State Of Washington v. Alfred Victor Apodaca ( 2013 )

-nnaTCF APPEALSD v
STATE Cr irV."rii.tG —
2013 JUL 22 fvi l^1
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
DIVISION ONE
Respondent,
No. 70345-5-1
v.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
ALFRED VICTOR APODACA,
Appellant FILED: July 22, 2013
Dwyer, J. — Alfred Apodaca appeals from his conviction for assault in the
fourth degree. On appeal, Apodaca asserts that the trial court erred in declining
to issue four requested self-defense jury instructions. However, there was no
evidence presented at trial indicating that Apodaca subjectively believed that he
was in danger of injury. Furthermore, even ifApodaca had held such a
subjective belief, there was no evidence presented at trial that would support a
finding that such a belief was objectively reasonable. Thus, the trial court did not
err in selecting its instructions to the jury. Accordingly, we affirm Apodaca's
conviction for assault in the fourth degree.
No. 70345-5-1/2
On September 27, 2011, Alfred Apodaca and his girl friend of
approximately three months, Amy Peapaelalo, were involved in a domestic
dispute at Peapaelalo's apartment. The couple was arguing in Peapaelalo's
bedroom. Apodaca was sitting on the bed, and Peapaelalo was standing in front
of him. At some point, the argument became physical, and Apodaca pushed
Peapaelalo onto a piece of furniture. Peapaelalo called the police.
As a result of this incident, the State charged Apodaca with assault in the
second degree—domestic violence and harassment—domestic violence.
At trial, Peapaelalo testified that, during the argument, she leaned down to
make eye contact with Apodaca and asked him whether he was going to hit her
when her children were home. She stated that Apodaca then grabbed her throat
with his right hand, sustaining such pressure on her throat that she could not
breathe, scream, or talk. While applying this pressure, she said, Apodaca stood
up, walked her backward, and pushed her onto a chair. She alleged that, once
she was in the chair, Apodaca put his left hand over her mouth and told her that
he was "gonna squeeze the fucking life out of you." She estimated that he
maintained this pressure for 20-30 seconds, although she acknowledged that she
could not be entirely certain. She stated that she did not know what caused
Apodaca to eventually let go. She further testified that she had not made any
physical contact with Apodaca prior to him grabbing her by the throat.
Apodaca also testified at trial. On direct examination, he told the jury that,
before he contacted Peapaelalo in any way, she "put her finger and just kind of
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No. 70345-5-1/3
pushed my head like to look up at her." He stated that this contact made him
"upset" and "frustrated." On cross-examination, he indicated that he acted "in
response to her putting her finger on my face and then opening her hand and
pushing my face up to make eye contact with her." He said that the contact
made him feel "anger, frustration, confusion." When asked whether he was in
complete control, he responded, "I was in - is there - I don't want to say half. I
was aware of the situation." He testified that he "reacted" to the contact by
placing his left hand on Peapaelalo's collar bone, grabbing her other shoulder,
rotating her toward the couch, and pushing her onto it. In response to the State's
question, "were you injured?" Apodaca replied, "I wasn't bleeding."
Before trial, Apodaca proposed a number of jury instructions, including
four pertaining to self-defense. After all evidence had been presented to the jury,
the court met with counsel to discuss which instructions the jury would receive.
The court declined to give the proposed self-defense instructions, noting that
"[tjhere is no basis for a self-defense instruction based upon the testimony that
has been presented."
On December 8, 2011, after approximately 90 minutes of deliberation, the
jury found Apodaca not guilty of the crimes of assault in the second degree—
domestic violence and harassment—domestic violence but found him guilty of
the lesser included offense of assault in the fourth degree.
Apodaca appeals.
II
Apodaca contends that the trial court erred by declining to instruct the jury
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No. 70345-5-1/4
on self-defense. Specifically, he contends that his testimony that his contact with
Peapaelalo was a reaction to Peapaelalo "putting her finger on my face and then
opening her hand and pushing my face up to make eye contact with her" was
"some evidence" that he had acted in self-defense. We disagree. Nothing in
Apodaca's testimony or the remainder of the trial record indicates that he
subjectively believed that he was in danger of injury or that, if he had held such a
belief, it would have been objectively reasonable. Thus, self-defense instructions
were not warranted.
A defendant is entitled to instructions on self-defense when there is "some
evidence admitted in the case from whatever source which tends to prove [that
an act was committed] in self-defense." State v. McCullum, 98 Wn.2d 484, 488,
656 P.2d 1064 (1983). Self-defense is at issue when "there [is] evidence that (1)
the defendant subjectively feared that he was [in danger of injury];1 (2) this belief
was objectively reasonable; (3) the defendant exercised no greater force than
was reasonably necessary; and (4) the defendant was not the aggressor." State
v. Callahan. 87 Wn. App. 925, 929, 943 P.2d 676 (1997) (citations omitted).
1A number of courts, including the court in State v. Callahan, have required the
defendant to subjectivelyfear that he was in danger of grievous bodily harm or death. 87 Wn.
App. 925, 929, 943 P.2d 676 (1997). See also, e.g., State v. Werner, 170 Wn.2d 333, 337, 241
P.3d 410 (2010). But, as this court noted in State v. L.B., "[according to the plain language of
RCW 9A. 16.020(3), a person has a rightto use force to defend himself against danger of injury,
'in case the force is not more than is necessary.'" 132 Wn. App. 948, 953, 135 P.3d 508 (2006).
