxes from buyers, it
    held them in trust until paid to DOR,RCW 82.08.050(2), and no authority states that
    Lowe's could later "negate" the buyer's satisfaction ofthe sales and B&O tax obligation
    through an agreement with the banks.
    12
    No. 96383-5
    DOR reasons that here, as in Home Depot, the banks contracted with Lowe s to
    provide the credit card accounts; determined the eligibility of cardholders; set the terms,
    fees, and penalties ofthe accounts; and exclusively owned and managed the credit card
    accounts, including account indebtedness and outstanding receivables. And Lowe's sold
    any right, interest, or title in any payment made by or on behalf ofthe account holder to
    the banks, which controlled all account collection. Within days of a credit card purchase,
    the banks paid Lowe's the full amount ofthe purchase, including sales and B&O taxes,
    so that the buyer then ceased to owe Lowe's anything, and Lowe's no longer held any
    debt "directly attributable" to its B&O or sales tax payments to DOR. Although Lowe's
    took a bad debt deduction pursuant to section 166 for the amount ofthe banks' bad debt
    that it guaranteed relating to the banks' account losses, that debt arose after the banks had
    paid Lowe's in full for an account purchase, including sales and B&O tax. Thus, the
    court held that the bad debt Lowe's paid was not "directly attributable" to Lowe's retail
    sale.
    We disagree. First, we note that the language "directly attributable" is nowhere in
    the statutes or regulations. Even if it that language did appear, there is no doubt that
    Lowe's was the retail seller, that it remitted sales tax to DOR,and that it was also the
    guarantor ofthe unpaid sales tax. DOR argues that Lowe's did recover the sales tax; it
    was fully paid by the banks, and then remitted to the State by Lowe's. But Lowe's did
    not receive payment from its buyers who had defaulted, and it was guarantor to the banks
    13
    No. 96383-5
    for the unpaid sales tax.^ A seller making a credit sale to a customer who later defaults in
    payment will have remitted sales tax to the State that it could not collect from a customer.
    Puget SoundNat'l 
    Bank, 123 Wash. 2d at 287
    .
    Similar to PSNB, which acted as assignee in Puget Sound National Bank, Lowe's
    contracted to act as guarantor for its customers who defaulted on credit payments and
    thus failed to pay sales tax that was due. As this court observed in Puget Sound National
    Bank, no statute or public policy prohibited the assignment of a sales tax refund. 
    Id. at 288-91.
    The court held that an assignment carries with it the rights and liabilities ofthe
    assigned contract and applicable statutory rights and liabilities, so that when the dealers
    assigned the installment contracts to PSNB,the bank assumed all the dealers' rights and
    liabilities related to the contracts. 
    Id. at 293.
    Here, no one questions that Lowe's was the
    seller and that Lowe's assumed the legal liability for losses attributable to its customers
    who defaulted, including unpaid sales tax. That the bad debt was created in two steps
    rather than one is of no moment—^the policy underpinning the bad debt deduction is to
    "provide relief to vendors" left holding uncollectible sales tax. Home Depot, 151 Wn.
    App. at 917.
    ^ The dissent invokes legislative history in the form of introduced but unpassed legislation as
    undermining the conclusion that Lowe's is not entitled to a deduction. See dissent at 18. As the
    dissent correctly notes, legislation that has not been enacted (let alone passed out of legislative
    committee)reveals little about the intent of the legislature and should not generally be relied
    upon. See, e.g.. In re Marriage ofSchneider, 
    173 Wash. 2d 353
    , 363, 268 P.3d 215(2011)("Our
    fundamental purpose in construing statutes is to ascertain and carry out the intent of the
    legislature. We determine the intent ofthe legislature primarily from the statutory language."
    (emphasis added)(citation omitted)).
    14
    No. 96383-5
    As noted, section 166 allows as a deduction "any debt which becomes worthless
    within the taxable year." And if a taxpayer agrees in the course of its business to
    guarantee a debt obligation and it makes a "payment of principal or interest... in
    discharge of... the taxpayer's obligation as a guarantor," that payment is "treated as a
    business debt becoming worthless in the taxable year in which the payment is made." 26
    C.F.R. § 1.166-9(a). A taxpayer's payment in discharge of its agreement to act as a
    guarantor of an obligation will be treated as worthless debt only if the agreement was
    entered into in the course ofthe taxpayer's trade or business or a transaction for profit,
    the taxpayer was subject to an enforceable legal duty to make the payment, and the
    agreement was entered into before the obligation became worthless. 26 C.F.R. § 1.166-
    9(d). These provisions entitled Lowe's to the sales and B&O tax credits because its
    payments, in the form ofthe banks' deductions from its profit share and made pursuant to
    an agreement executed before the debt became worthless, discharged its legal obligation
    as a guarantor ofthe sales and B&O tax bad debt.
    We agree with Lowe's that Home Depot does not control because there the
    financier was completely responsible for all its bad debt relating to nonpayment of retail
    sales tax and never agreed to act as Home Depot's guarantor, while here Lowe's agreed
    to guarantee a portion ofthe banks' credit card related bad debt for sales taxes previously
    paid that were "written off as uncollectible."
    WAG 458-20-196 entitles sellers to a refund for sales taxes or B&O taxes
    previously paid on bad debt under section 166 ofthe Internal Revenue Code, and ensures
    15
    No. 96383-5
    that taxpayers may claim the refund "for the tax reporting period in which the bad debt is
    written off as uncollectible in the taxpayer's books and records and would be eligible for
    a bad debt deduction for federal income tax purposes." Former WAC 458-20-196(2)(a),
    (3)(a). Consistent with federal standard section 166,former WAC 458-20-196 merely
    stated when a taxpayer may claim a credit or refund; it did not require a taxpayer seeking
    a tax refund to have claimed the bad debt as an uncollectible debt on its books, and it did
    not address a guarantor's payment of a financier's debt obligation. And even ifthere was
    a write-off requirement, in recording the amount ofthe banks' reductions to its profit
    share, Lowe's met that bad debt write-off requirement.
    R&O tax refund
    Lowe's also seeks relief for its B&O taxes pursuant to RCW 82.04.4284(1).
