State of Washington v. Mariano Diaz-Farias , 191 Wash. App. 512 ( 2015 )

FILED
DECEMBER 1,2015
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
W A State Court of Appeals, Division II I
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
) No. 32583-1-111
Respondent, )
)
v. )
)
MARIANO DIAZ-FARIAS, ) PUBLISHED OPINION
)
Appellant. )
SIDDOWAY, C.J. - Under RCW 10.01.160, a court may impose costs on a
convicted criminal defendant at the time of sentencing, with "costs" for this purpose
being "limited to expenses specially incurred by the state in prosecuting the defendant" or
for other limited purposes not relevant here. RCW 10.01.160(2). "They cannot include
expenses inherent in providing a constitutionally guaranteed jury trial or expenditures in
connection with the maintenance and operation of government agencies that must be
made by the public irrespective of specific violations oflaw." Id.
Mariano Diaz-Farias pleaded guilty to first degree assault on the day his jury trial
was to have begun. A principal issue in this appeal are legal financial obligations (LFOs)
imposed on him for the county's costs of a jury, a court reporter, and a court appointed
No. 32583-1-111
State v. Diaz-Farias
interpreter-expenses that he argues either fall within the cost reimbursement exceptions
for "expenses inherent in providing a constitutionally guaranteed jury trial" or were
required by other state laws to be borne by the county.
Consistent with cases construing the Oregon statute on which RCW 10.01.160 is
based, we hold that the cost reimbursement exception for "expenses inherent in providing
a constitutionally guaranteed jury trial" applies to juror costs, but not to expenses
incurred in protecting other constitutional rights of a defendant at trial; and that statutes
requiring the county to bear certain expenses in the first instance do not conflict with
RC W 10.01.160' s authorization to require a convicted defendant to reimburse "costs ...
incurred by the state."
Nonetheless, we follow State v. Marintorres, 93 Wn. App. 442, 969 P.2d 501(1999), which holds that RCW 2.43.040(4)'s authorization to tax costs of interpreters to
non-English speaking criminal defendants violates equal protection. Id. at 450. We also
direct the trial court on remand to identifY the nature of the court reporter cost included as
an LFO so that the parties may address whether it is a cost specially incurred by the
prosecution or one that must be made by the public irrespective of specific violations of
law.
Finally, because a remand for resentencing on the LFOs is required, we exercise
our discretion to review Mr. Diaz-Farias's unpreserved argument that the sentencing
court failed to engage in an individualized inquiry into his present or future ability to pay
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State v. Diaz-Farias
the LFOs. We accept the State's concession that ability to pay was not examined on the
record by the sentencing court and order that that be done on remand.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mariano Diaz-Farias pleaded guilty to one count of first-degree assault, entering
his plea the morning his criminal trial was set to begin.
At sentencing, after announcing that it would sentence Mr. Diaz-Farias to the 93
months recommended by the State, the court said it was increasing the costs requested by
the State by $2,200, "in recognition of the court reporter costs, the juror costs and the
interpreter costs incurred in anticipation ofthe trial date which could not be recouped."
Report of Proceedings (RP) at 22. The court's decision to include the additional costs
was sua sponte, and the record does not reveal what part of the $2,200 reflected "court
reporter costs," ')uror costs" or "interpreter costs," or what supported the component
amounts. Other than that change, the court signed the judgment and sentence proposed
by the State.
In addition to the court's handwritten addition of "$2,200" as "other court costs,"
the court's judgment and sentence reflected the following LFOs that had been proposed
and included by the State: a $500 victim assessment, a $200 criminal filing fee, a $140
sheriff service fee, a $125 crime lab fee, and a $100 DNAI collection fee. Before
I Deoxyribonucleic acid.
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State v. Diaz-Farias
including the $2,200 as "other court costs" and signing the judgment and sentence, the
court did not inquire into Mr. Diaz-Farias's present or future ability to pay the
discretionary LFOs.
At no time during the sentencing hearing did Mr. Diaz-Farias object to the LFOs.
He nonetheless timely appealed, challenging only the imposition ofLFOs.
