In Re The Marriage Of: Madhavan Vijayaboopathy, App V. Pramila Madhavan N/k/a Lawrance, Resp ( 2022 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION ONE
In the Matter of the Marriage of: ) No. 82192-0-I
)
MADHAVAN VIJAYABOOPATHY, )
)
Appellant, )
)
and )
)
PRAMILA MADHAVAN, n/k/a ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
PRAMILA LAWRANCE, )
)
Respondent. )
)
VERELLEN, J. — Madhavan Vijayaboopathy challenges the trial court’s
parenting plan restricting his residential time to the discretion of his 15-year-old
daughter. Because the court found that Vijayaboopathy had a history of domestic
violence under RCW 26.09.191(2)(a)(iii) against the mother, Pramila Lawrance,
the court did not abuse its discretion in restricting his residential time and also
considering the “wishes” of their “sufficiently mature” daughter.
Vijayaboopathy also challenges the trial court’s maintenance award,
division of property, child support order, and its attorney fee award in favor of
Lawrance. But he fails to properly assign error to specific findings of fact. Further,
even if we ignore his deficient assignments of error, substantial evidence supports
the trial court’s findings. The court did not abuse its discretion.
We award attorney fees on appeal to Lawrance.
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Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
In 2001, Madhavan Vijayaboopathy married Pramila Lawrance1 in India.
Shortly after they were married, he started physically abusing her.
In 2006, Vijayaboopathy, Lawrance, and their two daughters moved to the
United States, but they kept their residence in India. They entered the United
States on an H1-B visa sponsored by Vijayaboopathy’s employer, T-Mobile.
A few years later, the family, including daughters, Mokshita and Shivani,2
moved to Bothell, Washington. On April 7, 2019, after 19 years of marriage,
Vijayaboopathy filed for divorce.
During the marriage, Vijayaboopathy removed thousands of dollars from
“community funds” and transferred them to a “life coach,” Ms. Holloway.3
Vijayaboopathy also refinanced their Bothell residence without Lawrance’s
knowledge and failed to pay the mortgage. As a result, their “loan [on the
property] is now in foreclosure.”4
At the time of trial, Vijayaboopathy earned approximately $19,008 a month
as a senior architect for T-Mobile. Lawrance’s ability to work in the United States
1 Pramila Madhavan changed her name to Pramila Lawrance.
2 We refer to the daughters by their first names for clarity.
Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 106 (Finding of Fact (FF) 22.3(a)); Report of
3
Proceedings (RP) (Oct. 6, 2020) at 219.
4 CP at 106 (FF 22.3(a)).
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was complicated by her immigration status, and she referred to herself as a stay-
at-home mother.
After a bench trial, the trial court entered written findings of fact and
conclusions of law. The court entered a final parenting plan restricting
Vijayaboopathy’s residential time to the sole discretion of 15-year-old Mokshita.
The court entered a final divorce order requiring Vijayaboopathy to pay Lawrance
maintenance of $8,000 a month for nine years. The court also awarded the real
properties to Lawrance, divided the community personal property in favor of
Vijayaboopathy, distributed the community debt in favor of Lawrance, and held
each parent personally responsible for their individual debt. The court entered a
final child support order requiring Vijayaboopathy to pay Shivani’s college tuition.
And the court awarded Lawrance attorney fees based upon Vijayaboopathy’s
intransigence.
Vijayaboopathy appeals.
ANALYSIS
I. Parenting Plan
Vijayaboopathy argues that the trial court erred by depriving him “of any
parenting rights to see his daughter,” Mokshita.5
5Appellant’s Br. at 13. Shivani was 18 years of age at the time the court
entered the parenting plan.
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We review a parenting plan for an abuse of discretion.6 A trial court abuses
its discretion when its decisions are based on untenable grounds or made for
untenable reasons.7 Unchallenged findings of fact are accepted as verities on
appeal.8 An appellant is required to specifically assign error identifying any
portion of a finding of fact challenged on appeal.9
We note that Vijayaboopathy did not properly assign error to any findings of
fact.10 And even if an appellant properly assigns error, a finding of fact is
sustained on appeal if supported by substantial evidence.11 “Substantial evidence
is that which is sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the
matter asserted.”12
6 Katare v. Katare, 175 Wn.2d 23, 35, 283 P.3d 546 (2012); In re Marriage
of Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d 39, 46-47, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997).
