State v. Harris ( 2024 )

FILE
THIS OPINION WAS FILED
FOR RECORD AT 8 A.M. ON
NOVEMBER 27, 2024
IN CLERK’S OFFICE
SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WASHINGTON SARAH R. PENDLETON
NOVEMBER 27, 2024 ACTING SUPREME COURT CLERK
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
) No. 102311-1
Petitioner, )
) En Banc
v. )
) Filed: November 27, 2024
DARREN S. HARRIS, )
)
Respondent. )
_______________________________________)
MADSEN, J.—At issue here is this court’s decision in State v. Houston-Sconiers,
188 Wn.2d 1, 391 P.3d 409 (2017), and how it applies in the context of juvenile plea
agreements, specifically those agreements with joint sentence recommendations. We
hold that while juvenile defendants on direct review receive the benefit of Houston-
Sconiers, resentencing is not the appropriate remedy when the trial court imposes the
sentence the parties bargained for. When a defendant’s plea agreement requires them not
to recommend a lesser sentence, the defendant may present mitigating evidence only if
asked by the court to do so. However, when a trial court does not accept a plea
agreement and intends to impose a sentence other than the joint recommendation, the
court must meaningfully consider mitigating evidence of youth under Houston-Sconiers
and the parties must candidly answer the court’s questions.
No. 102311-1
In this case, no error occurred. Darren Harris received the sentence he bargained
for and resentencing is not required. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals in
part and we affirm Harris’s sentence.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from the Court of Appeals’ decision below. State v.
Harris, 27 Wn. App. 2d 522, 533 P.3d 135 (2023). They are not disputed here.
In 2011, 17-year-old Harris fatally stabbed an acquaintance approximately 21
times and stole his wallet. Harris later admitted to the stabbing. The State charged Harris
with first degree murder with a deadly weapon. Based on a prior juvenile adjudication
for assault, Harris faced a standard range sentence of 240 to 320 months, with additional
“flat time” for the deadly weapon enhancement.
After months of protracted negotiation, Harris pleaded guilty to second degree
murder while armed with a deadly weapon and to first degree robbery. The standard
range was 142 to 244 months for the murder charge and 41 to 54 months for the robbery.
Harris and the State jointly recommended a sentence of 220 months for the second degree
murder charge, with 24 months for the deadly weapon enhancement, and 54 months for
the robbery to be imposed concurrently. In total, the parties agreed to recommend 244
months (approximately 20 years) of confinement.
Harris pleaded guilty, and the trial court accepted the plea. At sentencing, the
prosecutor told the court that the plea was an agreed recommendation. Harris’s defense
attorney urged the court to follow the recommendation because it “was a heavily
negotiated plea.” Tr. of Proc. (Aug. 17, 2012) at 38. The judge followed the
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recommendation, stating that if the sentence had been 220 months, the court “wouldn’t
have followed it, because certainly it needs to be . . . [220] months plus [24] months.” Id.
at 38-39.
In 2020, Harris filed a personal restraint petition. Harris, 27 Wn. App. 2d at 528.
Harris argued he was entitled to resentencing primarily based on Houston-Sconiers in
order for the court to consider the mitigating qualities of youth. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition as frivolous, noting among other things, that Harris presented no
evidence of mitigation. Ord. Dismissing Pers. Restraint Pet., In re Pers. Restraint of
Harris, No. 37530-7-III, at 4 (Wash. Ct. App. June 2, 2020).
In May 2021, Harris filed a notice of appeal. The State moved to dismiss the
appeal as untimely. In response, Harris sought an extension of time under RAP 18.8(b),
arguing he was not properly advised of his right to appeal. Comm’r’s Ruling, State v.
Harris, No. 38217-6-III (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2021). The Court of Appeals
commissioner granted the extension of time.
At the Court of Appeals, the parties disputed whether Harris “ever bound himself
[to the plea agreement] in a way that would limit his freedom to seek a lesser sentence.”
Harris, 27 Wn. App. 2d at 529. Pursuant to a reference hearing, the court found that
Harris had agreed to join the State’s recommendation and not to seek a lesser sentence.
Id. at 529-30; see also Findings of Fact for Ref. Hr’g on Plea Agreement & Sent’g, State
v. Harris, No. 11-01-00945-4, at 1 (Yakima County Super. Ct., Wash. Apr. 14, 2023).
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No. 102311-1
The Court of Appeals accepted the reference hearing findings and examined
Harris’s argument that he was entitled to resentencing under Houston-Sconiers. Harris,
27 Wn. App. 2d at 530, 532.
First, the court concluded that any resentencing hearing in which Harris explicitly
or implicitly sought a lesser sentence would breach his plea agreement and the State
would be entitled to rescind the agreement. Id. at 532-35. Next, the court recognized that
as a new rule, Houston-Sconiers applies retroactively to all cases pending on direct
appeal or that are not yet final. Id. at 536 (citing State v. Evans, 154 Wn.2d 438, 444, 114
P.3d 627 (2005)). Thus, the court held that Houston-Sconiers applies to Harris’s case as
a direct appeal. The State did not dispute that consideration of Harris’s age was required,
arguing instead that the error was harmless. Alternatively, the State argued that the
remedy was not resentencing but for Harris to withdraw his guilty plea.
The Court of Appeals concluded that the State could not show the error was
harmless. There was no way to know what information the sentencing court would have
yielded in complying with Houston-Sconiers, therefore the Court of Appeals had no way
to assess whether the information would have affected sentencing. Id. at 537 (quoting
Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 319, 111 S. Ct. 731, 112 L. Ed. 2d 812 (1991)).
Despite finding a Houston-Sconiers violation, the Court of Appeals held that
resentencing was not the appropriate remedy. Harris did not explain how he would avoid
breaching the plea agreement at resentencing, and the State should not be required to
participate in a resentencing process that is materially different to what the parties
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bargained for in the original agreement. Instead, the court “recognize[d] Mr. Harris’s
right to move to withdraw his guilty plea.” Id. at 540 (formatting omitted).
The State filed a motion for reconsideration. When that motion was denied, the
State petitioned for review in this court. Pet. for Rev. at 1, 4. Harris answered and filed a
cross petition for review only on the appropriate remedy. Answer & Cross-Pet. for Rev.
at 2-3.
We granted both petitions. State v. Harris, 2 Wn.3d 1010 (2023). We also
received amici curiae briefing from the Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys
in support of the State and from Human Rights for Kids in support of Harris.
ANALYSIS
Houston-Sconiers requires trial courts to consider a juvenile defendant’s youth and
exercise discretion when sentencing juvenile offenders in criminal court. 188 Wn.2d at
21. We have not examined Houston-Sconiers’s broad language in the context of plea
agreements with joint sentencing recommendations on direct review. This case presents
such an opportunity.
Because this case sits at the confluence of Houston-Sconiers, plea agreements, and
the obligations for courts and parties flowing therefrom, it is useful to first examine those
authorities.
Houston Sconiers
Houston-Sconiers extended Eighth Amendment protections against
disproportionate punishment to all juveniles subject to the adult standard Sentencing
Reform Act of 1981 (SRA) sentence ranges and enhancements. Id. at 20-21; U.S.
