State Of Washington, V Jacob B. Matilla And Mykell Bru ( 2014 )

LED
COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION
21M DEC 30 AM 9: t15
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE WANNARTggisT
DIVISION II BY
DEP TY
STATE OF WASHINGTON. No. 44561 - 1 - II
Respondent,
v.
JACOB BENJAMIN MATTILA, aka JACOB Consolidated with:
BENJAMIN MATILLA,
Appellant.
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 44621 -9 -II
Respondent,
v.
MYKELL ALEX BRU, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
LEE, J. — A jury found Jacob Benjamin Mattila and Mykell Alex Bru guilty of residential
burglary. The jury also found Mattila guilty of first degree burglary, an additional count of
residential burglary, two counts of theft of a firearm, first degree theft, and unlawful possession of
a firearm. Mattila appeals, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that there
was insufficient evidence to support the jury' s verdict finding him guilty of unlawful possession
of a firearm. Bru also appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion to continue
trial. Mattila and Bru both argue that prosecutorial misconduct denied them a fair trial and that
the trial court improperly imposed legal financial obligations. The State concedes that there was
insufficient evidence to support the jury' s verdict finding Mattila guilty of unlawful possession of
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a firearm, and we accept the State' s concession. Mattila' s and Bru' s remaining claims lack merit.
Accordingly, we vacate Mattila' s .conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm and remand for
resentencing, and we affirm Mattila' s remaining convictions and Bru' s residential burglary
conviction.
FACTS
On October 16, 2012, P. M.1 was home alone. The doorbell rang, but P. M. did not answer
the door because she did not recognize the man standing outside. P. M. called her mother and told
her there was a stranger at the door. P.M.' s mother, Jennifer Mock, told P. M. not to answer the
door. A few minutes later, P. M. saw someone in the house. P.M. hid in the pantry and called 911.
From the window in the pantry, P.M. saw a tan car with a dark stripe and described the car to the
dispatcher. P. M. also saw a man in the house who was not the man who rang the doorbell. When
P.M. thought the men were away from the pantry, she ran out of the house and hid behind a tree
in the front yard.
Clark County Sheriff' s Deputy Rick Buckner responded to P. M.' s 911 call. When he
arrived at the house, he saw Mattila sitting in a tan Honda with a dark stripe down the side.
Buckner asked Mattila what he was doing there, and Mattila responded that he was trying to find
his girlfriend' s house. Buckner placed Mattila in his police car while he figured out what was
going on. About the same time, Mock returned home and ran into the house. When Mock came
back outside, she told Buckner that her home had been burgled. Buckner called for additional
1 Because P.M. is a minor, we use her initials to protect her privacy.
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units to respond, left Mattila in the car, and entered the house to ensure that there were no additional
suspects inside.
While at the scene, Buckner determined that the tan Honda was stolen. They obtained the
car owner' s permission to search the car. In the car, officers found stolen property, including
firearms in the trunk.
Mattila gave a statement implicating himself in several other burglaries. One of the
burglaries to which Mattila admitted involvement occurred in Washougal just prior to the burglary
at the Mock house.
Several days after the burglary, Mock found a cigarette in her bathroom. She turned the
cigarette over to the sheriffs, office. The forensics lab determined that the cigarette contained
Bru' s deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA).
The State charged Mattila with first degree burglary ( count one), two counts of residential
burglary ( count two and three), possession of a stolen vehicle ( count four), two counts of theft of
a firearm ( count five and seven), first degree theft (count six), and unlawful possession of a firearm
count eight). The State charged Bru with residential burglary ( count three), first degree burglary
count nine), and theft of a firearm ( count ten). Mattila and Bru were tried together.
On Monday, February 11, 2013, the first day of trial, Bru moved for a continuance because
he had just received the DNA report the previous Thursday afternoon. The State explained that
the parties had initially agreed to a continuance. However, at the readiness hearing on the previous
Thursday, Bru called the case ready for trial knowing that the State was still waiting for the DNA
report. The State received the DNA report that afternoon and immediately forwarded it to Bru.
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Furthermore, there was supposed to be a hearing on a motion to continue the next day ( Friday),
but Bru did not appear. Bru argued that the continuance was necessary because he wanted to
obtain an expert to respond to the State' s expert. The trial court denied the continuance because
Bru was aware that the DNA report was pending and called the case ready.
