State of Washington v. Reuben Denis Dwazi Mulamba ( 2015 )

FILED
JUNE 9, 2015
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
W A State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DMSION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
) No. 31314-0-111
Respondent, )
)
v. )
)
REUBEN D. MULAMBA, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
Appellant. )
)
FEARING, J. - Reuben Denis Mulamba (Denis) challenges his convictions for
abusing the children of his girlfriend. He principally argues that the trial court
impermissibly allowed evidence under the Washington child hearsay statute, RCW
9A.44.120. Since we find any error to be harmless, we affirm.
FACTS
Ashley Eli begat two children: S.E., a boy born on April 15, 2003, and J.R., a girl
born on February 24,2007. In the summer of2011, Eli and the two children lived in
Moses Lake.
In August 20 II, Ashley Eli met Denis Mulamba while smoking outside a bar in
No. 31314-0-III
State v. Mulamba
Moses Lake. By the end of the night, Eli and Mulamba exchanged phone numbers.
Mulamba attended Central Washington University in Ellensburg, but returned to Moses
Lake on weekends to work at Golden Age, an adult care facility that his mother owned.
Eli worked as a certified nurse assistant at a different adult care facility, the Blue Goose.
Ashley Eli and Denis Mulamba cultivated a close relationship. According to Eli:
"We hung out like every day, even with my kids and he [Mulamba] was always real
sweet" to both her and her children. Report of Proceedings (RP) at 124-25. In October
2011, Mulamba rented a two bedroom apartment in Ellensburg. Beginning in November
2011, Eli and J.R. stayed at Denis Mulamba's apartment in Ellensburg from Monday
through Thursday, while S.E. stayed with his grandmother in Moses Lake, where S.E.
attended school.
In December 2011, Ashley Eli and Denis Mulamba's relationship soured.
Mulamba criticized Eli for a lack of discipline of her children. Eli's mother ceased caring
for the children when Eli worked, and this situation angered Mulamba.
After Christmas 2011, the Blue Goose terminated Ashley Eli's employment. Eli
and her children then moved indefinitely into Denis Mulamba's Ellensburg apartment.
The two believed that, even if they stopped dating, they would remain best friends and
housemates. Eli agreed to pay half the rent and half the power bill.
By early January, Ashley Eli had failed to gain employment in Ellensburg.
Arguments between Eli and Denis Mulamba increased. Mulamba and Eli quarreled
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No. 31314-0-III
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about bills and Mulamba insisted he need not support Eli and her children. Mu1amba
complained about the noise of the children in his diminutive apartment. When Eli
questioned Mulamba about his anger, Mulamba responded that he would be cheerful if
Eli disciplined her children. Mulamba called Eli a "bad mom." RP at 138. S.E. was then
eight years old, and J .R. was four.
On January 13,2012, Ashley Eli and Denis Mulamba vociferously quarreled again
about Eli's lack of discipline of her children. Either Mulamba dismissed Eli from his
apartment or Eli voluntarily left. As Eli loaded her two children in her car, Mulamba
scattered some of Eli's belongings outside. Mulamba then commandeered the keys to
Eli's car and refused to allow her to leave. Police arrived, recovered Eli's keys, and Eli
departed. Eli's shoes, her makeup, her important documents, her children's toys, and the
children's clothing remained at Mulamba's apartment.
Within one day, Denis Mulamba telephoned Ashley Eli, apologized to her, and
entreated her to return to his apartment. Eli returned, in part, because many of her
possessions and the children's belongings remained at Mulamba's home. The arguments
continued during the ensuing days.
In mid-January, J.R. wet the bed. Ashley Eli spanked J.R. for the accident.
Mulamba loudly told Eli that the spanking "wasn't discipline." RP at 149. Mulamba,
unaccompanied by Eli, removed J .R. to the garage, where neighbors could not hear his
ensuing behavior toward J .R. Eli does not know all the measures Mulamba meted on J .R.
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No. 31314-0-III
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in the garage. Eli appeared momentarily and noticed J .R. missing her shirt and
performing wall sits. A wall sit consists of one resting her back against a wall and
pretending to sit in a chair.
Beginning in mid-January 2012, Denis Mulamba assumed the punishment of J.R.
and S.E. Mulamba beat the two children with a belt. Ashley Eli did not object, because
her mother disciplined her siblings with a belt. Mulamba gradually increased the severity
of the beatings, moving to a thicker belt, then an iron cord, and ending with a co-axle
cable. IfS.E. or J.R. failed to wall sit for a sufficient time during an episode of
discipline, Mulamba whipped the child and insisted on more wall sitting. When riding
from Moses Lake to Ellensburg one day, Mulamba threatened to pinch S.E. with pliers.
Later that night, Mulamba threatened to cut J .R. 's hair and bum her with a clothes iron.
Ashley Eli enrolled S.E. in Ellensburg school the week of January 23. That same
week, Eli noticed bruising on J.R.'s body. Eli demanded that Denis Mulamba cease his
methods of discipline. Mulamba refused.
By late January 2012, a pattern replayed itself in the Ellensburg household
whereby Denis Mulamba harshly disciplined a child, and Ashley Eli undertook to leave
Mulamba's apartment. Eli packed belongings, and Mulamba grabbed the belongings
from her. Mulamba seized Eli's keys, wallet, and telephone. Eli cried. Eli traversed to
the front door to exit, and Mulamba blocked and locked the door. On several occasions,
Mulamba embraced Eli and cooed: "Please, stop crying. It's okay. I am sorry. I am not
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State v. Mulamba
going to do it anymore." "[Y]ou know I am not a bad person." "I love you and I love
your kids and I am not going to do this anymore." RP at 163. The two recurrently
reconciled, and Eli remained with her children at Mulamba's home. On some occasions,
Mulamba told Eli that if she reported his conduct to law enforcement, he would claim
that she injured her children.
On January 29, 2012, J.R. vomited her dinner. J.R. undressed for a bath, at which
time Ashley Eli comprehended the extent of her daughter's injuries. Bruises blotched
J.R.'s entire body. She suffered black wounds on her legs. Eli confronted Mulamba,
who insisted that J.R. must be scratching herself. Eli knew that the wounds must be
cleaned to avoid infection, but she could not bring herself to perform the task. Mulamba
finished bathing J.R. and, after the bath, cleansed the wounds with hydrogen peroxide.
Later on January 29, Denis Mulamba threatened S.E. to either bum him or force
him to stand outside until morning. Mulamba gave S.E. a choice between the two
options. Mulamba retrieved a clothes iron but did not use it to bum S.E. He instead beat
S.E. with the iron on the boy's back. Denis Mulamba told Ashley Eli that, if she were not
a bad mother, he would not need to discipline the children.
On the night of January 29, Ashley Eli, with her two children, finally left Denis
Mulamba's apartment. Eli wrapped her naked daughter in a sheet and laid her in the car.
Young S.E. donned his shoes and left the home without a coat. Eli left without shoes and
a coat. Eli rented a motel room. She carried J.R. into the room, because of snow. J.R.
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No. 31314-0-II1
State v. Mulamba
was too ill to walk.
