Personal Restraint Petition Of: Peter Daniel Ansell ( 2022 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION ONE
In the Matter of the Personal Restraint ) No. 82506-2-I
Petition of )
)
)
PETER ANSELL, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
Petitioner. )
)
VERELLEN, J. — Peter Ansell filed this personal restraint petition to challenge
eight of the community custody conditions imposed by the Indeterminate Sentence
Review Board (ISRB) following his release from prison. Ansell argues three
conditions should be stricken as unrelated to his crimes, four should be stricken or
modified due to unconstitutional vagueness, and one geographic restriction should
be modified.
Under Matter of Winton,1 conditions of community custody imposed by the
ISRB must be crime-related, meaning that they must bear a reasonable relation to
the circumstances of the crime, the offender’s risk of reoffense, and public safety.
Because the ISRB concedes marijuana possession is unrelated to Ansell’s
convictions, the limitations on use, possession, or proximity to marijuana (condition
D) must be stricken. However, limitations on random drug testing (condition E)
1 196 Wn.2d 270, 474 P.3d 532 (2020).
No. 82506-2-I/2
and monitoring of internet use (condition H) are crime-related because they are
necessary to monitor and enforce valid conditions.
A community custody condition is vague when it does not provide
sufficiently ascertainable standards to let a reasonable person know which
conduct is prohibited. Although a limitation on “sexually explicit materials”
(condition G) is not inherently vague, it must be modified because the condition
includes an overbroad definition of “sexually explicit materials” that invites
subjective enforcement. And because conditions limiting “dating” (condition N)
and “not form[ing] relationships with persons/families with minor children”
(condition O) fail to provide objective guidance to avoid arbitrary enforcement, they
must be stricken or modified. The limitation upon entering places where children
congregate (condition L) is not vague.
The ISRB did not abuse its discretion when determining the size of the
geographic restriction imposed in condition B. But the condition lacks a defined
process for determining when an exception is appropriate, enabling arbitrary
enforcement. On remand, the ISRB must craft exceptions with consistent,
ascertainable standards that can be applied on a case-by-case basis.
Therefore, we grant the petition in part, dismiss the petition in part, and
direct the ISRB to strike, revise, or replace specific conditions consistent with this
opinion.
2
No. 82506-2-I/3
FACTS
In 2009, Ansell pleaded guilty to three counts of first degree child
molestation for offenses committed against three young girls. 2 He was sentenced
to a minimum term of 130 months with a maximum term of life on each count,
running concurrently. The court also imposed a lifetime no contact order to protect
the victims and their families. Ansell was released to community custody in July of
2020, and the ISRB imposed fifteen additional conditions of community custody
due to his status as a sex offender. In April of 2021, Ansell filed this personal
restraint petition challenging eight of the fifteen conditions.
ANALYSIS
To obtain relief through a personal restraint petition where, as here, no prior
judicial review has occurred, a petitioner must show “‘that he is restrained under
RAP 16.4(b) and that the restraint is unlawful under RAP 16.4(c).’”3 A petitioner
subject to conditions of community custody as a result of a criminal proceeding is
restrained for purposes of RAP 16.4(b). Thus, to be entitled to relief, Ansell must
show a challenged condition is unlawful because it violates state law or a
constitutional right.4
2 State v. Ansell, noted at 163 Wn. App. 1026, 2011 WL 4012382, at *1.
3 In re Pers. Restraint of Blackburn, 168 Wn.2d 881, 884-85, 232 P.3d 1091(2010) (quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Isadore, 151 Wn.2d 294, 299, 88 P.3d 390(2004)).
4Matter of Williams, 198 Wn.2d 342, 352, 496 P.3d 289 (2021) (citing In re
Pers. Restraint of Gentry, 170 Wn.2d 711, 715, 245 P.3d 766 (2010)); RAP
16.4(c)(6).
