State of Washington v. Carlos Negrete, Jr. ( 2018 )


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  •                                                                 FILED
    APRIL 12, 2018
    In the Office of the Clerk of Court
    WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    DIVISION THREE
    STATE OF WASHINGTON,                          )         No. 35449-1-III
    )
    Respondent,              )
    )
    v.                                     )         UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    )
    CARLOS NEGRETE, JR.,                          )
    )
    Appellant.               )
    PENNELL, J. — Carlos Negrete, Jr., appeals his Okanogan County conviction for
    manufacture of marijuana with a school zone enhancement. He contends the amended
    information was constitutionally defective because it failed to allege as an essential
    element of the crime that his actions were not in compliance with certain statutory
    exceptions for lawful marijuana activity. We affirm.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    We recount only the limited facts and procedural history necessary to address
    Mr. Negrete’s arguments on appeal. The State charged Mr. Negrete with one count of
    manufacture of marijuana with a school zone enhancement under RCW 69.50.401(1)
    and RCW 69.50.435. The State’s amended information alleged:
    On or about July 17, 2016 in the County of Okanogan, State of Washington,
    the above-named Defendant, as principal or accomplice, did knowingly
    No. 35449-1-III
    State v. Negrete
    manufacture a controlled substance, to-wit: marijuana; contrary to Revised
    Code of Washington 69.50.401(1) and furthermore, the commission of said
    crime took place (1) in a school; and/or (2) on a school bus; and/or
    (3) within one thousand feet of a school bus stop route designated by the
    school district; and/or (4) within one thousand feet of the perimeter of the
    school grounds; contrary to Revised Code of Washington 69.50.435.
    Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 25.
    The case proceeded to a jury trial. The to-convict jury instruction required the
    State to prove “beyond a reasonable doubt: “(1) That on or about July 17, 2016, the
    defendant, or one with whom he was an accomplice, manufactured a controlled
    substance, to wit: marijuana; (2) That the defendant knew that the substance was a
    controlled substance, to wit: marijuana; and (3) That this act occurred in the State of
    Washington.” CP at 14. The jury returned a verdict of guilty and also found by special
    verdict that Mr. Negrete committed the offense within one thousand feet of the perimeter
    of a school ground. He appeals.
    DISCUSSION
    Mr. Negrete’s sole claim on appeal is that the amended information, charging
    manufacture of marijuana, was constitutionally defective because it did not allege as an
    essential element of the crime his noncompliance with the statutory exceptions for lawful
    marijuana activities referenced in RCW 69.50.401(3).
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    No. 35449-1-III
    State v. Negrete
    Under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section
    22 of the Washington Constitution, an individual charged with a crime has the right to
    know the charges against him. State v. Johnson, 
    180 Wash. 2d 295
    , 300, 
    325 P.3d 135
    (2014). An information is constitutionally adequate “only if all essential elements of a
    crime, statutory and nonstatutory, are included in the document so as to apprise the
    accused of the charges against him or her and to allow the defendant to prepare a
    defense.” State v. Vangerpen, 
    125 Wash. 2d 782
    , 787, 
    888 P.2d 1177
     (1995). When, as
    here, the defendant challenges the charging document for the first time on appeal, we
    construe it liberally to determine whether the necessary elements appear in any form, or
    by fair construction, are found on the face of the document. State v. Kjorsvik, 
    117 Wash. 2d 93
    , 105, 
    812 P.2d 86
     (1991). We review the sufficiency of a charging document de novo.
    Johnson, 180 Wn.2d at 300.
    Mr. Negrete’s arguments require us to ascertain the meaning of portions of
    RCW 69.50.401 and related statutory provisions. Statutory interpretation is a question
    of law that we review de novo. State v. Schultz, 
    146 Wash. 2d 540
    , 544, 
    48 P.3d 301
     (2002).
    When interpreting a statute, our fundamental objective is to determine and give effect to
    the intent of the legislature. State v. Sweany, 
    174 Wash. 2d 909
    , 914, 
    281 P.3d 305
     (2012).
    When possible, we derive legislative intent solely from the plain language enacted by the
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    No. 35449-1-III
    State v. Negrete
    legislature, considering the text of the provision in question, the context of the statute in
    which the provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole.
    State v. Evans, 
    177 Wash. 2d 186
    , 192, 
    298 P.3d 724
     (2013). If the statute’s plain language
    is unambiguous, our inquiry is at an end. State v. Armendariz, 
    160 Wash. 2d 106
    , 110,
    
