State Of Washington v. Rebecca L. Mcintire ( 2018 )


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  •       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    STATE OF WASHINGTON,                     )
    )       DIVISION ONE
    Respondent,         )
    )       No. 77730-1-1
    v.                       )
    )       UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    REBECCA LOUISE MCINTIRE,                 )
    )
    Appellant.          )       FILED: February 26, 2018
    9C:9 WV 9Z 93J 010Z
    )
    DWYER, J. — Following a bench trial, Rebecca McIntire was found guilty of
    unlawful possession of a controlled substance. On appeal, McIntire contends
    that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress evidence of the drugs
    discovered in her purse. Finding no error, we affirm.
    The State charged Rebecca McIntire with possession of heroin. McIntire
    filed a motion to suppress evidence of the heroin discovered in her purse.
    Following a CrR 3.6 hearing, the trial court entered written findings of the
    following undisputed facts:
    1.1    Officer John Dorff and Sergeant Doug Clary were employed
    by the Centralia police department and working in their
    capacity as law enforcement officers on October 1, 2016.
    1.2    At approximately 4:30 pm, Dorff and Clary arrived at the
    King Oscar Motel in Centralia to look for Natalie Sanchez
    based on an anonymous tip that she was staying in a
    particular room at that hotel.
    1.3    Natalie had an active warrant for her arrest on October 1,
    2016.
    No. 77730-1-1/2
    1.4    Both Dorif and Clary went to the lobby of the hotel and
    spoke with the clerk about Natalie staying at the hotel.
    1.5    The clerk informed Dorff and Clary that Natalie Sanchez was
    not registered in that particular room, but Alicia Sanchez
    was.
    1.6    The clerk stated that if anyone other than Alicia Sanchez
    was in the hotel room, she (the clerk) wanted them
    trespassed from the hotel.
    1.7    The clerk informed Dorff and Clary how to get to the room
    Alicia was registered in.
    1.8    When they arrived at the hotel room, Dorff and Clary
    knocked on the door, which was answered a short while later
    by a person Clary visually recognized as Rebecca McIntire.
    1.9    Dorff explained to McIntire why he and Clary were at her
    hotel room, and asked if Natalie was in the room.
    1.10   McIntire informed Dorff and Clary that she was the only
    person in the hotel room.
    1.11   Around this same time, the clerk came to the room,
    observed McIntire, stated that she (McIntire) was not
    registered to the room, and requested law enforcement
    trespass McIntire from the room.
    1.12   The officers did not obtain any additional information
    regarding the basis for the clerk's request to trespass
    McIntire, and their authority to trespass was based on the
    clerk's request alone.
    1.13   When the clerk requested McIntire be trespassed, Dorff and
    Clary told her to gather her belongings and leave the room.
    1.14   While she was gathering her belongings, Dorff and Clary
    entered the hotel room to ensure Natalie was not present
    and to make sure McIntire did not pick up any type of
    weapon.
    1.15   During the time McIntire was gathering her belongings, Dorff
    asked for her driver's license in a normal, non-threatening
    tone.
    1.16   Dorf, was in possession of McIntire's license for an unknown
    length of time.
    1.17   That request was for Dorff to enter McIntire's name into the
    Spillman system to log for future officers to be able to see
    [that] McIntire was trespassed from the King Oscar Motel.
    1.18   An additional purpose for running McIntire's name was to
    check for any active warrants.
    1.19   The entry into Spillman for trespassing notice and the check
    for warrants are run on the same system and accomplished
    at the same time.
    1.20   McIntire returned as having a misdemeanor warrant from
    Chehalis.
    2
    No. 77730-1-1/3
    1.21 McIntire was advised she was under arrest for the warrant.
    1.22 When McIntire was advised she was under arrest, she was
    in possession of her belongings she had gathered from the
    room.
    1.23 When she was advised she was under arrest, McIntire asked
    if she could return the items to the room.
    1.24 When advised that she could not return the items to the
    room, McIntire stated that the purse she was carrying
    contained her wallet, cell phone, and her identification, but
    the purse was not hers and anything else inside the purse
    she knew nothing about.
    1.25 A search of the purse incident to McIntire's arrest revealed a
    plastic baggie that contained a receipt from Goodwill that
    was folded up. Inside the receipt was a black, tar-like
    substance.
    1.26 Clary later field-tested this substance, which returned
    positive for heroin.
    The trial court entered the following conclusions of law:
    2.1    Dorff and Clary were validly trespassing McIntire from the
    hotel based on the request of the hotel clerk.
    2.2    The request for McIntire's identification was necessary to
    register her information for trespassing purposes.
    2.3    The seizure of McIntire's license was minimally intrusive to
    accomplish that goal.