On January 30,2012, Ashley Eli met with Denis Mulamba at his apartment in the
hopes of retrieving shoes, coats, and clothes for herself and her children. Mulamba had,
in the meantime, called and apologized to Eli. When Eli arrived at the apartment with her
children, Mulamba expressed anger because J .R. was not in a car seat. Eli had chosen to
allow IR. to sit in the car free from restraints because of her wounds. Mulamba threw
Eli's and her children's belongings onto a sidewalk. Eli grabbed the possessions and
stuffed them in her car.
Ashley Eli returned with her children to the same Ellensburg moteL She noticed
an odor of sickness and infection on J .R. Eli paid for another night at the motel, and she
asked the front desk if she could work to pay for a room. She explained that she had no
place to live and her friend abused her children. The motel referred Eli to Aspen
Women's Domestic Violence Shelter.
The next morning, Ashley Eli bought J .R. a nightgown, fluffy robe, and socks
from a consignment store, fed her children, and went to Aspen Shelter. Eli explained to
Aspen supervisor Kathleen Coppin that she and her children needed housing because her
boyfriend beat the children. Eli refused to identify her boyfriend. Coppin summoned, by
phone, Ellensburg Police Department Detective Tim Weed. Weed traveled to Aspen.
After the adults discussed the situation, Coppin drove Eli, J.R., and S.E. to the police
station for interviews.
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No. 31314-0-III
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At the Ellensburg police station, Ashley Eli again refused to identifY her
boyfriend. So, Detective Tim Weed interviewed S.E. The transcript for the interview
reads, in part:
WEED: Okay. What made 'em hurt?
[S.E.]: Urn, I don't remember. I really don't remember what made
us urn, hurt at all. But I know we just hurt really bad. I don't know why
we hurt. I don't even know why urn, me and [J.R.] are hurting this bad.
Usually we don't hurt this bad. Ifwe hurt this bad, then usually after two
days it's gone, but nope, not with me and my sister yet, we urn, still hurt,
and I don't know why.
Clerk's Papers (CP) at 706. S.E. reported to Weed that he had earlier hit his head.
While Detective Weed interviewed S.E., Kathleen Coppin sat with lR. at the
police station. Coppin noticed that J.R. sat uncomfortably, whined painfully, and moved
slowly. lR. expressed that her stomach hurt and she wanted to lie on the floor. Coppin
concluded J .R. needed hospital care. After Detective Weed ended his interview with
S.E., Coppin drove Ashley Eli, J.R., and S.E. to Kittitas Valley Community Hospital's
emergency room.
Nurse John Yoder first examined J .R. at the hospital. Yoder noticed bruising on
lR.'s left side and arm and stripes on her back. Yoder also smelled an aroma of dead
flesh and infection. He raised J.R.'s nightgown and saw severe burns on the girl's legs.
Yoder retrieved Dr. David Frick.
While the emergency room waited for the arrival of Dr. Frick, Erik Davis tended
to S.E. As Davis changed S.E. into a hospital gown, Davis noticed "raised edge marks"
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No. 31314-0-111
State v. Mulamba
that covered the young lad from his shoulder down to his ankle. RP at 536. S.E. told
Davis he had been whipped with belts and wires and pinched with pliers.
Dr. David Frick examined J.R. and assessed her condition as serious to critical.
Frick observed second and third degree burns on J.R.' s thighs and buttocks. Dr. Frick
immediately transferred J.R., by airlift, to Seattle's Harborview Burn Center.
David Frick also assessed S.E. S.E. told Frick that his mother's boyfriendhad
abused him with belts and wire. Frick feared head and liver injuries to S.E. and
transferred the boy, by ambulance, to Harborview.
Detective Tim Weed interviewed Ashley Eli at Kittitas Valley Community
Hospital. After completing the interview, Weed arrested Eli for criminal mistreatment,
because of her failure to obtain needed medical care for her children.
At Harborview Medical Center, Dr. Kenneth Feldman examined lR. and S.E. Dr.
Feldman diagnosed J.R. with a urinary tract infection, anemia, and kidney failure. Dr.
Feldman opined that J.R. could have died from the kidney failure, if left untreated. Dr.
Feldman found S.E. severely injured throughout every portion of his young body, except
his head. Dr. Feldman believed "multiple blows" caused S.E.'s injuries. RP at 357.
On February 2, 2012, with Detective Tim Weed present, Child Protective Services
supervisor, Marti Miller, interviewed S.E. When asked to explain his injuries, S.E. told
Miller:
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No. 31314-0-111
State v. Mulamba
My mom's boyfriend was there urn-if we didn't listen we got a belt
or the wire and urn-the night when my mom decided to move he
threatened to bum me with an iron. Um--or urn-he threatened to bum me
with an iron or he would make me go stand outside until it was morning.
So I-he told me to choose. I didn't want to choose so he said he's
choosing and I guess he chose to bum me with an iron.
CP at 681. The interview continued:
MILLER: Anything else that has been used on you?
[S.E.]: Just a pair of pliers.
MILLER: Ok. And so tell me about that. What do you mean?
[S.E]: Urn-it was a long time ago. Urn-we were in the car um­
so my mom's boyfriend was mad so he grabbed a pair of pliers cause he
was mad at me and then he started pinching me right around-right here.
MILLER: Ok. And so you were in a car?
[S.E.]: Yeah.
MILLER: Where were you guys going?
[S.E.]: We were going to Moses Lake and urn-then the night when
we decided it, when my mom decided to leave he used his hands and
grabbed my stomach hard.
MILLER: Ok. And you said you and [J.R.] got beat. What-what
was that about?
[S.E.]: Um-I can't remember but I think it had to do with
something urn-my mom's boyfriend the day when we were going back,
coming back here to Ellensburg urn-she made me urn-get out of the car
and urn-we drove way back and I was on his property and he didn't want
me on there and then urn-he made my mom drive all the way up to the
end ofthe road and then he made me run after the car.
MILLER: Ok. So you-you were-what town when you were
doing that?
[S.E.]: We weren't in the town we were in a country and urn-and I
couldn't run so I just fell down. He said n9t to do that um-I just couldn't
run. My legs were hurting. So he started slapping me urn-and then I
finally got up, ran to the car, my shoes were off. And then I just got in, my
mom got my shoes and then we left and then urn-he said the next day
which was Sunday I was um-gonna get beat to death.
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No. 31314-0-III
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MILLER: Has anybody told you not to talk about anything or to,
you know say a certain thing?
[S.E.]: Urn-my mom was-didn't want me telling you guys this
because she didn't want her boyfriend to urn go to jail because this is his
last year of college. He's um-gonna graduate really soon.
MILLER: So what-what'd she say to you? What were her ... ?
[S.E.]: She said urn-not to tell you guys about this and um---cause
she didn't want him to lose urn-his urn lose his urn-career in college.
MILLER: Ok.
[S.E.]: And um-I think I urn-kind of know his name.
CP at 684-85, 697 (third alteration in original).
Marti Miller also interviewed J.R. on February 2. Miller started by asking J.R.
about her day:
MILLER: Okay . Yeah. What else happened today?
[J.R.]: And I got some cheerios for breakfast.
MILLER: Oh, those shoes, those slippers?
[J.R.]: Yeah. They brought me in some-some (inaudible).
MILLER: Oh, wow. Okay. You had a big day. Yeah. Okay.
Well, I was urn-wanting to talk with you a little bit. I heard something
might have happened to you. Can you tell me what happened to you?
[J.R.] : Yeah. I just puked.
