In Re The Custody Of: L.z., A Minor Child ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                                                                  FILED
    COURT OF APPEALS
    UI lSfOt It
    201511 R 31   AM 8: a8
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHIl ff                                                                SHINGTON
    Y
    DIVISION II
    IN RE CUSTODY OF L.Z.,                                                                No. 46466 -7 -II
    a minor child.
    DANIEL SCHOCH,
    Respondent,
    and
    LIYING ZHANG SCHOCH,                                                   UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    Appellant,
    SUTTON, J. —       Liying Zhang1 appeals the trial court' s order granting Daniel Schoch, her
    ex- husband, permanent nonparental custody of one of Zhang' s minor children. Zhang argues that
    the trial court erroneously applied a " best interests of the child" standard and thereby abused its
    discretion and erred when it changed the child' s last name. Zhang requests attorney fees and costs
    on appeal.        Schoch cross -appeals arguing that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to
    amend his petition to add a de facto parentage claim.
    We hold that ( 1) the trial court abused its discretion when it erroneously applied a " best
    interests   of the child" standard; (   2) the trial court erred by changing the minor' s last name; and ( 3)
    the trial court abused its discretion in denying Schoch' s motion to add a de facto parentage claim.
    Accordingly, we vacate the trial court' s nonparental custody decree and residential schedule and
    reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. On remand, Schoch may pursue
    1
    We   refer   to   Liying Zhang   Schoch   as   Liying Zhang,   we   intend   no   disrespect.
    No. 46466 -7 -II
    a de facto parentage claim. We award Zhang reasonable attorney fees and costs on appeal in the
    amount of $10, 000 based on her need and Schoch' s ability to pay.
    FACTS
    Liying Zhang      met   Daniel William Schoch through the internet in October 2008.       Zhang
    was   living   in China,   and   Schoch was   living   in Grays Harbor   County. Zhang had two daughters,
    Lh.   and   Lx.?, both   whom she adopted as infants after finding them abandoned near her home in
    China.      At the time of trial, Lh. was approximately 14 years old and Lx. was approximately 15
    years old.
    Zhang and Schoch met in person several times before they were married in November
    2009.    That same November, Zhang left her job with a Chinese pharmaceutical company and
    moved to Grays Harbor County with her two daughters to be with Schoch. Once she relocated to
    the United States, Zhang no longer worked outside the home and she and her daughters lived in
    Schoch' s home.
    After they married, Schoch asked Zhang to care for his ailing father and several of Schoch' s
    grandchildren. This arrangement caused marital stress because Zhang wanted to work outside the
    home.       Schoch insisted that Zhang care for his family, and he threatened not to renew Zhang' s
    green card. Zhang complied, but felt she was no longer treated as Schoch' s equal.
    Tension also existed in the home because of Zhang' s desire to have her daughters speak to
    her in Chinese.       During one incident, Schoch became angry when Zhang and Lx. did not eat
    2 It is appropriate to provide some confidentiality in this case. Accordingly, it is hereby ordered
    that initials will be used in the case caption and in the body of the opinion to identify the parties
    and other juveniles involved.
    2
    No. 46466 -7 -II
    American food, but              ate   Chinese food instead.          Schoch complained the house smelled, swept the
    meal off the table onto the floor, and fed the remaining food to the dog. When Zhang tried to clean
    the dishes, Schoch threw a pot or bowl at Zhang that struck her on the arm and caused a welt.
    According to Schoch, Zhang did not like Lh.' s rapid adjustment to American culture.
    When Lh. first arrived in the United States when she was 10 years old, she spoke no English, but
    by   the time      of   trial   she could speak     better English than her            mother.   Zhang would become upset
    when Lh. did not want to speak to her in Chinese. Schoch refused to allow Zhang to speak Chinese
    to either daughter in his presence. At one time, during an argument, Zhang got down on her knees,
    crying and begging her daughters to speak Chinese to her.
    On November 6, 2012 Zhang filed a petition for dissolution. Zhang intended to relocate to
    California with her daughters; a friend had offered to let them live with her in order to help Zhang
    find a job. Zhang bought a round trip airplane ticket for herself and Lh. to travel to China to visit
    Zhang' s ailing sister -in -law; the older daughter, Lx. had just traveled to China the previous year.
