State of Washington v. Gary Dale Engelstad, Jr. ( 2014 )

FILED
JULY 24, 2014
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
W A State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 30644-5-111
)
Respondent, )
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v. )
)
GARY ENGELSTAD, Jr., ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
Appellant. )
KORSMO, J. - Gary Englestad, Jr., challenges his convictions for second degree
theft and second degree malicious mischief, arguing that the court should have given a
Carter 1instruction although none was requested. We conclude that neither the trial judge
nor defense counsel erred, and affirm the convictions.
FACTS
The charges were filed after Mr. Engelstad and two others were caught dismantling
a 1957 Federal Crane at the Big Foot mining claim; they did not own the crane or the
1 Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 303, 101 S. Ct. 1112,67 L. Ed. 2d 241 (1981).
No. 30644-5-111
State v. Engelstad, Jr.
mining c1aim. 2 The men intended to recycle the crane as scrap. Mr. Engelstad alone
proceeded to jury trial in the Kittitas County Superior Court after the co-defendants
resolved their cases.
Mr. Engelstad, who has an extensive felony criminal history, did not testify. His
counsel did not seek, and the trial court did not give, an instruction telling the jury it
should draw no adverse inference from Mr. Engelstad's decision not to testify.
The jury convicted Mr. Engelstad as charged. After the court imposed a standard
range sentence, he timely appealed to this court.
ANALYSIS
This appeal presents two related questions concerning the lack of a Carter
instruction - whether (1) the trial court was required to give the instruction sua sponte,
and (2) defense counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by not seeking the
instruction. We answer both questions "no."
Necessity for Instruction
In Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. at 303, the United States Supreme Court held that,
upon request, a jury must be instructed that it can draw no adverse inference from a
defendant's failure to testify. Mr. Engelstad argues that Carter thus imposes a duty on
2The claim owner, Mr. Bradshaw, testified that he named the claim for the
legendary Big Foot who was "still running around." Report of Proceedings at 116.
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the trial court to give an instruction whenever a defendant does not testify. As noted
previously, we disagree.
Many constitutional rights stand in tension with other constitutional rights. The
right to counsel in criminal cases is in conflict with the right to self-representation. The
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is in contrast to the defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to testify and to present witnesses. E.g., State v. Thomas, 128
Wn.2d 553,556-57,910 P.2d 475 (1996). Many of these rights can be exercised only to
the exclusion of another right. Because of this fact, trial courts tread carefully in
inquiring about defense decisions at trial. A case on point is State v. Russ, 93 Wn. App.
241,969 P.2d 106 (1998).
There the defendant did not testify, but argued on appeal that he had wanted to do
so and that the trial court erred by not conducting a colloquy to assess his apparent waiver
ofthe right to testify. Id. at 244. This court, analogizing to the treatment of several other
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constitutional rights, concluded that it was not appropriate for the trial court to engage in i
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a colloquy with the defendant. Id. at 247. The Thomas court likewise recognized that it I
would be "ill-advised" to intrude upon the defense's trial strategy by inquiring about
which rights were to be exercised. 128 Wn.2d at 560.
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If it is "ill-advised" to inquire about the defendant's decision, we believe it also !
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would be very ill-advised to sua sponte give an instruction calling the jury's attention to ,
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the defendant's decision not to testify. Carter only mandated use of the instruction when 1
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requested by the defendant. It did not require the instruction in all cases. 3 It is better
practice to always inquire of defense counsel, outside the presence of the jury, if the
defense desires a Carter instruction. However, the trial court is not required to inquire
and can rely upon the failure to submit such an instruction as an expression that the
defense does not want the instruction to highlight the defendant's decision not to testify.
We conclude that the trial court had no duty to give a Carter instruction where one
was not requested by the defense.
Effective Assistance ofCounsel
Mr. Engelstad alternatively argues that his counsel failed to provide effective
assistance when he did not request a Carter instruction. Like the decision whether or not
to testify, this was a tactical choice rather than a failure of counsel.
Well settled standards govern the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. An
attorney's failure to perform consistent with the standards of the profession will require a
new trial when the client has been prejudiced by counsel's failure. State v. McFarland,
127 Wn.2d 322, 334-35, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995). In evaluating ineffectiveness claims,
courts must be highly deferential to counsel's decisions. A strategic or tactical decision is
not a basis for finding error. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689-91, 104 S. Ct.
2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). Under Strickland, courts evaluate counsel's performance
3 This fact is one reason why we disagree with Mr. Engelstad's argument that the
absence of a Carter instruction is structural error. We also note that the Ninth Circuit has
rejected the argument. United States v. Soto, 519 F .3d 927 (9th Cir. 2008).
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using a two-prong test that requires determination whether or not (1) counsel's performance
failed to meet a standard of reasonableness and (2) actual prejudice resulted from counsel's
failures. Id. at 690-92. When a claim can be disposed of on one ground, a reviewing court
need not consider both Strickland prongs. State v. Foster, 140 Wn. App. 266, 273, 166
P.3d 726 (2007).
Both before and after Carter, divisions of this court have opined that the decision
to seek a "no inference" instruction is a tactical one for defense counsel to make. State v.
Dauenhauer, 103 Wn. App. 373, 376, 12 P.3d 661 (2000); State v. King, 24 Wn. App.
495,500,601 P.2d 982 (1979).4 Mr. Engelstad contends that these decisions are merely
dicta on the issue presented here. Whether that is true or not, the observations in
Dauenhauer and King are consistent with the experiences of this court - although many
defense counsel seek a Carter instruction when appropriate, not all do so, and many who
decline such instructions do so for the tactical reason of not highlighting the defendant's
decision to not testify. That approach may be appropriate in some cases such as when the
defense is able to launch a strong attack on the prosecutor's case. There are many
reasons why the defense might prefer to have the jury focus on the State and its burden of
proof rather than being reminded that the defendant did not testify.
4 At issue in Dauenhauer was the trial court's decision to sua sponte give a Carter
instruction. This court rejected the defendant's argument that it was error to give the
instruction without a defense request. lO3 Wn. App. at 376-77. In King the court
concluded counsel was not ineffective for failing to offer a pre-Carter "no inference"
instruction. 24 Wn. App. at 500.
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Accordingly, we conclude that the decision not to use a Carter instruction often is
a tactical choice of counsel. In the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, the mere
failure to request such an instruction is not a basis for finding counsel failed the first
prong of the Strickland test. On the facts of this case, we conclude that there was no
evidence that defense counsel failed to perform to the standards of the profession. The
ineffective assistance argument thus necessarily fails without need to discuss the
prejudice prong of Strickland.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.
WE CONCUR:
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