MILLER: You just puked a little bit ago?
[J.R.]: Yeah.
MILLER: Yeah. Okay.
[J.R.]: They cleaned it up.
MILLER: Yes, they did. Alright. Well, I heard that something
might have happened to you and your brother?
[J.R.]: Well, I don't know what happened to my brother though.
MILLER: Yeah. Yeah. We just talked to your brother a little bit
ago and so he-he told us what happened to him. Urn-but we wanted to
know what happened to you and-and what's going on here for you. Okay?
[J.R.]: Okay.
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No.31314-0-III
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MILLER: Okay. So, tell me about-why-why you're in the
hospital. What's going on?
[J.R.]: Um-one day I um-(inaudible - background noise) and I
didn't eat, so the school met my mom (inaudible) to the hospital.
MILLER: Alright and so, what was-what was going on with um­
what was some things going on that caused you to have to come to the
hospital?
[J.R.]: Urn-well, I could have puked if I didn't come here and I
could have gone sicker and sicker.
MILLER: You would have been sicker and sicker.
[J.R]: I would have.
MILLER: You would have. Okay. Alright.
[J.R.]: And also, I, (inaudible). Also, those are all the reasons why.
I don't remember any other reasons.
MILLER: So, tell me who you live with [J.R.].
[J.R]: I live with-well, I only live with my mom. Not live with
my dad.
MILLER: Okay and who else?
[J.R.]: My brother and that's alL
MILLER: Okay, so your mom and you and your brother?
[J.R]: Yeah. Yeah. Even uh, (inaudible).
MILLER: That's okay. Okay.
[J.R.]: I'm trying to remember.
MILLER: You thinking?
[J.R.]: Yeah.
MILLER: You are?
[l.R]: (Inaudible).
MILLER: Okay, so you live with your mom and your brother and
anybody else?
[l.R.]: Yeah. Urn-no.
MILLER: Okay. Your brother told me that urn-there's somebody
else that lives with you guys.
[l.R]: Urn-there is? But Ijust don't know who.
MILLER: Okay.
[J.R.]: It is.
MILLER: Okay. Do you have a name?
[l.R.]: Hmm?
MILLER: You don't have a name for that person?
[l.R.]: No. I don't know his name.
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No. 31314-0-111
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MILLER: You don't know his name. Okay.
[IR.]: (Inaudible). I don't know that either.
MILLER: You said he's a boy? Is that what you said?
[l.R]: No. I don't know ifhe's a boy or girl.
MILLER: You don't know. Okay. Okay and did he live with you
guys? With your mom?
[l.R.]: The person?
MILLER: Yeah.
[J.R]: Urn-yeah. I saw-he always had to live by ourselves. That
person never lived with us.
CP at 665-67.
During the Miller interview, IR. spoke about her injuries:
MILLER: Okay. Okay. SO,tell me about-tell me your owies
here.
[l.R]: Well, they hurting. Every once in a while they start to hurt.
MILLER: Okay. Which owie hurts the most?
[J.R]: My butt.
MILLER: Your butt hurts the most?
[l.R.]: Yeah.
MILLER: Okay. What happened to it?
[J.R]: Uh, one day I fell asleep and it-I was itching real hard
sleeping and it's falling apart.
MILLER: It's falling apart.
[l.R.]: Yeah.
MILLER: Okay. How did you get the owie on your butt?
[l.R.]: Cause I was itching it.
MILLER: You were itching it. Okay.
[l.R.]: And sleeping (inaudible). (Inaudible). I was awake. I was
awake.
MILLER: You was awake.
[l.R.]: No. When I was sleeping I was itching it.
MILLER: Itching it when you were sleeping.
[l.R]: Yeah.
MILLER: Okay. What are some of your other owies?
[J.R.]: Well, on my legs.
MILLER: Okay.
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No. 31314-0-111
State v. Mulamba
[J.R.]: And on my arm and one right there.
MILLER: Okay. How'd you get those owies?
[J.R.]: Urn ... I don't know how I got these two owies up here.
MILLER: How'd you get the owies on your legs?
[J.R.]: Urn ... by getting spankings on my legs.
MILLER: You got spankings on your legs?
[J.R.]: Yeah.
MILLER: What from or who-who gave you the spankings?
[lR.]: Dad.
MILLER: [D]ad did.
[lR.]: Yeah.
MILLER: Okay and what did he spank you with?
[J.R.]: Belt.
MILLER: A belt. Okay. Do you remember what that belt looked
like?
[J.R.]: No.
MILLER: No. Okay. Alright.
[J.R.]: It was long.
MILLER: It was a long belt?
[J.R.]: Yeah.
MILLER: Okay.
[J.R.]: It's a grown up one.
MILLER: It's a what?
[J.R.]: It was grown up one though.
MILLER: A grown up one?
[J.R.]: Yeah.
MILLER: Okay, okay.
[J.R.]: It was my mom's belt.
MILLER: It's your mom's belt?
[J.R.]: Yeah. It's a rainbow belt.
MILLER: A rainbow belt?
[J.R.]: Yeah.
MILLER: Wow. Okay. Where's the rainbow belt usually kept?
[J.R.]: Urn - I don't know.
MILLER: Okay.
[J.R.]: [W]here it usually stays.
MILLER: Okay. Um-did you get any other spankings?
[J.R.]: Uh, I get the spankings when I get bad, and I be bad.
MILLER: Spankings when you're bad?
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No. 31314-0-III
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[lR]: Yeah.
MILLER: Okay. You get spankings on your legs. Where else?
[J.R]: And on my butt where (inaudible).
MILLER: On your butt.
[lR.]: Yeah.
MILLER: Where else?
[J.R.]: (inaudible) I got a spanking and I (inaudible) ...
MILLER: Spanking ....
[J.R.]: On the-where the (inaudible).
MILLER: Okay. You think you got slapped on the arms.
[lR.]: It hurts my arms. (Inaudible) and I don't know how I got
these, but I think it's I uh getting slapped.
MILLER: Okay. Who did the slapping? Who did that?
[J.R.]: I don't know. (Inaudible). And (inaudible).
MILLER: So - okay. Mom slapped you on the mouth and how did
you get slapped on the arms?
[lR.]: Uh, I didn't get slapped on the arms though.
MILLER: You didn't get slapped on the arms though?
[J.R]: No.
MILLER: Okay. How'd you get the owies on the arms then?
[J.R.]: I don't know.
MILLER: You don't know. Okay. Alright. How about any other
owies you have anywhere.
[J.R.]: Um-well, (inaudible) back (inaudible).
MILLER: Okay. Yep. I do see some owies on your back. You
can-that's okay honey. You can lay down. You're good. I don't want
you to hurt yourself. How'd you get the owies on your back?
[J.R.]: I don't know either.
MILLER: You don't know either. Okay. Okay. How about - I saw
something on the back of your head. Do you know what happened back
there?
[J.R.]: No.
CP at 667-70 (some alterations in original).
During the February 2 interview, J.R. told Marti Miller that her mother instructed
her to not disclose the name of her boyfriend:
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No. 31314-0-111
State v. Mulamba
MILLER: Okay. So, I just wanna be sure I heard you right [J.R.],
okay?
[J.R.]: Okay.
MILLER: So, dad did some spankings with the belt on your butt
and your legs. And ...
