Seattle Housing Authority v. City Of Seattle , 416 P.3d 1280 ( 2018 )

FILED
COURT OF APPEALS DIV
STATE OF WASHINGTON
10113 MAR -5 AM 8:2L
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
SEATTLE HOUSING AUTHORITY, ) No. 75455-6-1
)
Appellant, )
) DIVISION ONE
v. )
)
CITY OF SEATTLE and SEATTLE )
OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, on behalf)
of Ala Yudzenka, SEATTLE HUMAN )
RIGHTS COMMISSION, and SEATTLE) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
HEARING EXAMINER, )
)
Respondents. ) FILED: March 5, 2018
)
MANN, J. —The city of Seattle's Open Housing Ordinance, chapter 14.08
of the Seattle Municipal Code(SMC), promotes the availability and accessibility
of housing and real property to all persons. SMC 14.08.040D declares it an
unfair housing practice to prohibit reasonable modifications and accommodations
needed by a disabled tenant. The Seattle Housing Authority (SHA), an
independent municipal corporation, performs two distinct roles relevant to this
appeal. First, SHA owns and leases public housing to over 27,000 low income
people. Second, SHA provides financial assistance to about 8,300 low income
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households through rent vouchers in its role as administrator of the federal
Housing Choice Voucher Program, commonly known as Section 8.
SHA appeals from a decision of the city of Seattle hearing examiner
concluding that SHA violated SMC 14.08.040D by failing to make a reasonable
accommodation for Ala Yudzenka, a Section 8 voucher recipient. Because under
its plain language, SMC 14.08.040D only applies to landlords, and because SHA
is not acting as a landlord when it administers the Section 8 voucher program, we
reverse and vacate the hearing examiner's decision and order of August 19,
2015.
FACTS
SHA's Administration of the Section 8 Program
The SHA administers the federally funded Section 8 voucher program.
Through the Section 8 program, SHA provides vouchers for rent subsidy for
rental units selected by the voucher participants. The rent subsidy is the
difference between the market rent for the unit and 30 percent of the participant's
income. The number of bedrooms that attach to a Section 8 voucher is based on
the household size of the participant, so that a one-person household is generally
eligible for a studio voucher. The voucher participant is not precluded from
choosing to rent a larger apartment than designated under the Section 8
program, but the maximum rent subsidized by voucher is controlled by the
participant's eligibility. If the participant chooses a larger apartment, they are
responsible for any extra rent. In 2013, the maximum allowed amount SHA
would pay for rent and utilities was $771 for a studio and $879 for a one-bedroom
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unit. As of December 2014, the maximum amount SHA paid for rent and utilities
was $810 for a studio and $879 for a one bedroom unit.
Underlying Facts
Ala Yudzenka has resided in a one-bedroom apartment in the Olive Ridge
apartment complex since 2011.1 The Olive Ridge apartments are owned by
SHA. Prior to living at Olive Ridge, Yudzenka lived in a one-bedroom unit in
another SHA building. As a victim of domestic violence, Yudzenka suffers from
posttraumatic stress disorder, anxiety, and depression. She is unable to sleep in
studio apartments because "she would become afraid if she heard footsteps or
saw lights from the hallway under the studio apartment door."
In March 2013, while still leasing an apartment from SHA, Yudzenka was
called from the waiting list and allowed to apply for a Section 8 voucher. As a
single-person household, Yudzenka qualified for a studio apartment. Because of
her disability, Yudzenka submitted a request for accommodation seeking a
voucher for a one-bedroom apartment. Yudzenka supported her request with a
statement from her primary care physician.
In a letter dated April 23, 2013, SHA advised Yudzenka that the request
"cannot be approved at this time" and that in accordance with SHA procedures
was being referred to SHA's "ADA/504" Committee for review. The committee
reviewed Yudzenka's request and in June 2013, denied the request after
1 The facts are taken primarily from the unchallenged findings of the Seattle Human
Rights Commission and hearing examiner for the city of Seattle. Unchallenged hearing examiner
findings are verities on appeal. Getty Images v. City of Seattle, 163 Wn. App. 590, 599, 260 P.3d
926(2011).
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concluding that a "dark safe environment can be created in a studio unit."
Yudzenka requested and was granted an appeal hearing before the committee.
In July 2013, the appeal was denied, and on July 31, 2013, SHA issued a studio
voucher to Yudzenka.