7 Katare, 175 Wn.2d at 35.
8 Matter of Custody of A.T., 11 Wn. App. 2d 156, 163, 451 P.3d 1132(2019).
9 RAP 2.5(a).
10 In his reply brief, Vijayaboopathy cites authority that we may waive the
failure to make proper assignments of error to specific portions of the findings of
fact if the brief makes the nature of the challenge clear. But this exception is
discretionary and also requires that the brief “include the challenged findings in the
text” of the brief. See Harris v. Urell, 133 Wn. App. 130, 137, 135 P.3d 530 (2006)
(cited in Appellant’s Reply Br. at 9). Here, Vijayaboopathy’s briefing does not
adequately make specific reference to the challenged portions of the findings of
fact. Therefore, we are not compelled to apply this exception.
11
Katare, 175 Wn.2d at 35 (citing Ferree v. Doric Co., 62 Wn.2d 561, 568,
383 P.2d 900 (1963)).
Id. (citing King County v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hr’gs Bd.,
12
142 Wn.2d 543, 561, 14 P.3d 133 (2000)).
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RCW 26.09.191(2)(a)(iii) permits a trial court to impose restrictions on a
parent’s residential time when a parent has engaged in a “history of acts of
domestic violence.” And in imposing additional restrictions, the court can also
consider “the wishes of a child who is sufficiently mature to express reasoned and
independent preferences as to his or her residential schedule.”13
Here, Lawrance testified that she suffered from domestic violence “[m]any
times” during the marriage.14 She noted that both Mokshita and Shivani have
witnessed Vijayaboopathy “hitting” her.15 Lawrance stated that Vijayaboopathy
has been arrested more than five times for domestic violence and that most
recently, in April of 2019, he was convicted of assault. Lawrance also testified that
their 15-year-old daughter, Mokshita “doesn’t want to go” to Vijayaboopathy’s
apartment because “[h]e’s stopped talking with them” and “he’s acting weird.”16 As
a result, in the final parenting plan, the trial court limited Vijayaboopathy’s
residential time with Mokshita by stating, “Mokshita shall have visits with her father
at her sole discretion. If Mokshita desires to visit her father, she may determine
the length and location of such visits.”17
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s domestic violence finding
under RCW 26.09.191(2)(a)(iii) and its finding that Mokshita “does not want to
13 RCW 26.09.187(3)(a)(vi).
14 RP (Oct. 5, 2020) at 81.
15 Id. at 87-88.
16 Id. at 90.
17 CP at 108.
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engage in visits with her father at this time.”18 Because 15-year-old Mokshita was
sufficiently mature to indicate her preferences regarding her residential schedule,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in restricting Vijayaboopathy’s residential
time with her.
II. Maintenance
Vijayaboopathy contends that the trial court erred in the amount of
maintenance it awarded to Lawrance. We review a maintenance award for an
abuse of discretion.19
“‘The only limitation on amount and duration of maintenance under
RCW 26.09.090 is that, in light of the relevant factors, the award must be just.’”20
The court can consider the following nonexclusive factors in awarding
maintenance:
(1) the financial resources of the party seeking maintenance; (2) the
time needed to acquire education necessary to obtain employment;
(3) the standard of living during the marriage; (4) the duration of the
marriage, (5) the age, physical and emotional condition, and financial
obligations of the spouse seeking maintenance; (6) and the ability of
the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet his or her
needs and obligations while providing the other spouse with
maintenance.[21]
18 CP at 105-06 (FF 22.1(b)).
19 In re Marriage of Valente, 179 Wn. App. 817, 821-22, 320 P.3d 115(2014).
20Matter of Marriage of Anthony, 9 Wn. App. 2d 555, 564, 446 P.3d 635(2019) (quoting Bulicek v. Bulicek, 59 Wn. App. 630, 633, 800 P.2d 394 (1990)).
21 Valente, 179 Wn. App. at 821-22 (citing RCW 26.09.090).
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While the trial court must consider the above factors, “it is not required [that the
court] make specific factual findings on all of the factors.”22
Here, Lawrance testified that she has been unemployed since entering the
United States. Her immigration attorney, Neha Vyas, testified that when her
divorce is final, she will be “out of status.”23 And Vyas also testified that Lawrance
intends to apply for U nonimmigrant status, but due to long waiting lists, she will be
unable to lawfully work in the United States for five years.
Lawrance stated that during her 19-year marriage, she and her family lived
a luxurious lifestyle. Lawrance testified that in 2019, Vijayaboopathy earned
$225,346 and that each year, his salary increases.24 Lawrance also testified that
during the marriage, Vijayaboopathy transferred approximately $39,000 to Ms.