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CONST. amend. VIII; ch. 9.94A RCW. To effectuate these protections, we announced
rules characterized as the “dual mandates” of Houston-Sconiers. In re Pers. Restraint of
Williams, 200 Wn.2d 622, 630, 520 P.3d 933 (2022). Sentencing courts must consider
the mitigating qualities of youth at sentencing, and those courts must have discretion to
impose sentences below the standard ranges. Id. (citing Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at
21). These rules are “‘designed to enhance the accuracy of a . . . sentence by regulating
the manner of determining the defendant’s culpability.’” Id. (alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Ali, 196 Wn.2d 220,
237, 474 P.3d 507 (2020)).
Simply put, Houston-Sconiers directs courts to consider the full range of possible
sentences—contemplating that defendants will most often be presenting mitigating
evidence and advocating for a lesser sentence based on that evidence. See 188 Wn.2d at
21-23; State v. Ramos, 187 Wn.2d 420, 434, 387 P.3d 650 (2017) (quoting RCW
9.94A.535 (“The person being sentenced pursuant to the SRA carries the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence ‘that there are substantial and compelling
reasons justifying an exceptional sentence’ below the standard range.”)); cf. State v.
Delbosque, 195 Wn.2d 106, 123, 456 P.3d 806 (2020) (“[T]he Miller-fix statute, . . .
unlike the SRA, does not impose a burden of proof on either party.”). Houston-Sconiers
does not require, and we have not otherwise held, sentencing courts to collect mitigating
or aggravating evidence sua sponte, without being asked by the defendant or the State to
do so.
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Houston-Sconiers announced a new rule of criminal procedure that applies
retroactively to all cases pending on direct review or not yet final. In re Pers. Restraint
of Pierre, 118 Wn.2d 321, 326, 823 P.2d 492 (1992). Harris’s case is on direct appeal,
therefore Houston-Sconiers applies.
Plea agreements
A plea agreement is a contract. State v. Sledge, 133 Wn.2d 828, 838-39, 947 P.2d
1199 (1997). Because plea agreements concern an accused’s fundamental rights, due
process considerations are also at play. Id. at 839. Due process requires the prosecutor to
act in good faith and prohibits undercutting the terms or by conduct evidencing an intent
to circumvent the terms of a plea agreement. Id. at 840, 843. Defendants owe the same
duty of good faith. See In re Pers. Restraint of Breedlove, 138 Wn.2d 298, 307, 979 P.2d
417 (1999). Whether a plea agreement is breached is an objective inquiry. State v. Van
Buren, 101 Wn. App. 206, 213, 2 P.3d 991 (2000).
The State is not obligated to enthusiastically make a sentencing recommendation,
but it must participate in sentencing proceedings, answer the court’s questions with
candor, and cannot withhold relevant information regarding the plea agreement. Sledge,
133 Wn.2d at 840.
A breach can occur when a party offers unsolicited information through a “report,
testimony, or argument” that undercuts the party’s obligation under the agreement. State
v. Carreno-Maldonado, 135 Wn. App. 77, 83, 143 P.3d 343 (2006); State v. Williams,
103 Wn. App. 231, 236-39, 11 P.3d 878 (2000) (State breached the plea agreement when
it made unsolicited references to aggravating factors and suggested the court go beyond
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No. 102311-1
the recommendation in its sentencing memorandum and at oral argument); Sledge, 133
Wn.2d at 840-41 (listing cases in which a prosecutor was held to adhere to or breach a
plea agreement). A defendant breaches their plea agreement by refusing to abide by
promises in that agreement, such as when a defendant agrees but later declines to testify
in another proceeding. E.g., State v. Thomas, 79 Wn. App. 32, 35-36, 899 P.2d 1312(1995).
When a plea agreement is breached, the nonbreaching party has the choice of
remedy: specific performance or recession. Id. at 36-37 (“Just as a defendant has the
option to specifically enforce or rescind a plea agreement after a breach by the State, the
State has the option to specifically enforce or rescind a plea agreement after a breach by
the defendant.” (citations omitted)); In re Pers. Restraint of James, 96 Wn.2d 847, 850,
640 P.2d 18 (1982) (specific enforcement is available “provided the defendant has
complied with the agreement”); State v. Hall, 32 Wn. App. 108, 110, 645 P.2d 1143(1982) (“The State is expected to keep its bargains unless the defendant has failed to keep
[theirs].”); State v. Harrison, 148 Wn.2d 550, 557, 61 P.3d 1104 (2003) (stating that the
nonbreaching party may “withdraw [a] plea and be tried anew on the original charges or
receive specific performance of the agreement”). The nonbreaching party’s choice of
remedy controls unless compelling reasons exist not to allow it. Id.Judges play no role in plea negotiations. RCW 9.94A.421. Courts do, however,
play a critically important role when accepting or rejecting a plea agreement:
determining whether an agreement is consistent with the interests of justice and with
prosecuting standards. RCW 9.94A.431(1); State v. Tourtellotte, 88 Wn.2d 579, 583, 564
8
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P.2d 799 (1977) (“The judge’s role is not that of a party to the negotiation but rather as an
examiner to assure that the plea procedure is characterized by fairness and candor.”).
While a sentencing judge is not bound by any recommendation contained in an
agreement, once the agreement is accepted by the trial court it becomes a binding
agreement between the defendant and the State. RCW 9.94A.431(2); State v. Hunsicker,
129 Wn.2d 554, 559, 919 P.2d 79 (1996).
Houston-Sconiers and Plea Agreements
Prosecutors and defendants continue to reckon with Houston-Sconiers and plea
bargaining. 1 Plea bargaining is an “essential” and “highly desirable” part “of the
administration of justice.” Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-61, 92 S. Ct. 495,
30 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1971); 13 ROYCE A. FERGUSON, JR., WASHINGTON PRACTICE:
CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3401, at 2 (3d ed. 2004) (“Plea negotiations are
an important, if not essential, part of the criminal justice system.”). The negotiation of
pleas leads to the majority of final dispositions in criminal cases. Missouri v. Frye, 566
U.S. 134, 143, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 182 L. Ed. 2d 379 (2012) (97 percent of federal
convictions and 94 percent of state convictions result from guilty pleas); 13 FERGUSON,
supra, at 2-3 (noting the majority of defendants are convicted by pleading guilty rather
1
An unpublished case from the Court of Appeals reflects one way in which parties are
contending with Houston-Sconiers and plea negotiations. In State v. Ortiz, the State explained
that the parties negotiated a plea that allowed the State to argue for a high end and the defense to
argue for a low end standard range sentence. No. 81363-3-I, slip op. at 7-8 (Wash. Ct. App.
June 15, 2020) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/813633.pdf. The State
informed the court that the both parties had “‘specifically’” considered the defendant’s youth
with the defendant agreeing not to use Houston-Sconiers as a basis for recommending an
exceptional sentence downward. Id. The defense attorney confirmed the agreement. Id. at 8.