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No. 82506-2-I/4
A petitioner must prove an unlawful restraint by a preponderance of the
evidence,5 offering “[f]actual evidence, rather than conclusory allegations.”6
“Speculation, conjecture, and inadmissible hearsay [are] insufficient to warrant
relief.”7
We review community custody conditions imposed by the ISRB for abuse of
discretion, and we review whether the ISRB had the authority to impose a
particular condition de novo as a question of law. 8 The ISRB abuses its discretion
if its decision was based on untenable grounds or made for untenable reasons.9
I. Challenges for Crime Relatedness
Ansell argues the ISRB abused its discretion by imposing three conditions
that were unauthorized because they were not related to his crimes. The ISRB
contends his “argument is without merit because conditions imposed by the [ISRB]
need not be crime-related to be valid.”10
5
Id. (citing In re Pers. Restraint of Cook, 114 Wn.2d 802, 813-14, 792 P.2d
506 (1990)).
6
Id. (citing In re Pers. Restraint of Gronquist, 138 Wn.2d 388, 396, 978
P.2d 1083 (1999)).
7
Id. (citing Gronquist, 138 Wn.2d at 396). To the extent the record contains
hearsay evidence, neither party has objected to it.
8
Matter of Winton, 196 Wn.2d 270, 274, 474 P.3d 532 (2020) (citing In re
Pers. Restraint of Coats, 173 Wn.2d 123, 133, 267 P.3d 324 (2011); State v.
Armendariz, 160 Wn.2d 106, 110, 156 P.3d 201 (2007)).
9State v. Johnson, 197 Wn.2d 740, 744, 487 P.3d 893 (2021) (quoting
State v. Vy Thang, 145 Wn.2d 630, 642, 41 P.3d 1159 (2002)).
10 Resp’t’s Br. at 7.
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No. 82506-2-I/5
In Matter of Winton, our Supreme Court considered the ISRB’s authority to
impose conditions of community custody.11 The court began by examining “the
statutory authority defining the ISRB’s discretion to impose community custody
conditions.”12 It concluded unanimously that “any community custody condition
imposed by the ISRB, even those that implicate constitutional freedoms, must bear
a reasonable relation to the circumstances of the crime, the offender's risk of
reoffense, and public safety.”13 Accordingly, when an individual challenges a
community custody condition imposed by the ISRB, “the relevant inquiry is
whether the imposed condition is ‘crime-related,’ meaning it is reasonably related
to the crime, the offender’s risk of reoffense, and the protection of public safety. If
the condition fails to meet these statutory requirements, it is manifestly
unreasonable and should be removed.”14 Contrary to the ISRB’s belief that
Winton “does not at all require” that community custody conditions be crime-
related,15 the Supreme Court held otherwise, and we are bound by its decision.16
11 196 Wn.2d at 272.
12 Id. at 276.
13Id. (emphasis added); see id. at 283 (agreeing with the majority that
community custody conditions must be crime-related) (Gordon McCloud, J.,
concurring).
14 Id. at 278 (citing RCW 9.94A.702(10)(c)(i-iii); RCW 9.95.0001(2)).
15 Resp’t’s Br. at 11.
16State v. Rogers, 17 Wn. App. 2d 466, 476, 487 P.3d 177 (2021) (citing
State v. Gore, 101 Wn.2d 481, 487, 681 P.2d 227 (1984); State v. Mandefero, 14
Wn. App. 2d 825, 837, 473 P.3d 1239 (2020)).
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No. 82506-2-I/6
Ansell contends condition D is not crime-related and must be stricken.
Condition D prohibits him from “us[ing], possess[ing], or control[ing] any
Marijuana/THC or enter[ing] any establishments whose primary purpose is the
sale of Marijuana/THC.”17 The ISRB concedes no evidence links marijuana use to
Ansell’s convictions. Because this restriction is not crime-related, it must be
stricken.18
Ansell argues condition E, which requires random drug monitoring, is not
crime-related. The ISRB argues it is authorized to impose conditions required to
monitor compliance.