Holloway and has since transferred approximately $105,000 to her. The court
expressly found that these transfers to Ms. Holloway were made by
Vijayaboopathy “to hide the funds” from Lawrance and the court.25 Substantial
evidence supports this finding.
22Anthony, 9 Wn. App. 2d at 564 (quoting Mansour v. Mansour, 126 Wn.
App. 1, 16, 106 P.3d 768 (2004)).
23 RP (Oct. 6, 2020) at 247-48.
24See CP at 107 (FF 22.3(g)). Vijayaboopathy contends the trial court was
mistaken that his monthly earnings of $19,008 did not include his bonus ($25,000
on an annual basis) and thereby double counted his annual bonus. But even if we
ignore his failure to properly assign error to this portion of the finding of fact, the
determination of consequence was the great difference in earning capacity of the
parties. Even if we disregard the annual bonus, Vijayaboopathy’s earning capacity
far exceeds Lawrance’s.
25 CP at 106 (FF 22.3 (a)).
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Substantial evidence also supports the trial court’s determination that
Lawrance was in need of maintenance and that Vijayaboopathy had the ability to
pay. Substantial evidence supports the findings of a 19-year marriage, a great
difference in earning capacity, and an “upper-middle class standard of living during
their marriage.26 And in this setting, the court’s express emphasis upon the
father’s attempt to hide assets from the court is a legitimate concern regarding the
true picture of the assets available when evaluating the amount of maintenance. 27
Because the court’s maintenance award was “just,” the court did not abuse its
discretion.
III. Division of Property
Vijayaboopathy challenges the property distribution including his contention
that the trial court made “a series of computational errors.”28
The trial court has broad discretion in distributing marital property. 29 “The
trial court’s distribution of property in a dissolution action is guided by statute,
which requires it to consider multiple factors in reaching an equitable conclusion.
These factors include (1) the nature and extent of the community property, (2) the
nature and extent of the separate property, (3) the duration of the marriage, and
26 CP at 107 (FF 22.3(e)).
27
The final factor that should be considered in awarding maintenance is a
spouse’s “dissipation and probable concealment of assets.” In re Marriage of
Morrow, 53 Wn. App. 579, 588, 770 P.2d 197 (1989) (citing In re Marriage of
Nicholson, 17 Wn. App. 110, 118-19, 561 P.2d 1116 (1977)).
28 Appellant’s Br. at 6.
29 In re Marriage of Rockwell, 141 Wn. App. 235, 242, 170 P.3d 572 (2007).
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(4) the economic circumstances of each spouse.”30 And in weighing these factors,
the court “may properly consider a spouse’s waste or concealment of assets.”31
Here, the trial court favored Lawrance with a 71 to 29 percent split of the
assets. The court noted that due to Vijayaboopathy’s actions during the marriage,
there were “limited assets to divide.”32 The trial court awarded the equity in the
Bothell and India residences to Lawrance. The court divided the community
personal property marginally in Vijayaboopathy’s favor.33 The court ordered
Lawrance to pay the mortgage on the India residence and ordered the rest of the
community debt to be paid by Vijayaboopathy, including three different loans he
obtained. And the trial court held each responsible for their separate debt.
In its maintenance findings, the court noted that during the marriage
Vijayaboopathy took “huge sums of community funds and transferred them to Ms.
Holloway, to hide the funds” from Lawrance and the court.34 The court also found
that Vijayaboopathy took “on enormous amount[s] of debt unbeknownst to
[Lawrance], and those funds” were never accounted for by him.35 Vijayaboopathy
30 Id. (citing RCW 26.09.080).
31 In re Marriage of Wallace, 111 Wn. App. 697, 708, 45 P.3d 1131 (2002)
(citing In re Marriage of White, 105 Wn. App. 545, 551, 20 P.3d 481 (2001)).
32 CP at 106 (FF 22.3(a)).
33 Compare CP at 64 with CP at 65.
34 CP at 106 (FF 22.3(a)).
35 Id. “The trial court may properly consider the property division when
determining maintenance, and may consider maintenance in making an equitable
division of the property.” In re Marriage of Estes, 84 Wn. App. 586, 593, 929 P.2d
500 (1997) (citing In re Rink, 18 Wn. App. 549, 552-53, 571 P.2d 210 (1977)).
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fails to establish that the court abused its discretion in considering his concealment
of assets in dividing the couple’s property.
Vijayaboopathy’s argument that the trial court committed “arithmetic errors”
in its division of property focuses on the court’s calculation of equity in the Bothell
residence.36 But the only finding of consequence regarding the value of the
Bothell residence is unchallenged finding of fact 22.4(a), that the home “has equity
in the amount of $47,894.”37 Even if we disregard the lack of an adequate
assignment of error, Lawrance testified that the Bothell residence was most likely
to sell for approximately $850,000 with closing costs of roughly $66,000.