ANALYSIS
For the first time on appeal, Mr. Diaz-Farias raises several challenges to the LFOs
imposed by the sentencing court as exceeding the sentencing court's authority under
RCW 10.01.160 and other statutes. He also contends that because the sentencing court
failed to inquire into his present or future ability to pay the discretionary costs imposed,
we must remand for resentencing. 2
The State responds that because Mr. Diaz-Farias failed to raise any of his
objections in the trial court, we should apply the general rule that we will not consider
errors raised for the first time on appeal. RAP 2.5(a). By reply, Mr. Diaz-Farias
concedes that following State v. Blazina, 182 Wn.2d 827, 344 P.3d 680 (2015), the trial
court's failure to engage in an individualized inquiry does not require us to reverse, but
he argues that we should exercise our discretion to review the alleged error.
2 Mr. Diaz-Farias concedes that $800 of the LFOs (the $500 victim assessment
fee, the $200 criminal filing fee, and the $100 DNA collection fee) were mandatory. Br.
of Appellant at 2 n.l.
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We first review the sentencing court's authority to impose costs, next address the
application of RAP 2.5(a) to challenges to LFOs that are not raised in the trial court, and
finally-having concluded that some of Mr. Diaz-Farias's challenges are to sentencing
errors that may be raised for the first time on appeal and exercising our discretion to
review others-we turn to his arguments of error.
1. The statutory authority and obligation ofthe sentencing court to
consider and impose costs
It is a well settled proposition that at common law, costs (as such) in criminal
cases were unknown, so that liability for costs arises only from statutory enactment.
Annot., Items ofcosts ofprosecution for which defendant may be held, 65 A.L.R.2d 854(collecting cases); State v. Buchanan, 78 Wn. App. 648, 651, 898 P.2d 862 (1995). In
Washington, RCW 9.94A.760(1) provides that
[w]henever a person is convicted in superior court, the court may order the
payment of a legal financial obligation as part of the sentence. The court
must on either the judgment and sentence or on a subsequent order to pay,
designate the total amount of a legal financial obligation and segregate this
amount among the separate assessments made for restitution, costs, fines,
and other assessments required by law.
"Legal financial obligation" is generally defined by RCW 9.94A.030(31) as
meaning
a sum of money that is ordered by a superior court of the state of
Washington for legal financial obligations which may include restitution to
the victim, statutorily imposed crime victims' compensation fees as
assessed pursuant to RCW 7.68.035, court costs, county or interlocal drug
funds, court-appointed attorneys' fees, and costs of defense, fines, and any
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No. 32583-1-111
State v. Diaz-Farias
other financial obligation that is assessed to the offender as a result of a
felony conviction.
RCW 10.01.160, which provides that "[t]he court may require a defendant to pay
costs," RCW 10.01.160(1), describes the scope and limitations on the type of costs that
can be imposed:
Costs shall be limited to expenses specially incurred by the state in
prosecuting the defendant or in administering the deferred prosecution
program under chapter 10.05 RCW or pretrial supervision. They cannot
include expenses inherent in providing a constitutionally guaranteed jury
trial or expenditures in connection with the maintenance and operation of
government agencies that must be made by the public irrespective of
specific violations of law.
RCW 10.01.160(2). Elsewhere, the statute provides that
The court shall not order a defendant to pay costs unless the defendant is or
will be able to pay them. In determining the amount and method of
payment of costs, the court shall take account of the financial resources of
the defendant and the nature of the burden that payment of costs will
Impose.
RCW 10.01.160(3). Ifa trial court determines at some time after the sentence has been
imposed that the costs will impose a manifest hardship on the defendant or his family, the
court "may remit all or part of the amount due in costs, or modify the method of
payment." RCW 10.01.160(4).
These statutory provisions satisfy the requirements of a constitutional cost and fee
recovery regime. State v. Curry, 118 Wn.2d 911,915-16,829 P.2d 166 (1992).
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I State v. Diaz-Farias
II. Some ofMr. Diaz-Farias's challenges are to sentencing error that
may be raisedfor the first time on appeal; we exercise discretion to
consider others.
In Mr. Diaz-Farias's opening brief, he argued that where a sentencing court fails to
comply with the requirement of RCW 10.01.160(3) that it "take account of the financial
resources of the defendant and the nature of the burden that payment of costs will
impose," the result is an illegal or erroneous sentence that may be challenged for the first
time on appeal. Br. of Appellant at 8 (citing State v. Ford, 137 Wn.2d 472,477,973 P.2d
452 (1999)).
In Blazina, our Supreme Court held that "[ u]npreserved LFO errors do not
command review as a matter of right under Ford and its progeny," explaining that in
those cases, it was a concern about sentence conformity that motivated its decision to
allow review of a "narrow category" of cases in which errors, if permitted to stand,
"would create inconsistent sentences for the same crime" and result in some defendants
receiving "unjust punishment simply because his or her attorney failed to object."