Under RCW 9.94A.030(10), a condition is “crime-related” when it imposes
“affirmative acts necessary to monitor compliance” with valid community custody
conditions.19 Ansell has not challenged condition C, which prohibits him from use
17 Resp’t’s Br., Attachment B, at 2.
18 Winton, 196 Wn.2d at 278. The ISRB argues this condition is also
authorized by the requirement that Ansell “obey all laws.” Resp’t’s Br. at 13. This
argument is not compelling because it would obviate the requirement that an
individual receive notice of their specific conditions of community custody. See
Blackburn, 168 Wn.2d at 885-87 (holding a condition requiring an offender to
“obey all laws” was insufficiently definite to allow enforcement without additional
notice). The ISRB also argues unchallenged condition C, which prohibits
possession of “any . . . controlled substance . . . without a valid prescription,”
Resp’t’s Br., Attachment B, at 2, authorizes condition D. But, even if crime-
related, condition C is intended to cover different conduct because a person under
ISRB supervision can be prohibited from possessing or using marijuana
regardless of whether they have a valid prescription. RCW 69.51A.055.
19 RCW 9.95.0001(3) (using RCW 9.94A.030 to define “crime-related
prohibition”); see State v. Olsen, 189 Wn.2d 118, 130, 399 P.3d 1141 (2017) (“We
have approved of monitoring tools used to enforce a valid parole or probation
conditions.”) (citing State v. Riles, 135 Wn.2d 326, 339, 342, 957 P.2d 655(1998)).
6
No. 82506-2-I/7
of “any . . . controlled substance . . . without a valid prescription.”20 Although
Ansell argues random drug screening is unnecessary because the ISRB can
already require random polygraphs to enforce condition C, he cites no authority for
the proposition that the ISRB’s decision to use more than one monitoring tool is, in
itself, an abuse of discretion. Because affirmative requirements are crime-related
conditions of community custody when required to monitor compliance with valid
conditions, the ISRB did not abuse its discretion by imposing random drug testing
to monitor compliance with condition C.
Ansell argues condition H, which requires an internet monitoring program, is
not crime-related and must be stricken. Although the ISRB concedes internet use
is not connected to Ansell’s convictions, it argues this condition is, like the random
drug testing, authorized as a crime-related monitoring condition. Condition G
prohibits Ansell from “possess[ing] or access[ing] sexually explicit materials.”21
Ansell does not argue condition G is not crime-related, although he challenges it
on due process grounds, as discussed below. Ansell fails to show the ISRB
abused its discretion by choosing to monitor and enforce a valid prohibition on
accessing sexually explicit materials using both internet monitoring and random
polygraph examinations.22
20 Resp’t’s Br., Attachment B, at 2.
21 Id.22 Because we uphold the prohibition in condition G, requiring only that its
definition be clarified to avoid overbreadth and arbitrary enforcement, condition H
remains valid.
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No. 82506-2-I/8
II. Challenges for Vagueness
Ansell challenges four conditions of community custody as
unconstitutionally vague. Imposition of an unconstitutional condition is an abuse of
discretion.23
Due process protections apply to conditions of community custody.24 Both
the 14th Amendment and article I, section 3 of the state constitution require “‘fair
warning of proscribed conduct.’”25 A community custody condition is
unconstitutionally vague when “(1) it does not sufficiently define the proscribed
conduct so an ordinary person can understand the prohibition or (2) it does not
provide sufficiently ascertainable standards to protect against arbitrary
enforcement.”26 It “will be void if it ‘may authorize and even encourage arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement.’”27
A community custody condition “implicating First Amendment speech must
be narrowly tailored to further the State’s legitimate interest”28 and “demands a
23State v. Padilla, 190 Wn.2d 672, 677, 416 P.3d 712 (2018) (citing State v.
Irwin, 191 Wn. App. 644, 652, 364 P.3d 830 (2015)).
