State Of Washington v. Brian Michael Shelley ( 2015 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
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STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
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Respondent, ) 1
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BRIAN MICHAEL SHELLEY, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
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Appellant. ) FILED: June 1,2015
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Becker, J. — When charged with the crime of vehicular assault, a
defendant receives sufficient notice of the element of causation if the State's
information links the defendant's driving to a victim's injury. The information in
this case satisfies that requirement. We therefore affirm the conviction but
remand for resentencing in light of an offender score issue.
Appellant Brian Shelley was driving down Ewing Road in Langley,
Washington, on May 16, 2013, when he lost control of his Isuzu. The Isuzu slid
into the opposite lane and collided with a Mini Cooper. A passenger in the Mini
Cooper was treated at a local hospital for a broken thumb she suffered in the
accident.
The State charged Shelley by information alleging he committed vehicular
assault and other crimes. Shelley did not object to the information. He
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proceeded to trial and was found guilty of vehicular assault and hit and run. On
appeal, Shelley challenges the sufficiency of the information charging vehicular
assault.
All essential elements of a crime, statutory and nonstatutory, must be
included in a charging document to notify a defendant of the accusation against
him. State v. Kiorsvik, 117 Wn.2d 93, 97, 101-01, 812 P2d 86 (1991).
Defendants need to be fully informed of the nature of the accusation "so that they
may prepare an adequate defense." State v. Leach, 113 Wn.2d 679, 695, 782
P.2d 552 (1989).
The information used the word "cause" to link Shelley's driving to the
passenger's injury, but it did not use the phrase "proximate cause":
On or about the 16th day of May, 2013, in the County of
Island, State of Washington, the above-named Defendant did
operate or drive a vehicle (a) in a reckless manner, and cause
substantial bodily harm to another, to-wit: [name]; and/or (b) while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug, as defined by
RCW 46.61.502, and cause substantial bodily harm to another, to-
wit: [name]; and/or (c) with disregard for the safety of others and
cause substantial bodily harm to another, to-wit: [name]; contrary to
Revised Code of Washington 46.61.522(1).
Shelley contends "proximate cause" is a nonstatutory element the State
must plead to sustain a conviction for vehicular assault. The State's failure to
refer explicitly to "proximate cause" in the information, Shelley argues, entitles
him to a new trial.
The elements of vehicular assault are presently defined by statute without
using the word "proximate" to qualify the causation element:
(1) A person is guilty of vehicular assault if he or she
operates or drives any vehicle:
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(a) In a reckless manner and causes substantial bodily harm
to another; or
(b) While under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any
drug, as defined by RCW 46.61.502, and causes substantial bodily
harm to another; or
(c) With disregard for the safety of others and causes
substantial bodily harm to another.
RCW 46.61.522(1). To support his claim that "proximate cause" is a nonstatutory
element of the crime of vehicular assault, Shelley relies on the presence of that
term in the vehicular assault pattern instruction. See 11A Washington Practice:
Washington Pattern Jury Instructions: Criminal 91.02, at 266 (3d ed. 2008)
(WPIC). The pattern instruction, however, is not based on any case holding that
the word "proximate" is essential in a charging document. It simply reflects the
understanding that vehicular assault is not a strict liability crime.1
Shelley argues that the nuance added by the word "proximate" is essential
to inform a defendant that his conduct is not a cause of the alleged harm if an
independent or superseding cause exists. We disagree. The State provided
adequate notice of the causation element when it alleged that Shelley's driving
caused the victim's harm. Vehicular assault defendants do not need to see the
word "proximate" in an information to realize that they have a defense if the
victim's injury had an independent or superseding cause. See State v. Mee Hui
1"Before criminal liability is imposed, the conduct of the defendant must be
both (1) the actual cause, and (2) the 'legal' or 'proximate' cause of the result."
State v. Rivas. 126 Wn.2d 443, 453, 896 P.2d 57 (1995).
In a vehicular assault case, the jury is typically instructed on how to
determine the actual cause aspect of causation. See WPIC 90.07, at 259
(defining proximate cause as "a cause which, in a direct sequence [, unbroken by
any new independent cause,] produces the [death] [substantial bodily harm], and
without which the [death] [substantial bodily harm] would not have happened.")
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Kim. 134 Wn. App. 27, 42, 139 P.3d 354 (2006) ("A superseding cause may
relieve the actor from liability, irrespective of whether his prior negligence was or
was not a proximate cause in bringing about the harm."), review denied. 159
Wn.2d 1022 (2007).
The term "proximate cause" includes "but for" causation which is the
physical connection between an act and an injury. State v. Bauer, 180 Wn.2d
929, 936, 329 P.3d 67 (2014). This is the relatively straightforward meaning of
"cause" familiar to a person of common understanding. The term "proximate
cause" also includes legal causation, the normative judgment of whether liability
should attach as a matter of law once cause in fact has been established. Bauer.
180 Wn.2d at 936. Shelley argues that including the word "proximate" in an
information is necessary to convey this additional meaning of the statutory
causation element that the State is obligated to prove. Again, we disagree.