Procedural History
Yudzenka filed a complaint with the Seattle Office of Civil Rights(SOCR)
on October 16, 2013. SOCR determined there was reasonable cause to believe
that violations of the Fair Housing Amendments Act and SMC 14.08 were
committed. SOCR referred the matter to the city attorney. In April 2015, the City
and SOCR filed a complaint against SHA before the Seattle Human Rights
Commission and hearing examiner for the city of Seattle (hearing examiner).
Prior to the hearing, SHA moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis that as a
Section 8 program administrator it was not a "landlord" within the meaning of
SMC 14.08.040D. The hearing examiner denied the motion.
On August 19, 2015, the hearing examiner concluded that SHA violated
SMC 14.08.040D "by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation" and
ordered SHA to pay Yudzenka $1,500 and issue her a one-bedroom voucher.
SHA petitioned the superior court for a writ of review. The trial court
affirmed the decision of the hearing examiner and denied SHA's writ of review.
SHA appeals.
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ANALYSIS
Standard of Review
The parties agree that the only issue before us on appeal is whether SMC
14.08.040D "applies to SHA as Section 8 voucher program administrator." When
reviewing an appeal of a statutory writ, we review findings of fact for substantial
evidence and conclusions of law de novo. Getty Images v. City of Seattle, 163
Wn. App. 590, 599, 260 P.3d 926 (2011). Because SHA did not assign error to
any of the hearing examiner's findings, they are verities on appeal. We therefore
determine whether the hearing examiner "erred in applying the law to the
unchallenged facts." Getty, 163 Wn. App. at 599. The construction of a city
ordinance is a question of law reviewed de novo. Sleasman v. City of Lacey, 159
Wn.2d 639, 642-43, 151 P.3d 990(1997).
"The same rules of statutory construction apply to the interpretation of
municipal ordinances as to the interpretation of state statutes." City of Seattle v.
Green, 51 Wn.2d 871, 874, 322 P.2d 842(1958). In interpreting a statute the
"fundamental objective is to ascertain and carry out the Legislature's intent."
Citizens All. v. San Juan County, 184 Wn.2d 428,435, 359 P.3d 753(2015)
(citation omitted). "[I]f the statute's meaning is plain on its face, then the court
must give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent."
Citizens All., 184 Wn.2d at 435 (quoting Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn,
LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9-10,43 P.3d 4(2002)). When determining a statute's plain
meaning we consider "the ordinary meaning of words, the basic rules of
grammar, and the statutory context to conclude what the legislature has provided
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for in the statute and related statutes." In re Forfeiture of One 1970 Chevrolet
Chevelle, 166 Wn.2d 834, 839, 215 P.3d 166 (2009). We may look to a
dictionary to determine the plain meaning of an undefined term. HomeStreet,
Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 166 Wn.2d 444, 451, 210 P.3d 297(2009). We
"construe a statute so that all the language used is given effect, with no portion
rendered meaningless or superfluous." City of Seattle v. Swanson, 193 Wn. App.
795, 810, 373 P.3d 342(2016)(internal quotations omitted). "Commonsense
informs our analysis, as we avoid absurd results in statutory interpretation."
State v. Alvarado, 164 Wn.2d 556, 562, 192 P.3d 345(2008).
Seattle Municipal Code 14.08.040D
SHA contends that SMC 14.08.040D is expressly limited to landlords, and
because it is not acting as a landlord in its role as administrator of the Section 8
voucher program, the code is not applicable. We agree for at least three
reasons.
We start with the plain language of the ordinance. SMC 14.08.40D
provides:
It is an unfair practice to prohibit reasonable modifications needed
by a disabled tenant. Whether or not the landlord permits tenants
in general to make alterations or additions to a structure or fixtures,
it is an unfair practice for a landlord to refuse to make reasonable
accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when
such accommodations may be necessary to afford a disabled
person equal opportunity to use and enjoy any dwelling, or to
refuse to allow a person to make alterations or additions to existing
premises occupied or to be occupied by a disabled person which
are necessary to make the rental property accessible by disabled
persons, under the following conditions:
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1. The landlord is not required to pay for the alterations, additions,
or restoration unless otherwise required by federal law;
2. The landlord has the right to demand assurances that all
modifications will be performed pursuant to local permit
requirements, in a professional manner, and in accordance with
applicable building codes;
3. The landlord may, where it is reasonable to do so, condition
permission for modification on the tenant's agreement to restore the
interior of the premises to its pre-existing condition, reasonable
wear and tear excepted.
SMC 14.08.040D (emphasis added).