24 Blackburn, 168 Wn.2d at 884.
25 State v. Wallmuller, 194 Wn.2d 234, 239, 449 P.3d 619 (2019) (quoting
State v. Sanchez Valencia, 169 Wn.2d 782, 791, 239 P.3d 1059 (2010)).
26
Padilla, 190 Wn.2d at 677 (citing State v. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d 739, 752-53,
193 P.3d 678 (2008)).
27
Id. at 679 (quoting City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56, 119 S. Ct.
1849, 144 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1999) (plurality opinion)).
28Id. at 678 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 117, 92 S.
Ct. 2294, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1972)).
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No. 82506-2-I/9
greater degree of specificity.”29 “[A]n overbroad definition does not sufficiently put
the offender on notice of what materials are prohibited and subjects him to
possible arbitrary enforcement.”30 Thus, the “presence of a vague definition does
not save the condition from a vagueness challenge if it also encompasses a broad
range of speech protected by the First Amendment.”31
Ansell challenges condition G, arguing it has invited arbitrary enforcement
from his community corrections officer (CCO) as a result of its definition.
Condition G prohibits Ansell from accessing or possessing “sexually explicit
materials.” It defines “sexually explicit materials” as
any item reasonably deemed to be intended for sexual gratification
and which displays, portrays, depicts, or describes: a) Nudity, which
includes, but is not limited to, exposed/visible (in whole or part,
including under or through translucent/thin materials providing
intimate physical detail) genitals/genitalia, anus, buttocks and/or
female/transgender breast nipple(s); b) A sex act which includes, but
is not limited to, genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal
contact/penetration, genital or anal contact/penetration with an
inanimate object, masturbation and/or bodily excretory behavior; c)
Sadistic/masochistic abuse, bondage, bestiality, and/or participant
who appears to be nonconsenting, dominated, degraded, humiliated,
or in a submissive role, and/or a participant who appears to be acting
in a forceful, threatening, dominating, or violent manner; and/or d) A
minor, or a model or cartoon depicting a minor, in a sexually
suggestive setting/pose/attire.[32]
Ansell does not contend the prohibition on possessing or accessing “sexually
explicit materials” is inherently vague. Rather, he contends the condition is vague
29 Id. (citing State v. Riley, 121 Wn.2d 22, 37-38, 846 P.2d 1365 (1993)).
30 Id. at 674-75.
31 Id. at 680-81 (citing Bahl, 164 Wn.2d at 756)).
32 Resp’t’s Br., Attachment B, at 2.
9
No. 82506-2-I/10
as applied to him because the definition of “sexually explicit materials” is
overbroad and requires the CCO’s subjective judgment.
The ISRB cites to State v. Nguyen33 to argue condition G is not vague. In
Nguyen, a man convicted of child molestation and child rape challenged as vague
a community custody condition prohibiting him from “possess[ing], us[ing],
access[ing] or view[ing] any sexually explicit material . . . erotic materials . . . or
any material depicting any person engaged in sexually explicit conduct” as
defined, respectively, by RCW 9.68.130, 9.68.050, and 9.68A.011(4).34 Our
Supreme Court concluded the condition was not vague.35 Relying on State v.
Bahl,36 it explained the phrase “sexually explicit material” is not inherently vague. 37
The court also noted that the statutory definitions cited in the condition supported
its conclusion that “persons of ordinary intelligence can discern ‘sexually explicit
material’ from works of art and anthropological significance.”38 But Nguyen is not
directly applicable here because Ansell’s challenge is to the definition of “sexually
explicit materials” as applied by his CCO.
In State v. Padilla, a defendant convicted of communicating with a minor for
immoral purposes was prohibited from possessing or accessing “pornographic
33 191 Wn.2d 671, 425 P.3d 847 (2018).
34 Id. at 676, 679.
35 Id. at 681.
36 164 Wn.2d 739, 760, 193 P.3d 678 (2008).