After a CrR 3. 5 hearing, the trial court concluded that Mattila' s statements to the police
were admissible. At trial, Clark County Sheriff' s Office Deputy Robin Yakhour testified regarding
a redacted version of Mattila' s statements.2 Mattila stated that he was the lookout and driver for
the burglaries. He also stated that the men who actually performed the burglaries generally looked
for guns and gold to steal from the homes they burglarized. Deputy Yakhour testified that the
following exchange took place in regard to the Washougal burglary:
I asked, " You sat out there and basically you' re the lookout again ?"
Mr. Mattila replied, " Yes."
I asked, " They load stuff into the trunk ?"
Mr. Mattila says, " Yes."
Did they tell you what they acquired in the house ?" I asked.
He says, " No."
I said, " Not a word ?"
He said, " Theythey don' t—they said something about not enough
jewelry."
I said, " Okay." I asked, " So, did they tell you there were guns in the house ?"
Mr. Mattila replied, " Um— because yes, um, one of them was like —he' s
like, ``Hey, there' s —' I said, `` Did you guys get what you —did you guys get— what
did you guys get ?' And they were like, `` Oh, there' s some jewelry and like that. "'
2B Report of Proceedings ( RP) at 508 -09.
At closing argument, the prosecutor argued:
2 Because Mattila and Bru were tried together, Mattila' s statements were required to be redacted
to comply with Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S. Ct. 1620, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476 ( 1968).
There is no issue regarding the admission of the statements.
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These two Defendants had zero regard for other people' s property, their sense of
security, or their right to be safe in their own homes. They didn' t care that ten -
year -old [ P. M.] was home all alone that day, terrified, hiding in the pantry. They
didn' t consider how her mother would feel about leaving her daughter home alone
that day, even for a few minutes.
These two didn' t care that the victims of their crimes worked hard to obtain
the property that they had. They didn' t care that those things meant something to
them, and they didn' t care how these people would feel after their homes had been
invaded by complete strangers to them. It meant nothing to them, nothing.
3 RP at 658, 659 -60. The prosecutor went on to argue that Mattila was guilty of unlawful
possession of a firearm on the date of the Washougal and Mock burglaries because the guns were
in the trunk of the car he was driving and because he knew that the goal of the burglaries was to
steal gold and guns. Neither Mattila nor Bru objected during the prosecutor' s closing argument.
The jury found Mattila guilty of first degree burglary, two counts of residential burglary,
two counts of theft of a firearm, first degree theft, and unlawful possession of a firearm. The jury
also found Bru guilty of residential burglary. The trial court imposed standard range sentences
and legal financial obligations. Mattila and Bru appeal.
ANALYSIS
A. MATTILA' S ISSUES
1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel has the burden of establishing that
1) counsel' s performance was deficient and ( 2) counsel' s deficient performance prejudiced the
defendant' s case. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674
1984). ( Failure to establish either prong is fatal to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700. Counsel' s performance is deficient if it falls below an objective
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standard of reasonableness. State v. McFarland, 127 Wash. 2d 322, 334, 899 P.2d 1251 ( 1995). Our
scrutiny of counsel' s performance is highly deferential and we strongly presume reasonableness.
McFarland, 127 Wash. 2d at 335. To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable
probability that the outcome of the trial would have differed absent counsel' s deficient
performance. McFarland, 127 Wash. 2d at 337.
Mattila contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because defense counsel
did not move to suppress the evidence found in the car or Mattila' s statements. Mattila asserts that
he was unlawfully arrested because, at the time Buckner arrested him, Buckner did not have
probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed.
When an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is based on a failure to move to suppress
evidence, the defendant must show that the motion to suppress would have been granted.
McFarland, 127 Wash. 2d at 333 -34. However, "[ t]hat standard often cannot be met when the record
lacks a factual basis for determining the merits of the claim." State v. Walters, 162 Wash. App. 74,
81, 255 P.3d 835 ( 2011) ( citing McFarland, 127 Wash. 2d at 337 -38). Here, the record before us
lacks the factual basis for determining whether a claim that Mattila' s arrest was unlawful would
have been successful.
Because Mattila never challenged the lawfulness of his arrest, the parties never developed
the record necessary to determine when Mattila was actually arrested. Mattila argues that he was
arrested when Buckner detained him by placing Mattila in his vehicle. The record is clear that, at
that point, Mattila was not free to leave. But, an officer may detain a person, without formal arrest,
for further investigation if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the person has been involved
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in criminal activity. State v. Day, 161 Wash. 2d 889, 895, 168 P.3d 1265 ( 2007). Here, Mattila was
outside of the Mock house in the same car P.M. described when she called 911. A trial court could
have determined that Buckner reasonably detained Mattila to further investigate whether a
burglary had occurred. However, the issue before the trial court at the CrR 3. 5 hearing was whether
Mattila was properly read his Miranda rights prior to giving his statements to the police; the trial
court was not asked to determine whether Mattila' s arrest was lawful. Therefore, the record is not
fully developed as to the circumstances regarding Mattila' s detention and arrest, or the officers'
search of the vehicle. The facts here have not been settled, the parties have not had an opportunity
to develop their arguments, and the trial court has not made factual findings for our review.