    Taxpayers pay for the "privilege of engaging in business" in Washington State through
    B&O taxes. RCW 82.04.220(1). The state B&O tax system "impose[s] the business and
    occupation tax upon virtually all business activities carried on within the state," Time Oil
    Co. V. State, 
    19 Wash. 2d 143
    , 146,483 P.2d 628 (1971), and "leave[s] practically no
    business and commerce free of... tax." Budget Rent-A-Car ofWash.-Or., Inc. v. Dep t
    ofRevenue, 
    81 Wash. 2d 171
    , 175, 500 P.2d 764(1972). Businesses cannot impose B&O
    taxes on their customers. Nelson v. Appleway Chevrolet, Inc., 
    160 Wash. 2d 173
    , 180-83,
    157 P.3d 847(2007). Instead, the tax is levied directly on businesses and against the
    value of products, gross proceeds of sales, or gross income of a business. RCW
    82.04.220(1). RCW 82.04.4284(1) states,"In computing tax there may be deducted from
    16
    No. 96383-5
    the measure ofthe tax bad debts, as that term is used in 26 U.S.C. Sec. 166,... on which
    tax was previously paid." For B&O taxes on retail sales, the tax applies at the rate of
    0.471 percent of"the gross proceeds of sales of the business." RCW 82.04.250(1). A
    party may deduct "from the measure oftax bad debts, as that term is used in 26 U.S.C.
    Sec. 166,. .. on which tax was previously paid." RCW 82.04.4284(1).
    Lowe's is entitled to a bad debt deduction for B&O tax because, similar to its
    "sales tax" payments, Lowe's incurred bad debt. Lowe's satisfies RCW 82.04.4284.
    CONCLUSION
    Under the circumstances of this ease, Lowe's is entitled to a refund for the taxes it
    paid concerning its customers' bad debt. Lowe's timely paid sales taxes to the State
    following Lowe's sale of goods to its customers, but some customers defaulted on those
    credit sales. Via its guarantor arrangement with the banks, which facilitated the credit
    transactions, Lowe's reimbursed the banks for the losses the banks incurred from the
    defaulting customers (i.e., the bad debt). While third-party banks were involved as to the
    credit transactions (i.e., as facilitators ofthe credit sales), Lowe's is still the seller
    burdened with the loss for its customers' defaults, including their nonpayment of the sales
    taxes. Accordingly, we hold that under RCW 82.08.037(1), Lowe's may properly claim a
    deduction for "sales taxes previously paid on bad debts." Similarly, under RCW
    82.04.4284, Lowe's may properly claim a deduction concerning its B&O taxes based on
    the same bad debt. We reverse the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further
    proceedings in accord with this opinion.
    17
    No. 96383-5
    WE CONCUR;
    v5z
    18
    Lowe's Home Centers, LLC v. Dep't of Revenue, No. 96383-5
    No. 96383-5
    WIGGINS, J. (dissenting)—The central issue before us is whether petitioner
    Lowe's Home Centers LLC is entitled to a refund of sales taxes and business and
    occupation(B&O)taxes from credit extended by banks to Lowe's customers, who then
    defaulted. RCW 82.08.037(1); RCW 82.04.4284. Lowe's contracted with two banks to
    provide private label credit cards (PLCCs). Within two days of a credit purchase, the
    banks would send full payment and related sales taxes to Lowe's. Lowe's then remitted
    the sales tax to the Department of Revenue (DOR). To help mitigate the banks' risks
    of defaulting customers, the banks and Lowe's entered into a profit and loss sharing
    agreement under which Lowe's profits were reduced to cover a certain percentage of
    the banks' losses from defaulting customers.
    The majority holds that Lowe's may claim a tax deduction under RCW
    82.08.037(1)for "sales taxes previously paid on bad debts." It further holds that under
    RCW 82.04.4284, Lowe's may claim a deduction concerning its B&O taxes for the same
    alleged bad debts.
    The majority would allow Lowe's to contract its way out of paying Washington
    state taxes—taxes not, in fact, paid by Lowe's but paid by the banks and Lowe's
    customers. I respectfully dissent because the majority's interpretation allows Lowe's to
    collect the unpaid sales tax even though Lowe's never loaned Lowe's customers the
    funds to pay the sales tax, never owned the funds used to pay the sales tax, and never
    tracked the customer debtors or pursued any collection action against the credit card
    debtor. It permits Lowe's to reap the benefits of operating in Washington, enjoying the
    Lowe's Home Centers, LLC v. Dep't of Revenue, No. 96383-5
    Wiggins, J., dissenting
    privileges of a business and the direct commerce with the state's residents, while
    depriving the State—and therefore those very Washington residents—of the benefit of
    more tax dollars. The loser here is not just the State but also the people of Washington.
    Nothing in the statutory scheme nor the case law permits this result. Just the
    opposite is what is mandated by our statutes. Lowe's reductions in profit sharing are
    "not sales taxes previously paid" within the meaning of the statutory scheme, and
    Lowe's did not incur any bad debt directly attributable to retail sales. I would therefore
    hold that Lowe's is not entitled to the deductions. Given that, I would also reach the
    issue of whether the denial of the tax deduction violates equal protection and hold that
    it does not. I respectfully dissent.
    STATEMENT OF FACTS
    The material facts in this case are undisputed. Lowe's and the banks entered
    into contracts to provide PLCCs to customers. Clerk's Papers(CP) at 452."' Only the
    banks extended the credit and owned and managed the cardholders' accounts. 
    Id. at 134,136,
    453. Lowe's had "no right, title or interest in or to any of the foregoing and no
    right to any payments made by or on behalf of Cardholders on Accounts or any
    proceeds with respect to the Accounts." 
    Id. at 136
    (agreement between Lowe's and
    Monogram Credit Card Bank of Georgia). Further, the banks held the exclusive right to
    receive payments from cardholders. Id.^ As a result, the cardholders never owed
    Lowe's any debt.
    ^ Customers could apply for a Lowe's PLCC,and if the bank granted the application, customers
    could use the PLCC to purchase merchandise from Lowe's. CP at 133, 136, 453.
    2 Although cardholders could make payments on the accounts at Lowe's retailers. In those
    situations, Lowe's was acting solely as an agent of the banks. 
    Id. at 136
    .
    Lowe's Home Centers, LLC v. Dep't of Revenue, No. 96383-5
    Wiggins, J., dissenting
    When a customer used a PLCC to purchase merchandise from Lowe's, Lowe's
    would notify the banks of the total purchase price. 