    Zhang picked up Lh. from school to take her to the airport, but Lh. physically resisted going.
    Schoch filed a nonparental custody petition that same day and obtained an ex parte
    restraining        order    preventing     Zhang from          removing Lh. from Washington.              In his petition for
    nonparental custody, Schoch alleged that Zhang' s parental visitation should be limited due to ( 1)
    p] hysical,   sexual or a pattern of emotional abuse "; (               2) "[    a] history of acts of domestic violence
    3
    as   defined in RCW 26. 50. 010( 1) ";              and (   3) "[   t] he child has expressed great fear of the mother and
    3
    RCW 26. 50. 010( 1) defines "[ d] omestic                violence" as: "(        a) Physical harm, bodily injury, assault,
    or the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury or assault, between family or
    household members."
    3
    No. 46466 -7 -I1
    has been      abused       by the     mother."        Clerk' s Papers ( CP) at 3, 4. Zhang denied these allegations. The
    trial court then entered an agreed temporary order, placing Lh. with her mother but allowing
    Schoch       visitation.        The trial court also appointed a guardian ad litem ( GAL) to investigate and
    report to the trial court regarding custody and visitation, and ordered the GAL to hold the children' s
    passports.
    The GAL investigated the nature of Schoch' s and Zhang' s relationship with both girls, and
    reported her findings and recommendations to the trial court. Although Schoch did not adopt either
    daughter, he actively participated in their schooling and activities, and both girls referred to Schoch
    as   their   father      during      the   parties'   four   year marriage.            Lx. showed little interest in rural farm life
    and maintained a closer bond with her mother. The younger daughter, Lh. became very involved
    with   the    farm       animals and embraced            her      new   life   with    Schoch. Lh. " developed          a strong parentlike
    bond [     with    Schoch]       similar      to that of     a   father -daughter relationship."               CP at 43C ( Sealed Report
    of   GAL      at   3).    Lh.   expressed a "         strong desire to             remain with [      Schoch]" and continue her life in
    Grays Harbor.4 CP at 43C ( Sealed Report of GAL at 3).
    The GAL reported that Lh. had repeatedly contacted her complaining about Zhang, but the
    GAL        was not able          to   confirm      any   allegations       of abuse or           threats.     The GAL testified that Lh.
    expressed " concern" " over and over again"                             about       her " fear   of   being   sent   back to China."   VRP
    July   30, 2013)      at   91.    Schoch alleged that Zhang kicked Lh. and slapped her in the face with a wet
    4
    Schoch        acknowledged            that if    Zhang       remained          in Grays Harbor, "          certainly that could be a
    possibility that they [ could] have some sort of shared custody or [ Schoch] has lots of visitation,
    but if [Zhang] leaves the                  area,   custody       should rever[ t]      to [ Schoch]."       VRP ( July 30, 2013) at 101-
    02.
    4
    No. 46466 -7 -II
    towel    numerous       times.       Zhang denied          these allegations.            According to the GAL' s report, neither
    Child Protective Services nor law enforcement substantiated these allegations after investigating
    them.
    After completing her investigation, the GAL                            reported allegations    that: (     1) Zhang inflicted
    self h
    - arm over        Lh.' s   refusal     to   speak    to her in Chinese; ( 2)          Zhang made repeated threats to send
    Lh. back to China; and ( 3) Zhang attempted to fly to China and take Lh. with her against Lh.' s
    will, but Schoch stopped Zhang from doing so by obtaining an ex parte temporary restraining
    order.
    The GAL described Lh. as a " typical pre- teen" who " knows what she wants, and she is
    her           way." VRP ( July 30, 2013)                      90. But the GAL             testified that Lh. " never
    going to    get         own                                               at                         also
    indicated      a    lack    of affection        for [ Zhang]     or   her    older sister,"   but instead she had " expressed
    great concern"          for them. VRP ( July 30, 2013)                    at   91.     The GAL summarized Lh.' s concerns by
    stating: "[ T] his little       girl [ Lh.]       is very torn. She very much wants to stay here, and she wants her
    mom      to stay here,     and    her      sister   to stay here, but          she [   Lh.] wants to maintain a relationship with
    Mr. Schoch,       even    if they [ Zhang           and   Lx.] don' t."       VRP (July 30, 2013) at 92. The GAL described
    Lh.' s relationship with her mother as " challenging" in part because Zhang and her older daughter
    Lx. " cling very tightly to their                cultural roots. [   Lh.] has          pushed some of   that away."      VRP (July 30,
    2013) at 91.