Blazina, 182 Wn.2d at 833-34. "[A]llowing challenges to discretionary LFO orders
would not promote sentencing uniformity in the same way," and where such an error is
unique to a defendant's circumstances, an appellate court ~'properly exercise[s] its
discretion to [deny] review." Id. at 834.
Mr. Diaz-Farias raises the same "failure to consider financial ability to pay"
challenge that Blazina holds does not command review as a matter of right. But he also
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No. 32583-I-III
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challenges whether the sentencing court exceeded its statutory authority by burdening
him with some costs that no criminal defendant is intended to bear. Sentencing errors
appropriate for review for the first time on appeal include errors in calculating offender
scores and errors in the imposition of community custody requirements. See id at 833-34
(citing State v. Mendoza, 165 Wn.2d 913,919-20,205 P.3d 113 (2009); Ford, 137 Wn.2d
at 475-78; State v. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d 739, 743-45, 193 P.3d 678 (2008». Review of these
types of error is appropriate because "the error, if permitted to stand, would create
inconsistent sentences for the same crime ... and some defendants would receive unjust
punishment simply because his or her attorney failed to object." Id at 834. We conclude
that Mr. Diaz-Farias's assignments of error to costs he contends are not authorized by
statute under any circumstances are sentencing errors of the sort that can be raised for the
first time on appeal.
Because judicial economy will be served by remanding all of the LFO issues if we
remand some, we review all of Mr. Diaz-Farias's assignments of error.
Ill. Mr. Diaz-Farias's challenges to costs imposed sua sponte
A. The statutory cost reimbursement exception for expenses
"inherent in providing a constitutionally guaranteed jury trial"
Mr. Diaz-Farias argues that juror costs, court reporter costs, and the expense of a
Spanish-speaking interpreter are all expenses "inherent in providing a constitutionally
guaranteed jury trial" that cannot be included in an award of costs under RCW
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No. 32583-1-111
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10.01.160(2). No reported Washington decision has construed the prohibition on
imposing such expenses or attempted to reconcile it with the legislature's provision
elsewhere that some constitutionally required expenditures by the State can be imposed
on criminal defendants. As noted earlier, for example, RCW 9.94A.030(31) defines legal
financial obligations as including "court-appointed attorneys' fees" and "costs of
defense," both of which are not directly associated withjury trial, but are associated with
other constitutional rights that serve to protect a defendant at trial. Washington decisions
have long recognized that the cost of a court-appointed lawyer for an indigent defendant
is one that can be imposed under RCW 10.01.160. E.g., State v. Eisenman, 62 Wn. App.
640,644,810 P.2d 55 (1991).
The closest examination ofRCW 10.01.160 has been by Division Two of our
court in Utter v. State, 140 Wn. App. 293, 165 P.3d 399 (2007). In that differently-
postured case, the State sought to recover state hospital costs incurred in evaluating and
treating a defendant who was possibly incompetent to stand trial. Since RCW
10.01.160(1) provides that most costs can be recovered only from defendants who are
convicted, the defense urged the court to find that the evaluation and treatment expenses
provided by the hospital were "specially incurred by the state in prosecuting the
defendant," that RCW 10.01.160 was the controlling statute, and that the expenses could
not be recovered from Utter, who was ultimately found incompetent to stand trial and
was never convicted. The State urged the court to apply a different statute, which
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No. 32583-1-111
State v. Diaz-Farias
generally authorized the State to recover treatment expenses from patients treated in State
hospitals. 3
Division Two observed that no Washington cases had construed pertinent
language in RCW 10.01.160, but it observed that "because our legislature adopted RCW
10.01.160 from former ORS 161.665, we consider Oregon's construction and
interpretation of former ORS 161.665 as authoritative." Utter, 140 Wn. App. at 309
(citing State v. Earls, 51 Wn. App. 192, 197,752 P.2d 402 (1988), disapproved on other
grounds by Curry, 118 Wn.2d at 915).