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No. 102311-1
than through a trial). This process avoids subjecting defendants to excessive time in
confinement pretrial, provides them a measure of certainty as to possible punishments,
and more quickly begins the rehabilitative process for those pleading guilty and who are
imprisoned. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260-61.
Plea bargaining also allows swift closure for victims and preserves time and
expense for all involved in the administration of criminal trials. Frye, 566 U.S. at 144(recognizing that plea agreements can benefit both parties based on the “potential to
conserve valuable prosecutorial resources and for defendants to admit their crimes and
receive more favorable terms at sentencing”). “[O]urs ‘is for the most part a system of
pleas, not a system of trials.’” Id. at 143 (quoting Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170,
132 S. Ct. 1376, 182 L. Ed. 2d 398 (2012)). Plea bargaining is an integral tool in the
criminal justice system and will continue to be widely used.
Houston-Sconiers did not consider plea agreements. The juvenile defendants in
that case did not enter pleas; they were convicted and sentenced at a contested sentencing
hearing. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at 12-13.
Indeed, much of our juvenile sentencing case law involves contested sentencings
rather than negotiated pleas with agreed sentence recommendations. E.g., State v. Scott,
190 Wn.2d 586, 588-89, 416 P.3d 1182 (2018) (holding the Miller-fix 2 statute is an
adequate remedy when a juvenile received an exceptional sentence after a contested
sentencing); Ord., State v. Vazquez, No. 97964-2, at 1-2 (Wash. June 5, 2020) (remanding
2
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012).
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No. 102311-1
case under Houston-Sconiers when sentencing court determined a juvenile defendant’s
youth did not justify an exceptional sentence below the standard range); Ali, 196 Wn.2d
at 227-29 (holding Houston-Sconiers applies retroactively and entitled a juvenile who
received a low end standard range sentence after a contested hearing to resentencing); In
re Pers. Restraint of Domingo-Cornelio, 196 Wn.2d 255, 260-62, 474 P.3d 524 (2020)
(same); In re Pers. Restraint of Hinton, 1 Wn.3d 317, 322, 329, 525 P.3d 156 (2023)
(holding that a juvenile who received a midrange standard sentence with enhancements at
a contested hearing had an adequate alternative remedy and only Houston-Sconiers’s
substantive rule applies retroactively); see also In re Pers. Restraint of Light-Roth, 191
Wn.2d 328, 332, 336, 422 P.3d 444 (2018) (holding young adult defendant could argue
mitigating evidence of youth under the SRA after receiving the State-requested maximum
standard range sentence); In re Pers. Restraint of Meippen, 193 Wn.2d 310, 313, 440
P.3d 978 (2019) (dismissing a personal restraint petition for lack of error and prejudice
for a juvenile who was sentenced at the top end of the standard range at a contested
hearing). 3
With these considerations in mind, we turn to the issue before us.
3
We also rejected the argument that trial courts must presume exceptional sentences below the
standard range are required for juvenile defendants unless the State proves otherwise. State v.
Gregg, 196 Wn.2d 473, 482-83, 474 P.3d 539 (2020).
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1. When a trial court accepts a negotiated plea agreement requiring that neither
party advocates for a lesser sentence, Houston-Sconiers does not require
consideration of youth
Harris argues that Houston-Sconiers requires the judge to consider the mitigating
qualities of youth and that he must be allowed to present such evidence in spite of his
plea bargain and agreed sentencing recommendation. We disagree.
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, Houston-Sconiers and the cases
interpreting it have done so almost exclusively in the context of contested sentencing
hearings. The current case presents a different situation—a plea agreement with a joint
sentence recommendation accepted by the court without meaningful consideration of the
juvenile defendant’s youth. 4 None of our juvenile sentencing cases have addressed this
issue. That is, whether a trial court in the first instance must independently collect
mitigating evidence of youth even if it is not raised or argued for by the parties.
This issue of first impression implicates two competing interests: Houston-
Sconiers’s requirement that courts meaningfully consider a juvenile defendant’s youth
and the critical role of plea bargaining in our legal system. To balance these interests, we
hold that when parties negotiate a plea agreement requiring neither party to advocate for a
lesser sentence, a trial court is not required to sua sponte ask the parties to provide
mitigating evidence of youthful qualities if the court accepts the agreed recommendation.
In such cases, the parties must answer the court’s questions with candor. See Sledge, 133
4
The dissent criticizes the majority as a sweeping decision that limits Houston-Sconiers in
juvenile sentencing writ large. See dissent at 10. But, the holding of this case applies only in
situations where a juvenile defendant has negotiated a plea bargain in which the parties agree not
to argue for a lesser sentence and the trial judge accepts the recommendation.
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No. 102311-1
Wn.2d at 840 (parties must candidly answer the court’s questions and hold back no
relevant information regarding the plea agreement). Nevertheless, parties must also take
care not to violate the plea agreement when answering the court’s questions. State v.
Talley, 134 Wn.2d 176, 187, 949 P.2d 358 (1998) (the State must not “contradict its
recommendation for a standard range sentence”); In re Pers. Restraint of Palodichuk, 22
Wn. App. 107, 111, 589 P.2d 269 (1978) (prosecutor undercut an agreement by
expressing reservations about the agreed disposition to the court); State v. Coppin, 57
Wn. App. 866, 875, 791 P.2d 228 (1990) (prosecutor did not breach the agreement when
explaining why he did not seek an exceptional sentence in response to a direct inquiry by
the court).
Conversely, if the parties have not reached an agreed recommendation or if a court
does not accept a plea and agreed recommendation, a trial court must meaningfully
consider mitigating evidence related to the qualities of youth as required by Houston-
Sconiers. The court must call on the defendant and the State to answer its questions
about mitigating or aggravating factors, if relevant, to determine whether mitigation
controls the court’s sentencing decision. See Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at 21.
Holding otherwise risks destabilizing the plea-bargaining process in Washington.
Such a holding would undo long-settled plea agreements for juveniles who negotiated
and received recommended sentences. It would also increase the work of trial judges,
requiring them to independently elicit evidence from defendants, who may not as a matter
of strategy wish to (or cannot effectively) argue mitigating qualities of youth.
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Plea bargaining is not perfect, 5 but it “is an essential component” in the
administration of the criminal legal system. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260. To protect and
encourage this essential work, we conclude that when a trial court accepts a plea bargain
and sentence recommendation, Houston-Sconiers does not require inquiry into youth.
Such an inquiry is required when parties do not come to an agreement, the trial judge
rejects it, or the judge intends to impose a different penalty.
Accordingly, we hold that no error occurred when the trial court did not inquire
into Harris’s youth before accepting the plea agreement and imposing the recommended
sentence.
2. Houston-Sconiers does not relieve the parties of the joint sentence
recommendation
Alternatively, Harris contends that if he cannot present mitigation evidence and
advocate for a lesser sentence, this should relieve the parties of the joint sentence
recommendation. We disagree.
Harris bases this claim primarily on a quartet of California cases, which concludes
that plea agreements incorporate subsequent changes in the law. Resp’t’s Suppl. Br. at
17-18 (citing John Doe v. Harris, 57 Cal. 4th 64, 66, 71, 73, 302 P.3d 598, 158 Cal. Rptr.