Accordingly, Mattila has failed to meet his burden to show counsel' s performance was deficient
because the record is insufficient for us to determine whether the motion to suppress would have
been granted.3
2. Sufficiency of the Evidence —Unlawful Possession of a firearm
The test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Salinas, 119 Wash. 2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 ( 1992). " A
claim of insufficiency admits the truth of the State' s evidence and all inferences that reasonably
can be drawn therefrom." Salinas, 119 Wash. 2d at 201. All " reasonable inferences from the
evidence must be drawn in favor of the State and interpreted most strongly against the defendant."
3
When a claim rests on matters outside the record, " a personal restraint petition is the appropriate
vehicle for bringing those matters before the court." McFarland, 127 Wash. 2d at 338.
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Salinas, 119 Wash. 2d at 201. Circumstantial and direct evidence are deemed equally reliable. State
v. Delmarter, 94 Wash. 2d 634, 638, 618 P.2d 99 ( 1980). " Credibility determinations are for the trier
of fact and cannot be reviewed on appeal." State v. Camarillo, 115 Wash. 2d 60, 71, 794 P.2d 850
1990).
To convict Mattila of unlawful possession of a firearm, the State was required to prove that
Mattila knowingly owned, possessed, or controlled a firearm, and that Mattila had been convicted
of a serious offense. RCW 9. 41. 040( 1). Knowing possession is an essential element of unlawful
possession of a firearm. State v. Anderson, 141 Wash. 2d 357, 366 -67, 5 P.3d 1247 ( 2000). Mattila
was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm on October 16, the date of the Washougal and
Mock robberies. Therefore, the State had to present sufficient evidence to prove that the guns
were in the trunk of the car Mattila was driving and that Mattila knew the guns were in the trunk.
The State concedes that there was not sufficient evidence to prove that Mattila knew that the guns
were in the trunk, and therefore, there was not sufficient evidence to support the jury' s verdict
finding Mattila guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm. We agree.
Here, the evidence presented at trial established that the men committing the Washougal
burglary stated that there was not enough jewelry in the house; there was no evidence that Mattila
was told they stole guns from the house. The inference that, because the goal was usually to steal
gold and guns, Mattila must have known there were guns in the car, is not sufficient evidence for
a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mattila knew the guns were in the
trunk. Accordingly, we accept the State' s concession and vacate Mattila' s conviction for unlawful
possession of a firearm.
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B. BRU' S MOTION TO CONTINUE4
The decision to grant or deny a continuance rests within the sound discretion of the trial
court, and we will not disturb the trial court' s decision unless the defendant can show that the trial
court' s decision was "' manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for
untenable reasons. "' State v. Downing, 151 Wash. 2d 265, 272 -73, 87 P.3d 1169 ( 2004) ( quoting
State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wash. 2d 12, 26, 482 P.2d 775 ( 1971)). " In exercising discretion
to grant or deny a continuance, trial courts may consider many factors, including surprise,
diligence, redundancy, due process, materiality, and maintenance of orderly procedure." Downing,
151 Wash. 2d at 273 ( citing State v. Eller, 84 Wash. 2d 90, 95, 524 P.2d 242 ( 1974); RCW 10. 46. 080;
CrR 3. 3 ( f)). The mere existence of surprise and diligence does not require reversing a trial court' s
decision denying a motion to continue in order for the defense to secure expert testimony.
Downing, 151 Wash. 2d at 274.
Bru argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to continue
because the prosecutor did not provide him with the DNA lab report until just before trial and he
did not have time to have an expert review the results. But Bru knew that the DNA results would
be available the afternoon after the readiness hearing, and he decided to call the case ready for
trial. And, Bru did not make any effort to contact an expert or present an offer of proof as to what
4 In addition to arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion to continue trial and by
imposing legal financial obligations, Bru asserts the trial court erred by refusing to grant him a
new Presumably, Bru is referencing the trial court' s orders denying Bru' s CrR 7. 5 motion.
trial.
However, Bru offers no argument or authority addressing his assignment of error; Bru does not
even reference his post- conviction motions in his analysis. Accordingly, we do not consider Bru' s
assignment of error referencing the trial court' s decision on his CrR 7. 5 motion. RAP 10. 3( a)( 6);
Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wash. 2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 ( 1992).