    The GAL testified that it                 would   be in Lh.' s " best interests" to " remain         ...    in the Montesano
    School District         and    keep ... on with the activities she has been involved in the last three [ years]."
    VRP ( July 30, 2013)            at   89.    The GAL declined to recommend who should be awarded custody of
    5
    No. 46466 -7 -II
    Lh., but   said   the decision        should   be based        on "   facilitat[ ing]"    the " living circumstances" that the
    GAL recommended were in Lh.' s best interests. VRP ( July 30, 2013) at 89.
    Several months before trial, Schoch moved to amend his pleading to add a de facto
    parentage claim as        to Lh.      The trial     court   denied the       motion without explanation.          On August 9,
    2013, after a bench trial, the trial court granted Schoch' s petition and awarded him permanent
    nonparental custody of Lh. and entered a nonparental custody decree, residential schedule, and
    findings of fact and conclusions of law dissolving the marriage. 5 In awarding Schoch permanent
    nonparental custody, the trial court found:
    T] hat   the       child    is    flourishing        academically,        physically,      athletically   and
    extracurricularly living in Grays Harbor County and attending Montesano Schools.
    She is a 4.0 student, is in band, plays traveling team softball, is a member of 4 -H,
    is raising a market steer for County Fair, loves animals, and thoroughly enjoys and
    embraces        the   farm    and    American lifestyle.           She has       made close   friends.   She has
    known Daniel Schoch                  as   her "   Daddy" and has had no other father -daughter
    relationship. The child has expressed concern about the uncertainty of living with
    the    mother.          There have been numerous incidents of inappropriate verbal,
    psychological and physical punishment of the child by the mother and threats of
    being sent away from the Country for transgressions.
    The child' s residence with the mother would be an environment detrimental to her
    continued growth and welfare.
    CP at 73 ( Finding of Fact (FF) 2. 6).
    The trial    court   further found that ( 1)           Zhang had encouraged a. parent -child relationship
    between Schoch          and    Lh.,    and   that   it   was   in Lh.' s " best interest[ s] "    6 to be placed in Schoch' s
    5 The trial court found that Zhang stipulated to adequate cause to hear the case under by agreeing
    that the    petitions   for    nonparental        custody      and    dissolution    could    be heard together.     On appeal,
    Zhang argued that she never stipulated to adequate cause.
    6 CP at 75 ( Conclusion of Law (CL) 3. 2).
    6
    No. 46466 -7 -II
    7
    custody; ( 2)    Zhang " inappropriate[ ly]          punish[ ed]"       Lh.; (3) Zhang "threat[ ened] " 8 to send Lh. back
    to China; ( 4)       Zhang attempted to travel with Lh. to China without the trial court' s or Schoch' s
    approval; and (        5) the trial   court    had "   significant questions regarding [ Zhang' s] credibility after
    hearing [ Zhang' s] testimony, witnessing her demeanor, and hearing the testimony and reports of
    others."    CP    at   74 ( FF 2. 13).     Upon entering its custody order, the trial court also changed Lh.' s
    last name to Schoch.
    Zhang appeals. Schoch cross -appeals the trial court' s denial of his motion to amend to add
    a de facto parentage claim.
    ANALYSIS
    Zhang argues that the trial court applied the wrong " best interest[ s] " 9 of the child standard
    and   thereby    abused     its discretion     by failing   to apply the      correct "`` actual     detriment "' standard. Br.
    of Appellant at 22 (quoting In re Custody ofE.A. T. W., 
    168 Wn.2d 335
    , 338, 
    227 P. 3d 1284
     ( 2010)).
    We    agree.     The trial    court      did   not   apply the   correct " actual       detriment"    standard to its custody
    determination.