Accordingly, a requirement that the defendant believe he is in imminentdanger of death or great
or grievous bodily harm "placestoo high of a standard for one who tries to defend himself against
a danger less than great bodily harm but that still threatens injury." LJL 132 Wn. App. at 953.
See also 11 Washington Practice: Washington Pattern Jury Instructions: Criminal 17.04
cmt., at 263 (3d ed.2008) (noting that the requirement of "great bodily harm" in previousversions
had been changed to "injury"). Although the proposed jury instructions contained a correct
statement of the law, the respondent's brief quotes the Callahan passage excerpted supra
without correcting this misstatement of the law.
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No. 70345-5-1/5
A defendant has the initial burden of pointing to evidence in the case
"showing that he or she had a good faith belief in the necessity of force and that
that belief was objectively reasonable." State v. Dyson. 90 Wn. App. 433, 438-
39, 952 P.2d 1097 (1997). However, because he "is entitled to the benefit of all
the evidence," the defendant may assert self-defense even if it is "based upon
facts inconsistent with his own testimony." Callahan, 87 Wn. App. at 933. The
evidence presented need not be sufficient "to create a reasonable doubt in the
minds of the jurors." McCullum, 98 Wn.2d at 488. However, "while the threshold
burden of production for a self-defense instruction is low, it is not nonexistent."
State v. Janes. 121 Wn.2d 220, 237, 850 P.2d 495 (1993). Indeed, "an
instruction on an issue or theory not supported by the evidence is improper."
State v. Goqolin, 45 Wn. App. 640, 643, 727 P.2d 683 (1986).
In determining whether to issue self-defense instructions, a trial court must
evaluate the evidence both subjectively and objectively. State v. Read, 147
Wn.2d 238, 243, 53 P.3d 26 (2002). In order to assess the subjective
component of the defendant's self-defense claim, the trial court must consider
evidence of what the defendant knew when committing the act and determine
whether there is evidence that the defendant subjectively believed that he or she
was in danger of injury. Read, 147 Wn.2d at 243. In evaluating the objective
component of the defendant's self-defense claim, the trial court must consider
what a reasonable person would have done in reaction to the situation that
prompted the defendant's actions. Read, 147 Wn.2d at 243. Having considered
the evidence both subjectively and objectively, the trial court must then determine
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No. 70345-5-1/6
whether instruction on self-defense is warranted. Read, 147 Wn.2d at 243. With
regard to self-defense instructions,
[t]he standard for review ... depends on whether the trial court's
refusal to grant the jury instructions was based upon a matter of law
or of fact. A trial court's refusal to give instructions to a jury, if
based on a factual dispute, is reviewable only for abuse of
discretion. The trial court's refusal to give an instruction based
upon a ruling of law is reviewed de novo.
State v. Walker. 136 Wn.2d 767, 771-72, 966 P.2d 883 (1998) (citation omitted).
Here, the trial court stated that "[t]here is no basis for a self-defense
instruction based upon the testimony that has been presented." It is somewhat
unclear whether the trial court based this statement on a finding that Apodaca
had not provided evidence that he subjectively believed that he was at risk of
injury or on a finding that no reasonable person would have responded to the
provocation in the manner that Apodaca did. However, a ruling on either basis is
supportable.
There was no evidence adduced at trial tending to demonstrate that
Apodaca subjectively believed that he was at risk of injury as a result of
Peapaelalo's actions. Apodaca did not testify that he subjectively believed that
he was about to be injured, nor can such a belief be reasonably inferred from his
testimony. Although he testified that Peapaelalo used her finger and open hand
to tilt his face upward so that they would make eye contact, Apodaca did not
indicate that she did so violently or aggressively. Apodaca described Peapaelalo
as "very frustrated," but did not provide any evidence that she intended violence.
No evidence was introduced into the record that Peapaelalo had a weapon or
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No. 70345-5-1/7
approached him threateningly. Apodaca did not testify that Peapaelalo's touch
itself was injurious; when asked whether he was injured, he replied that he
"wasn't bleeding." Nor did he testify that he feared future injury. Instead, when
asked what his reaction to the contact was, Apodaca stated he was "upset," and
"frustrated."
Indeed, Apodaca's own testimony belies his claim that he subjectively
believed that he was in imminent danger of injury. Apodaca testified to a number
of mental states. He told the jury that he was "frustrated" and "irritated" and that
he felt "anger, frustration, confusion." Apodaca did not, however, testify to the
one mental state that properly triggers a self-defense instruction: a subjective
belief that he was about to be injured. Because there was no evidence
presented tending to show such a belief, the trial court did not err by declining to
give the proposed self-defense instructions.
Where a defendant fails "to satisfy the subjective element of self-defense,
[courts]. . . need not review the trial court's finding regarding the objective
element of self-defense." Read, 147 Wn.2d at 244. However, even ifApodaca
had subjectively believed that he was in danger of injury, this belief was not
objectively reasonable. Apodaca testified to only one fact relative to this belief:
that Peapaelalo had used her finger and open hand to tilt his head up. No
reasonable person would believe he was at risk of future injury when faced with
such minimal contact and no other threatening circumstances. There was no
other evidence on the question that would have supported a self-defense claim.
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No. 70345-5-1/8
Accordingly, because there was no evidence adduced at trial tending to
demonstrate either that Apodaca subjectively believed that he was in danger of
injury or that such a subjective belief would have been objectively reasonable,
the trial court properly declined to issue the proposed self-defense instructions.
Affirmed.
We concur:
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