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he would present expert testimony for. The trial court considered the fact that Bru was not
surprised by the evidence because he knew that it was going to be disclosed shortly at the time he
called the case ready. The trial court did not act unreasonably when it determined that Bru was
not surprised by the evidence and that Bru did not act diligently by calling the case ready when he
was aware the report was about to be disclosed. We affirm the trial court' s decision to deny Bru' s
motion to continue on the morning of trial.
C. JOINT ISSUES
1. Prosecutorial Misconduct
To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, Mattila and Bru must show that the
prosecutor' s conduct was both improper and prejudicial. State v. Emery, 174 Wash. 2d 741, 756, 278
P.3d 653 ( 2012) ( citing State v. Thorgerson, 172 Wash. 2d 438, 442, 258 P.3d 43 ( 2011)). First, we
must determine whether the prosecutor' s conduct was improper. Emery, 174 Wash. 2d at 759. If we
determine that the prosecutor' s conduct was improper, we then determine whether the prosecutor' s
improper conduct resulted in prejudice. Emery, 174 Wash. 2d at 760 -61. Prejudice is established by
showing a substantial likelihood that the prosecutor' s misconduct affected the verdict. Emery, 174
Wash. 2d at 760.
If the defendants did not object at trial, the defendants are deemed to have waived any
error, unless the prosecutor' s misconduct was so flagrant and ill-intentioned that an instruction
could not have cured any resulting prejudice. Emery, 174 Wash. 2d at 760 -61 ( citing State v. Stenson,
132 Wash. 2d 668, 727, 940 P.2d 1239 ( 1997)). Under this heightened standard of review, the
defendant must show that "( 1) `` no curative instruction would have obviated any prejudicial effect
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on the jury' and ( 2) the misconduct resulted in prejudice that `` had a substantial likelihood of
affecting the jury verdict. ' Emery, 174 Wash. 2d at 761 ( quoting Thorgerson, 172 Wash. 2d at 455).
In closing argument, prosecutors are afforded wide latitude to draw and express reasonable
inferences from the evidence. State v. Reed, 168 Wash. App. 553, 577, 278 P.3d 203, review denied,
176 Wash. 2d 1009 ( 2012). Prosecutors may not rely on facts outside the evidence or use arguments
calculated to inflame the passions or prejudices of the jury. In re Pers. Restraint of Glasmann,
175 Wash. 2d 696, 704, 286 P.3d 673 ( 2012); State v. Jones, 71 Wash. App. 798, 808, 863 P.2d 85
1993), review denied, 124 Wash. 2d 1018 ( 1994). We do not look at the comment in isolation, but
in the context of the total argument, the issues in the case, the evidence, and the instructions given
to the jury. State v. Yates, 161 Wash. 2d 714, 774, 168 P.3d 359 ( 2007), cert. denied, 554 U.S. 922
2008). We presume the jury follows the trial court' s instructions. State v. Anderson, 153 Wn.
App. 417, 428, 220 P.3d 1273 ( 2009), review denied, 170 Wash. 2d 1002 ( 2010).
Mattila and Bru challenge the following portion of the prosecutor' s closing argument:
These two Defendants had zero regard for other people' s property, their sense of
security, or their right to be safe in their own homes. They didn' t care that ten -
year -old [ P. M.] was home day,
all alone hiding in the pantry. They
that terrified,
didn' t consider how her mother would feel about leaving her daughter home alone
that day, even for a few minutes.
These two didn' t care that the victims of their crimes worked hard to obtain
the property that they had., They didn' t care that those things meant something to
them, and they didn' t care how these people would feel after their homes had been
invaded by complete strangers to them. It meant nothing to them, nothing.
3 RP at 658, 659 -60.
First, Mattila and Bru argue that the prosecutor committed misconduct by relying on facts
outside the evidence; specifically, that Mattila and Bru did not care about P.M. being alone or
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terrified. The prosecutor did not improperly rely on facts outside the record. P. M. testified that
she believed the man who rang the doorbell saw her looking out the window. 1B RP 273. The
prosecutor did not commit misconduct by inferring that the burglars then knew she was there and
broke into the house anyway. It was also reasonable to infer that, if Mattila and Bru knew P. M.
was in the house, they would know she would be scared or terrified by strange men breaking into
her house.