    We   review     custody decisions for          abuse of      discretion.      In re Marriage of Chandola, 
    180 Wn.2d 632
    , 642, 
    327 P. 3d 644
     ( 2014). " A                  court' s      decision is manifestly      unreasonable"         if (1) "   it
    is   outside   the   range of acceptable choices, given             the   facts   and   the   applicable   legal   standard "; ( 2)    it
    is based      on untenable grounds            if the factual findings       are unsupported        by   the   record ";   and ( 3) it
    7 CP at 73 ( FF 2. 6).
    8 CP at 73 ( FF 2. 6).
    9 VRP ( Aug. 9, 2013) at 143.
    7
    No. 46466 -7 -II
    is based on untenable reasons if it is based on an incorrect standard or the facts do not meet the
    requirements of      the       correct standard."    West v. Dep' t ofLicensing, 
    182 Wn. App. 500
    , 516 -17, 
    331 P. 3d 72
    , review denied, 
    339 P. 3d 634
     ( 2014).
    We review a trial court' s statutory interpretation de novo. Grieco v. Wilson, 
    144 Wn. App. 865
    , 873, 
    184 P. 3d 668
     ( 2008), aff'd, E.A. T. W., 
    168 Wn.2d 335
    .                                Because of the trial court' s
    unique   opportunity to personally             observe     the   parties,"    we will disturb a custody designation only
    when both the trial court' s written and oral opinions demonstrate a failure to consider statutory
    requirements.       In    re   Marriage of Murray, 
    28 Wn. App. 187
    , 189, 
    622 P. 2d 1288
     ( 1981).             We do
    not review     the trial       court' s   credibility determinations          or reweigh      the evidence.        In re Welfare of
    C.B.,   
    134 Wn. App. 942
    , 953, 
    143 P. 3d 846
     ( 2006).
    I. " ACTUAL DETRIMENT" STANDARD IN A NONPARENTAL CUSTODY ACTION
    Chapter 26. 10 RCW                allows   third   parties     to   petition   for   child   custody. "    Such an award
    confers on the nonparental custodian the legal power to `` determine the child' s upbringing,' to the
    exclusion of       the   natural parent."       In re Custody of C.C.M., 
    149 Wn. App. 184
    , 204, 
    202 P. 3d 971
    2009) ( quoting RCW 26. 10. 170).                   Parents, however, have a protected liberty interest in the
    custody of their children. In re Custody ofB.M.H., 
    179 Wn.2d 224
    , 235, 
    315 P. 3d 470
     ( 2013).
    In   a   custody dispute between             parents        and     nonparents . . .        the analysis must
    accommodate the natural parents' constitutionally protected priority right to the
    custody of their children. The general constitutional rule of " respect for family
    integrity" demands a substantive showing in a nonparental custody action of far
    more than a child' s best interests.
    C. C.M., 149 Wn.          App.     at   204 -05 ( internal   citations omitted) ( quoting             In   re   Custody   of A. C., 
    165 Wn.2d 568
    , 580, 
    200 P. 3d 689
     ( 2009) (                J.M. Johnson, J., concurring)).
    8
    No. 46466 -7 -II
    Therefore, a nonparent can obtain custody of a child only if (1) a parent is unfit, or ( 2)
    custody     with a parent would result        in "' actual detriment to the child' s growth and development.'
    B.M.H., 179 Wn.2d       at   235 ( quoting E.A. T..W., 
    168 Wn.2d at 338
    );   see also In re Custody ofShields,
    
    157 Wn.2d 126
    , 142 -43,             
    136 P. 3d 117
     ( 2006).            The showing required by the nonparent is
    substantial, and "    only [ under]    ``   extraordinary       circumstances '        does there exist a compelling state
    interest that justifies interference with the integrity of the family and with parental rights. Shields,
    157 Wn.2d at 145 ( quoting In re Marriage ofAllen, 
    28 Wn. App. 637
    , 649, 
    626 P.2d 16
     ( 1981));
    see also    B.M.H., 179 Wn.2d          at   236.    The nonparent' s burden of proof is clear and convincing
    evidence.     C.C.M., 149 Wn. App. at 205.
