State Of Washington v. Fagalulu Feau Filitaula ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                                             FILED
    COURT OF APPEALS
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OI                                                 i #   lINGTON
    MI
    DIVISION II
    2015 FEB -   3        8: 55
    STATE OF WASHINGTON
    STATE OF WASHINGTON,                                                              No. 44963
    BY
    Respondent,
    v.
    FAGALULU FEAU FILITAULA,                                                    UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    Appellant.
    MELNICK, J. —        Fagalulu Filitaula appeals his conviction and sentence for violating a no-
    contact order, contending that insufficient evidence existed to support his conviction that the to-
    convict instruction and charging document omitted some elements of the offense, and that the trial
    court erred by imposing a term of community custody. Because the evidence is sufficient to show
    that Filitaula willfully violated the no- contact order, we reject his sufficiency challenge. Because
    the " to convict" instruction and the information alleged that Filitaula knowingly violated the no-
    contact order, we reject his challenges to those documents as well. Finally, because the combined
    total of Filitaula' s exceptional sentence and the community custody imposed did not exceed the
    statutory maximum for his offense, we reject his sentencing challenge. We affirm.
    FACTS
    On July 12, 2012, Filitaula signed a domestic violence no- contact order that prohibited him
    from   having    any   contact with    Faufau Boyd for       a   two -year   period.   Filitaula and Boyd had dated
    for   eight years and   had two   children     together. In December 2012, Boyd went to the residence of
    her   cousin,   Anna Hartman, to       see   Filitaula.   Filitaula had been living at the Hartman home for a
    few   months.    Boyd    wanted   to   confront   Filitaula   about   being   unfaithful.   She knew about the no-
    contact order and      the   consequences of     its   violation.
    44963 -3 -II
    After an initial conversation with Filitaula, Boyd left and then returned for an additional
    discussion.     When Filitaula became angry, Boyd called her mother, who heard Filitaula yelling
    and   cursing in the background.             Boyd' s mother called the police who arrested Filitaula at the
    Hartman residence.
    The State charged Filitaula with felony violation of a no- contact order and added a bail
    jumping      charge after   he failed to     appear   for   a pretrial   hearing.' Boyd, her mother, the Hartmans,
    and a deputy prosecutor testified to the above facts. Boyd added that she and Filitaula talked for
    about 45 minutes, that they both knew about the no- contact order, and that Filitaula made no
    attempt to leave the house or go into a different room. Filitaula stipulated to two prior no- contact
    order violation convictions. The jury found him guilty as charged.
    On appeal, Filitaula challenges only his conviction for violating the no- contact order.
    ANALYSIS
    I.       SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
    Filitaula initially argues that the State failed to prove that he willfully violated the no-
    contact order. We disagree.
    The State must prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt for a
    conviction     to be   upheld. "'    State   v.   Sibert, 
    168 Wn.2d 306
    , 311, 
    230 P. 3d 142
     ( 2010) ( quoting
    State   v.   Byrd, 
    125 Wn.2d 707
    , 713, 
    887 P. 2d 396
     ( 1995)).                    To determine whether sufficient
    evidence supports a conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and
    determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime beyond a
    reasonable     doubt. State     v.   Homan, 
    181 Wn.2d 102
    , 105, 
    330 P. 3d 182
    , 185 ( 2014).             A claim of
    1 The no- contact order violation was charged as a felony because of Filitaula' s two prior
    convictions for violating no- contact orders. RCW 26. 50. 110( 5).
    2
    44963 -3 -II
    insufficient evidence admits the truth of the State' s evidence and all reasonable inferences that can
    be drawn therefrom. State               v.   Salinas, 
    119 Wn.2d 192
    , 201, 
    829 P. 2d 1068
     ( 1992). Circumstantial
    and   direct   evidence         are   equally    reliable.         State v. Delmarter, 
    94 Wn.2d 634
    , 638, 
    618 P. 2d 99
    1980).      We defer to the trier of fact on issues of conflicting testimony, credibility of witnesses,
    and   the   persuasiveness of          the    evidence.          State v. Thomas, 
    150 Wn.2d 821
    , 874 -75, 
    83 P. 3d 970
    2004).