[J.R.]: No spank me with his hand on arm and butt but I-but don't
tell my mom that I told you that cause she told me to tell you guys only that
I-we got a spank with the belt.
MILLER: Okay. You know what? You-you did a good job cause
we promised to tell the truth today, remember and the truth is that you got
spanked on the butt with a belt and then sometimes with a hand. But
mom-mama didn't want you to talk about that?
[J.R.]: No.
MILLER: Okay, but you-you did the right thing by telling the
truth. Remember that was what we agreed too when we first started
talking, so good job. Okay.
[J.R.]: Okay.
MILLER: What else did mama tell you?
[J.R.]: She also told us not to tell you guys dad's real name and just
tell you guys that his name is dad.
MILLER: Okay.
[J.R.]: And that-that we don't know who his name is.
MILLER: Okay, but she didn't want you to tell who your dad's
name was?
[J.R.]: Nope.
MILLER: Okay.
[J.R.]: It's (inaudible).
MILLER: Do you know what his name is?
[J.R.]: No.
MILLER: Okay.
[J.R.]: Urn-yeah, but I don't-I just don't want them to because
um-I just-cause he has last day of school and he's still (inaudible) go to
school every day.
MILLER: So, you don't want him to go to jail?
[J.R.]: No because I don't want him to miss school.
MILLER: Okay, so he can finish school?
[lR.]: Yeah.
MILLER: Okay. Okay. So, mom said not talk about it.
[J.R.]: No.
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No. 31314-0-111
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MILLER: Okay. So, any other owies you can tell me about and
how you got those owies?
[J.R.]: Urn ... there's no other owies.
MILLER: Mom what?
[J.R.]: Just like mom slapped me.
MILLER: Just like mom did to you?
[J.R.]: Yep.
MILLER: Okay and I just want to be clear, when mom slapped you
with her hand where did she-what part of your body did she slap?
[J.R.]: I don't remember.
MILLER: You don't remember.
[J.R.]: Don't tell her I said that.
MILLER: Okay. Did she ever use anything else to hit you?
[J.R.]: Urn-no.
MILLER: How about did dad ever use anything else to hit you?
[J.R.]: Yeah. He used uses a wire too.
MILLER: A wire?
[J.R.]: Yeah.
MILLER: Okay. Do you know what that wire looks like?
[J.R.]: [W]ell, it's black.
MILLER: It's a black wire?
[J.R.]: Yeah.
MILLER: Do you know where-where that wire is at? Where's it
at? Where does it come from?
[J.R.]: It was something in my bedroom, but it's not [S.E.'s]
bedroom it's my bedroom.
MILLER: And so the wire sometimes was in your bedroom?
[J.R.] : Yeah and I found it in there' and something (inaudible).
Well, one day urn-he didn't find (inaudible) in that room and then
(inaudible) told me to keep (inaudible) and then uh ... I did and (inaudible)
from the blanket and then I-and then [S.E.] got a spanking with it because
he wasn't listening to what Dennis said.
MILLER: Okay. He wasn't listening to what Dennis said?
[J.R.]: No and don't tell him that I said that either.
MILLER: Okay. Okay.
[J.R.]: I supposed to say dad.
CP at 670-73 (some alterations in original).
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No. 31314-0-111
State v. Mulamba
PROCEDURE
The State of Washington charged Denis Mulamba with four counts: (1) assault of
a child in the first degree against J.R. in violation ofRCW 9A.36.l20, (2) assault of a
child in the second degree against S.E. in violation ofRCW 9A.36.l30, (3) criminal
mistreatment in the first degree against lR. in violation ofRCW 9A.42.020, and (4)
criminal mistreatment in the second degree against S.E. in violation ofRCW 9A.42.030.
For all four counts, the State additionally alleged that Mulamba "knew or should have
known that the victim of the current offense was particularly vulnerable or incapable of
resistance, under RCW 9.94A.535(3)(b)." CP at 306. After the State filed the
information, Denis Mulamba's defense counsel interviewed S.E. and J.R.
The State moved under RCW 9A.44.l20, the child hearsay statute, to admit lR.'s
and S.E.'s statements to law enforcement, child social workers, and medical personnel.
The State asked the trial court to find the children competent as witnesses and admit the
statements made by them through the testimony of Ellensburg Police Department
Detective Tim Weed, Child Protective Services Supervisor Marti Miller, Aspen Women's
Domestic Violence Crime Victim Manager Kathleen Coppin, and medical personnel.
The State informed the trial court that S.E. and J.R. would testify at trial. The State
attached transcripts from the interviews to its motion.
Before the motion hearing, the trial court reviewed law enforcement's video-taped
17
No. 31314-0-III
State v. Mulamba
interviews of the children and transcripts of defense counsel's interviews of S.E. and J.R.
The trial court admitted the hearsay statements. In tum, the trial court entered the
following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
I. FINDINGS OF FACT
l. On February 2,2012, [S.E.], 8, and his sister [J.R.], 4, provided
statements to a social worker and a police detective, about physical acts of
abuse the defendant inflicted upon them.
2. The interviews were conducted separately at Harborview
Hospital.
3. The interviews were audio-video recorded.
4. The court reviewed the recordings and transcripts of the same in
their entirety and incorporated them by reference.
5. The court also reviewed the defense attorney's recorded
interviews of each child.
[6]. The court reviewed the parties' legal memorandums.
II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. All witnesses are presumed competent.
2. There is no evidence presented that the children are incompetent
to testify.
3. The recordings make it clear that the children understand both
what it means to tell the truth and why it is important to tell the truth.
4. They understand simple questions and intelligently respond
corresponding with their ages.
5. The children's answers were spontaneous in response to
questions asked by their interviewers.
6. The children's responses are relatively consistent.
7. The children demonstrate a good sense of timing and being able
to recall and describe what happened.
8. When the defendant's attorney questioned the children, out of
court, the children were still able to recall what physical acts of abuse they
say the defendant inflicted upon them.
18
No. 31314-0-II1
State v. Mulamba
9. Any omissions, by the children, are not the result of faulty
recollection as opposed to the children just not wanting to talk about what
they do not want to talk about.
10. The social worker and/or detective cannot testify as to
statements one child made about any acts of physical abuse the other child
may have suffered.
11. The social worker and/or detective can only testify as to what
statements each child made as to physical acts of abuse incurred by the
child who made the statement.
12. The statements constitute testimonial evidence.
13. However, the State of Washington advises that the children are
available to testify.
14. The court's findings are premised upon the children testifying at
trial before the social worker and/or detective testify.
CP at 822-24. Thus, on the condition that J.R. and S.E. testify first, the trial court ruled
J.R.'s and S.E.'s out-of-court statements admissible under RCW 9A.44.l20.
S.E. and J.R. both testified during the jury trial. S.E. testified that Mulamba hit
him with a belt. J.R. identified Mulamba as "[t]he guy who hurt me." RP at 477.
Detective Tim Weed testified to his January 31, 2012 interview of S.E. Weed related to
the jury S.E.' s statements that he and his sister were hurting.