    Id. at 138,
    145. The banks would,
    within two days, pay Lowe's for the merchandise price and any applicable sales taxes.
    
    Id. at 145,
    453. Lowe's would then remit the sales taxes and B&O taxes to DOR. 
    Id. at 453.
    Things became more complicated when a cardholder defaulted. The PLCC
    agreements established a process of monthly allocations of revenue and expenses to
    distribute to the banks and to Lowe's. This fund consisted of program revenues net of
    program expenses, reduced by net write-offs. The net write-offs consisted of
    delinquencies from prior credit card sales. Under the PLCC agreements, Lowe's agreed
    to guarantee payment of delinquent customers' debt. 
    Id. at 453-55.
    All delinquencies
    were totaled monthly and became net write-offs. Lowe's was then charged a fixed
    percentage of the net write-offs pursuant to its contractual guaranty to cover a
    percentage of customer defaults. 
    Id. at 442.
    Lowe's payment was actually charged
    against Lowe's share of the monthly distribution under the PLCC agreements. In short,
    under the contracts, Lowe's and the banks agreed to share profits and losses. See 
    id. at 140-41,
    453-55. Lowe's was entitled to profits above the banks' target rate of return
    from interest payments, late fees, and other fees associated with cardholder accounts.
    
    Id. at 141,
    454. Further, Lowe's was responsible for the banks' net write-offs across the
    portfolio up to a cap of approximately 7.0 percent to 7.5 percent of average net
    receivables depending on the contract. 
    Id. at 453.
    In other words, when cardholders
    defaulted, Lowe's was responsible for a certain percentage of their default up to the
    cap. 
    Id. Lowe's Home
    Centers, LLC v. Dep't of Revenue, No. 96383-5
    Wiggins, J., dissenting
    The bank retained ownership of all rights, debts, and accounts whether the
    cardholder defaulted or not. See 
    id. at 145
    (Lowe's has "no right, title or interest in the
    Accounts (including the Indebtedness)"). The banks would write off the debt from the
    defaults as uncollectible. 
    Id. at 85,
    128. To settle these debts according to the PLCC
    agreement, the banks would reduce Lowe's profits by the amount of money Lowe's
    owed for the defaulting customers. 
    Id. at 454-55.
    The defaulting customers were
    separated by stores, but Lowe's did not determine the individual debtors or whether
    those debtors paid any of the sales taxes. 
    Id. at 433.
    Lowe's declared these losses on
    its corporate income tax return. 
    Id. at 455.
    The contracts also provided that Lowe's retained the right to claim any available
    sales tax deductions. 
    Id. at 144,
    454. Accordingly, Lowe's deducted the sales tax bad
    debts on line 15 of its federal income tax returns. 
    Id. at 455.
    Lowe's also claimed
    Washington sales tax credits and B&O tax credits. 
    Id. at 459.
    DOR audited Lowe's bad debt and B&O tax claims, determined Lowe's had
    improperly claimed the credits, and assessed the PLCC bad debt and B&O taxes. 
    Id. at 419,
    427, 460. The Appeals Division of DOR affirmed the assessment of the taxes.
    See 
    Id. at 432-48.
    Lowe's paid its tax assessments and filed a refund claim in superior court for a
    refund of the tax payments. 
    Id. at 5,
    450-51. The parties filed cross motions for
    summary judgment. 
    Id. at 1156,
    2616. The superior court granted DOR's motion for
    summary judgment and denied Lowe's motion for summary judgment. 
    Id. at 2800-02.
    Lowe's appealed, and Division Two of the Court of Appeals affirmed. See Lowe's Home
    Lowe's Home Centers, LLC v. Dep't of Revenue, No. 96383-5
    Wiggins, J., dissenting
    Ctrs., LLC V. Dep't of Revenue,
    5 Wash. App. 2d
    211, 215, 425 P.Sd 959(2018). Lowe's
    then appealed to this court and we granted review.
    ANALYSIS
    We presume taxes are valid, and the burden is on the taxpayer to prove an
    assessed tax is incorrect. RCW 82.32.180] Ford Motor Co. v. City ofSeattle, 160Wn.2d
    32,41,156 P.Sd 185(2007)."If there is ambiguity in a provision providing an exemption
    or deduction, the court must strictly construe the provision against the taxpayer." Avnet,
    Inc. V. Dep't of Revenue, 
    187 Wash. 2d 44
    , 50, 384 P.Sd 571 (2016)(plurality opinion).
    Lowe's cannot meet this burden.
    RCW 82.08.037(1) provides that a "seller is entitled to a credit or refund on sales
    taxes previously paid on bad debts, as that term is used in 26 U.S.C. Sec. 166." A bad
    debt is "based on federal income tax standards for worthlessness under 26 U.S.C. Sec.
    166."    WAC 458-20-196(2)(a): see also WAC 458-20-196(3)(a) ("The bad debts
    reported must meet the federal revenue code standards for worthlessness.").^
    Our state bad debt statute requires that a taxpayer (1) be a seller (2) making
    sales at retail and (3) entitled to a refund for sales taxes previously paid on bad debts
    (4)that are federally deductible. RCW 82.08.037(1); see also WAC 458-20-196(3)(a).
    At issue in this case is whether Lowe's meets requirement three and whether meeting
    requirement four automatically meets requirement three.
    3 A deductible bad debt under 26 U.S.C. section 166 must "arise[ ]from a debtor-creditor
    relationship based upon a valid and enforceable obligation to pay a fixed or determinable sum
    of money." 26 C.F.R. § 1.166-1(c). Bad debts under 26 U.S.C. section 166 can result from
    multiple transactions, including guaranty payments. 26 C.F.R. § 1.166-9(a).
    Lowe's Home Centers, LLC v. Dep't of Revenue, No. 96383-5
    Wiggins, J., dissenting
    1.   Lowe's contractual payments to the banks do not guaiifv as "sales taxes
    previously paid" under RCW 82.08.037(1)
    To determine if Lowe's meets the third requirement, I examine the meaning of
    "sales taxes previously paid." RCW 82.08.037(1).
    Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which we review de novo. State v.
    Budik, 
    173 Wash. 2d 727
    , 733, 
    272 P.3d 816
    (2012). The purpose of statutory
    interpretation is to ascertain and carry out the intent of the legislature. 