A year before the 1976 adoption of the legislation now codified in part at RCW
10.01.160, our own Supreme Court had invalidated a probation condition requiring a
criminal defendant to reimburse the State for court-appointed attorney fees, pointing out
that while Oregon had enacted requirements for the repayment of court appointed
attorney fees that survived constitutional challenge in the United States Supreme Court,
Washington had no such statute. State v. Hess, 86 Wn.2d 51, 53-54, 541 P.2d 1222(1975) (citing State v. Fuller, 417 U.S. 40, 94 S. Ct. 2116, 40 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1974». The
next year, the Washington legislation adopted cost reimbursement legislation identical to
3 The legislature responded to the Utter decision in 2008 by amending RCW
10.01.160 to provide that its limitations only apply to the State's recovery of "direct costs
relating to evaluating and reporting to the court, prosecutor, or defense counsel regarding
a defendant's competency to stand trial." LAWS OF 2008, ch. 318, § 2, codified as RCW
10.01.160(5),
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No. 32583-1-111
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Oregon's 1971 statute. The Washington attorney general has relied on Oregon case law
in responding to at least two requests for guidance on which costs can be imposed on a
defendant under RCW 10.01.160. 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 14, at 2-3, 1976 WL 168498;
1978 Op. Att'y Gen. No.4, at 4-6, 1978 WL 23884.
Utter recognized that it was unclear whether the cost reimbursement exception for
``expenses inherent in providing a constitutionally guaranteed jury trial" was broad
enough to extend to a defendant's constitutional right to appear and defend in person, but
. the court concluded that it had not been called on to decide that issue. 140 Wn. App. at
311. It noted that the breadth of the cost reimbursement exception had been addressed in
Oregon v. ~erman-Velasco, 333 Or. 422, 41 P.3d 404 (2002).
The Oregon Supreme Court was called on in ~erman-Velasco to determine
whether the cost reimbursement exception for "expenses inherent in providing a
constitutionally guaranteed jury trial" encompasses only those expenses directly
associated with a jury trial, or expenses associated with all other constitutional rights that
serve to protect a defendant at trial. 41 P.3d at 442. A sentencing court had imposed the
prosecution's witness fees on the defendant, who contended that because he had a
constitutional right to meet witnesses against him "face to face" under article I, section 12
of the Oregon Constitution and a confrontation right under the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, the witness fees were expenses inherent in providing a
constitutionally guaranteed jury trial.
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No. 32583-1-III
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The Oregon court concluded that the defendant's argument for such a broad
reading of the exception failed at the first level of analysis: reading the exception in
context. The statute contemplated that defendants could be required to reimburse the
State for the cost of court-appointed counsel, the right to which, "like the right to meet
witnesses face to face, serves to protect a criminal defendant during trial." Id. at 415. It
was thus "apparent that the legislature ... did not intend [the] exception to apply to
expenses associated with all constitutional rights that protect a defendant at trial." Id.
(emphasis in original).
The Oregon court also considered the legislative history and case law construing
the Michigan cost reimbursement provision on which its own statute was based. It
discussed People v. Hope, 297 Mich. 115,297 N.W. 206 (1941), in which the Michigan
Supreme Court had reversed that part of a cost order that imposed juror costs on a
convicted defendant, but had affirmed the imposition of witness fees. Ferman-Velasco,
41 PJd at 415 (citing 297 Mich. at 118-19). It concluded that Michigan case law
supports the conclusion that, in using the phrase "expenses inherent in
providing a constitutionally guaranteed jury trial" . .. the Oregon
Legislature intended to encompass only expenses relating to a defendant's
jury trial itself, not expenses associated with other constitutional rights that
apply at the time of trial.
Id. at 416 (emphasis in original).
Both the Oregon and Michigan cases are persuasive authority that the "juror
costs" that the sentencing court imposed on Mr. Diaz-Farias are the type of expense that
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No. 32583-1-111
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the exception was intended to exempt from assessment on a criminal defendant under
RCW lO.01.160(2). And see 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 14, at 4 (the statute "plainly
excludes such costs as compensation ofjurors even though specially incurred"). Notably,
after the Attorney General concluded in 1978 4 that RCW 10.01.160 was irreconcilable
with preexisting RCW 10.46.190 (authorizing sentencing courts to assess a fixed "juror
fee" against a criminal defendant) and that the 1976 legislation impliedly repealed the
earlier statute, the legislature amended RCW 10.01.160 to explicitly provide that the jury
fee provided by RCW 10.46.190 can be imposed as a cost. See LAWS OF 1987, ch. 363,
§1 at 1381.
We agree with Mr. Diaz-Farias that the $250 statutory jury fee provided by RCW
lO.46.190 is the only jury-related cost that may be imposed under RCW 10.01.160(2),
given its express prohibition on imposing expenses inherent in providing a jury trial. In
resentencing Mr. Diaz-Farias as to costs, the court may not impose any other jury-related
expense.