37 Nguyen, 191 Wn.2d at 680.
38 Id. at 680-81.
10
No. 82506-2-I/11
material,” which was defined as “images of sexual intercourse, simulated or real,
masturbation, or the display of intimate body parts,” and he challenged the
definition as vague.39 Our Supreme Court agreed.40 The court explained the
definition “would unnecessarily encompass movies and television shows not
created for the sole purpose of sexual gratification . . . impermissibly extend[ing] to
a variety of works of arts, books, advertisements, movies, and television shows.” 41
As a result, it failed to provide adequate notice of prohibited conduct, both
preventing the defendant from modifying his behavior and inviting arbitrary
enforcement.42
The circumstances here are like Padilla rather than Nguyen. The ISRB
argues the breadth of the condition is saved by the requirement that only materials
“intended for sexual gratification” are prohibited.43 But, as in Padilla, Ansell
challenges the definition for not providing adequate notice and for inviting arbitrary
enforcement. And, like Padilla, at least some portion of the definition is broad
enough to encompass materials not created for a sexual purpose, such as video
recordings of ballet performances and some athletic activities or descriptions of
nudity or sex in any book. The definition here invites a subjective interpretation by
39 190 Wn.2d 672, 674, 676, 416 P.3d 712 (2018).
40 Id. at 675.
41Id. at 681 (citing Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161, 94 S. Ct. 2750,
41 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1974)).
42 Id. at 682.
43 Resp’t’s Br. at 28-29.
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No. 82506-2-I/12
encompassing materials protected under the First Amendment and providing no
guidance of whether those materials were “intended for sexual gratification.” As
the Padilla court explained, the “presence of a vague definition” can support a due
process challenge, even if, as here, the prohibition itself is not inherently vague. 44
When the ISRB chose to broadly define “sexually explicit materials” and declined
to provide enforcement criteria, it infringed Ansell’s First Amendment rights and
risked subjecting him to arbitrary enforcement.”45
Indeed, the record here illustrates how condition G impermissibly invited
arbitrary enforcement. In September 2020, Ansell’s CCO wrote that he “received
hits on [Ansell’s] monitoring software regarding [Y]ou[T]ube videos which are
potential violations.”46 After watching the videos, Ansell’s CCO wrote that Ansell
violated condition G for watching “‘risqué’ videos on [Y]ou[T]ube for sexual
gratification,” even though “the videos in question were not pornographic in nature,
but they were suggestive.”47 By delegating the authority to determine the
prohibition’s boundaries to an individual CCO, condition G created “‘a real danger
that the prohibition . . . translate[d] to a prohibition on whatever the officer finds
personally titillating.’”48 Because condition G has an overbroad definition of
“sexually explicit material” that invites the CCO’s subjective perspective when
44 Padilla, 190 Wn.2d at 680-81 (citing Bahl, 164 Wn.2d at 756)).
45 Id. at 674-75.
46 Reply Br., Attachment A, at 5.
47 Id. at 4.
48 Padilla, 190 Wn.2d at 682 (quoting Bahl, 164 Wn.2d at 755).
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No. 82506-2-I/13
enforcing it, it implicates Ansell’s due process and First Amendment rights. 49 And
because imposing an unconstitutional condition of community custody is always
an abuse of discretion,50 the definition of “sexually explicit material” in condition G
must be rewritten by the ISRB to provide sufficient guidance and must be narrowly
tailored to meet the ISRB’s legitimate interests.51
Ansell argues condition L is vaguely defined and has resulted in arbitrary
enforcement. Condition L states that Ansell “must not enter places where minor
children tend to congregate, including but not limited to shopping malls, schools,
playgrounds, parks, public schools, skating rinks, and video arcades[,] without
prior approval from your CCO.”52
Ansell contends the word “park” has been rendered vague by the use of
“playground” because “park” could be understood as referring to any type of park
as opposed to one intended for children.53 The ISRB argues “park” is not vague
because “‘parks’ is one illustrative example among many” and Ansell “reads ‘park’
in isolation.”54 We agree with the ISRB. As in State v. Wallmuller,55 the specific
prohibition is against entering “places where minor children tend to congregate,”
49 Id. at 679 (quoting Morales, 527 U.S. at 56).
50 Blackburn, 168 Wn.2d at 884.
51 Padilla, 190 Wn.2d at 678 (citing Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109).
52 Resp’t’s Br., Attachment B, at 3.
53 Personal Restraint Petition (PRP) at 14-15.
54 Resp’t’s Br. at 30.
55 194 Wn.2d 234, 449 P.3d 619 (2019).