    Id. We determine
    the intent of the legislature primarily from the statutory language. In re Marriage of
    Schneider, 
    173 Wash. 2d 353
    , 363, 268 P.3d 215(2011).
    We start with '"the statute's plain language and ordinary meaning.'" State v. J.P.,
    
    149 Wash. 2d 444
    , 450, 
    69 P.3d 318
    (2003)(quoting Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n v.
    Riveland, 138Wn.2d9,19,978 P.2d 481 (1999)). To determine the piain meaning, we
    look to all the legislature has said in the statute and related statutes. Dep't of Ecology
    V. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 
    146 Wash. 2d 1
    , 11, 43 P.3d 4(2002). We assume that the
    legislature does not intend to create an inconsistency between statutes. State v. Bash,
    
    130 Wash. 2d 594
    , 602, 
    925 P.2d 978
    (1996). Statutes are to be read together in order
    "to achieve a 'harmonious total statutory scheme . . . which maintains the integrity of
    the respective statutes.'" State ex rel. Peninsula Neigh. Ass'n v. Dep't of Transp., 
    142 Wash. 2d 328
    , 342, 
    12 P.3d 134
    (2000)(alteration in original)(internal quotation marks
    omitted)(quoting Employco Pers. Servs., Inc. v. City of Seattle, 
    117 Wash. 2d 606
    , 614,
    817P.2d 1373(1991)).
    Lowe's argues that its contractual payments constitute "sales taxes previously
    paid" under the statute because they covered some of the banks' losses that included
    6
    Lowe's Home Centers, LLC v. Dep't of Revenue, No. 96383-5
    Wiggins, J., dissenting
    sales tax funds. Pet. for Review at 13-15; Suppl. Br. of Pet'r at 11-14. The majority
    agrees without performing any substantive analysis. Majority at 14. I would reject this
    conclusion because under the statutory scheme Lowe's profit reductions do not
    constitute sales taxes previously paid.
    A. Lowe's fullv recovered sales tax from the banks, and its reductions in
    profits from the bank do not qualifv as sales tax
    Because "sales tax" is not defined in RCW 82.08.037, we look to the statutory
    scheme as a whole and related statutes in order to define "sales tax previously paid."
    RCW 82.08.050(1)details the protocol for "tax payable in respect to each taxable sale,"
    or sales tax. Under the unambiguous language, this statute detailing sales tax explains
    that sales tax is collected by a seller from a buyer and that the tax collected is then
    "deemed to be held in trust by the seller" until it has been used for its sole purpose:
    paying DOR. RCW 82.08.050(2). This indicates that the legislature intended that sales
    tax payments can be used only to pay DOR and cannot be used to pay for any other
    type of debt. Here, after each transaction, Lowe's informed the banks of the purchase
    price, including sales tax. The banks then paid Lowe's, and Lowe's properly remitted
    sales tax funds to DOR. These payments constitute the only sales taxes Lowe's has
    previously paid.
    When the banks could not collect funds from defaulting credit card holders, the
    banks reduced the profits shared with Lowe's subject to the profit and loss sharing
    agreement. These reductions in Lowe's profits cannot constitute "sales taxes previously
    paid." As section .050 requires, Lowe's can use sales tax funds only to pay DOR.
    Lowe's cannot purport to use sales tax funds to pay an obligation to the banks. This is
    Lowe's Home Centers, LLC v. Dep't of Revenue, No. 96383-5
    Wiggins, J., dissenting
    especially true when the monthly reconciliation of defaulting customers did not include
    an inquiry into whether any individual customers had previously paid some, if not all, of
    the sales tax on the purchases on which they defaulted. Defaulting customers can fail
    to pay the purchase price, the sales tax, interest, and other fees. Without an
    individualized determination of each default, one cannot determine what, if any, sales
    tax loss Lowe's made up for with the profit sharing. Interpreting the phrase "sales taxes
    previously paid" within the statute to include Lowe's reduction in profits results in Lowe's
    receiving a sales tax refund for its payments to third parties for a private debt. This
    effectively permits Lowe's to characterize private payments as payments of sales tax
    when, under the statute, sales tax is only that tax deemed held in trust and then remitted
    to DOR. This cannot be the legislature's intent as it violates section .050 and creates
    inconsistency in our tax statutes in that it would allow sales taxes to be used for private
    debts when sales taxes can be used only for paying DOR. See Bash, 130 Wn.2d at
    602("This court assumes that the Legislature did not intend to create an inconsistency
    in statutes, and seeks to construe statutes so as to avoid inconsistency."); Peninsula
    
    Neigh., 142 Wash. 2d at 342
    (citing the same). The majority fails to reconcile this
    inconsistency.
    Even if we assume Lowe's payments to the banks are not strictly "sales tax" as
    contemplated by section .050 but, instead, cover the banks' sales tax funds, permitting
    Lowe's to receive a sales tax refund based on these repayments essentially allows a
    private corporation to transform non-sales-tax funds into sales tax funds by contract.
    Private agreements cannot disrupt the characterizations of a business's transactions
    for tax purposes. Wash. Imaging Servs., LLC v. Dep't of Revenue, 
    171 Wash. 2d 548
    ,
    8
    Lowe's Home Centers, LLC v. Dep't of Revenue, No. 96383-5
    Wiggins, J., dissenting
    556-57, 252 P.Sd 885(2011)(citing Rho Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 
    113 Wash. 2d 561
    , 
    782 P.2d 986
    (1989)); see also Ford Motor 
    Co., 160 Wash. 2d at 43-44
    (out-of-state seller
    could not avoid business and occupation tax by contractually transferring title at the
    point of shipment).
    The majority reasons that "Lowe's did not receive payment from its buyers who
    had defaulted" and "a seller making a credit sale to a customer who later defaults in
    payment will have remitted sales tax to the State that it could not collect from a
    customer." Majority at 14 (citing Puget Sound Nat'! Bank v. Dep't of Revenue, 
    123 Wash. 2d 284
    , 287, 
    868 P.2d 127
    (1994)). But this ignores the fact that Lowe's was never
    going to receive payment directly from the buyers, even if it did pay back the banks in
    full, because the banks had already paid Lowe's. After the banks had paid Lowe's in
    full, there was nothing left for Lowe's to collect, and Lowe's had no ownership or interest
    in any payments from the cardholders to the banks.
