State Of Washington v. Rafael Meza ( 2015 )

Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
December 15, 2015
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 47315-1-II
Respondent,
v.
RAFAEL GUTIERREZ MEZA, PUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
MAXA, J. — Rafael Meza appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to vacate an ex
parte order entered after he was charged with first degree theft, which required his credit union to
freeze and hold his account. We hold that the trial court’s order was not a search warrant or the
functional equivalent of a search warrant, and therefore did not satisfy the warrant requirement
for the seizure of Meza’s funds. Accordingly, we reverse and vacate the trial court’s order
requiring that the credit union freeze and hold Meza’s account.
FACTS
In June 2014, John Armstrong spoke with the Lewis County sheriff’s office and alleged
that Meza had swindled money from him. Armstrong claimed that he paid Meza $75,000 to
purchase Meza’s asphalt plant, but then discovered that Meza already had sold the asphalt plant
to someone named Cliff Mansfield.
Deputy Justin Rogers investigated Armstrong’s allegations. Rogers contacted the Twin
Star Credit Union and verified that Meza held an account that had received large wire transfers
No. 47315-1-II
recently. Rogers also learned from Mansfield that Meza recently had informed him that he was
planning to go to Mexico.
Rogers served Twin Star Credit Union with a valid search warrant for Meza’s account
information. Meza’s bank statements showed a check and four wire transfers from Mansfield
totaling $105,000, with the last transfer on June 18. They also showed a single wire transfer
from Armstrong in the amount of $15,000 on April 11. Meza’s checking account showed that
between October 2013 and June 2014, he withdrew approximately $89,000 in cash in 41
transactions involving between $3,000 and $5,000 each.
On June 27, 2014, the State charged Meza with one count of first degree theft. On the
same day, the State presented an ex parte “Motion for an Order Freezing and Holding Funds” to
the trial court. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 25-26. The State asserted that the funds in Meza’s credit
union accounts were “evidence in a felony offense.” CP at 25. The State’s motion was based on
the probable cause affidavit filed with the information and asserted that there was “a high
likelihood, based on [the affidavit regarding probable cause], that [Meza] will remove said funds
and leave the country.” CP at 26. The State did not request a search warrant for the credit union
funds or reference CrR 2.3 in its motion.
The trial court signed an order directing Twin Star Credit Union to “freeze and hold all
accounts in the name of . . . Meza . . . as evidence in a criminal proceeding, until further order of
this Court.” CP at 14. Neither the motion nor the order cited any legal authority for freezing
Meza’s accounts.
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In January 2015, Meza filed a motion to vacate the trial court’s order. Meza argued that
there was no legal authority for the order. The State contended that the trial court could seize the
fruits of a crime under CrR 2.3.
The trial court denied Meza’s motion to vacate the order, ruling that there was probable
cause to believe that Meza’s account was related to the charged crime. The court concluded that
it had the authority to freeze Meza’s funds under CrR 2.3. In addition, the trial court ruled that
Meza’s account qualified as both evidence of a crime and the proceeds of a crime.
Meza filed a motion for discretionary review. The commissioner granted discretionary
expedited review on the basis that the trial court committed probable error.
ANALYSIS
Meza argues that the trial court lacked the legal authority to order the credit union to
freeze his account because (1) the account lawfully could be seized only pursuant to a warrant
that complied with CrR 2.3, and (2) the trial court’s order was not a warrant.1 The State argues
that the trial court’s order was either a warrant or the functional equivalent of a warrant, and
therefore the trial court had the authority under CrR 2.3 to order the seizure of Meza’s account.
We agree with Meza.
A. WARRANT REQUIREMENT
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
1
Meza also argues that the trial court’s order violates his constitutional right to counsel because
he needs the frozen funds to pay for his defense. Because we reverse on other grounds, we do
not address this issue.
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No. 47315-1-II
and seizures, shall not be violated.” Similarly, article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution
provides that “[n]o person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without
authority of law.” These provisions generally prohibit warrantless searches and seizures unless
one of the narrow exceptions to the warrant requirement applies. State v. Garvin, 166 Wash. 2d
242, 249, 207 P.3d 1266 (2009).