The Oregon and Michigan cases are also persuasive authority that court reporter
costs and interpreter costs are not included within the cost reimbursement exception for
4 1978 Op. Att'y Gen. No.4, at 4-6.
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No. 32583-1-III
State v. Diaz-Farias
expenses inherent in providing a jury trial. We need not consider further whether these
expenses were associated with other constitutional rights. 5
B. Statutory provisions for court reporters and interpreters
Mr. Diaz-Farias next contends that the sentencing court erred in imposing court
reporter and interpreter costs because both court reporter and interpreter expenses are
addressed by state laws requiring that counties cover those costs.
Addressing court reporter expense, he points out that superior court judges in
larger counties are required by statute to appoint a county court reporter who will be paid
out of county funds. RCW 2.32.180; RCW 2.32.210 (a reporter's compensation "shall be
paid out of the current expense fund of the county or counties where court is held"). In
smaller counties, such as Adams County where Mr. Diaz-Farias was convicted, ajudge
may appoint a reporter ifhe or she determines that a reporter is necessary. RCW
2.32.220. Adams County Local Rule 14 provided at the time of Mr. Diaz-Farias's
sentencing that "[i]n criminal matters, all pre-trial motions and appearances will be
recorded electronically, and the Court will arrange for a court reporter to be in attendance
5 Mr. Diaz-Farias argues that court reporters are constitutionally required, relying
on article 4, section 11 of the Washington Constitution, which provides that superior
courts are to be "courts of record." State v. Gonzales-Morales, 138 Wn.2d 374, 379, 979
P.2d 826 (1999) addresses the constitutional right of a defendant in a criminal case to
have an interpreter.
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No. 32583-1-III
State v. Diaz-Farias
for criminal trials at the expense of Adams County." Former ADAMS COUNTY SUPER.
CT. R. 14(C) (1992), readopted as ADAMS COUNTY SUPER. CT. R. 12(C).
Addressing interpreter expense, Mr. Diaz-Farias points out that RCW 2.43.040(2)
provides that "'in all legal proceedings in which a non-English speaking person is a
party ... including criminal proceedings ... the cost of providing the interpreter shall be
borne by the governmental party initiating the legal proceedings."
A statute requiring a county to bear an expense in the first instance is not
inconsistent with a statute providing that reimbursement of the county's expense can be
ordered by a sentencing court. Indeed, the only expenses with which RCW 10.01.160 is
concerned are "expenses ... incurred by the state."
This issue, too, was addressed in the Oregon Supreme Court's decision in Ferman-
Velasco. There, the defendant argued that because a statute required counties to pay
witness fees in grand jury and criminal proceedings, such fees could not then be imposed
on a criminal defendant under ORS 161.655. The court disagreed and held that state law
could require counties to pay expenses of prosecution as they became due to third parties
without conflicting with ORS 161.655's authorization to sentencing courts to impose
responsibility for such expenses on a convicted criminal defendant. 41 P.3d at 440. It
reasoned that "the fact that ORS 161.65 5( 1) speaks to costs already' incurred' suggests,
as the state contends here, that that statute authorizes a trial court to order a convicted
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No. 32583-1-111
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defendant to provide reimbursement for certain prosecution expenses (such as witness
fees) already paid." Id.Washington's statute providing for county payment of court reporter expense
explicitly contemplates county payment in the first instance, followed by possible
taxation and reimbursement as costs. While Mr. Diaz-Farias points out that RCW
2.43.040(2) provides that the cost of providing an interpreter for a non-English speaking
person is borne by the governmental body initiating the prosecution, he ignores the fact
that subsection (4) of the same statute provides, "The cost of providing the interpreter is a
taxable cost of any proceeding in which costs ordinarily are taxed."
Although not pointed out by Mr. Diaz-Farias, however, we cannot ignore the fact
that the provision under which he could be taxed with an interpreter cost has been
declared unconstitutional as applied to a criminal defendant. In Marintorres, supra, the
defendant successfully challenged an assessment of the costs of his Spanish-speaking
interpreter under RCW 2.43.040(4) and 10.01.160(2) on equal protection grounds. 93
Wn. App. at 451-52. He pointed out that chapter 2.42 RCW, which deals with providing
interpreters for hearing impaired parties, requires the county to appoint and pay for a
qualified interpreter without any provision that the expense of the interpreter is a taxable
cost. This court agreed that there was a violation of equal protection, reasoning that this
distinction in the treatment of hearing-impaired and non-English speaking criminal
defendants could not satisfY even "rational basis" review. Id. at 451. Since neither
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No. 32583-1-111
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chapter 2.42 nor 2.43 of the RCW has been amended in response to Marintorres, we rule
that in resentencing Mr. Diaz-Farias as to legal financial obligations, the court may not
impose any expense of an interpreter.