    156 P.3d 201
     (2007); State v. Delgado, 
    148 Wash. 2d 723
    , 727, 
    63 P.3d 792
     (2003) (Court
    “cannot add words or clauses to unambiguous statute when the legislature has chosen not
    to include that language.”).
    RCW 69.50.401 provides in relevant part:
    (1) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any
    person to manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or
    deliver, a controlled substance.
    ....
    (3) The production, manufacture, processing, packaging, delivery,
    distribution, sale, or possession of marijuana in compliance with the terms
    set forth in RCW 69.50.360, 69.50.363, or 69.50.366 shall not constitute a
    violation of this section, this chapter, or any other provision of Washington
    state law.
    (Emphasis added). The referenced statutes in subsection (3) pertain to certain legally
    authorized activities of marijuana retailers (.360), processors (.363), and producers (.366).
    As the State contends, those are plainly exceptions to the proscribed criminal conduct in
    subsection (1) and provide a basis for a person to defend against charges or claim
    exemption from prosecution.
    4
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    State v. Negrete
    Mr. Negrete nevertheless contends the referenced statutes are not merely
    affirmative defenses because no language in RCW 69.50.401(3) labels them as such,
    whereas the legislature will expressly designate something an affirmative defense when
    it intends to include one in a statute. To illustrate, Mr. Negrete cites the statute for
    physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug
    (RCW 46.61.504), which in subsection (3) states “[i]t is an affirmative defense to a
    violation of subsection (1) . . . .” RCW 46.61.504(3)(a), (b). In contrast, with no
    mention of the term “affirmative defense” in RCW 69.50.401, Mr. Negrete contends the
    statute’s language is clear that, in order to pursue a conviction for manufacturing
    marijuana, the State must prove as an essential element the defendant’s noncompliance
    with RCW 69.50.360, .363 and .366. The argument fails.
    Mr. Negrete’s analysis overlooks RCW 69.50.506(a), which unambiguously
    relieves the State of any burden to charge or prove any of the exceptions contained within
    chapter 69.50 RCW. The statute provides:
    It is not necessary for the state to negate any exemption or exception in this
    chapter in any complaint, information, indictment, or other pleading or in
    any trial, hearing, or other proceeding under this chapter. The burden of
    proof of any exemption or exception is upon the person claiming it.
    RCW 69.50.506(a) (emphasis added).
    As discussed, the plain reading of RCW 69.50.401(1) and (3) confirms that the
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    State v. Negrete
    marijuana activities authorized in RCW 69.50.360, .363 and .366 are exceptions to what
    constitutes criminal conduct. Under the unambiguous language ofRCW 69.50.506(a), it
    follows that these exceptions are not an essential element of which the State must allege
    the defendant's noncompliance in a charging document, but are in the nature of defenses
    that the defendant must prove.
    The elements of manufacture of marijuana are: (1) the defendant manufactured
    marijuana, (2) the defendant knew the substance manufactured was marijuana, and (3) the
    act occurred in the State of Washington. Here, the amended information clearly included
    each of these elements and was sufficient to allow Mr. Negrete to prepare a defense.
    There is no error.
    Affirmed.
    A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
    Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
    RCW 2.06.040.
    Pennell, J.
    WE CONCUR:
    #1 "
    Lawrence-Berrey, C.J.                     Siddoway, J.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 35449-1

Filed Date: 4/12/2018

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021