    A parent is unfit if he or she cannot meet a child' s basic needs, and in such cases, the State
    is justified in removing the child from the home and in certain cases, permanently terminating
    parental rights."     B.M.H., 179 Wn.2d            at   236;   see also   Shields, 157 Wn.2d        at   142 -43.   But Schoch
    did not argue that Zhang was an unfit parent. The issue at trial was whether Zhang' s custody of
    Lh. would cause actual detriment to Lh.
    Significantly, the " actual detriment" determination does not focus on the " best interests of
    the child."     Facts that merely support a finding that nonparental custody is in the child' s " best
    interests" are insufficient to award custody to the nonparent. B.M.H., 179 Wn.2d at 237 ( quoting
    In   re   Custody   ofS.C.D.   -L., 
    170 Wn.2d 513
    , 516 -17, 
    243 P. 3d 918
     ( 2010)); Shields, 157 Wn.2d at
    150. "     A nonparent' s capacity to provide a superior home environment to that which a parent can
    offer is not enough to outweigh the deference that is constitutionally owed to a natural, fit parent."
    C. C.M., 149 Wn. App.          at   204 ( citing Shields, 157 Wn.2d              at   144).   Similarly, a nonparent cannot
    obtain custody of a child merely because the trial court finds that the nonparent would be a better
    9
    No. 46466 -7 -II
    parent.   E.A. T. W., 16.8 Wn.2d      at   346 -47.      And " actual detriment" does not include that the child
    will   be deprived     of " wonderful      opportunities"      as   a member    of   the   nonparent' s   family.   In re
    Custody ofAnderson, 
    77 Wn. App. 261
    , 266, 
    890 P. 2d 525
     ( 1995).
    II. THE TRIAL COURT' S CUSTODY DECISION
    Although the trial       court purported        to apply the "   actual    detriment" standard, entering a
    written   finding   that "[   Lh.' s] residence with [ Zhang] would be an environment detrimental to her
    continued growth and welfare, "10 its oral ruling clearly shows that the trial court based its decision
    solely on a consideration of what was in Lh.' s " best interest[ s] i11. Therefore, we hold that the trial
    court erred in applying the wrong legal analysis in its custody decision.
    A. Consideration of Trial Court' s Oral Decision
    Despite the trial court' s finding that living with Zhang would be " detrimental "12 to Lh., the
    trial court' s oral rulings clearly show that it was applying a " best interests of the child" standard
    and not an " actual detriment" standard. Therefore, we must reverse the trial court' s custody ruling.
    Ordinarily, we will not look behind a trial court' s oral rulings to contradict the trial court' s
    written   ruling. In   re     Marriage of Getz, 
    57 Wn. App. 602
    , 605   n. 4,   
    789 P. 2d 331
     ( 1990). But we
    may consider a .trial court' s oral decision so long as it is not inconsistent with the trial court' s
    written   findings   and conclusions.       State   v.   Kull, 
    155 Wn.2d 80
    , 88, 
    118 P. 3d 307
     ( 2005); see Getz,
    57 Wn. App. at 605 n.4 (we may resolve an ambiguity in a trial court' s written decision by looking
    1° CP at 73 ( FF 2.6).
    11 VRP ( Aug. 9, 2013) at 143.
    12 CP at 73 ( FF 2. 6).
    10
    No. 46466 -7 -II
    to its   oral   ruling).   And oral findings that the trial court expressly incorporates it into its findings
    of   fact,   conclusions of          law,   and   judgment   are   binding. State v. Truong, 
    168 Wn. App. 529
    , 539
    n. 6, 
    277 P. 3d 74
    , review denied, 
    175 Wn.2d 1020
     ( 2012).
    Here, the trial court' s written findings of fact and conclusions of law do not state what
    standard        it   applied   in its custody determination.              The trial court entered a finding regarding
    detriment, but the trial             court also entered a     finding    that "[   i]t is in the best interest[ s] of the child"
    to be    placed      in Schoch'      s   custody. CP   at   74 ( FF 2. 7).   Therefore, because the written findings of
    fact and conclusions of law were ambiguous, we will consider the trial court' s oral rulings to
    ascertain what standard it was applying.
    In its oral ruling, the trial court unequivocally applied the " best interests" standard:
    Now, the statute says I do what' s in the best interests of the child. I do believe at
    this time for the following reasons, education, age, personal life, i.e., her athletic
    involvement, school involvement and other matters, all involving that, her issues
    with 4H, and other issue of that, that I do believe it' s in the best interests ofthe child
    that the custody at this time be awarded to Mr. Schoch.