    Under RCW 10. 99. 050, a defendant commits the offense of violating a no- contact order
    when he willfully has contact with another, knowing that a no- contact order exists and prohibits
    the   contact.   State     v.   Clowes, 
    104 Wn. App. 935
    , 943 -44, 
    18 P. 3d 596
     ( 2001), disapproved on other
    grounds,      State   v.   Nonog,      
    169 Wn.2d 220
    , 
    237 P. 3d 250
     ( 2010).                       The offense has three essential
    elements: willful contact with another, the prohibition of such contact by a valid no- contact order,
    and   the defendant'        s   knowledge       of    the      no- contact order.      State v. Washington, 
    135 Wn. App. 42
    ,
    49, 
    143 P. 3d 606
     ( 2006) ( quoting Clowes, 104 Wn.                                 App.   at   944).   The element of willfulness
    requires a purposeful act.             State    v.   Sisemore, 
    114 Wn. App. 75
    , 78, 
    55 P. 3d 1178
     ( 2002). Filitaula
    contends that the State did not prove that he acted willfully or purposefully because he simply
    remained at home when Boyd came over to confront him.
    The fact that the protected party initiated the forbidden contact is not a defense to violating
    a no- contact     order.         See RCW 10. 99. 040( 4)( b)                  and   RCW 26. 50. 035( 1)(      c) (   domestic violence
    protection orders must inform restrained person that he is subject to arrest even if protected party
    invites     or permits contact);         State       v.   Dejarlais, 
    136 Wn.2d 939
    , 942, 
    969 P. 2d 90
     ( 1998) (                consent
    is   not   defense to      charge of     violating         a   domestic   violence protection           order).   The evidence shows
    that Filitaula engaged in conversation with Boyd and did not attempt to terminate that conversation
    either by leaving or by asking her to leave. See Sisemore, 114 Wn. App. at 78 ( defendant did not
    3
    44963 -3 -II
    violate no- contact order with accidental or inadvertent contact if he immediately broke it off).
    Because his conversation with Boyd was a purposeful act, we find the evidence sufficient to prove
    that Filitaula willfully violated the no- contact order.
    II.     ADEQUACY OF THE TO- CONVICT INSTRUCTION
    Filitaula argues here that instruction 8, the " to convict" instruction, omitted the essential
    element of willfulness. We disagree.
    A " to convict" instruction must contain all elements of the crime because it serves as a
    yardstick"       by   which    the   jury   measures   the   evidence   to determine   guilt or   innocence.   State v.
    Smith, 
    131 Wn.2d 258
    , 263, 
    930 P. 2d 917
     ( 1997).                    Instruction 8 informed the jury as follows:
    To convict the defendant of the crime of violation of a no contact order as
    charged, each of the following elements of the crime must be proved beyond a
    reasonable doubt:
    1)   That on or about December 16, 2012 there existed a no contact order
    applicable to the defendant regarding a family or household member;
    2) That the defendant knew of the existence of this order;
    3) That on or about said date, the defendant knowingly violated a provision
    of this order against a family or household member[;]
    4) That the defendant has twice been previously convicted for violating the
    provisions of a court order; and
    5)   That the defendant' s act occurred in the State of Washington.
    Clerk' s Papers ( CP)         at   14 -15.   Filitaula did not object to this instruction in the trial court, but he
    raises an issue of manifest constitutional error that may be reviewed for the first time on appeal.
    RAP 2. 5(   a)(   3); State v. Stein, 
    144 Wn.2d 236
    , 240 -41, 
    27 P. 3d 184
     ( 2001).
    Instruction 8 refers to a knowing rather than a willful violation of a no- contact order. The
    requirement that an offense be committed willfully is generally satisfied if a person acts knowingly
    with   respect     to the      material      elements   of    offense.   RCW 9A.08. 010( 4).        Consequently, the
    substitution of "knowingly" for "willfully" in an instruction setting forth the elements of violating
    a no- contact order is not error. Clowes, 104 Wn. App. at 944; see also Sisemore, 114 Wn. App. at
    4
    44963 -3 -II
    78 ( defendant       acts    willfully is    he   acts   knowingly      with respect      to the   contact element).      But, such
    an instruction must inform the jury of the need to find both that the defendant knew of the no-
    contact order and that he intended the contact. Clowes, 104 Wn. App. at 944 -45.