During trial, Marti Miller testified extensively concerning the children's
statements during her respective interviews of each. On appeal, Denis Mulamba
challenges much of Marti Miller's testimony as inadmissible under the child hearsay
statute, among other grounds. Miller testified, without objection, to: when S.E. indicated
the family moved to Ellensburg, the children's statements that their mother did not
participate in the beatings, and J .R.' s statements that her mother instructed her to not
19
No. 31314-0-111
State v. Mulamba
identify Mulamba by name. Mulamba twice objected to Marti Miller's testimony that
lR. told her that Mulamba had beat S.E.:
Q. Okay. Did you have an opportunity to ask about [S.E.] injuries?
A. I did. I asked [J.R.] if she knew anything that had happened to
[S.E].
Q. What did she say?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, separate hearsay objection on top
of the other ones.
THE COURT: Okay. So noted.
Q. (By [THE STA TEl) "What did she say?"
A. She said he got some "owies" by getting spankings too.
Q. That's how she described it? Spankings?
A. He got spankings on his butt and on the leg, too?
Q. Spankings. Did you ask [J.R.] who spanked [S.E.]?
A. I did. I asked her who spanked him on the leg with the belt and
she said, "Same person, our dad."
Q. Were those her words "same person our dad"?
A. Correct.
Q. Did you ask [J.R.] ifher mother or their mother hit [S.E.]?
A. I said, "Who slapped him with the hand?" And she said, "urn,
mom." And I clarified "mom did?" And she said, "yeah." ...
Q. In response to your question about halfway down your question,
"So the wire sometimes was in your bedroom?" "Uh-huh." Do you recall
what [J.R.] said?
A. I do.
Q. What did she say?
A. If I can look here for a minute. There was some inaudible, some
trouble with the transcriptionist hearing everything she said. But her reply
was, "Yeah, in there." And something inaudible. "Well one day urn he
didn't find ..." inaudible. " ... in that room and then ..." inaudible. " .. .
told me to keep ..." inaudible " ... and then I did and ... inaudible " .. .
from the blanket and then [S.E.] got a spanking with it because he wasn't
listening to what [Denis] said."
Q. [Denis] said?
A. Correct.
Q. Who utilized those words?
20
NO.31314-0-II1
State v. Mulamba
A. [l.R.].
Q. With [l.R.] saying "[Denis] said" what did you ask?
A. I asked, "He wasn't listening to what [Denis] said?" So again
repeating words that she's given me.
Q. You utilized her words now at this point?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. And what did she say when you asked he wasn't doing
what [Denis] said?
A. She actually said­
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, I am going to object. Statute
requires statements about abuse to that child not other children­
THE COURT: Sustained.
[THE STATE]: Okay. We'll move on.
RP at 592-94 (some alterations in original). Mulamba also objected when Miller testified
to: S.E.'s statements about how many times he was beaten, S.E.'s statements that
Mulamba threatened to bum him with an iron, and S.E. 's statement that Mulamba had
threatened to beat him to death.
Denis Mulamba also contends that Marti Miller improperly vouched for lR. 's
veracity, when testifying:
A. I asked her why she was at the hospital? What happened?
Q. What did she say?
A. She said they washed her off.
Q. Did that prompt you to ask any other questions?
A. I wanted to know what happened to her. I explained, what
happened to you? She said she puked, which I knew to be true. Mom after
we went into the room she threw up all over herself and on the bed.
Q. SO she in fact-[J.R.] in fact described for you an actual thing?
What had just happened?
A. Had happened I don't know probably a half hour by the time
maybe a little longer or so from the prior time we essentially arrived to the
time-wise speaking with her and doing the interview.
21
No. 31314-0-111
State v. Mulamba
RP at 586-87.
Denis Mulamba testified in his own defense. Mulamba testified that he and
Ashley Eli argued over the disciplining of her children. He denied ever hitting S.E. or
lR. Instead, Mulamba blamed the children's injuries on Eli, testifying that he saw Eli hit
lR. on the hands with a wire. Mulamba testified that he was unaware that the children
needed medical treatment.
The jury found Denis Mulamba guilty as charged on counts one through three:
assault of a child in the first degree against J.R., assault of a child in the second degree
against S.E., and criminal mistreatment in the first degree against J.R. For these three
offenses, the jury also found by special verdict that J.R. and S.E. were "particularly
vulnerable or incapable of resistance." CP at 479-80, 483. On count four, the jury found
Mulamba not guilty of criminal mistreatment in the second degree against S.E., but guilty
of the lesser offense of criminal mistreatment in the third degree.
The trial court imposed an exceptional sentence above the standard range for
counts one, two, and three based on the jury's special verdict finding. The trial court
sentenced Denis Mulamba to 20 years on count one, 10 years on count two, lOon count
three, and no time on count four. The court ordered the sentences to run consecutively,
for a total of 40 years.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
On appeal, Denis Mulamba contends: (1) the trial court erred when it admitted J.R.
22
No. 31314-0-III
State v. Mulamba
and S.E.'s hearsay statements under RCW 9A.44.l20, (2) Marti Miller's comment of
J.R.'s veracity violated Mulamba's right to a jury trial, and (3) the trial court erred in
imposing an exceptional sentence based on the jury's special verdict finding that S.E. was
particularly vulnerable. We address the contentions in this order.
lR. Competency to Testify
As a precursor to his argument that RCW 9A.44.120 did not sanction admission of
J.R.'s hearsay statements uttered to others, Denis Mulamba challenges J.R.'s competency
to testify. Presumably this argument extends to lR.'s trial testimony. In arguing that
J.R. was an incompetent witness, Denis Mulamba does not review J.R.'s trial testimony,
but rather focuses on the pretrial interview with Marti Miller to argue that J .R. did not
understand the obligation to speak the truth, and lR. failed to recall anything that
happened beyond generalized statements about being spanked with a belt. Mulamba
contends that impediments to J .R.' s competency precluded introduction of her statements
through the testimony of others under the child hearsay statute.
Denis Mulamba challenges J .R. ' s competency as a witness based on her young
age. Therefore, we review rules addressing child witnesses. Under ER 601:
Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise
provided by statute or by court rule.
In tum, RCW 5.60.050 provides:
The following persons shall not be competent to testify:
(1) Those who are of unsound mind, or intoxicated at the time of
23
No. 31314-0-III
State v. Mulamba
their production for examination, and
(2) Those who appear incapable of receiving just impressions of the
facts, respecting which they are examined, or of relating them truly.
Before a 1986 amendment, RCW 5.60.050(2) read: "Children under ten years ofage,
who appear incapable of receiving just impressions of the facts, respecting which they are
examined, or of relating them truly." LAWS OF 1986, ch. 195, § 2. The legislative
amendment suggests children under the age often may be suitable witnesses. State v.
8.J.W, 170 Wn.2d 92,100,239 P.3d 568 (2010).
Because RCW 5.60.050 no longer references age, the default rule that all
witnesses are presumed competent to testify applies to child witnesses. State v. S.J. W,
170 Wash. 2d at 100. The burden is on the party opposing testimony from the witness to
prove incompetence. 8.1. W, 170 Wash. 2d at 100. A party challenging the competency of
a child witness has the burden of rebutting that presumption with evidence indicating that
the child is incapable of receiving just impressions of the facts or incapable of relating
facts truly. 8.J.W, 170Wn.2dat 102.