    The majority further reasons,"That the bad debt was created in two steps rather
    than one is of no moment—the policy underpinning the bad debt deduction is to 'provide
    relief to vendors' left holding uncollectible sales tax." Majority at 14-15 (quoting Home
    Depot USA, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 
    151 Wash. App. 909
    , 917, 
    215 P.3d 222
    (2009)).
    But Lowe's is not a vendor left holding uncollectible sales tax. Lowe's collected all of
    the sales tax from the banks and remitted the tax to DOR. That Lowe's profits are
    reduced"^ because of a customer's failure to repay the banks does not mean that Lowe's
    The majority itself refers to the guarantor payments between Lowe's and the banks as
    "deductions from [Lowe's] profit share." Majority at 15. This cuts against the majority's own
    assertion that Lowe's is holding uncollectible sales taxes and supports instead that the banks
    are holding the uncollectible sales taxes but pays Lowe's less profits if customers default.
    Lowe's Home Centers, LLC v. Dep't of Revenue, No. 96383-5
    Wiggins, J., dissenting
    is "holding an uncollectible sales tax." The banks are holding an uncollectible sales tax
    in which Lowe's has no interest per the contractual agreement.
    Although I would find the statute unambiguous, at best Lowe's and the majority
    have identified an ambiguity in the sales tax statutory scheme. But an ambiguity is not
    sufficient to meet the burden of showing that the assessed tax is incorrect. Because
    any ambiguity is construed against the taxpayer, Lowe's cannot meet the burden, and
    DOR correctly assessed the tax.
    B. Lowe's did not incur bad debt
    Lowe's is not entitled to bad debt relief because under the statutory and
    regulatory language, Lowe's did not incur bad debt or write it off as uncollectible.
    ROW 82.08.037(1) defines "bad debts" "as that term is used in 26 U.S.C. Sec.
    166." 26 U.S.C. section 166(a)(1) allows a bad debt deduction for "any debt which
    becomes worthless within the taxable year." Former WAC 458-20-196(2)(a) (2005)
    provides,"Taxpayers may claim the credit or refund for the tax reporting period in which
    the bad debt is written off as uncollectible in the taxpayer's books and records and
    would be eligible for a bad debt deduction for federal income tax purposes." See also
    ROW 82.08.037(6)("The department must allow an allocation of bad debts . . . If the
    books and records of the person claiming bad debts support the allocation.). The plain
    language of the WAC thus indicates that the taxpayer can receive the refund only in
    the year that they have written the debt off as uncollectible.
    Lowe's did not incur bad debt because it received full payment on credit card
    purchases from the banks. Lowe's did not write off any debt because Lowe's recorded
    the purchase price and sales taxes on its books as it did for cash, checks, and other
    10
    Lowe's Home Centers, LLC v. Dep't of Revenue, No. 96383-5
    Wiggins, J., dissenting
    credit card transactions. See CP at 60. Lowe's books did not reflect unpaid debt
    obligations on any credit card accounts because the accounts were managed by the
    banks. CP at 41, 136, 160.
    Rather than incurring bad debt, Lowe's agreed to pay for the banks' bad debt
    and seeks to make up this ioss through a state sales tax deduction. This might have
    been a necessary compromise on Lowe's part in order to make the PLCC program
    viable. But Lowe's risk mitigation decisions do not allow it to escape the tax
    consequences of those decisions. E.g., Wash. Imaging 
    Servs., 171 Wash. 2d at 556
    ."The
    risk that the private label credit card program will be less profitable than anticipated
    does not qualify as a bad debt." Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Roberts, No. M2014-02567-
    C0A-R3-CV, 
    2016 WL 2866141
    , at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 11, 2016)(unpublished),
    review denied. No. M2014-02567-SC-R11-CV (Tenn. Sept. 23, 2016).
    The majority contends that because Lowe's is a guarantor its debt is a worthless
    debt under 26 C.F.R. section 1.166-9(a) and that this is sufficient to meet the
    requirements for bad debt. Majority at 15. As will be discussed below, meeting the
    federal requirements is not sufficient to qualify for a deduction in Washington. See Part
    II, infra.
    The majority also concludes that "written off on the books" is not a requirement
    but, instead, indicates when the deduction can be taken. This is somewhat true in that
    it does indicate the year in which the deduction can be taken: the year that the taxpayer
    has written the debt off as uncollectibie. If within the year the taxpayer does not write
    off the debt as uncollectible, then the taxpayer does not qualify. Further, the majority
    concludes, but does not explain, that Lowe's meets the write-off requirement. Majority
    11
    Lowe's Home Centers, LLC v. Dep't of Revenue, No. 96383-5
    Wiggins, J., dissenting
    at 16. As noted, Lowe's does not show that it meets this requirement and cannot meet
    its burden.
    Even if it were ambiguous whether the write-off is a requirement, this ambiguity
    would be strictly construed against the taxpayer and, thus, is a requirement that Lowe's
    has not met. Therefore, DOR properly assessed the tax.
    C. Case law supports the conclusion that Lowe's is not entitled to a deduction
    Both Lowe's and DOR rely on the only two Washington cases interpreting
    ROW 82.08.037(1): Puget Sound an6 Home Depot. The majority concludes that Puget
    Sound supports Lowe's claim for bad debt relief and that Home Depot is materially
    distinguishable. Majority at 13-15. The majority misreads these cases.
    In Home Depot, Division Two of the Court of Appeals addressed whether a
    retailer could obtain a sales tax refund based on losses from a private credit card
    
    program. 151 Wash. App. at 912
    . Home Depot contracted with a bank to finance its
    private credit cards. 
    Id. at 913.
    The bank was the exclusive owner and bore all the
    loss on the accounts; Home Depot had no interest in the accounts or any indebtedness
    created by the program. 
    Id. at 914.
    After close of business each day. Home Depot
    transmitted credit card sales to the bank. 
    Id. The bank
    would pay Home Depot the
    proceeds and sales tax, minus service fees that partially covered the bank's losses for
    uncollectible funds. 
    Id. The bank
    took a federal bad debt deduction for defaulting
    accounts; Home Depot did not. 
    Id. at 913.
    Home Depot sought a sales tax credit under
    subsection .037(1), which DOR denied. 