    Instruction 8, which mirrors the pattern jury instruction, informed the jury that it had to
    find that Filitaula knew of the existence of the no- contact order and that he knowingly violated
    that   order.       11 WASHINGTON PRACTICE: WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL
    36. 51. 02,    at   79 ( 3d   ed.   2014).    The " to convict" instruction in this case adequately set forth the
    essential elements of the crime of violating .a no- contact order.
    III.         ADEQUACY OF THE CHARGING DOCUMENT
    Filitaula argues next that the charging document was fatally flawed because it did not
    contain      the   willfulness element.           Because an inadequate information raises due process concerns,
    Filitaula may        raise    this challenge for the        first time    on appeal.       State v. Kjorsvik, 
    117 Wn.2d 93
    ,
    107 -08, 
    812 P. 2d 86
     ( 1991).              We disagree, however, with his claim of error.
    A charging document is constitutionally adequate only if all essential elements of a crime
    are included so as to inform the accused of the charges and to allow him to prepare a defense.
    State   v.   Vangerpen, 
    125 Wn.2d 782
    ,               787, 
    888 P. 2d 1177
     ( 1995). When a defendant challenges a
    it               in favor                    Kjorsvik, 117
    charging document             after   the   verdict, we construe              liberally              of   validity.
    Wn.2d at 105. Under that liberal analysis, we determine whether the necessary facts appear in any
    form, or by fair construction can be found, in the charging document; and, if so, whether the
    defendant shows that he was nonetheless actually prejudiced by the inartful language that caused
    a lack of notice. Kjorsvik, 
    117 Wn.2d at
    105 -06.
    The charging document            provided     in   pertinent part     that Filitaula, " with      knowledge that the
    Grays Harbor          County        District Court had previously issued              a no contact order...           did violate the
    5
    44963 -3 -II
    order while the order was in effect by knowingly violating the restraint provision therein pertaining
    to Faufau I. Boyd[.]"           CP     at   7.    As stated above, a requirement that an offense be committed
    willfully is     satisfied   if the   person acted          knowingly.      RCW 9A. 08. 010( 4).     Even if the substitution
    of knowingly for willfully can be characterized as inartful, we see no prejudice as a result. Filitaula
    does not show that his defense would have differed had the information charged him with willfully
    violating the no- contact order.
    IV.       COMMUNITY CUSTODY
    Finally, Filitaula argues that the trial court violated RCW 9. 94A.701( 9) by imposing 12 .
    months of community custody. We disagree.
    RCW 9.94A.701( 9) provides that a community custody term " shall be reduced by the court
    whenever an offender' s standard range term of confinement in combination with the term of
    community custody            exceeds    the statutory         maximum       for the   crime."   The crime of felony violation
    of a no- contact order         is   a class       C   felony   punishable     by   up to 60     months'   confinement.   RCW
    26. 50. 110( 5);    RCW 9A. 20. 021( 1)(              c).    Because Filitaula had an offender score of more than 9
    points,   his   standard range was           60   months as well.          RCW 9. 94A. 510, . 515.
    During      sentencing,           Filitaula argued that an               exceptional     sentence   downward was
    appropriate      because Boyd initiated the                  prohibited contact.       See RCW 9. 94A.535( 1)(    a) ( victim' s
    initiation   of crime   is mitigating factor). The trial court agreed and imposed an exceptional sentence
    downward of 48 months plus 12 months of community custody.
    Filitaula now argues that the trial court erred by imposing 12 months of community custody
    because his total      sentence could             have      exceeded   the statutory    maximum.     He contends that RCW
    9. 94A.701( 9) does not focus on the confinement actually imposed but on the confinement that is
    possible.       According to Filitaula, whenever a defendant' s standard range and term of community
    6
    44963 -3 - II
    custody could together exceed the statutory maximum, a reduction or elimination of community
    custody is required.
    The State responds that RCW 9. 94A.701( 9) is irrelevant to Filitaula' s sentence because the
    trial court imposed an exceptional rather than a standard range sentence. The Washington Supreme
    Court recently      agreed and     held that RCW 9. 94A. 701( 9),   by its terms, applies only to standard
    range sentences.     In   re   Pers. Restraint ofMcWilliams, No. 88883 -3, 
    2014 WL 7338498
    , * 2 ( Wash.
    Dec. 24, 2014).
    Accordingly, we affirm the conviction and sentence for felony violation of a no- contact
    order.
    A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
    Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2. 06. 040,
    it is so ordered.
    We concur:
    IBC,
    Jjorgen, A.C. J.
    7