3d 290 (2013); People v. Carter, 97 Cal. App. 5th 960, 974, 315 Cal. Rptr. 3d 895(2023); People v. Harrell, 95 Cal. App. 5th 161, 169, 313 Cal. Rptr. 3d 234 (2023));
5
E.g., Douglas D. Guidorizzi, Should We Really “Ban” Plea Bargaining?: The Core Concerns
of Plea Barganing Critics, 47 EMORY L.J. 753, 767-73 (1998) (noting criticisms of plea
bargaining as undermining the integrity of the criminal legal system and the disproportionate
bargaining position of the defense and the prosecution).
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No. 102311-1
Answer & Cross-Pet. for Rev., at 4 (citing Harris v. Superior Ct., 1 Cal. 5th 984, 991,
383 P.3d 648, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 584 (2016)).
In Doe, the California Supreme Court held that as a general rule in the state, plea
agreements are deemed to incorporate and contemplate existing law and the power of the
state to amend or enact additional laws. 57 Cal. 4th at 70 (“[T]he Legislature, for the
public good and in furtherance of public policy, . . . has the authority to modify or
invalidate the terms of an agreement.”). That parties entered a plea agreement, lawful at
the time of negotiation and accepted by the court, “‘does not have the effect of insulating
them from changes in the law that the Legislature has intended to apply to them.’”
People v. Prudholme, 14 Cal. 5th 961, 975, 531 P.3d 341, 309 Cal. Rptr. 3d 814 (2023)
(quoting Doe, 57 Cal. 4th at 66). “[R]equiring the parties’ compliance with changes in
the law made retroactive to them does not violate the terms of the plea agreement.” Doe,
57 Cal. 4th at 73 (emphasis added).
California courts applying Doe closely examine the legislative intent of a
subsequent law to determine whether it was intended to apply to previous plea
agreements, as well as whether the law spoke to remedies. E.g., Harris, 1 Cal. 5th at 989(noting the later statute expressly referenced “serving a sentence for a conviction,
whether by trial or plea” (emphasis added)); Prudholme, 14 Cal. 5th at 975, 978 (unlike
Harris, unambiguous statutory language did not exist and the court considered legislative
history to determine intent and remedy); Harrell, 95 Cal. App. 5th at 164-69 (reviewing
the text and legislative history of amendments relating to whether persons serving
stipulated sentences were eligible for a certain type of relief); Carter, 97 Cal. App. 5th at
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No. 102311-1
972-73 (holding the legislature intended to prohibit a prosecutor from withdrawing from
a plea for any reduction in sentence); People v. Coddington, 96 Cal. App. 5th 562, 565,
314 Cal. Rptr. 3d 610 (2023) (holding the legislature intended to preclude a prosecutor
from withdrawing from a plea when a certain offense is struck but allowing withdrawal if
the sentence is otherwise reduced), rev. denied, No. S282336 (Cal. Jan. 31, 2024).
In his statement of additional authorities, Harris provides only one Washington
case in support—State v. McRae, 96 Wn. App. 298, 304-05, 979 P.2d 911 (1999).6
McRae considered a due process challenge to an offender score—the defendants argued
their juvenile adjudications must be excluded from their adult offender scores based on
their plea bargains. Id. at 303. The Court of Appeals disagreed that the defendants had a
substantive right stemming from earlier sentencing laws in their plea agreements that the
prosecutor violated. Id. at 305. Instead, the court concluded the statements alleged to
give rise to specific performance to exclude certain offenses were not promises from the
State to disregard future changes in the law or assurances that the law would not change.
6
Amicus curiae Human Rights for Kids provides an additional, unpublished case: State v.
Morales, No. 51279-3-II, slip op. at 2, 5-6 (unpublished) (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 1, 2020),
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2051279-3-II%20Unpublished%20Opinion.pdf.
Br. of Amicus Curiae Human Rts. for Kids in Supp. of Resp’t (Am. Br.) at 11-13. There, a
juvenile defendant pleaded guilty, Houston-Sconiers had already been decided, and the parties
informed the court that it must consider the defendant’s youth. The sentencing court
acknowledged Houston-Sconiers’s application. Morales, No. 51279-3-II, slip op. at 2, 4. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction but remanded on other grounds. Id. at 3. This court
remanded to the Court of Appeals to reconsider its decision under Delbosque, and held the
sentencing court’s consideration of youth was not meaningful. Id. at 3-4. Morales is unhelpful
because, unlike the current case, Houston-Sconiers had already been decided when the defendant
was sentenced and both the prosecution and defense asked that the court consider it.
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No. 102311-1
Id. at 304-05. Absent a specific promise to exclude their offenses, the defendants could
not establish the use of those offenses breached their prior agreements. Id. at 305.
It does not appear that McRae and the cited California cases apply outside the
legislative context. McRae involved later amendments to sentencing laws. Id. at 300.
Doe, and the cases in its line, “incorporated only laws amended or enacted by a
legislative body. It did not consider the impact of post-plea changes in decisional law.”
Laura Arnold, The “Romeo & Juliet” Scenario in the Aftermath of Johnson v. Superior
Court, 45 SW. L. REV. 959, 983 (2016) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
McRae and the California cases are inapposite. Nevertheless, even if we adopt
those cases and assume that plea agreements in Washington are not insulated from
changes in the law, Houston-Sconiers did not involve a statutory change. Moreover, the
intent of the legal change at issue (Houston-Sconiers) did not contemplate previously
made plea agreements. See Prudholme, 14 Cal. 5th at 975.
Houston-Sconiers was intended to prevent disproportionate sentencing for juvenile
offenders subject to adult standard SRA sentences. 188 Wn.2d at 21. This is
accomplished by ensuring that judges have wide discretion when sentencing juveniles
and that they exercise that discretion in a meaningful way. But the decision does not
speak to modifying plea agreements, especially a plea that contains an express promise
not to seek a lesser sentence. Houston-Sconiers requirements also anticipate that
defendants will most often present mitigating evidence supporting a lesser sentence. See
Ramos, 187 Wn.2d at 434. Neither Houston-Sconiers nor any other decision has required
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No. 102311-1
the sua sponte collection of mitigating evidence from sentencing courts, particularly in
the context of an agreed sentencing recommendation.
Considering Houston-Sconiers’s facts and reasoning, as well as the lack of
precedent requiring courts to independently collect mitigation evidence, Houston-
Sconiers did not intend its requirement that courts must consider mitigation evidence
should be applied to plea agreements where defendants received the sentences for which
they bargained. 7 Harris provides no reason to relieve the parties of their joint sentence
recommendation.
3. The remedy for a Houston-Sconiers violation is resentencing
The Court of Appeals found a Houston-Sconiers violation but, in light of the
parties’ plea bargain, held that the remedy in this context is for Harris to withdraw his
7
Amicus curiae Human Rights for Kids cites multiple out-of-state cases in support of its
argument that mitigating circumstances are constitutionally required notwithstanding a plea
agreement. Am. Br. at 8-11, 15-16 (citing Aiken v. Byars, 410 S.C. 534, 765 S.E.2d 572 (2014);
State v. Wise, noted at 882 N.W.2d 874, 2016 WL 894377, 2016 Iowa App. LEXIS 211; State v.