Determining legal causation is a task for a court, not a jury, as it rests on policy
considerations. Hartley v. State. 103 Wn.2d 768, 778-80, 698 P.2d 77 (1985).
We are aware of no authority holding that legal causation must be specifically
alleged.
We conclude that the word "proximate" is not essential to the charge of
vehicular assault. The information in this case adequately alleged the element of
causation.
Shelley's second issue concerns his sentence. At the sentencing hearing,
the prosecutor represented to the court that Shelley's offender score on the
charge of hit and run was 7; on the charge of vehicular assault, it was 6. These
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scores were based on prior convictions. The prosecutor itemized five prior felony
convictions that are listed in the criminal history section of the judgment and
sentence. The earliest was second degree malicious mischief committed in 2001
and sentenced on March 1, 2002. The next three felonies were committed in
June 2009 and were sentenced on August 3, 2009. The last was a conviction for
driving under the influence in 2013.
At the hearing, the prosecutor stated that the standard range was 33 to 43
months for vehicular assault and 43 to 57 months on the hit and run. The court
asked whether the defense agreed with the ranges:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: In terms of Mr. Shelley's offender
score, Your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, Your Honor.
The court imposed a sentence of 57 months at the top of the standard range as
recommended by the State.
Shelley contends the sentence should be remanded for a redetermination
of the offender score because the State did not prove that the earliest of the prior
convictions did not wash out. Class C prior felony convictions wash out—that is,
are not to be included in the offender score—if the offender spends the next five
years in the community crime-free:
Class C prior felony convictions other than sex offenses shall not be
included in the offender score if, since the last date of release from
confinement (including full-time residential treatment) pursuant to a
felony conviction, if any, or entry of judgment and sentence, the
offender had spent five consecutive years in the community without
committing any crime that subsequently results in a conviction.
RCW 9.94A.525 (2)(c).
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More than seven years elapsed between the date Shelley was sentenced
for the 2001 felony and the date he committed the next felony. The record does
not provide any details about how long Shelley remained in confinement, if at all,
after being sentenced in 2002. Nor does it indicate that he had any
misdemeanors during the seven-year period. Therefore, it is possible that the
2001 felony should not have been included in the offender score.
The State has the burden of proving a defendant's criminal history by a
preponderance of the evidence. RCW 9.94A.500(1); State v. Ford, 137 Wn.2d
472, 479-80, 973 P.2d 452 (1999); State v. Mendoza, 165 Wn.2d 913, 928-29,
205 P.3d 113 (2009). disapproved of on other grounds by State v. Jones, 182
Wn.2d 1, 338 P.3d 278 (2014). Shelley contends that part of the State's burden
is to prove absence of washout.
At the sentencing hearing, Shelley acknowledged the State's calculation of
his offender score was correct. The State claims that Shelley's acknowledgment
obviated the need to produce evidence supporting that calculation. See
Mendoza, 165 Wn.2d at 920 ("This is not to say that a defendant cannot
affirmatively acknowledge his criminal history and thereby obviate the need for
the State to produce evidence.")
It is true that Shelley did not raise any concern below about the possible
washout of the 2001 felony. Nevertheless, Shelley's argument is not without
merit. In some circumstances, Washington law permits offenders to challenge
criminal history for the first time on appeal. Mendoza, 165 Wn.2d at 919-20. The
Supreme Court has emphasized "the need for an affirmative acknowledgement
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by the defendant of facts and information introduced for the purposes of
sentencing" before the State will be excused from its burden of providing criminal
history. Mendoza, 165 Wn.2d at 928. Shelley implicitly acknowledged the
existence of the 2001 felony in his criminal history, but the issue he raises is
whether it was properly included in his offender score. The State did not present,
and Shelley did not affirmatively acknowledge, the existence of facts and
information demonstrating that it did not wash out.
That the State's burden of proof includes the submission of evidence
negating the possibility of washout is indicated by State v. Cross, 156 Wn. App.
568, 586-87, 234 P.3d 288 (2010), a case not cited by the parties. We held in
Cross that a printout from a case management system was a reliable source
"providing sufficient proof to meet the State's burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence" that the defendant's assault conviction did not
wash out. Cross, 156 Wn. App. at 589.
Under these circumstances, Shelley is entitled to a remand for
resentencing. At resentencing, the court may consider any appropriate proof
relating to the issue whether the 2001 felony washed out. See In re Pers.
Restraint of Williams, 111 Wn.2d 353, 362, 759 P.2d 436 (1988).
In a statement of additional grounds, Shelley contends his convictions
should be reversed because the trial court denied his request for a continuance
to investigate a diminished capacity defense. Shelley also claims he is entitled to
a new trial because a juror allegedly encountered the State's trial counsel at a
little league coaches' meeting after the second day of trial. Shelley's written
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motion to continue was not designated as part of the clerk's papers, and we find
no reference in the record to the coaches' meeting. The issues raised in
Shelley's statement of additional grounds are therefore not properly before us.
State v. Calvin, 176 Wn. App. 1, 26, 302 P.3d 509, 316 P.3d 496 (2013).
Shelley's conviction is affirmed. Remanded for resentencing.
WE CONCUR:
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