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No. 82506-2-I/14
and “such a phrase is sufficiently specific when modified by a nonexclusive list of
places illustrating its scope.”56 The “vagueness doctrine does not require
impossible precision”57 and demands only “‘the kind of notice that will enable
ordinary people to understand what conduct it prohibits.’”58 Because condition L
provides sufficient guidance, the ISRB did not abuse its discretion by imposing this
condition.59
Ansell challenges condition N, which requires that he “not date individuals
who have minor children” without prior approval from his CCO and the ISRB.60 He
contends the word “date” is vague because “knowing the boundaries of this
condition, as it is written, is impossible.”61 “Date” is undefined, and the condition
does not provide examples. The ISRB argues that “date” should be defined as “a
56 Id. at 243 (citing State v. Johnson, 4 Wn. App. 2d 352, 360, 421 P.3d 969(2018)).
57 Id. at 244-45.
58 Padilla, 190 Wn.2d at 679 (quoting Morales, 527 U.S. at 56).
59 We note that the ISRB and Ansell’s CCO disagree about whether
condition L encompasses state parks. See Resp’t’s Br. at 30 (arguing condition L
does not apply to “‘national parks’ or ‘state parks’ . . . as ‘minor children’ do not
‘tend to congregate’ there”); Reply Br., Attachment G (safety plan required by
Ansell’s CCO regarding Ansell receiving permission to visit state parks). Because
remand is required for the other conditions, the ISRB may take that opportunity to
resolve this tension with more precise language in the condition regarding parks.
60 Resp’t’s Br., Attachment B, at 3.
61 PRP at 15-16.
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No. 82506-2-I/15
means of establishing contact with an adult who ‘has’ minor children.”62
Restrictions on the freedom to associate implicate the First Amendment.63
In Nguyen, which considered the consolidated appeals of two defendants, a
woman convicted of second degree child molestation brought a vagueness
challenge against a condition of community custody requiring her to inform her
CCO of any “dating relationship.”64 Our Supreme Court upheld the condition.65
The court explained “A ‘date’ is defined as ‘an appointment between two persons’
for ‘the mutual enjoyment of some form of social activity,’ ‘an occasion (as an
evening) of social activity arranged in advance between two persons.’”66 A
“relationship” is “‘a state of affairs existing between those persons having
relations.’”67 And, the legislature defined “dating relationship” in RCW
26.50.010(2) using factors a court may consider to identify a “‘social relationship of
a romantic nature.’”68 From these definitions, the court concluded “dating
relationship” was not vague because “a reasonable person, in considering the
62 Resp’t’s Br. at 32.
63 Matter of Brettell, 6 Wn. App. 2d 161, 169, 430 P.3d 677 (2018).
64 Nguyen, 191 Wn.2d at 677, 681.
65 Id. at 683.
66 Id. at 682 (quoting W EBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 576
(2002)).
67 Id. (quoting W EBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1916
(2002)).
68 Id. (quoting RCW 26.50.010(2)).
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No. 82506-2-I/16
factors, would not conclude that individuals who are ‘just friends’ or engage in a
single social activity with one another are in a ‘dating relationship.’”69
Using the definition of “date” from Nguyen, Ansell has, absent prior
authorization from his CCO and the ISRB, been prohibited from having an
occasion of social activity arranged in advance with another person when the
purpose of the activity is their mutual enjoyment.70 Unlike Nguyen, condition N
does not require that Ansell be in a romantic relationship with the person on the
“date.” The condition has the potential to prohibit Ansell from a wide range of
planned social engagements with friends, family, or spiritual leaders regardless of
whether the lone “date” could endanger a minor. It is also unclear whether a date
for professional networking would be prohibited by this condition when part of the
purpose of such a “date” is the enjoyment of both parties. Unlike the limitation
upon a “dating relationship” upheld in Nguyen, condition N fails to provide a
“sufficiently definite” standard that is easily understood by an ordinary person.