While the term landlord is not defined within chapter 14.08 SMC, we look
to the ordinary meaning, or, in this case, the dictionary definition. HomeStreet,
Inc., 166 Wn.2d at 451. Landlord is defined as "one who lets land to another: the
owner or holder of land or houses which he leases or rents to another."
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1269 (2002). This definition is
premised on the relationship between the landlord and tenant as to the landlord's
property; the landlord is the owner or manager of property that it lets to a tenant.
SHA in its capacity as the Section 8 voucher program administrator is not acting
as the owner of the property being leased to the tenant—it is instead assisting
the tenant by subsidizing rental payment due to the landlord. SHA does not fit
within the dictionary definition of a landlord.
Second, the statutory context of SMC 14.08.040D indicates a legislative
intent to address unfair practices in the landlord-tenant relationship, not in the
Section 8 voucher program. SMC 14.08.040D references three actors:
"landlords," "tenants," and "disabled persons;" it does not reference Section 8
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program administrators or other third parties providing a housing subsidy. The
ordinance is further focused on "accommod tions" to the physical property that
"afford a disabled person equal opportunity t• use and enjoy any dwelling." The
ordinance illustrates such accommodation to include "alteration or additions"
"necessary to make the rental property acce sible." It then further conditions
such accommodation by ensuring that:(1)th landlord is not required to pay for
the alterations, additions, or restoration,(2) t e landlord may require the
modifications are professionally done consis ent with the building code and
permit requirements, and (3) the landlord ca condition permission for
modifications on the tenant's agreement to r store the property to its preexisting
condition. SMC 14.08.040D(1)-(3). Again, as administrator of the Section 8
voucher program, SHA is not the controlling roperty owner with authority to
make or approve modifications.
Finally, while SMC 14.08.040D appea s limited to the landlord-tenant
relationship, other provisions within chapter 4.08 directly address Section 8
voucher holders to protect them from discrimination in obtaining housing. For
example, SMC 14.08.020 defines "Section 8 or other subsidy programs" as a
"short or long term federal, state or local gov rnment, private nonprofit, or other
assistance programs in which a tenant's rent is paid either partially by the
program (throu h a direct arran ement betw en the ro ram and the owner or
lessor of the real property), and 'partially by t e tenant or completely by the
program." SMC 14.08.020 (emphasis added). Additionally, SMC 14.08.040(F)
declared it an unfair practice to discriminate gainst Section 8 voucher holders in
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determining tenant eligibility. SMC 14.08.04 H declares it an unfair practice to
fail to cooperate with a Section 8 voucher ho der in completing required
information for the voucher program or fail to accept a pledge from the Section 8
program to pay past due or current housing osts. These provisions
demonstrate that the city council knew how t discuss Section 8 voucher holders
and protect them from discrimination, and ye did not include the Section 8
program administration within SMC 14.08.04 D.
The City raises a series of arguments urging us to extend the plain
language of SMC 14.08.040D to include SH in its capacity as the Section 8
voucher program administrator. We addres each in turn.
First, the City urges us not to rely too eavily on the word "landlord" in
SMC 14.08.040D. But a plain-meaning anal sis requires that we look to the "the
ordinary meaning of words, the basic rules o grammar, and the statutory context
to conclude what the legislature has provide for in the statute and related
statutes." Chevelle, 166 Wn.2d at 839. Her , as discussed above, the plain
meaning of SMC 14.08.040D limits its applic bility to landlords, and not SHA in
its role as the Section 8 voucher program ad inistrator.
Second, the City argues that the SHA s interpretation ignores the broader
regulatory and statutory context. It argues t at the first sentence of SMC
14.08.040D—it is an unfair practice to prohi it reasonable modifications needed
by a disabled tenant"—applies universally. The City reads this first sentence to
mean that it is an unfair practice for anyone o prohibit reasonable modifications
needed by a disabled tenant. Relatedly, the City argues that the words "any
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dwelling" in SMC 14.08.040D do not mean a y particular, specific, or existing
dwelling. These arguments fail because the are not in harmony with the plain
meaning of SMC 14.08.040D. The first sent nce makes it an unfair practice to
"prohibit reasonable modifications needed by a disabled tenant" without
specifying who may not prohibit reasonable modifications. But this mandate can
only be directed at landlords. To read the fir t sentence as applying to everyone
makes the second sentence's first clause— hether or not the landlord permits
tenants in general to make alterations or ad itions to a structure or fixtures"—
meaningless because the second sentence efers to a narrower category of
people than the first. Moreover, the word "t nant" in the first sentence and the
references to landlords in the section's seco d, third, fourth, and fifth sentences
creates an inference that the section only ap lies to the landlord-tenant context.