    Id. at 914.
    On appeal, the court concluded that reimbursement was not warranted. 
    Id. at 922.
    A unanimous panel reasoned that when buyers purchased goods with PLCCs and
    12
    Lowe's Home Centers, LLC v. Dep't of Revenue, No. 96383-5
    Wiggins, J., dissenting
    Home Depot paid the sales tax to DOR,this created a statutory debt owed by the buyer
    to the seller. 
    Id. at 921.
    When the bank reimbursed Home Depot for the purchase price
    and sales tax, buyers no longer owed any debt to Home Depot—thus Home Depot no
    longer held any debt "directly attributable to its sales tax payment to DOR." 
    Id. at 922.
    The court specifically recognized that federal and state tax law demonstrate that the
    party seeking a deduction must be the one holding the bad debt as well as the one to
    whom repayment on the debt would be made. 
    Id. (citing cases
    from multiple
    jurisdictions in support). Furthermore, contrary to Home Depot's assertion that it
    "actually bore the loss for the defaulted debts" based on service fee payments to the
    bank, the court held that these payments constituted ordinary business expenses that
    can never constitute bad debt. 
    Id. at 923-24(citing
    Spring City Foundry Co. v. Comm'r,
    
    292 U.S. 182
    , 189, 54 8. Ct. 644, 78 L. Ed. 1200(1934); RCW 82.08.010(1)(excluding
    overhead and other costs of doing business from sales tax calculations)).
    While not identical, the facts of Home Depot are remarkably similar to the present
    case, and any differences in the present case are minor and fail to distinguish it from
    Home Depot. Both cases involve third-party lenders financing a retailer's private credit
    card program. The retailers do not own, manage, or have any interest in the accounts,
    and the third-party lenders bore all loss from the accounts. Despite Lowe's claim that
    its contractual repayments are distinct from Home Depot's service fees, the nature of
    the transactions are the same for sales tax purposes. Home Depot and Lowe's both
    claimed their respective payments demonstrated that they bore losses on bad debt, but
    neither's payments covered debt because neither retailer incurred debt—in both cases
    the banks incurred the debt and were the sole parties who could collect from the
    13
    Lowe's Home Centers, LLC v. Dep't of Revenue, No. 96383-5
    Wiggins, J., dissenting
    customers. There was no continuing sales tax debt between Lowe's or Home Depot
    and its customers. Both Lowe's and Home Depot properly paid DOR the full amount
    of sales tax funds; thus no debt existed for either retailer. The only continuing debt
    concerned the customers and the banks. Lowe's contractual guaranty of the banks'
    debt does not transfer that debt to Lowe's for sales tax relief. Wash. Imaging 
    Servs., 171 Wash. 2d at 556
    -57 (private agreements cannot disrupt the proper characterizations
    of its transactions for tax purposes).
    In addition, though Home Depot did not concern contractual guaranty payments,
    the tax consequence of Lowe's guaranties is the same as Home Depots service fees:
    the funds constitute the costs of business to run the private credit card program. They
    were not "sales taxes" or payments for bad debt. RCW 82.08.010(1)(excluding costs
    of doing business from sales tax calculations). Lowe's contractual payments and Home
    Depot's service fees thus constitute ordinary business expenses, which cannot be
    included for sales tax calculations. I would hold Lowe's does not qualify for the
    deduction.
    The majority concludes that Home Depot does not control because "the financier
    was completely responsible for all its bad debt relating to nonpayment of retail sales
    tax and never agreed to act as Home Depot's guarantor, while Lowe's agreed to
    guarantee a portion of the banks' credit card related bad debt for sales taxes previously
    paid." Majority at 15. This brief discussion® oversimplifies Home Depot and attempts
    ® Although the majority dedicates over three pages to discussing the Home Depot opinion and
    another page to DOR's arguments in relation to Home Depot, it concludes the case does not
    control with little substantive explanation as to why beyond the above-quoted text. See majority
    at 9-15.
    14
    Lowe's Home Centers, LLC v. Dep't of Revenue, No. 96383-5
    Wiggins, J., dissenting
    to distinguish the case when the distinguishabie facts are not material to the resolution
    of the present case, as discussed above.
    The majority further takes issue with the '"directly attributable' to its B&O or sales
    tax payments to DOR" language in Home Depot, as it is "nowhere in the statutes or
    regulations." Majority at 13.
    Although the words do not appear in the statutory scheme, the Court of Appeals
    appropriately used "directly attributable" to limit the sales tax refund. The "directly
    attributable" language provides a helpful test to determine whether debts and payments
    should qualify under the statutory scheme. As the majority emphasizes, the policy
    surrounding the deduction is to provide relief to a vendor holding uncollectible sales
    tax. Majority at 14-15. The "directly attributable" language provides a framework for the
    trial courts to determine whether the vendor, or another, is holding uncollectible sales
    tax. if the debt is not directly attributable to the sales tax payments to DOR, then the
    party is not holding the debt. Here, the debt cannot be directly attributable to the sales
    tax payments to DOR because that tax has already been paid and remitted in full. The
    debt at issue is contractual as part of the profit sharing agreement, and the banks—not
    Lowe's—are holding the uncollectible sales taxes.
    Where Home Depot Is persuasive in the present case, Puget Sound presents a
    completely distinguishable factual scenario and, thus, an unpersuasive analysis. In
    Puget Sound, we addressed whether a contract assignee could receive a bad debt
    reduction as a 
    "seller." 123 Wash. 2d at 287
    . A car dealership financed customer car
    purchases through installment contracts. 
    Id. at 285-86.
    When a contract was signed,
    the dealer paid the full amount of the sales tax due for the car. 
    Id. at 285.
    Puget Sound
    15
    Lowe's Home Centers, LLC v. Dep't of Revenue, No. 96383-5
    Wiggins, J., dissenting
    National Bank (PSNB) bought these contracts, including the balance of uncollected
    sales tax. 
    Id. at 286.
    PSNB wrote off the loss on its books for defaulting customers,
    and applied for sales tax relief; DOR denied the claim. 
    Id. at 285-86.
    On appeal, the
    parties disputed whether PSNB, as a contract assignee, constituted a "seller" under
    ROW 82.08.037. 
    Id. at 287.
    We recognized that a "seller" is a person making sales at
    retail, including an assignee. 