In State v. Allen, 70 Wash. 2d 690, 424 P.2d 1021 (1967), our Supreme Court listed
five factors for assessing a child's competency to testify. Although Allen was decided
before the 1986 amendment to RCW 5.60.050, our Supreme Court continues to instruct
trial courts to utilize the five factors when assessing competency. S.J. W, 170 Wash. 2d at
97. Those considerations are:
(1) an understanding of the obligation to speak the truth on the
24
No. 3 13 14-0-III
State v. Mulamba
witness stand; (2) the mental capacity at the time of the occurrence
concerning which he is to testify, to receive an accurate impression of it;
(3) a memory sufficient to retain an independent recollection of the
occurrence; (4) the capacity to express in words his memory of the
occurrence; and (5) the capacity to understand simple questions about it.
State v. Allen, 70 Wash. 2d at 692 (1967). The child must not only be able to relate facts
truly at the time of trial, but must have been capable of receiving just impressions of the
facts at the time ofthe events about which she testifies. Allen, 70 Wash. 2d at 691.
The Allen court also identified the proper appellate standard of review, a standard
important to our decision affirming the trial court. The Allen court wrote:
The determination of the witness's ability to meet the requirements
of this test and the allowance or disallowance of leading questions rest
primarily with the trial judge who sees the witness, notices his manner, and
considers his capacity and intelligence. These are matters that are not
reflected in the written record for appellate review. Their determination
lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be disturbed
on appeal in the absence of proof of a manifest abuse of discretion.
70 Wash. 2d at 692 (citation omitted). The defendant bears the burden of establishing that
the trial court abused its broad discretion when permitting child testimony. State v.
Woods, 154 Wn.2d 613,622, 114 P.3d 1174 (2005). In Allen, the Supreme Court
affirmed a trial court finding that a six-year-old was competent to testify.
J.R. was five years of age at the time of trial. In the following decisions, the
courts held a five-year-old child competent to testify: State v. Avila, 78 Wash. App. 731,
734,899 P.2d 11 (1995); State v. Hunsaker, 39 Wash. App. 489, 693 P.2d 724 (1984); and
State v. Woodward, 32 Wash. App. 204, 207, 646 P.2d 135 (1982). In the following
25
No. 31314-0-111
State v. Mulamba
decisions, the courts held a four-year-old competent to testifY: State v. Woods, 154 Wn.2d
613,616, 114 P.3d 1174 (2005); State v. Perez, 137 Wash. App. 97, 100, 105, 151 P.3d 249
(2007); State v. Borland, 57 Wash. App. 7, 9, 11, 786 P.2d 810 (1990), overruled on other
grounds by State v. Rohrich, 132 Wn.2d 472,939 P.2d 697 (1997); State v. Strange, 53
Wash. App. 638, 639, 642, 769 P.2d 873 (1989); State v. Acheson, 48 Wn. App. 630,631,
637-38, 740 P.2d 346 (1987); and State v. Walker, 38 Wash. App. 841, 845-46,690 P.2d
1182 (1984). In Borland, the child encountered difficulty in responding to some
questions and inconsistencies were found in her statements. In State v. Carlson, 61 Wn.
App. 865, 868, 812 P.2d 536 (1991), the court allowed testimony from a child who was
three and one-half years old at the time of the abuse. In State v. Bailey, 52 Wash. App. 42,
757 P.2d 541 (1988), the court permitted testimony from a three-year-old victim.
Excerpts of Marti Miller's interview of l.R. raise a legitimate concern of the
truthfulness of J.R. Eventually, J.R. identified Denis Mulamba as having injured her with
belt whippings. Nevertheless, l.R. first stated that no one lived with her other than her
mother and brother. Then after a leading question, J.R. said someone else lived with her,
but she did not know who and whether that someone was a boy or girl. She first told
Miller that she caused the injuries on her rear end by scratching herself during sleep. She
denied knowing the source of her arm and head injuries. She denied knowing the name
of Denis Mulamba. She testified that her mom slapped her.
Denis Mulamba accentuates Allen factor one that demands that a child understand
26
No. 31314-0-111
State v. Mulamba
the obligation to speak the truth on the witness stand. Denis Mulamba contends that
Ashley Eli's instructions to J.R. to conceal the identity of her boyfriend evidence a strong
motive to lie rather than a recognition of an obligation to tell the truth. The trial court
disagreed and entered a conclusion of law that read: "The recordings make it clear that
the children understand both what it means to tell the truth and why it is important to tell
the truth." CP at 568. This conclusion may be more in the nature of a finding of fact, or
a mixed finding and conclusion. A finding of fact erroneously described as a conclusion
oflaw is reviewed as a finding of fact. Willener v. Sweeting, 107 Wn.2d 388,394, 730
P.2d 45 (1986).
We conclude that the trial court could reasonably conclude J.R. understood the
obligation to tell the truth. A review of the Miller interview shows a struggle between
J.R. wishing to tell the truth and wishing to obey her mother's direction to pretend a lack
of knowledge of the boyfriend's name and his devastating behavior. In the end, the
obligation to tell the truth prevailed.
Denis Mulamba also contends that J .R. lacked the capacity to express in words her
memory of what occurred, the fourth Allen factor. Mulamba argues that Ashley Eli's
instructions to J.R. to hide the truth and Marti Miller's comments to J.R. as to which of
her statements were true corrupted J.R.'s ability to express what happened in her own
words. The trial court entered a number of conclusions that conflict with Mulamba's
argument. The trial court found that J .R. understood simple questions and intelligently
27
No. 31314-0-111
State v. Mulamba
responded corresponding with her age; J .R. demonstrated a good sense of timing and was
able to recall and describe what happened; and, when the defendant's attorney questioned
J.R., she was able to recall what physical acts of abuse defendant inflicted on her. We
conclude substantial evidence supports these findings, and the trial court did not abuse
her discretion in so finding.
Marti Miller told J.R.: "you did a good job cause we promised to tell the truth
today, remember and the truth is that you got spanked on the butt with a belt and then
sometimes with a hand." CP at 671. Miller's remarks may not provide a model of child
interrogation, but the remarks' potential danger of leading J.R. pale when viewed in
context of the entire interview. Contextually, Miller merely reminded J.R. to be truthful,
and then reminded J.R. of what she had just said in order to ask clarifYing questions.
After Miller's remarks, J.R. consistently stated that Denis Mulamba beat her with a belt
after her family moved to Ellensburg. Although J .R. repeatedly conceded that she could
not remember much beyond basic facts, she recalled those facts consistently and
accurately without embellishment.
Denis Mulamba notes that the transcripts and recording on which the trial court
relied are available to this court. Therefore, he encourages this court to make an
independent review of the competency of J.R. We have done so. While this court may
examine the entire record, we must afford significant deference to the trial judge's
competency determination. State v. Brousseau, 172 Wn.2d 331,340,259 P.3d 209
28
No. 31314-0-111
State v. Mulamba
(2011). There is probably no area of law where it is more necessary to place great
reliance on the trial court's judgment than in assessing the competency of a child witness.
State v. Borland, 57 Wash. App. at 11 (1990).
Denis Mulamba faults the trial court for failing to enter an express finding of fact
that J.R. was competent to testify. This argument ignores the rule that Mulamba carried
the burden to prove that J~R. lacked competency. State v. S.J. W, 170 Wash. 2d at 102
(2010). The absence of a finding on a material issue is presumptively a negative finding
entered against the party with the burden of proof. Golberg v. Sanglier, 96 Wash. 2d 874,
880,639 P.2d 1347 (1982); Pillingv. E. & Pac. Enters. Trust, 41 Wash. App. 158, 165,702
P.2d 1232 (1985). The trial court expressly found that no evidence showed J.R. to lack
competency.