Therefore, it is vague, and remand is required for it to be stricken or clarified.71
Ansell challenges condition O, which requires that he “not form
relationships with persons/families with minor children without first disclosing your
sex offender status and having this relationship approved by your CCO.”72 Ansell
69 Id. at 682, 683.
See id. at 682 (quoting W EBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
70
576 (2002)).
71
See id. at 681 (citing City of Spokane v. Douglass, 115 Wn.2d 171, 179,
795 P.2d 693 (1990)).
72 Resp’t’s Br, Attachment B, at 3.
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No. 82506-2-I/17
argues that condition O, like condition N, is too unclear to let him modify his
behavior by predicting when and what types of relationships require approval. We
agree. Like condition N, and unlike the “dating relationship” condition upheld in
Nguyen, condition O provides no guidance about when routine, friendly
interactions between Ansell and a person or family with minor children slips from a
mere passing acquaintance into a “relationship.” Indeed, an ordinary person could
easily regard routine neighborliness as forming a relationship. Although “a
subjective element in a [community custody] condition may be sufficiently specific
if tethered to objective criteria,”73 condition O provides none. Because condition O
fails to provide ascertainable standards, it is unconstitutionally vague.
On remand, the ISRB must clarify community custody condition G and must
strike or clarify conditions N and O to provide ascertainable standards and avoid
arbitrary enforcement.74
III. Geographic Limitation
Ansell challenges community custody condition B, which imposes
geographic and travel limitations, arguing it must be revised to “ensure a
functioning exception process.”75 Condition B prohibits Ansell from entering the
73United States v. Reeves, 591 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 2010); accord Nguyen,
191 Wn.2d at 683 (upholding a condition pairing “highly subjective qualifiers” with
“an objective standard”).
74Ansell argues the ISRB should follow his therapist’s recommendations to
modify his community custody conditions, but he cites no authority showing the
ISRB must consider them. The ISRB has the discretion to craft particular
conditions. Winton, 196 Wn.2d at 274.
75Reply Br. at 22; PRP at 20-25. To the extent Ansell challenges the size
of the exclusion zone, his arguments are not compelling. The ISRB has the
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No. 82506-2-I/18
portion of the City of Seattle north of I-90 without prior written approval from his
CCO and the ISRB. The ISRB contends condition B is appropriate as written
because it is related to Ansell’s crimes, community safety, and his risk of
reoffense. It does not address why a formal exception process is unnecessary.
In Winton, the Supreme Court upheld a condition of community custody
imposing a geographic exclusion.76 The offender, who had been convicted of
molesting two children in Clark County, was prohibited from travelling to the county
unless he received permission from his CCO and the ISRB or did not intend to
stop there.77 Although the offender argued the requirement unduly burdened his
right to travel because his daughter lived in northern Oregon, the court concluded
the restriction did not do so.78 The court explained the offender did not live or work
in Clark County, did not “demonstrate any need to otherwise stop or engage in
discretion to determine the scope of geographic restriction so long as it is
reasonably related to the crime, the offender’s risk of reoffense, and public safety.
Winton, 196 Wn.2d at 278-79. The record shows the ISRB drew these specific
boundaries based upon where his victims live, work, attend school, and engage in
other routine activities. Based on these facts and to minimize the risk of the
victims encountering Ansell, the ISRB explains “it became difficult to construct the
restricted area more narrowly.” Ansell Resp. to ISRB Offer of Proof at 3. And
Ansell concedes the existence of the exclusion zone “serves a valid purpose: to
prevent inadvertent contact between Ansell and his victims.” Ansell Resp. to ISRB
Offer of Proof at 2. Although Ansell posits a narrower geographic limitation is
possible, he does not show the ISRB abused its discretion when it determined the
size of the exclusion zone.