Davis, noted at 880 N.W.2d 518, 2016 WL 146528, 2016 Iowa App. LEXIS 18; Casiano v.
Comm’r of Corr., 317 Conn. 52, 115 A.3d 1031 (2015); State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 45, 76
(Iowa 2013); Bear Cloud v. State, 2014 WY 113, 334 P.3d 132, 135 (2014); Thomas v.
Pennsylvania, 2012 WL 6678686, at *1 & n.2 (E.D. Pa. 2012)). These cases resulted in
summary resentencing despite previous plea agreements. The decisions do not discuss the
interaction of prior agreements with the requirement to consider youth, nor do they reference the
specific terms of any plea agreement. Aiken, 410 S.C. at 537, 548-51 (Toal, C.J., dissenting);
Casiano, 317 Conn. at 55 (same); Null, 836 N.W.2d at 45 (same); Thomas, 2012 WL 6678686,
at *1 & n.2 (same); Bear Cloud v. State, 2012 WY 16, ¶¶ 9-15, 275 P.3d 377, 384 (noting
defendant entered “cold pleas,” without a plea agreement with the State), vacated by 568 U.S.
802, 133 S. Ct. 183, 184 L. Ed. 2d 5 (2012). The unpublished Iowa cases are similarly
unspecific. In Wise, a defendant pleaded guilty and later successfully sought resentencing to
consider his youthfulness. 2016 WL 894377, at *1, 2016 Iowa App. LEXIS 211, at **1-2. Wise
considered only the defendant’s argument that the resentencing court relied on an improper
factor when it reimposed the original sentence. 2016 WL 894377, at *4; 2016 Iowa App. LEXIS
211, at *10; Davis, 2016 WL 146528, at *1, 2016 Iowa App. LEXIS 18, at **1-2 (same).
18
No. 102311-1
plea. Harris, 27 Wn. App. 2d at 540. The State contends Harris is not entitled to
withdraw his plea because the plea is not invalidated due to subsequent changes in the
law. Though Harris has not moved to withdraw his plea, we take this opportunity to
clarify that resentencing is the proper remedy for a Houston-Sconiers violation.
A motion to withdraw a plea made after entry of judgment is reviewed as a
collateral attack, even if raised via direct appeal. State v. Buckman, 190 Wn.2d 51, 60,
409 P.3d 193 (2018); State v. Lamb, 175 Wn.2d 121, 124-26, 285 P.3d 27 (2012). We
permit defendants to withdraw pleas when it appears withdrawal is necessary to correct a
manifest injustice, that is, if a plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. State v.
Robinson, 172 Wn.2d 783, 794, 263 P.3d 1233 (2011); State v. A.N.J., 168 Wn.2d 91,
119, 225 P.3d 956 (2010).
A voluntary plea made pursuant to then applicable law does not become
vulnerable because of subsequent judicial decisions. Pet. for Rev. at 8-11; Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1970) (“[A]
voluntary plea of guilty intelligently made in the light of the then applicable law does not
become vulnerable because later judicial decisions indicate that the plea rested on a faulty
premise.”). Lamb explained that a defendant must be “informed of the direct
consequences of the plea that existed at the time of the plea.” 175 Wn.2d at 129.
Applied to Harris, a postplea change in the law would not render his plea invalid because
he was properly informed of the consequences in force at the time he was sentenced. See
id.19
No. 102311-1
Moreover, as a general matter, a defendant on direct appeal need show only the
existence of a Houston-Sconiers error to receive a resentencing. In re Pers. Restraint of
Carrasco, 1 Wn.3d 224, 230, 525 P.3d 196 (2023).
While no Houston-Sconiers error occurred here, the proper remedy if it had would
be resentencing. See id. We reverse the Court of Appeals’ holding on this issue. 8
CONCLUSION
To balance the competing interests of parties who have reached an agreed
sentencing recommendation with Houston-Sconiers protections for juvenile defendants,
we hold that when a sentencing court intends to follow a plea agreement and sentencing
recommendation, there is no requirement that the court solicit mitigating and/or
aggravating factors from the parties. On the other hand, if the sentencing court does not
follow the proffered agreement and intends to impose a different sentence, Houston-
Sconiers requires meaningful consideration of a defendant’s youth. In that case, a party
does not violate its agreement by strictly answering the sentencing court’s questions and
does not advocate for a lesser sentence. Similarly, the State does not breach its
agreement if it responds to a trial court’s questions regarding aggravating evidence.
Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals on different grounds and reverse in
part. We affirm Houston-Sconiers’s application to Harris because this case is on direct
8
Because no Houston-Sconiers error occurred and resentencing is not required, we decline to
address the remaining issues presented. Hayden v. Mut. of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 141 Wn.2d 55,
68, 1 P.3d 1167 (2000) (“‘[I]f resolution of an issue effectively disposes of a case, we should
resolve the case on that basis without reaching any other issues that might be presented.’”
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Peterson, 133 Wn.2d 885, 894, 948 P.2d 381(1997) (Talmadge, J., concurring))); see Answer & Cross-Pet. for Rev. at 3.
20
No. 102311-1
appeal. That the original trial court did not consider Harris’s youth was not error,
however. We reverse the Court of Appeals’ holding that Houston-Sconiers was violated
and that the remedy for such a violation is withdrawal of a plea.
Because we conclude no error occurred and affirm Harris’s sentence, we decline
to address the remaining issues regarding notice and breach of a plea agreement on
resentencing.
___________________________________
WE CONCUR:
_______________________________ ________________________________
_______________________________ ________________________________
________________________________
_______________________________
_______________________________ ________________________________
21
State v. Harris, No. 102311-1
(Yu, J., concurring)
No. 102311-1
YU, J. (concurring) — I fully agree with the majority’s holding that
“juvenile defendants on direct review receive the benefit of Houston-Sconiers,”
and that it does not impose a requirement on “sentencing courts to collect
mitigating or aggravating evidence sua sponte” when the parties have reached a
plea agreement with a joint sentencing recommendation. Majority at 1, 6; see State
v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1, 391 P.3d 409 (2017). In my view, imposing
such a requirement changes the role of the judge and undermines defense counsel.
While I join the majority, I nevertheless write to acknowledge my support
for the dissent’s vision of juvenile justice reform and the disappointment in the lost
opportunities of prior decisions. However, I do not join the dissent because the
majority correctly strikes the balance between application of our current case law,
the need to protect juvenile privacy, and respect for the role of defense counsel in
our adversarial criminal legal system.
1
State v. Harris, No. 102311-1
(Yu, J., concurring)
Given the adversarial nature of our criminal legal system, a trial judge must
recognize the limits of their role as a neutral decision-maker. This neutrality
ensures that judicial officers act “fairly and impartially” in performing their duties
to “uphold and apply the law.” CJC 2.2. The judge’s duty of impartiality is
especially crucial when a trial judge is considering whether to accept a plea
agreement with a joint sentencing recommendation.