Denis Mulamba argues that, under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.
Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004), since incompetence rendered J.R. unavailable to
testify, any of her testimonial hearsay statements would have been inadmissible. Since
we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding J.R. competent, we reject
this additional contention.
Child Hearsay Statute
We now address Denis Mulamba's assignment of error based on the trial court's
admission of testimony by Marti Miller and Detective Weed of statements uttered by S.E.
29
No. 31314-0-III
State v. Mulamba
and lR. RCW 9A.44.120 governs the admissibility of child hearsay. The statute
provides in pertinent part:
A statement made by a child when under the age of ten describing
... any act of physical abuse of the child by another that results in
substantial bodily harm as defined by RCW 9A.04.l10, not otherwise
admissible by statute or court rule, is admissible in evidence in ...
criminal proceedings ... if:
(1) The court finds, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of
the jury, that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide
sufficient indicia of reliability; and
(2) The child either:
(a) Testifies at the proceedings; or
(b) Is unavailable as a witness: PROVIDED, That when the child is
unavailable as a witness, such statement may be admitted only if there is
corroborative evidence of the act.
In order to admit a hearsay statement made by a child under the age of ten, the
court must find that the statement is reliable. State v. Beadle, 173 Wash. 2d 97, 111-12, 265
P.3d 863 (2011). The underlying issue in any RCW 9A.44.I20 determination is whether
the time, content, and circumstances ofthe statement provide sufficient indicia of
reliability. State v. Carlson, 61 Wash. App. 865, 872, 812 P.2d 536 (1991).
In determining the reliability of child hearsay statements, the trial
court considers nine factors: (1) whether there is an apparent motive to lie,
(2) the general character of the declarant, (3) whether more than one person
heard the statement, (4) the spontaneity of the statements, (5) the timing of
the declaration and the relationship between the declarant and the witness,
(6) whether the statement contained express assertions of past fact,
(7) whether the declarant's lack of knowledge could be established through
cross-examination, (8) the remoteness of the possibility ofthe declarant's
recollection being faulty, and (9) whether the surrounding circumstances
suggested the declarant misrepresented the defendant's involvement.
30
No.31314-0-II1
State v. Mulamba
State v. Kennealy, 151 Wn. App. 861,880,214 P.3d 200 (2009) (citing State v. Ryan, 103
Wash. 2d 165, 175-76,691 P.2d 197 (1984)). Courts refer to these nine considerations as
the Ryan factors.
We review a trial court's admission of child hearsay statements for abuse of
discretion. State v. Borboa, 157 Wn.2d 108,121, 135 P.3d 469 (2006). A trial court
abuses its discretion only when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or is based on
untenable reasons or grounds. State v. c.J, 148 Wash. 2d 672, 686, 63 P.3d 765 (2003).
Denis Mulamba argues that the testimony of the two children through the adult
witnesses conflicts with Ryan factor one. Mulamba contends that Ashley Eli's
instructions to her children to conceal the identity of her boyfriend evidence a strong
motive to lie. This argument may be misplaced because any prevarication motivated by
Eli's directions benefitted, not prejudiced Mulamba. The Ryan factor may assume that a
child will lie to harm the accused, not help the accused. Regardless, the children's
disclosure of Eli's instructions might lead the trial court to conclude S.E. and J.R. each
understood the importance of being truthful, despite maternal directions to the contrary.
Denis Mulamba also argues that J.R. engaged in demonstrable lies. We agree, but
the trial court could conclude that, despite the initial prevarications, J.R. told the truth as
the interviews progressed. In Gilson v. State, 8 P.3d 883, (Okla. Crim. App. 2000), the
reviewing court affirmed a trial court admission of victim statements under Oklahoma's
child hearsay statute, despite earlier lying by the victims, because the record also showed
31
No.31314-0-II1
State v. Mulamba
the children understood the obligation to tell the truth.
The trial court did not expressly find that neither child lacked a motivation to lie.
We do not consider this omission error, however, since no single Ryan factor controls and
the trial court's reliability assessment is based on an overall evaluation of the factors.
Kennealy, 151 Wash. App. at 881. The trial court found that each child comprehended the
obligation to speak the truth. The trial court resolved this question of fact in favor of
finding the children reliable, and Mulamba identifies no legitimate reason to conclude
that the children wished to lie.
Denis Mulamba contends that S.E.'s and J.R.'s statements were not spontaneous
as listed as Ryan factor four. He emphasizes that the children uttered the statements
within the context of a forensic interview for the express purpose of determining who
injured them and how. The law does not support this contention. For purposes of a child
hearsay analysis, spontaneous statements are statements the child volunteered in response
to questions that were not leading and did not in any way suggest an answer. Carlson, 61
Wash. App. at 872. Mulamba concedes that the interviewers' questions generally did not
suggest an answer. Thus, the trial court did not err when it found that S.E. and J.R.'s
answers were spontaneous.
Denis Mulamba asserts, concerning Ryan factor eight, that no evidence supports
the trial court's conclusion that: "The children demonstrate a good sense of timing and
being able to recall and describe what happened;" and "Any omissions, by the children,
32
No.31314-0-III
State v. Mulamba
are not the result of faulty recollection as opposed to the children just not wanting to talk
about what they do not want to talk about." CP at 823. The trial court noted that it
reviewed law enforcement's video-taped interviews of the children and transcripts of
defense counsel's interviews prior to the hearing. An independent review of those
interview transcripts shows that the children answered questions directly and declined to
answer when they did not know the answer, could not understand the question, or desired
not to answer. Regardless, whether S.E. and 1.R. demonstrated a good sense oftiming
and recall are matters of credibility. Independent appellate review does not extend to
factual determinations such as findings on credibility. State v. Johnston, 156 Wash. 2d 355,
365-66, 127 P.3d 707 (2006).
Denis Mulamba argues that, during the interviews, 1.R. often stated she did not
remember or she did not know. We concede this fact, but the fact does not require
reversal of the trial court's ruling. Even adult witnesses do not remember all details of
events. Some of 1.R.'s lack of memory resulted from a desire to protect Mulamba. After
1.R. felt comfortable telling the truth, she provided sufficient detail to evidence the
reliability of her statements.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found S.E. and 1.R.' s statements
to be sufficiently reliable under the child hearsay statute.
33
No. 31314-0-111
State v. Mulamba
Scope ofRCW 9A.44.120.
Denis Mulamba contends Marti Miller's testimony exceeded RCW 9A.44.120's
scope of statements describing acts of physical abuse. RCW 9A.44J20 renders
admissible hearsay statements "describing any act of physical abuse of the child by
another that results in substantial bodily harm." To this end, the trial court ruled that the
adult witnesses could only testify to a child's statement about that child's injuries. The
logical extension of this ruling was that the adult interviewer may not testify to a remark
one child uttered about injuries to his or her sibling.
Denis Mulamba goes further and challenges Marti Miller's hearsay testimony of
statements made by the children that did not involve injuries. Mulamba complains about
Miller's testimony regarding: when S.E. indicated the family moved to Ellensburg, the
children's statements that Eli did not participate in the beatings, and l.R.'s statements that
Ashley Eli instructed her to not identify Mulamba by name.