76 Winton, 196 Wn.2d at 279.
77 Id. at 273.
78 Id. at 278.
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activity within Clark County,” and did not show his travel requests had ever been
denied.79
Ansell contends that, unlike Winton, the ISRB has enforced condition B
arbitrarily, particularly affecting his ability to obtain medical care. The record
supports his argument.
The exclusion zone includes many medical providers because it
encompasses the University of Washington Medical Center, First Hill, Cherry Hill,
and Capitol Hill. In September of 2020, Ansell notified his CCO that he needed a
medical appointment at a hospital on Capitol Hill. In October, Ansell received the
permit for the November appointment. After the November appointment, Ansell
requested additional permits for more medical appointments in January. On
January 4, 2021, Ansell received permits for two appointments on January 14 and
28. On January 27, Ansell’s CCO approved permits for multiple medical
appointments over the coming months, and he forwarded the permit requests to
the ISRB. On February 10, 2021, the ISRB told the CCO:
[T]he proctologist and dermatologist appointments would be doable
since they are specialists and travel would be infrequent, [but] the
[physical therapy] appointments should be outside of his exclusion
zone due to the frequency. . . . [I]t would be best if [Ansell] didn’t
travel in the zone at all[,] as it would make things easier on him, you,
[the] victim[s], as well as the Board and the [victim liaison]. . . . If he
REALLY needs to go to these professionals in his exclusion zone[,]
we can make some of them work, but not all of them.[80]
79 Id.
80 Ansell Resp. to ISRB Offer of Proof, Ex. 3.
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The ISRB also explained the CCO could “kill the request” by “denying any of his
requests[,] and they wouldn’t be reviewed by the [ISRB].”81 The next morning,
Ansell’s CCO emailed him to say that, based upon correspondence from the ISRB,
he “will not be permitted to travel into his exclusion zone for any reason.”82 The
CCO also stated that the ISRB “will not consider any further requests for medical
appointments.”83 He explained the current permits “were issued prematurely” and
had been rescinded.84 In March, the CCO denied Ansell’s request to travel inside
the exclusion zone to receive a COVID-19 vaccination.
Ansell filed this personal restraint petition in April of 2021, and in May, his
CCO “clarified to [him] that the previous communication about [the] passes that
were rescinded were only relating to those specific requests.”85 In June, his CCO
and the ISRB granted Ansell a permit to enter the exclusion zone to visit a self-
storage facility.
Unlike Winton, Ansell has demonstrated a need to enter the exclusion zone
on some occasions, and the ISRB, for a period of time, encouraged the CCO to
prohibit Ansell from travelling into his exclusion zone without exception and
appeared to do so, at least in part, for its own convenience. And it decided to
condition Ansell’s ability to obtain medical care within the exclusion zone on the
81 Id.
82 Reply Br., Attachment A at 1.
83 PRP at 22, Attachment F.
84 Reply Br., Attachment A at 1.
85 Resp’t’s Br., Attachment A at 1.
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frequency of appointments rather than a medical provider’s recommendations.
This record shows the ISRB and his CCO arbitrarily denied some requests for
exceptions. A community custody condition must “provide sufficiently
ascertainable standards to protect against arbitrary enforcement,”86 and condition
B does not do so. Remand is required for the ISRB to modify the condition and
develop ascertainable standards applicable on a case-by-case basis to allow
travel into and through the exclusion zone.87
Therefore, we grant the petition in part, dismiss the petition in part, and
direct the ISRB to strike, revise, or replace conditions consistent with this opinion.
WE CONCUR:
86 Padilla, 190 Wn.2d at 677 (citing Bahl, 164 Wn.2d at 752-53).
87 Our focus on medical care does not mean other exceptions may not be
justified.
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