Second, Mattila and Bru argue that the prosecutor improperly appealed to the jury' s
passions and prejudice. The prosecutor' s argument was not improper. In State v. Brown, 132
Wash. 2d 529, 562 -63, 940 P.2d 546 ( 1997), cent. denied, 523 U.S. 1007 ( 1998), our Supreme Court
held that statements asking the jury to personalize crimes were not improper. In Brown, the
prosecutor stated:
I' ve sort of lived with Holly [Washa] over the last two years or so preparing for this
case, and perhaps I' ve personalized her a little bit. Maybe by the time this trial is
over, you will know enough about her that maybe you' ll personalize her a little bit.
The one thing I do hope though is that justice can be done by the end of this trial
and we can put Holly [ Washa] to rest.
I want to assure you at the end of this case you' re not going to look at me and say,
Did he do it ?" I suggest you' re going to look at me and you' re going to say, " How
could he have done it ?" And, you know, that' s one question that I won' t be able to
answer for you. I don' t have to answer it for you. I can' t imagine how any person
could have done this to Holly Washa or to any other living human being. How
could he have done it?
132 Wash. 2d at 562. The court held that the prosecutor' s statements were not improper. Brown,
132 Wash. 2d at 563. Here, the prosecutor reminded the jury that property crimes have victims. The
prosecutor did not improperly urge the jury to find guilt based on passions or prejudice. And, the
remainder of the prosecutor' s closing argument focused on applying the facts to the law as stated
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in the jury instructions. Like the prosecutor in Brown, the prosecutor' s comments in this case were
not improper.
2. Legal Financial Obligations
Mattila and Bru make two arguments regarding their allegation that the trial court
improperly imposed legal financial obligations. First, they argue that the trial court impermissibly
imposed the cost of a jury trial by including a " trial per diem" fee in their legal financial
obligations. Second, they argue that the trial court violated their right to counsel by imposing costs
for assigned counsel without sufficient evidence supporting the trial court' s finding that they had
the present or likely future ability to pay legal financial obligations. Their first claim lacks merit;
their second claim is not properly before this court. Therefore, we affirm the trial court' s
imposition of legal financial obligations.
a. " Court Appointed Attorney and Trial Per Diem" Fee
Mattila and Bru contend that the trial court exceeded its statutory authority because the
trial court may not impose costs for exercising their constitutionally guaranteed right to a jury trial
in excess of the $ 250 jury trial fee expressly authorized by statute. However, the $ 1, 500 legal
financial obligation is assigned to " court appointed attorney and trial per diem." CP ( Manila) atl 1;
CP ( Bru) at 18. RCW 9. 94A.030( 30) authorizes the trial court to impose legal financial obligations
for " court- appointed attorneys' fees, and costs of defense." Therefore, because the costs of a court
appointed attorney are statutorily authorized legal financial obligations, the trial court did not
exceed its statutory authority to impose legal financial obligations.
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b. Ability to Pay
Mattila and Bru argue that the trial court may not impose court- appointed attorney costs
unless it finds that the defendant has the present or future ability to pay. They are correct. Fuller
v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 45, 94 S. Ct. 2116, 40 L. Ed. 2d 642 ( 1974); RCW 10. 01. 160( 3). But the
record shows that the trial court did find that Mattila and Bru had the present or future ability to
pay.
It appears that Mattila and Bru are actually arguing that the trial court' s finding is not
supported by substantial evidence.5 However, this issue is not properly before us.
Under State v. Blazina, 174 Wash. App. 906, 911, 301 P.3d 492, review granted, 178 Wn,2d
1010 ( 2013), Mattila and Bru may not raise a challenge to the trial court' s finding that they have
the present or future ability to pay for the first time on appeal. And, under State v. Lundy, 176 Wn.
App. 96, 108 -09, 308 P.3d 755 ( 2013), their claim is not ripe for review until the State attempts to
collect the ordered legal financial obligations. Accordingly, Mattila' s and Bru'.s claim that the
trial court erred by imposing court- appointed attorney costs is not properly before this court.
5 For example, Mattila argues:
In this case, the sentencing court entered such a finding without any support in the
record. Indeed, the record suggests that Mr. Mattila lacks the ability to pay the
amount ordered. The court found Mr. Mattila indigent at the end of the
proceedings. His lengthy incarceration and felony conviction will also negatively
impact his prospects for employment. Accordingly, Finding No. 2. 5 of the
Judgment and Sentence must be vacated.
Br. of Appellant (Mattila) at 20 ( citations omitted).
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We vacate Mattila' s conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm and remand for
resentencing. We affirm Mattila' s other convictions and Bru' s residential burglary conviction.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW
2. 06. 040, it is so ordered.
Lee, J.
We concur:
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