A final issue remaining as to the cost imposed for a court reporter is whether it
qualifies as a cost "specially incurred by the state in prosecuting the defendant" or
whether it is excluded from recovery as an "expenditure[] in connection with the ...
operation of [a] government agenc[y] that must be made by the public irrespective of
specific violations of law." RCW 10.01.160(2). We found no decision holding that any
expense incurred in operating a court is a cost "specially incurred by the state in
prosecuting the defendant." Oregon cases have held that costs specially incurred by
police and prosecutors cannot include "the regular salaries of law enforcement officers
involved in an investigation and the ordinary overhead expenses of maintaining a police
agency ... principally because they are incurred irrespective of specific violations of
law." State v. Heston, 74 Or. App. 631, 634, 704 P.2d 541, 542 (1985); accord State v.
Wilson, 193 Or. App. 506,510,92 P.3d 729, 731 (2004) (Department of Corrections did
not incur expense other than the regular salaries of employees, hence no cost could be
assessed against the defendant). Given the dearth of information as to the nature of the
court reporter expense included by the sentencing court in the $2,200 in "other court
costs," we order the court on remand to identifY the nature of the expense so that the
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No. 32583-1-II1
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parties may advance legal arguments as to whether it is or is not a cost that may be
imposed.
IV. Mr. Diaz-Farias's challenges to costs included in the State's
proposed judgment
Mr. Diaz-Farias's remaining challenges are to matters of which he had advance
notice yet did not address in the trial court. We exercise our discretion to review them
since we are otherwise remanding for resentencing on the sole issue of the LFOs.
A. Crime Lab Fee of $125
Mr. Diaz-Farias argues that the sentencing court erred when it imposed a crime lab
analysis fee of$125. The fee was assessed under RCW 43.43.690, which provides in
part:
When an adult offender has been adjudged guilty of violating any criminal
statute of this state and a crime laboratory analysis was performed by a
state crime laboratory, in addition to any other disposition, penalty, or fine
imposed, the court shall levy a crime laboratory analysis fee of one hundred
dollars for each offense for which the person was convicted.
RCW 43.43.690(1). Mr. Diaz-Farias argues that under the plain language of the statute,
the fine is to be levied only if "a crime laboratory analysis was performed by a state
crime laboratory" and points out that the State failed to present any evidence that a
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No. 32583-1-111
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laboratory analysis was ever performed. 6 Alternatively, he argues that the fee, even if
appropriate, should have been in the statutorily-required amount of $1 00, not $125.
Since we are remanding for review of other LFO issues, we direct the sentencing court to
reconsider this fee.
B. Failure to engage in individualized review of ability to pay
Mr. Diaz-Farias's final argument is that under RCW 10.01.160(3), "[t]he court
shall not order a defendant to pay costs unless the defendant is or will be able to pay
them." RCW 10.01.160(3). "The record must reflect that the trial court made an
individualized inquiry into the defendant's current and future ability to pay." Blazina,
182 Wn.2d at 838. He argues that no individualized inquiry was made.
The State agrees that the sentencing court did not examine Mr. Diaz-Farias'
present or future ability to pay LFOs on the record. It concedes error in the event we
exercise our discretion to review the issue. Br. of Resp't at 2-3. Again, since we are
remanding for review of other LFO issues, we direct the sentencing court to engage in the
individualized inquiry into the defendant's current and future ability to pay that is
required by RCW 10.01.160(3).
6 During the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor mentioned "ballistics" in a context
unrelated to the legal financial obligations it had proposed. Report of Proceedings at 14
("And ballistics bore out that only one weapon was fired in this altercation and it in fact
was the defendant's weapon.") But no evidence or argument supported the State's
request that the court levy the fee.
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We reverse the discretionary LFOs imposed by section 4.3 of the judgment and
sentence and remand for resentencing solely with respect to those LFOs, consistent with
this opinion.
;;Jt fJ.L;w.~ . ``
Siddoway, C.J.
WE CONCUR:
20