As a matter of both statutory and constitutional law, trial judges are
authorized to consider youthfulness of a juvenile defendant sentenced in adult
court, with “full discretion to depart from mandatory sentencing enhancements and
to take the particular circumstances surrounding the defendant’s youth into
account.” RCW 9.94A.533(15); see also Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1. This
affords juvenile defendants an opportunity to provide mitigating information to the
trial court if they so choose.
Defense counsel may present oral argument or submit a presentence report
to outline the defendant’s circumstances, such as youthfulness, in support of a
sentencing recommendation, joint or otherwise. See CrR 7.1(d); RCW
9.94A.500(1). However, these reports are generally not mandatory. RCW
9.94A.500(1). Where the defendant has chosen not to provide mitigating
information in connection with a joint sentencing recommendation, trial judges
must exercise restraint before soliciting mitigation information sua sponte.
2
State v. Harris, No. 102311-1
(Yu, J., concurring)
Trial judges are not bound to follow the parties’ plea agreement because “the
court retains the ultimate decision on sentencing.” State v. Harrison, 148 Wn.2d
550, 557, 61 P.3d 1104 (2003). However, they are not authorized to probe for
information that the parties specifically and intentionally wish to keep out of the
record. It is critical that trial judges respect the parties’ good-faith efforts to reach
a joint plea agreement because “[j]udges play no role in plea negotiations.”
Majority at 8 (citing RCW 9.94A.421). These negotiations can, and often do,
consider aspects of a defendant’s circumstances, including their age and personal
social struggles, and possibly their prior bad acts. There are so many issues
regarding one’s prior adolescent period that an individual may not want revealed in
open court. Despite the good intentions of a judge, these young people must be
respected and allowed to retain their agency and control of information they might
consider private.
A judge cannot and should not assume anything regarding what information
was discussed in plea negotiations. The only inquiry that ought to be vigorously
pursued is whether the person understands the nature of the charges, the
consequences, and whether the plea is voluntary. Dangerous assumptions cannot
be avoided if trial judges were required to seek out mitigating information
regarding youthfulness before accepting a joint sentencing recommendation in
every case involving a juvenile defendant. I agree with the majority that such a
3
State v. Harris, No. 102311-1
(Yu, J., concurring)
requirement “risks destabilizing the plea-bargaining process in Washington.”
Majority at 13.
A rule requiring trial judges to solicit mitigating information about a
defendant’s youth could have a negative impact by undermining the defense
attorney’s role and placing the trial judge in the position of a defense advocate.
Conversely, because the trial judge cannot know what occurred during plea
negotiations, a probe into the defendant’s life in search of circumstances that relate
to youthfulness may inadvertently unearth aggravating points that could be used to
increase, rather than decrease, the defendant’s sentence. In either scenario, the trial
judge risks stepping outside their role as neutral adjudicator by substituting their
assumptions for counsel’s professional judgment.
Requiring trial judges to question juvenile defendants about their personal
histories in adult court undermines the defendant’s interest in privacy, creating
“very real and objectively observable negative consequences.” State v. S.J.C., 183
Wn.2d 408, 432, 352 P.3d 749 (2015). In contrast to juvenile court proceedings,
juvenile defendants placed in adult court are not afforded the same benefit of
having their court records sealed pursuant to statute. See id. at 430, 434.
Therefore, these defendants can expect no confidentiality at sentencing. The
statements made by, and about, a juvenile defendant in adult court will become
part of the public record. This public information could lead to the “denial of
4
State v. Harris, No. 102311-1
(Yu, J., concurring)
‘housing, employment, and education opportunities,’” further exacerbating racial
disparities in a system where it is already “well documented that juveniles of color
face disproportionately high rates of arrest.” Id. at 432-33 (quoting LAWS OF 2014,
ch. 175, § 1(1)).
In juvenile courts, “‘[a]ccess to and the use of juvenile records should be
strictly controlled.’” Id. at 429 (alteration in original) (quoting INST. OF JUD.
ADMIN. & AM. BAR ASS’N, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS: STANDARDS RELATING
TO JUVENILE RECORDS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS 115-16 (1980)). However,
within the context of juveniles tried in adult court, the only barrier that protects a
juvenile defendant’s privacy is defense counsel. In consultation with their client,
defense counsel alone can control whether mitigating information about
youthfulness is disclosed to a trial judge and, if so, how it can be done in a way
that furthers the defendant’s objectives and priorities.
Defense counsel may have strategic and tactical reasons not to disclose
certain information about a defendant’s life in open court. They are entitled to a
presumption of effective advocacy in making this decision, even if the undisclosed
information could be viewed as mitigating by a sentencing judge. See Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). By
exercising restraint and respecting defense counsel’s role, trial judges can ensure
5
State v. Harris, No. 102311-1
(Yu, J., concurring)
that the defendant’s privacy is safeguarded and that the defendant is not compelled
to provide statements at sentencing that could be used against them.
The dissent’s vision for juvenile justice reform is one in which I
wholeheartedly share. However, it is imperative that trial judges remain neutral
and impartial to best serve the interests of justice throughout the criminal legal
system, including juvenile justice reform efforts. Trial judges cannot maintain
their neutral role if they are required to solicit mitigating evidence sua sponte
before accepting a juvenile defendant’s plea and joint sentencing recommendation.
Further, courts must take care to limit the amount of private information a juvenile
defendant is compelled to provide in open court, respecting defense counsel’s duty
and ability to obtain the best possible outcome for their client.
For these reasons, I respectfully join the majority.
______________________________
_____________________________
_____
6
State v. Harris, No. 102311-1
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)
No. 102311-1
MONTOYA-LEWIS, J. (dissenting)—Today, the majority’s opinion
undercuts this court’s prior precedent by holding that accepting a plea agreement
prohibits a juvenile from resentencing that we have previously held is a
constitutional mandate. This court continues down a troubling path that appears to
limit our juvenile jurisprudence to such an extent that what we have previously
accepted as being of constitutional magnitude has become an error without a true
remedy. While the majority correctly acknowledges that (1) the dual mandates of
Houston-Sconiers1 apply to 17-year-old Darren Harris’s sentence, (2) the sentencing
court did not follow those requirements, and (3) the proper remedy for a Houston-
Sconiers error is resentencing, it declines to recognize that error or grant any relief
because, like many people accused of committing crimes, Harris accepted a plea
agreement. That reasoning impermissibly undermines the constitutional protections
against disproportionate punishments for children while simultaneously divesting
1
State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1, 391 P.3d 409 (2017).
1
State v. Harris, No. 102311-1
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)
sentencing courts of their responsibility to exercise discretion as required by statute
and constitution. Therefore, I respectfully must dissent.
As this court has repeatedly recognized, “‘[c]hildren are different.’” State v.
Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at 8 (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 480,
132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012)). Children possess diminished culpability
compared to adults, which renders certain punishments unconstitutionally
disproportionate for youth. Id. at 19 n.4 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
569-71, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48,
74, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010); Miller, 567 U.S. at 483). In Houston-
Sconiers, we held that when punishing children convicted as adults, the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution requires courts to consider the
mitigating qualities of youth and to have discretion to set lower sentences in order
to impose a proportional punishment based on those qualities. Id. at 19-21.
Specifically, the court must consider children’s lessened culpability, poorer
judgment, and greater capacity for change compared to adults. Id. at 19 n.4 Further,
it must do so with knowledge that it has discretion to impose any lesser sentence
below the otherwise applicable sentence under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981
(SRA), ch. 9.94A RCW, if it finds that sentence would be disproportionate in light
of the defendant’s youthful characteristics. Id. at 19-21.
2
State v. Harris, No. 102311-1
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)
We left no room for doubt in Houston-Sconiers that these requirements are
mandatory every time a child is convicted and sentenced as an adult: “we hold that
sentencing courts must have complete discretion to consider mitigating
circumstances associated with the youth of any juvenile defendant, even in the adult
criminal justice system.” Id. (emphasis added). “Trial courts must consider
mitigating qualities of youth at sentencing and must have discretion to impose any
sentence below the otherwise applicable SRA range and/or sentence enhancements.”
Id. (emphasis added); see also In re Pers. Restraint of Ali, 196 Wn.2d 220, 232, 474
P.3d 507 (2020) (“the Eighth Amendment requires that the sentencing judge
consider the defendant’s youthfulness and retain absolute discretion to impose a
lower sentence”). If a court fails to do so, it also fails to ensure proportionate
punishment. Ali, 196 Wn.2d at 240. It is difficult to see how the Houston-Sconiers
court could have made this imperative any clearer. 188 Wn.2d at 9-34 (using the
mandatory language that sentencing courts “must” follow these dual requirements
no fewer than 10 times). On direct appeal, such as here, “the defendant needs only
to establish the existence of the Houston-Sconiers error in order to be entitled to a
new sentencing hearing.” In re Pers. Restraint of Carrasco, 1 Wn.3d 224, 230, 525
P.3d 196 (2023).
In this case, no one disputes that Houston-Sconiers applies to Harris or that
his sentencing hearing failed to comport with the constitutional requirement that the
3
State v. Harris, No. 102311-1
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)
sentencing court consider the mitigating qualities of youth with the understanding
that it has discretion to impose a lower sentence outside the SRA range in light of
those mitigating circumstances. To the contrary, the sentencing court indicated its
mistaken belief that it did not have authority to impose a sentence that included the
weapon enhancement concurrently rather than consecutively. Tr. of Proc. (Aug. 17,
2012) at 38-39 (“Well, if this sentence was going to be two hundred and twenty
months, including the twenty-four months, I wouldn’t have followed it, because
certainly it needs to be two hundred and forty-four, not two hundred and twenty.”).
Though the SRA makes weapon enhancements mandatory and consecutive when
sentencing adults, Houston-Sconiers recognized that as applied to juveniles, “[t]he
mandatory nature of these enhancements violates the Eighth Amendment
protections” and so courts must have discretion to make such enhancements
concurrent or not impose them at all. 188 Wn.2d at 25-26, 21. The court did not
know it had discretion to impose a lesser sentence regarding the weapon
enhancement and it did not consider any mitigating circumstances of youth with
respect to Harris. On its face, this record demonstrates a Houston-Sconiers error at
sentencing, and Harris should be entitled to resentencing. Carrasco, 1 Wn.3d at 230.
The State and the majority focus on the plea agreement as binding Harris and
the State, preventing Harris from presenting mitigating evidence at the sentencing
hearing—though all agree the parties would have to answer candidly any questions
4
State v. Harris, No. 102311-1
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)
the court might ask about the mitigating qualities of youth. State v. Sledge, 133
Wn.2d 828, 840, 947 P.2d 1199 (1997). The defendant and the State cannot be the
only actors in the sentencing process. While the court is not a party to the plea
agreement, it is not a passive bystander here or, crucially, at any sentencing.
Sentencing judges are “not bound by any recommendations contained in an
allowed plea agreement.” RCW 9.94A.431(2). The judge’s task is to “determine if
the agreement is consistent with the interests of justice and with the prosecuting
standards.” RCW 9.94A.431(1). Thus, it is the sentencing court’s responsibility to
assess the recommended sentence and determine for itself whether to follow the
recommendation—or not. The court has not only the authority but also the duty to
impose the sentence it deems consistent with the interests of justice and prosecuting
standards, even if it differs from what the parties agree to recommend. RCW
9.94A.431. And in the context of juvenile sentencing, the court need not even
impose a sentence within the standard range under the SRA; it has “discretion to
impose any sentence below the otherwise applicable” sentence and it “must consider
mitigating qualities of youth at sentencing.” Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at 21(emphasis added). Rather than follow these time-honored principles, which we have
held are both statutory and constitutional mandates, the majority diverges from this
and holds that contract principles hold more importance.
5
State v. Harris, No. 102311-1
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)
Instead of ensuring a sentencing court has the authority to analyze whether a
sentence (especially of a juvenile) follows the requirements of constitutional and
legislative mandate, the majority today holds that when the parties agree to a
recommended sentence, “a trial court is not required to sua sponte ask the parties to
provide mitigating evidence of youthful qualities if the court accepts the agreed
recommendation.” Majority at 12. I cannot join a position that is entirely
inconsistent with the role of the sentencing court under our statutes and our case law.
It cannot be that when the parties agree to a recommended sentence, the court has
no duty to ensure that the sentence it ultimately imposes is a constitutional one.
Further, it absolutely cannot be so when one of the parties is a juvenile.
The majority’s holding that a person such as Harris can never have a proper,
constitutional sentencing hearing forces us to confront the truth: that this error of
constitutional proportions has no remedy. Houston-Sconiers was decided during a
period where this court acted as a front-runner in recognizing the robust
constitutional protections for children accused of committing crimes. E.g., State v.
Bassett, 192 Wn.2d 67, 72-73, 85-90, 428 P.3d 343 (2018) (life without parole
(LWOP) sentences for children are categorically unconstitutional under the
Washington Constitution); In re Pers. Restraint of Monschke, 197 Wn.2d 305, 311-
13, 482 P.3d 276 (2021) (plurality opinion) (mandatory LWOP sentences for young
adults at least up to age 20 are unconstitutional under the Washington Constitution).
6
State v. Harris, No. 102311-1
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)
In more recent years, this court has increasingly moved away from these holdings,
which we held were grounded in constitutional requirements, to undermine those
same protections in ways that have created inconsistencies and unjust results.