Denis Mulamba failed to preserve these challenges with objections before the trial
court. The proper way to approach errors raised for the first time on appeal is, first, to
determine whether the error is truly of constitutional magnitude; if the error fails this test,
the court will refuse review. State v. Quigg, 72 Wash. App. 828, 834, 866 P.2d 655 (1994);
RAP 2.5. If both the child hearsay declarant and the hearsay recipients testify at trial and
are subject to full cross-examination, no issue of truly constitutional magnitude is
involved. Quigg, 72 Wash. App. at 834. S.E., l.R., and Marti Miller all testified. Thus,
34
No. 31314-0-111
State v. Mulamba
any error is not constitutional in nature. Because Mulamba failed to object at trial, we
refuse review of this challenge.
Denis Mulamba objected at trial when Marti Miller testified to: S.E.'s statements
about how many times he was beaten, J.R.'s statements that Mulamba beat S.E., and
S.E.'s statements that Mulamba threatened to burn him with an iron and beat him to
death. RCW 9A.44.120 encompasses statements "describing any act of physical abuse of
the child by another that results in substantial bodily harm." S.E.'s statement that
Mulamba beat him multiple times falls within the scope of the statute, because Dr.
Feldman testified that S.E.'s injuries were caused by multiple blows. The cumulative
impact of those blows resulted in substantial bodily harm.
The statements from one victim about the other victim's abuse are not admissible
underRCW 9A.44.l20. State v. Alvarez-Abrego, 154 Wash. App. 351, 365,225 P.3d 396
(2010). The State concedes error in testimony ofS.E.'s statement about lR.'s injuries.
The adult witnesses' repetition ofS.E.'s comments about threats to him was likewise
inadmissible, because the threats are not "acts" of physical abuse under RCW 9A.44.120.
The words themselves did not cause S.E. bodily harm. The erroneous admission ofthis
evidence does not warrant reversal, however.
As already discussed, errors surrounding admissibility of evidence under RCW
9A.44.120 do not implicate constitutional concerns when the victims and the hearsay
recipients all testified. Quigg, 72 Wash. App. at 834. Thus, we apply the nonconstitutional
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State v. Mulamba
harmless error standard. Under this leaner standard, any error was harmless unless,
within reasonable probabilities, had the error not occurred, the outcome of the trial would
have been materially affected. State v. Hancock, 46 Wash. App. 672, 678-79, 731 P.2d
1133 (1987), aff'd, 109 Wash. 2d 760, 748 P.2d 611 (1988). Here, the critical issue was
whether the jury found Denis Mulamba, who testified in his own defense, more credible
than Ashley Eli, as to who harmed the children. J.R.'s statements regarding S.E.'s abuse
merely echoed S.E.'s statements. See, e.g., Hancock, 46 Wash. App. at 679. In the larger
context of Mulamba's seven day trial, there is no reasonable probability that the error
affected the trial's outcome.
Comment on J.R. 's Veracity
Denis Mulamba contends that Marti Miller's comment of IR.'s veracity violated
his right to a jury trial. Mulamba identifies the following testimony as impermissible
opinion testimony from Marti Miller: "I wanted to know what happened to her. I
explained, what happened to you? She said she puked, which I knew to be true." RP at
587 (emphasis added).
In determining whether statements are impermissible opinion testimony, the court
will consider the circumstances of the case, including the following factors: (1) the type
of witness involved, (2) the specific nature of the testimony, (3) the nature of the charges,
(4) the type of defense, and (5) the other evidence before the trier of fact. State v.
Kirkman, 159 Wash. 2d 918, 928, 155 P.3d 125 (2007). The second factor, the nature of the
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No. 31314-0-111
State v. Mulamba
testimony, is sufficient to show that Miller's comment was innocuous. The phrase
"which 1 knew to be true" refers only to "[lR.] said she puked." RP at 587. The State
clarified that Miller's comment was limited to "[w]hat had just happened." RP at 587.
The comment does not concern lR.'s overall veracity, but only whether the child had
recently vomited. Whether the young child vomited at the hospital that day had no
bearing on the issue of who caused her injuries. Thus, we find no error.
Particularly Vulnerable Victim
Denis Mulamba contends the trial court erred when imposing an exceptional
sentence on count three, second degree assault ofS.E., based on the jury's special verdict
finding that S.E. was particularly vulnerable. He argues that S.E. is not "particularly
vulnerable" because he was eight years old, attended school, dressed and bathed himself,
prepared simple meals, and has no physical or mental impairments. Mulamba cites no
case authority to support the conclusion that any of these factors disqualifies a child from
being "particularly vulnerable."
RCW 9.94A.535(3)(b) allows the imposition of an exceptional sentence when
"[t]he defendant knew or should have known that the victim of the current offense was
particularly vulnerable or incapable of resistance." When age is an element of the crime,
the victim's age may also be used as ajustification for departure from the standard
sentencing range if the extreme youth of the victim in fact distinguishes the victim
significantly from other victims of the same crime. State v. Garibay, 67 Wash. App. 773,
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NO.3l3l4-0-III
State v. Mulamba
779,841 P.2d 49 (1992), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Moen, 129 Wash. 2d 535,
919 P.2d 69 (1996). The second degree assault ofa child statute already contemplates
the victim's age by limiting its application to children "under the age of thirteen." RCW
9A.36.130. S.E. was eight years old, and there was no evidence that he was somehow
disabled, physically or mentally.
After this court's opinion in Garibay, the legislature amended the aggravating
factor such that it is no longer limited to "extreme youth." As late as 2004, former RCW
9.94A.535(2)(b) provided: "The defendant knew or should have known that the victim
... was particularly vulnerable or incapable of resistance due to extreme youth, advanced
age, disability, or ill health." (Emphasis added); see, e.g., State v. Suleiman, 158 Wn.2d
280,288, 143 P.3d 795 (2006). But in 2005, our legislature reorganized RCW 9.94A.535
in response to the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Blakely v. Washington, 542
U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531,159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004). LAWS OF 2005, ch. 68. As part of
this reorganization, the legislature recodified the aggravating factor at RCW
9.94A.535(3)(b), and deleted the categorical limitations of "extreme youth, advanced age,
disability, or ill health." LAWS OF 2005, ch. 68, § 3. Such a deletion evinces the
legislature's intent. See, e.g., State v. Ratliff, 140 Wn. App. 12,16, 164 P.3d 516 (2007).
The aggravating factor for particularly vulnerability is no longer limited to those
categories.
For the aggravating factor to apply, some fact must distinguish the victim
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State v. Mulamba
significantly from other victims of the same crime. Garibay, 67 Wash. App. at 779. The
facts of this case distinguish S.E. from other victims. S.E. was particularly vulnerable
because of his mother's complicity, or at least willful ignorance, toward the abuse.
Ashley Eli acquiesced to Denis Mulamba's discipline of her children. Sufficient
evidence supports the jury's finding that S.E. was particularly vulnerable, which, in tum,
supports the trial court's exceptional sentence. See State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192,201,
829 P.2d 1068 (1992).
CONCLUSION
We affirm all convictions upon Denis Mulamba and the sentence imposed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW
2.06.040.
WE CONCUR:
Lawrence-Berrey, J.
39