    Id. at 288-89.
    Because the car dealer assigned all its
    rights and liabilities for the contracts to PSNB, PSNB stepped into the seller's shoes
    and its status therefore included that of"making sales at retail." 
    Id. at 293.
    Thus, PSNB
    was entitled to a sales tax refund. 
    Id. The present
    case is distinguishable from Puget Sound because a guaranty is
    materially distinguishable from an assignment and, as noted above, Lowe's did not pay
    sales tax to the banks such that it is entitled to a sales tax credit. In Puget Sound, we
    noted that when the car dealer assigned its customers' installments contracts to PSNB,
    PSNB took on the car dealer's tax rights and 
    liabilities. 123 Wash. 2d at 292-93
    . In effect,
    PSNB became the car dealer, which included the dealer's right to bad debt relief. 
    Id. at 293.
    Here, the banks owned and managed the PLCC accounts; Lowe's had no "right,
    title or interest" in them. CP at 136. Unlike Puget Sound, Lowe's did not step into the
    banks'shoes by repaying the banks because the banks did not assign their tax benefits
    and liabilities to Lowe's. Nor could the banks assign Lowe's the right to claim bad debt
    relief because the banks were not the original seller under subsection .037(1)—again,
    unlike Puget Sound. Furthermore, the Puget Sound car dealer(and eventually PSNB)
    was out of pocket when it could not collect sales tax from defaulting 
    customers. 123 Wash. 2d at 285-86
    . Lowe's, however, received from the banks and remitted to DOR the
    16
    Lowe's Home Centers, LLC v. Dep't of Revenue, No. 96383-5
    Wiggins, J., dissenting
    full amount of sales tax. Thus, Lowe's was not out of pocket when credit card holders
    defaulted—the banks were. Lowe's contracted to be almost immediately reimbursed
    by the banks for the sales, unlike PSNB, which had to accept the uncollectible debt it
    owned because it stepped into the car dealer's shoes.®
    In contrast, the majority incorrectly concludes that similar to PSNB, which paid
    the balance of uncollectible tax by buying customer installment contracts, Lowe's also
    paid for uncollected sales tax by guaranteeing the banks' losses (which included
    uncollectible sales tax). Majority at 14. Thus, the majority concludes that when the
    banks deducted from Lowe's profit share, Lowe's discharged its obligation as guarantor
    and was entitled to a tax credit for the profit reduction. 
    Id. at 15.
    But this ignores that
    Lowe's cannot have paid sales tax to the banks, that Lowe's had no interest in the
    payments from the cardholders, and the material distinction between a guaranty and
    an assignment, as indicated above.
    ® Lowe's repeatedly emphasizes that its contractual bad debt guaranties made it subject to
    recourse to the banks for defaulting accounts. Suppl. Br. of Pet'r at 11. Lowe's argues the
    statement that it received the full purchase price and sales tax from the banks is "false"; in
    reality, Lowe's contends, it '"paid sales taxes [it] could not collect from the buyer.'" 
    Id. at 11-12
    (alteration in original)(quoting CP at 2668). For the reasons discussed above, this argument
    fails.
    17
    Lowe's Home Centers, LLC v. Dep't of Revenue, No. 96383-5
    Wiggins, J., dissenting
    D. Legislative history also undermines the majority's conclusion that Lowe's
    is not entitled to the deduction
    Legislative history discloses that Washington lawmakers appear to agree that
    RCW 82.08.037 does not allow retailers like Lowe's to receive sales tax reimbursement
    for bad debt incurred by third parties.         In 2017, a bipartisan group of legislators
    introduced a bill recognizing that
    [u]nder current law, if a customer who uses a credit card owned by the
    retailer fails to pay their bill, the retailer is entitled to a credit or refund of
    the sales tax. However, if that same customer uses a private label credit
    card, neither the retailer nor the private label credit card company is
    entitled to a credit or refund of the tax.
    S.B. 5910, at § 1(3), 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017)(emphasis added). The
    proposed legislation would have altered section .037 to allow sellers to claim a sales
    tax deduction for "tax previously reported by the seller on the unpaid balance due on
    the accounts or receivables that are charged off as bad debt on the books and records
    of the lender." 
    id. § 2(8)(a).
    The fiscal note attached to S.B. 5910 echoed the bill's
    language, noting that "[u]npaid charges made with private label credit cards .. . are
    currently not entitled to a bad debt reduction." Agency Fiscal Note to S.B. 5910, 65th
    Leg., Reg. Sess.(Wash. 2017)(prepared by DOR).^ S.B. 5910 was not enacted by our
    legislature.   Unpassed legislation reveals little about legislative intent, but it does
    indicate that some lawmakers have acknowledged that current law precludes Lowe's
    from bad debt relief and have sought to change the law.
    ^ Passage of S.B. 5910 would have affected about 250 taxpayers and resulted In state revenue
    losses of $8.4 million In fiscal year 2018 and $9.6 million In fiscal year 2019. Agency Fiscal
    Note to S.B. 
    5910, supra, at 2-3
    .
    18
    Lowe's Home Centers, LLC v. Dep't of Revenue, No. 96383-5
    Wiggins, J., dissenting
    II.   RCW 82.08.037(1) requires more than a federal bad debt deduction
    Lowe's asserts, and the majority appears to agree,® that if Lowe's qualified for a
    federal deduction, it automatically meets state requirements for a deduction. Majority
    at 7 (citing Pet. for Review at 3, 11-12; Suppl. Br. of Pet'r at 3). I disagree with this
    interpretation of the statute.
    This conclusion ignores the plain language of our State's bad debt provisions. In
    RCW 82.08.037(1), federal law is invoked in relation to bad debt "as that term is used
    in 26. U.S.C. Sec. 166." (Emphasis added.) The phrase "that term" is specific. It
    modifies only "bad debt" and does not modify any other words in the statute. WAG 458-
    20-196(2)(a)'s reference to federal income tax standards is similarly limited: that our
    State's bad debt provisions are "based on federal ... standards" is descriptive. Federal
    deductibility is required, but it does not supplant subsection .037(1 )'s additional
    requirement that a seller must also pay "sales tax."
    RCW 82.08.037(1) and WAC 458-20-196 plainly require more than a federal
    deduction. As the State succinctly put it, "a federally-qualified bad debt is a necessary
    but not sufficient condition" for Washington sales tax relief. DOR's Suppl. Br. at 14.