Ultimately, this path we are on erodes the legitimacy of our juvenile justice
jurisprudence. We seem to have no hesitation in chipping away at our prior
precedents, for reasons that I cannot join and do not understand.2
For example, we have recognized that not only did Houston-Sconiers
announce a new rule applicable to all cases that are not yet final—it also applies
retroactively to cases on collateral review as a substantive constitutional rule that
prohibits adult sentences that would be disproportionate punishment for juveniles
with diminished culpability. Ali, 196 Wn.2d at 237. In doing so, we explicitly held
that “[t]he substantive protection of proportionate punishment ceases to exist without
the mechanism to determine whether the juvenile belongs in the class of culpability
2
We have been loath to overrule precedent in other contexts. See, e.g., City of Sammamish
v. Titcomb, No. 101894-1, slip op. at 8-9 (Wash. Sept. 12, 2024),
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/1018941.pdf (declining to overrule Court of Appeals
decision finding fish passage not to be a legitimate condemnation purpose where we could
conclude that fish passage purpose does not divest city of condemnation authority for other
legitimate purpose in RCW 8.12.030); State v. Ortiz Martinez, 196 Wn.2d 605, 612-14, 476 P.3d
189 (2020) (declining to overrule precedent on complaint doctrine as inconsistent with hearsay
rules where doctrine was long standing, protected victims, and provided important supplement to
rules of evidence); State v. Frawley, 181 Wn.2d 452, 464-65, 334 P.3d 1022 (2014) (declining to
overrule precedent that public trial rights violations may be asserted for first time on appeal to
avoid perception of trial proceedings being presumptively closed, with open proceedings serving
as exception). We should uphold consistent standards in the juvenile justice context to preserve
the legitimacy of that jurisprudence, should we wish to be consistent in our approach to precedent.
7
State v. Harris, No. 102311-1
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)
that would allow adult sentences . . . . This does not transform Houston-Sconiers’s
substantive rule into a procedural rule.” Id. at 240; see also In re Pers. Restraint of
Domingo-Cornelio, 196 Wn.2d 255, 266, 474 P.3d 524 (2020) (“Houston-Sconiers
announced a substantive constitutional rule” because it “identified a category of
punishments that are beyond courts’ authority to impose”). But just three years after
we recognized Houston-Sconiers as a substantive and retroactive rule in Ali and
Domingo-Cornelio, this court eviscerated that holding in In re Personal Restraint of
Hinton, severing Houston-Sconiers’s “procedural requirements” from its
“substantive rule,” despite Ali’s express and repeated holding to the contrary. 1
Wn.3d 317, 329-31, 525 P.3d 156 (2023). Contra Ali, 196 Wn.2d at 239 (Houston-
Sconiers did not announce a procedural rule), 240 (same), 241 (same). See also
Hinton, 1 Wn.3d at 337-38 (Whitener, J., dissenting) (“We framed both Ali and
Domingo-Cornelio as analyzing whether the dual mandates of Houston-Sconiers are
retroactive.”); Carrasco, 1 Wn.3d at 243-46 (Whitener, J., dissenting) (same). As a
result, the court limited the relief available to children who undeniably received
sentences without the protections of Houston-Sconiers, contrary to the unequivocal
decision in Houston-Sconiers itself. Similarly, in apparent disregard for our recent
juvenile justice holdings, this court held in State v. Haag that “any” de facto life
sentences are categorically unconstitutional for children and that Miller-fix
sentencing hearings require courts to consider the mitigating qualities of youth, 198
8
State v. Harris, No. 102311-1
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)
Wn.2d 309, 317, 330, 495 P.3d 241 (2021), yet this court reversed course the next
year, holding in State v. Anderson that a de facto life sentence for a child was
permissible when there was some evidence they understood consequences, despite
other evidence of immaturity and impulse, 200 Wn.2d 266, 287-88, 516 P.3d 1213(2022); see also id. at 303-04 (González, C.J., dissenting) (critiquing the majority
for “rewrit[ing] our jurisprudence” and expressing concern that the resentencing
court gave considerable weight to the original sentencing transcript, given its
backward-looking approach and the backdrop of since-debunked racist
“superpredator” myth); id. at 310 (Yu, J., concurring in dissent) (“In fact, by
disregarding both our precedent and the stare decisis considerations supporting it,
the majority causes confusion and invites further litigation attempting to undermine
settled law.”). These cases may address different issues than the one before us today
but show a troubling and consistent backtracking on what we have held our
constitution requires.
Once again, “the majority . . . is either mistaken or dishonest” in its view that
no Houston-Sconiers error occurred here, where the record shows the sentencing did
not comport with the mandatory requirements of Houston-Sconiers, and that Harris
is not entitled to any remedy. Id. at 309 (Yu, J., concurring in dissent). The majority
holds that in light of a plea and agreed recommended sentence, the defendant cannot
raise and the court need not consider the mitigating qualities of youth that we
9
State v. Harris, No. 102311-1
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)
required sentencing courts to consider in Houston-Sconiers. The result is that there
is no remedy for this constitutional violation. I cannot join such a holding.
To be sure, to so limit the efficacy of Houston-Sconiers in the context of plea
agreements will have vast consequences. As the majority acknowledges, the
overwhelming majority of criminal convictions result from guilty pleas. Majority at
9. That means that in reality, astonishingly few children charged as adults will
actually receive sentencing that comports with Houston-Sconiers if, as the majority’s
result compels, those Eighth Amendment protections vanish once the child agrees to
plead guilty. This highlights another issue with the majority’s holding today. As
any trial judge knows, plea agreements are offered with recommendations for
sentences that are lesser than the sentences people would face if they took their case
to trial and were convicted. The majority seems to believe that a juvenile can assess
those risks with the maturity an adult might, even though we have stated countless
times, “‘[c]hildren are different.’” Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at 8 (quoting
Miller, 567 U.S. at 480). Indeed, we have discussed why juveniles are different at
length in prior cases, and we have held symposia that have educated not only this
court but also the public on the neuroscience that explains why these holdings are
based in widely accepted scientific principles.3 I do not dispute that counsel has a
3
See, e.g., Wash. State Sup. Ct. Symposium, A Legacy of Harm: Examining the Impacts
of Our Sentencing Paradigm (2024), video recording by TVW, Washington State’s Public Affairs
Network, https://tvw.org/video/washington-supreme-court-minority-and-justice-commission-
10
State v. Harris, No. 102311-1
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)
critical role in advising their juvenile clients about the benefits of accepting a plea
and I do not suggest here that no juvenile can do so freely and voluntarily. What I
do dispute is that they can do so with the wisdom and maturity of an adult. If what
we have held in so many of our cases on juvenile justice remains true (and as far as
I can see, nothing has changed other than our view), then it follows that a juvenile’s
decision making about accepting a plea should be subject to the discretion of the
sentencing judge.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
______________________________
_____________________________
_____
symposium-2024061073/?eventID=2024061073; Wash. State Sup. Ct. Symposium, “Behind
Bars:” The Increased Incarceration of Women and Girls of Color (2021), video recording by
TVW, Washington State’s Public Affairs Network, https://tvw.org/video/2021-state-supreme-
court-symposium-2021061001/?eventID=2021061001; Wash. State Sup. Ct. Symposium,
Looking to the Future: Adolescent Brain Development and the Juvenile Justice System (2014),
video recording by TVW, Washington State’s Public Affairs Network,
https://tvw.org/video/washington-state-supreme-court-symposium-
2014051062/?eventID=2014051062.
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