And finally "modification" is different from "a commodation;" it means "the act or
action of changing something without funda entally altering it." WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1452 002). This word further limits the
sentence's mandate to a real-property conte
Third, the City argues that the plain eaning of the word "landlord" is
contrary to one of chapter 14.08's purposes: "to promote the availability and
accessibility of housing and real property to 11 persons." SMC 14.08.010(A).
Although the chapter's broad purpose conte plates protection from a Section 8
program administrator unreasonably denyin an accommodation request, section
.040D is written too narrowly to accomplish this purpose. Section .040D is silent
on the Section 8 program or housing-subsid programs, despite the fact that
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section .020 defines these programs and su section .040(F)(1) references these
programs. See SMC 14.08.020 (defining "S ction 8 or other subsidy program");
SMC 14.08.040(F)(1)(making it an unfair pr ctice for a landlord to use
participation in the Section 8 program in scr ening applicants' eligibility).
Fourth, the City argues that a plain-m aning interpretation of landlord
defies the mandate in chapter 14.08 that "th provisions of this chapter shall be
liberally construed to accomplish [the chapt r's] purposes." SMC 14.08.010(A).
"A policy requiring liberal construction is a c mmand that the coverage of an act's
provisions be liberally construed and that its exceptions be narrowly confined."
Nucleonics All. v. Wash. Pub. Power Su S s., 101 Wn.2d 24, 29, 677 P.2d
108 (1984). Construing "landlord" liberally t include administrators of the
Section 8 program would override SMC 14. 8.020's existing definition of "Section
8 or other subsidy program" by conflating tw separate things included in the
definition—a landlord and a Section 8 Progr m administrator—into one. See
SMC 14.08.020 ("Section 8 or other subsidy program' means short or long term
federal, state or local government. .. in whi h a tenant's rent is paid either
partially by the program (through a direct arr ngement between the program and
the owner or lessor of the real property), an partially by the tenant or completely
by the program.").
Fifth, the City argues that because S ction 8 voucher holders are
protected in parts of chapter 14.08, it follow that the city council intended the
protections provided in SMC 14.08.040D to xtend to Section 8 voucher holders
in their interactions with Section 8 program dministrators. We disagree. "[I]f the
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statute's meaning is plain on its face, then th court must give effect to that plain
meaning as an expression of legislative inte t." Citizens All., 184 Wn.2d at 435
(citation omitted). The language of SMC 14. 8.040D is clear: it does not address
Section 8 voucher holders or administrators f Section 8 housing programs.
Sixth, the City argues that limiting ap lication of SMC 14.08.040D to
landlords leads to an absurd result: disabled voucher holders who are denied
their request for a voucher for a larger rental unit have no recourse, a result that
contravenes the section's spirit and purpose Again, we disagree. "It is true that
we should not so interpret a statute as to re ch an absurd result, but neither
should we make an absurd interpretation to each a desired result." Cooper's
Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Simmons,94 Wn.2d 21, 326,617 P.2d 415(1980)
(internal citation omitted). Shoehorning a S ction 8 administrator into the term
"landlord" is "an absurd interpretation to rea h a desired result." Simmons,94
Wn.2d at 326.
Finally, the City urges us to consider he legislative history and similar
federal legislation, but because the ordinanc 's plain language is not ambiguous,
we decline to do so. We hold that the plain eaning of SMC 14.08.040D shows
that the city council only intended the sectioril to apply to discrimination between
landlords and tenants in the city, not discrim nation between Section 8 voucher
holders and administrators.
The City is not, however, without rec urse. As both the City and SHA
agreed during oral argument, if the City wis es to extend the unfair practice
requirement of SMC 14.08.040D to include requirement that Section 8 program
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administrators like SHA make reasonable a commodations including granting
vouchers for larger rental units than the curr nt guidelines require, then it can
amend the Seattle Municipal Code accordin ly. The Seattle City Council, not this
court, is in the best position to effectuate thi change. "It is our duty to effectuate
the legislature's intent, not rewrite the words the legislature used." State v. Gray,
189 Wn.2d 334, 343, 402 P.3d 254 (2017).
Because SMC 14.08.040D only applies to landlords, and since SHA as
administrator of the Section 8 program is not a landlord when it acts in its
capacity as a Section 8 program administrator, we reverse and vacate the
hearing examiner's decision and order of Au ust 19, 2015. '
ak
/
WE CONCUR:
)
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