    Thus, I would hold that Lowe's is not entitled to state bad debt relief based on its federal
    deduction alone.
    ® Although the majority refers to Lowe's assertion in the previous sentence when stating that a
    federai deduction automaticaiiy meets state requirements, the opinion appears to conciude in
    a roundabout way that because Lowe's meets the federai deduction under 26 C.F.R.§ 1.166-
    9(a) and (d), it meets the requirements of Washington's bad debt statutes. See majority at 7
    ("Therefore, ... a federai deduction automaticaiiy meets state requirements."), 15(conciuding
    that under 26 C.F.R. § 1.166-9(a) and (d), not the state statutory scheme, Lowe's is entitied to
    the deductions). This is incorrect because, as discussed in this section, a federai deduction is
    oniy one of the requirements and does not automaticaiiy entitie a taxpayer to a state deduction.
    19
    Lowe's Home Centers, LLC v. Dep't of Revenue, No. 96383-5
    Wiggins, J., dissenting
    III.   Lowe's similarly does not qualify for a B&Q tax refund because it did not incur
    bad debt
    Lowe's also seeks relief for its B&O taxes pursuant to RCW 82.04.4284(1).
    Lowe's does not distinguish its argument between RCW 82.08.037 (sales tax) and
    RCW 82.04.4284 (B&O tax) for bad debt purposes. See Pet. for Review at 1 n.3
    (referring to RCW 82.08.037 and RCW 82.04.4284 collectively as the "Bad Debt
    Statutes"). For the same reasons that I would hold Lowe's does not qualify for a sales
    tax deduction, I would hold that Lowe's does not qualify for a B&O tax deduction.
    "Upon every person engaging within this state in the business of making sales
    at retail . . . the amount of tax with respect to such business is equal to the gross
    proceeds of sales of the business, multiplied by the rate of 0.471 percent." RCW
    82.04.250(1). RCW 82.04.4284(1) further indicates that "[i]n computing [the B&O] tax
    there may be deducted from the measure of tax bad debts, as that term is used in 26
    U.S.C. Sec. 166,... on which tax was previously paid."
    Lowe's is not entitled to a bad debt deduction for B&O tax because, similar to its
    "sales tax" payments, Lowe's did not incur bad debt. It paid B&O taxes on sale
    proceeds it received. DOR's Suppl. Br. at 19. As with sales taxes, the banks—not
    Lowe's—held the bad debt for which a deduction would be warranted. Thus, I would
    hold that Lowe's does not satisfy section .4284.
    IV.     Denving Lowe's sales tax deduction does not violate equal protection
    Having disposed with the statutory arguments, I would also reach Lowe's final
    claim that denying it bad debt relief violates equal protection. I would hold that it does
    not. We review constitutional issues de novo. State v. Gresham, 
    173 Wash. 2d 405
    , 419,
    20
    Lowe's Home Centers, LLC v. Dep't of Revenue, No. 96383-5
    Wiggins, J., dissenting
    269 P.Sd 207 (2012)(citing Optimer Int'l, Inc. v. RP Bellevue, LLC, 
    170 Wash. 2d 768
    ,
    771, 
    246 P.3d 785
    (2011)). The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall
    "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const.
    amend. XIV. The Washington State Constitution provides that "[n]o law shall be passed
    granting to any citizen, class of citizens, or corporation other than municipal, privileges
    or immunities which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens, or
    corporations." Wash. Const, art. I, § 12.
    A state tax law does not violate equal protection if there is a rational and
    legitimate basis for the tax classification. Williams v. Vermont, 
    472 U.S. 14
    , 23, 105 S.
    Ct. 2465, 
    86 L. Ed. 2d 11
    (1985). The tax classification does not violate due process
    unless it is '"arbitrary and irrational.'" United States v. Carlton, 
    512 U.S. 26
    , 30, 114 S.
    Ct. 2018, 129 L. Ed. 2d 22(1994)(quoting Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray &
    Co., 
    467 U.S. 717
    , 733, 
    104 S. Ct. 2709
    , 
    81 L. Ed. 2d 601
    (1984)). It does not
    violate article I, section 12 of the state constitution if "any state of facts can reasonably
    be conceived that would sustain the classification." United Parcel Serv., inc. v. Dep't of
    Revenue, 
    102 Wash. 2d 355
    , 368-69, 
    687 P.2d 186
    (1984)("The Legislature has broad
    discretion in making classifications for purposes of taxation."); see also Wash. Const.
    art. I, §12.
    Lowe's argues that as a guarantor of the banks' debt, it falls within the class of
    retailers for whom bad debt relief is available. Pet. for Review at 20. But Lowe's is not
    in the same class as retailers entitled to claim bad debt relief because, as discussed,
    Lowe's payments to the banks are not sales tax under subsection .037(1), nor did
    Lowe's incur bad debt.
    21
    Lowe's Home Centers, LLC v. Dep't of Revenue, No. 96383-5
    Wiggins, J., dissenting
    CONCLUSION
    Lowe's is not entitled to bad debt relief for two reasons: it was not left paying
    sales tax funds it could not recover and it incurred no bad debt. ROW 82.08.037(1).
    Lowe's and the banks constructed their PLCC program so that the sales tax obligation
    was fully satisfied when the banks paid Lowe's, and Lowe's remitted sales tax to DOR.
    Lowe's did not pay sales tax it could not recover—the banks supplied the tax funds,
    and the banks attempted to recover those funds from credit card holders, some of
    whom defaulted. That Lowe's contracted to reimburse the banks for some of that loss
    does not reanimate Lowe's discharged sales tax obligation. Lowe's was not out of
    pocket due to sales tax it was required to pay to the State; Lowe's elected to put itself
    at risk of loss by contracting with the banks to repay uncollectible debt. But Lowe's
    cannot retroactively incur bad debt or transform its payments into sales tax by contract.
    Lowe's does not meet the requirements for reimbursement under RCW 82.08.037(1)
    or RCW 82.04.4284. I would affirm the Court of Appeals and therefore respectfully
    dissent.
    22
    Lowe's Home Centers, LLC v. Dept. of Revenue, No. 96383-5
    Wiggins, J., dissenting
    hM/Vii, L) rPT"
    23