Vijayaboopathy argued at closing that the principal balance with delinquent
amounts on the Bothell property “basically adds up to $731,580.”38
Taken together, this record is consistent with an equity in the Bothell
residence of roughly $48,000, approximately what the trial court found. And “[a]
just and equitable division [of property] ‘does not require mathematical precision,
but rather fairness, based upon a consideration of all the circumstances of the
marriage, both past and present, and an evaluation of the future needs of the
parties.’”39 On this record, Vijayaboopathy does not establish an abuse of
discretion in the property distribution.
36 Appellant’s Br. at 24-25.
37 CP at 107.
38 RP (Oct. 6, 2020) at 311.
39
In re Marriage of Larson and Calhoun, 178 Wn. App. 133, 138, 313 P.3d
1228 (2013) (citing In re Marriage of Crosetto, 82 Wn. App. 545, 556, 918 P.2d
954 (1996)).
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IV. Child Support
Vijayaboopathy argues that the trial court erred by “failing to enter adequate
findings” in support of its conclusion that he should be solely responsible for
Shivani’s college tuition.40 We review a child support order for an abuse of
discretion.41
“In setting child support, the trial court must take into consideration all
factors bearing upon the needs of the children and the parents’ ability to pay.”42 A
child support order “should meet each child’s basic needs and should provide any
‘additional child support commensurate with the parent’s income, resources and
standard of living.’”43
Here, Lawrance testified that despite her efforts to persuade Shivani to
attend a more financially affordable college such as the University of Washington,
Vijayaboopathy promised to pay for Shivani to attend the University of California
Santa Barbara (UCSB).44 The trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding him
solely responsible for Shivani’s UCSB tuition.
40 Appellant’s Br. at 5.
41In re Marriage of Holmes, 128 Wn. App. 727, 736, 117 P.3d 370 (2005)
(citing Marriage of Griffin, 114 Wn.2d 772, 776, 791 P.2d 519 (1990)).
42In re Marriage of Pollard, 99 Wn. App. 48, 52, 991 P.2d 1201 (2000)
(citing Matter of Marriage of Blickenstaff, 71 Wn. App. 489, 498, 859 P.2d 646(1993)).
43 Id. (citing RCW 26.19.001).
44 See Untersteiner v. Untersteiner, 32 Wn. App. 859, 864, 650 P.2d 256(1982) (“‘An agreement of a husband to pay a designated amount of support is an
undertaking which is favored by the courts.’”) (quoting Kinne v. Kinne, 82 Wn.2d
360, 363, 510 P.2d 814 (1973)).
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V. Attorney Fees
Vijayaboopathy argues that the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees to
Lawrance. We review an award of attorney fees for an abuse of discretion.45 In
an action for dissolution of marriage a trial court may award attorney fees if “one
spouse’s intransigence increased the legal fees of the other party.” 46 Here, the
trial court found Vijayaboopathy in contempt four times for his failure to pay debts
and child support “demonstrat[ing] his intransigence in this case.”47 The court also
noted that he filed 24 petitions and motions throughout the litigation, only one of
which was granted. Based on the record before us, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in awarding Lawrance attorney fees based upon intransigence.
Additionally, both parties request attorney fees on appeal. Vijayaboopathy
provides no authority in support of his assertion that he is entitled to attorney fees.
Lawrance requests attorney fees on appeal under RCW 26.09.140. “RCW
26.09.140 authorizes an award of [attorney] fees after consideration of one party’s
need and the other party’s ability to pay.”48 The parties submitted financial
declarations on appeal. Each party challenges the accuracy of the other party’s
financial declaration. But we conclude that Lawrance has made an adequate
45 Matter of Marriage of Laidlaw, 2 Wn. App. 2d 381, 392, 409 P.3d 1184(2018).
46
Burrill v. Burrill, 113 Wn. App. 863, 873, 56 P.3d 993 (2002) (citing In re
Marriage of Morrow, 53 Wn. App. 579, 590, 770 P.2d 197 (1989)).
47 CP at 107 (FF 22.5(c)).
48 Burrill, 113 Wn. App. at 874.
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showing of her entitlement to fees on appeal under RCW 26.09.140 subject to her
compliance with RAP 18.1(d).49
Therefore, we affirm.
WE CONCUR:
49 There is no need for us to address Lawrance’s alternative ground for
attorney fees on appeal based on intransigence.
13