    VRP ( July 30, 2013)            at    108 ( emphasis   added).      The trial court did not apply or even reference the
    correct standard —actual
    "                     detriment" to the child.
    At the presentation hearing on August 9, 2013, Zhang objected to Schoch' s proposed order
    that included the finding regarding " detriment" because that finding had not been part of the trial
    court' s oral ruling. VRP (Aug. 9, 2013) at 136. The trial court explained its oral ruling:
    Now, when you come to the terminology of detrimental and best interests,
    isn' t that what you' re doing is evaluating? You are evaluating two people and you
    come to the conclusion that this one, quote, is in the best interests of the child. If
    you remove that child from the environment that' s in the best interests of the child
    isn' t that detrimental?
    VRP (Aug. 9, 2013) at 143 ( emphasis added).
    11
    No. 46466 -7 -II
    In addressing whether Zhang could properly provide for Lh., the trial court stated:
    I don' t think —we'   re not sitting here saying mom is running some sweat shop or
    mom' s over      here                 dump of a house. We' re not saying that. We 're
    with a garbage
    saying that it' s in the best interests ofthe child that the finding of the Court, where
    this Court— kid is going to         live   and go   to   school —   and by the way, she' s only going
    to do so for about three or four years here and then she' s off to college and guess
    who' s probably going to pay for the college, the guy she' s living with.
    VRP (Aug. 9, 2013) at 143 ( emphasis added).
    The trial court then stated:
    Now, let'   s   don' t   get   lost in   semantics       about   their   finding   detrimental.   I' m not
    sitting here trying to denigrate [ Zhang], Mr. Campbell. The law says you' ve got to
    do one to get to the other and that' s all I am telling you. If this kid was down there
    in California with mom I don' t have any problem that the kid would be fed and
    clothed and sheltered or whatever.             But   what     have   you   done? You have then taken
    the kidfrom the environment that a Courtfound was in the best interest ofthe child,
    that' s where the child should continue for the next three or four years of her life.
    And then you' ve got all this other stuff, her education, her friends, her peers ...."
    I' m the one who had to wrestle with this and make the decision and it wasn' t
    pleasant.... But you know what, you look at the statute for this purpose for that
    part this proceeding, it' s the best interests of the child, period.
    VRP (Aug. 9, 2013) at 143 -45 ( emphasis added).
    The trial court' s oral comments leave no doubt that it awarded custody based on Lh.' s " best
    interests."   In addition, the trial court erroneously stated that the applicable statute required the
    court   to apply   a "   best interests"    standard.    VRP ( July 30, 2013) at 108; see also VRP ( Aug. 9,
    2013) at. 145. The trial court abused its discretion when it applied this standard because the proper
    standard is whether remaining with the parent would cause " actual detriment to the child' s growth
    and   development."        B.M.H., 179 Wn.2d at 235 ( quoting E.A. T. W., 
    168 Wn.2d at 338
    ).
    12
    No. 46466 -7 -II
    We hold that the trial court erred in applying the wrong legal standard in its custody
    decision. Therefore, we reverse the trial court' s award of custody to Schoch.
    B. The Trial Court Changed Lh.' s Last Name
    In the custody decree, the trial court changed Lh.' s last name to Schoch. Zhang argues that
    this relief was neither requested nor authorized under RCW 4.24. 130. 13 In a custody action, the
    party desiring a change of name of his or her minor child must set forth the reasons for the change
    under   RCW 4. 24. 130. Daves         v.   Nastos, 
    105 Wn.2d 24
    , 29, 
    711 P. 2d 314
     ( 1985).        But in order to
    change the child' s name, the trial court must enter a finding that the name change is in the child' s
    best interests. Daves, 
    105 Wn.2d at
    29 -30.   The trial court failed to enter any such finding in this
    case. Therefore, we reverse the trial court' s order changing Lh.' s last name to Schoch.