    2.4    The discovery of the controlled substances in McIntire's
    purse was pursuant to a lawful search incident to arrest.
    2.5    All statements made by McIntire were voluntary and
    admissible at trial.
    The trial court denied the motion to suppress. After a stipulated facts
    bench trial, the trial court found McIntire guilty and imposed a standard range
    sentence. McIntire appeals.
    11
    McIntire contends that she was unlawfully seized when Dorff asked for her
    identification. We disagree.
    Because McIntire does not challenge the trial court's findings of fact, they
    are verities on appeal. State v. O'Neill, 
    148 Wn.2d 564
    , 571,
    62 P.3d 489
    (2003).
    - 3-
    No. 77730-1-1/4
    We review the trial court's conclusions of law de novo. State v. Duncan, 
    146 Wn.2d 166
    , 171,
    43 P.3d 513
    (2002).
    A person is seized under article 1, section 7 of the Washington Constitution
    "only when, by means of physical force or a show of authority,' his or her
    freedom of movement is restrained and a reasonable person would not have
    believed he or she is (1)free to leave, given all the circumstances, or (2)free to
    otherwise decline an officer's request and terminate the encounter." O'Neill, 148
    Wn.2d at 574 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)(quoting State v.
    Young, 
    135 Wn.2d 498
    , 510, 
    957 P.2d 681
     (1998)). "[The 'reasonable person'
    test presupposes an innocent person." Florida v. Bostick, 
    501 U.S. 429
    , 438,
    
    111 S. Ct. 2382
    , 
    115 L. Ed. 2d 389
    (1991). The standard is "a purely objective
    one, looking to the actions of the law enforcement officer." Young, 
    135 Wn.2d at 501
    . The defendant bears the burden of proving that a seizure occurred. O'Neill,
    148 Wn.2d at 574.
    "[Mot every encounter between a police officer and a citizen is an
    intrusion requiring an objective justification." State v. Rankin, 
    151 Wn.2d 689
    ,
    695, 
    92 P.3d 202
    (2004)(alteration in original)(quoting United States v.
    Mendenhall, 
    446 U.S. 544
    , 553, 
    100 S. Ct. 1870
    , 
    64 L. Ed. 2d 497
    (1980)).
    "Examples of circumstance that might indicate a seizure, even
    where the person did not attempt to leave, would be the threatening
    presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer,
    some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of
    language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the
    officer's request might be compelled.... In the absence of some
    such evidence, otherwise inoffensive contact between a member of
    the public and the police cannot, as a matter of law, amount to a
    seizure of that person."
    4
    No. 77730-1-1/5
    Young, 
    135 Wn.2d at 512
     (alteration in original)(quoting Mendenhall, 
    446 U.S. at 554-55
    ).
    Thus, "the police are permitted to engage persons in conversation and ask
    for identification even in the absence of an articulable suspicion of wrongdoing."
    Young, 
    135 Wn.2d at 511
    . Moreover, "[w]hile most citizens will respond to a
    police request, the fact that people do so, and do so without being told they are
    free not to respond, hardly eliminates the consensual nature of the response."
    Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 
    466 U.S. 210
    , 216, 
    104 S. Ct. 1758
    , 
    80 L. Ed. 2d 247
    (1984).
    Here, the trial court found that Dorff asked for McIntire's identification in a
    "normal, non-threatening tone." Nothing in the record indicates that the officers
    used any show of force or authority, commanded McIntire to relinquish her
    identification, or prevented her from leaving without first complying with the
    officers' request. Although the record does not establish for how long Dorff
    retained possession of McIntire's driver's license, it is clear that he did not
    remove the license from her presence.
    Under these circumstances, McIntire fails to demonstrate that a seizure
    occurred when the officers asked for her identification. See, e.g., O'Neill, 148
    Wn.2d at 578-80(no seizure occurred when officer shined spotlight on
    defendant's car, approached car and shined flashlight into it, asked defendant to
    roll down window, asked defendant to try to start car, and asked defendant for his
    identification); State v. Hansen, 
    99 Wn. App. 575
    , 579, 
    994 P.2d 855
    (2000)(no
    seizure occurred when an officer requested the defendant's identification and
    5
    No. 77730-1-1/6
    handed it to another officer, who took note of the defendant's name and birthdate
    in the presence of the defendant); State v. Smith, 
    154 Wn. App. 695
    , 700, 
    226 P.3d 195
    (2010)(no seizure occurred when an officer requested the defendant's
    identification and remained in close proximity of the defendant while holding the
    identification). Because McIntire fails to demonstrate any constitutional violation,
    the trial court properly denied her motion to suppress.
    Ill
    The State has indicated that it will not seek appellate costs in this appeal.
    Accordingly, we direct that no such costs be imposed. RAP 14.2.
    Affirmed.
    We concur:
    AcS
    6