    13
    RCW 4. 24. 130( 1)         Any person desiring a change of his or her name or that of his or her
    states: "
    child or ward, may apply therefor to the district court of the judicial district in which he or she
    resides, by petition setting forth the reasons for such change; thereupon such court in its discretion
    may order a change of the name and thenceforth the new name shall be in place of the former."
    13
    No. 46466 -7 -II
    III. DE FACTO PARENTAGE CLAIM
    Schoch argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to amend to add a de facto
    parentage claim. We agree.
    Motions to        amend " should        be   freely    granted when      justice   so requires."    Chadwick Farms
    Owners Ass 'n         v.   FHC LLC, 
    166 Wn.2d 178
    , 202, 
    207 P. 3d 1251
     ( 2009); CR 15(                         a).   We will not
    overturn a trial court' s refusal to grant a motion to amend pleadings except for manifest abuse of
    discretion.        Greenhalgh       v.
    Dep' t   of Corr., 
    170 Wn. App. 137
    , 143, 
    282 P. 3d 1175
     ( 2012).        We
    reverse a     trial   court' s   decision for     abuse of      discretion if it "`` is   manifestly unreasonable, exercised
    on untenable grounds, or exercised                 for      untenable reasons,'     with the last category including errors
    of   law."    Humphrey Indus., Ltd. v. Clay Street Assocs., LLC, 
    170 Wn.2d 495
    , 506, 
    242 P. 3d 846
    2010) ( quoting Noble              v.   Safe Harbor         Family   Pres. Trust, 
    167 Wn.2d 11
    ,             17, 
    216 P. 3d 1007
    2009)).
    The trial court did not state a reason for denying the motion to amend. At the time of the
    motion, however, the case law could have been interpreted as precluding a former stepparent from
    becoming       a   de facto      parent.     See In    re   Parentage of M.F., 
    168 Wn.2d 528
    , 532, 
    228 P. 3d 1270
    2010).      Because there are no other apparent reasons to deny the motion, we assume that the trial
    court determined that the amendment would be futile under existing law.
    Our Supreme Court recently               clarified   that M.F. "did     not preclude all stepparents as a class
    from    being      de facto      parents."    B. M.H., 179 Wn.2d           at   243 ( citing M.F., 
    168 Wn.2d 528
    ).        At the
    time that the trial court denied Schoch' s motion to amend, B.M.H. had not yet been decided.
    Nevertheless, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion based on the
    14
    No. 46466 -7 -II
    now -rejected conclusion that he did not qualify for de facto parentage as a former stepparent. We
    hold that on remand, Schoch may pursue a de facto parentage claim based on B.M.H.
    IV. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
    Finally, Zhang requests reasonable attorney fees on appeal based on her need and Schoch' s
    ability to pay. RCW 26. 10. 080.                   This   statute provides,        in   part: "   Upon any appeal, the appellate
    court may, in its discretion, order a party to pay for the cost to the other party of maintaining the
    appeal and       attorney'     s   fees in   addition     to statutory       costs."    RCW 26. 10. 080.          Therefore, we have
    the authority, "       after   considering the financial            resources of all parties,"            to award attorney fees to
    Zhang. RCW 26. 10. 080.
    Zhang' s only source of income was spousal maintenance, which has ended. Schoch is self -
    employed,        owns    two businesses,            and    has    available     assets.     Given their income disparity and
    expenses,    Zhang has             a   financial   need     and    Schoch has the' ability to pay.                 We award Zhang
    reasonable attorney fees on appeal in the amount of $10, 000.
    CONCLUSION
    We hold that: (             1) The trial court abused its discretion when it erroneously applied a " best
    interests   of   the   child" standard,        equating it       with   the " detriment to the          child"   standard; (   2) the trial
    court erred by changing the child' s last name; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion in denying
    Schoch' s motion to add a de facto parentage. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court' s non -parental
    for            trial.   We also grant
    custody decree         and residential schedule, and reverse and remand                                 a new
    Zhang' s request that the matter be heard by a different superior court judge. On remand, Schoch
    may pursue a de facto parentage claim. We award Zhang reasonable attorney fees and costs on
    15
    No. 46466 -7 -II
    appeal in the amount of $10, 000 based on her need and Schoch' s ability to pay.
    A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
    Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2. 06. 040,
    it is so ordered.
    We concur:
    16