A person’s banking records fall within the constitutional protection of private affairs
under article I, section 7. State v. Miles, 160 Wash. 2d 236, 244-47, 156 P.3d 864 (2007); see also
State v. McCray, 15 Wash. App. 810, 814, 551 P.2d 1376 (1976) (holding that both the federal and
state constitutions protect a person’s bank account against unwarranted searches and seizures). 2
Although no Washington case has addressed whether funds in a bank account can be seized
without a warrant, it defies reason to extend constitutional protection to bank account records but
not to the funds reflected in those records. The seizure of funds is as much a threat to security in
a person’s effects and a disturbance of a person’s private affairs as the seizure of the records
regarding those funds. Therefore, we hold that funds in a bank account cannot be seized without
a valid warrant.3
The Fourth Amendment sets forth the constitutional requirements of a warrant: “[N]o
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend.
IV.
2
In Peters v. Sjoholm, the Supreme Court refrained from deciding whether the Fourth
Amendment applied to bank accounts and deposits. 95 Wash. 2d 871, 877, 631 P.2d 937 (1981).
However, that case involved federal tax liens and is not applicable here.
3
The State does not contend that an exception to the warrant requirement applies here.
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No. 47315-1-II
CrR 2.3 outlines the requirements of a valid search warrant in Washington. CrR 2.3(b)
provides that “[a] warrant may be issued under this rule to search for and seize any (1) evidence
of a crime; or (2) contraband, the fruits of crime, or things otherwise criminally possessed; or
(3) weapons or other things by means of which a crime has been committed . . . ; or (4) person
for whose arrest there is probable cause, or who is unlawfully restrained.” Under CrR 2.3(c),
there must be probable cause to issue a warrant, the warrant must identify the property and
describe the place to be searched, and the warrant must be directed to and executed by a peace
officer.4
B. NATURE OF THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER
The State concedes that it did not expressly request a warrant under CrR 2.3 and that the
trial court did not issue the order freezing Meza’s account under CrR 2.3. However, the State
argues that the trial court’s order is a warrant or the functional equivalent of a warrant because it
met the requirements of CrR 2.3, citing State v. Garcia-Salgado, 170 Wash. 2d 176, 240 P.3d 153
(2010). We disagree.
1. Garcia-Salgado
In Garcia-Salgado, the trial court ordered the defendant to provide a cheek swab for
DNA as authorized by CrR 4.7(b)(2)(vi).5 170 Wash. 2d at 181-82. The Supreme Court
acknowledged that swabbing a cheek to obtain a DNA sample is a search and that such a search
4
RCW 10.79.020 and RCW 10.79.035 contain similar requirements for search warrants.
5
CrR 4.7(b)(2)(vi) states that a court may order, subject to constitutional limitations, a defendant
to permit the taking of samples from the defendant's blood, hair, and other materials of the
defendant's body.
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No. 47315-1-II
must be supported by a warrant unless the search fell into one of the exceptions to the warrant
requirement. Id. at 184. The court recited the constitutional requirements of a warrant set forth
in the Fourth Amendment: “(1) a neutral and detached magistrate (2) makes a determination of
probable cause based on oath or affirmation and (3) the warrant particularly describes the place
to be searched and the items to be seized.” Id. at 184-85. The court then addressed the warrant
requirement:
Normally, a warrant in Washington State is issued under CrR 2.3, but neither the
state constitution nor federal constitution limits warrants to only those issued
under CrR 2.3. A court order may function as a warrant as long as it meets
constitutional requirements.
Id. at 186 (emphasis added). Therefore, the court concluded that “the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7 may be satisfied by a court
order.” Id.
The court held that a search pursuant to an order issued under CrR 4.7(b)(2)(vi) is valid if
the order meets the constitutional requirements of a search warrant. Id. The order must “be
entered by a neutral and detached magistrate; must describe the place to be searched and items to
be seized; [and] must be supported by probable cause based on oath or affirmation.” Id.6 The
court did not address whether a court order also must meet the requirements of CrR 2.3 to
function as a warrant.
6
Because the search intruded into the defendant’s body, the court also required the order to meet
additional requirements regarding those searches set forth in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 769-70, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966). Garcia- Salgado, 170 Wash. 2d at 185-87.
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No. 47315-1-II
2. Trial Court’s Order as a Warrant
The State argues that under Garcia-Salgado, the trial court’s order actually is a search
warrant. However, it is undisputed that the trial court did not issue its order under CrR
4.7(b)(2)(vi). And Garcia-Salgado does not support this argument. The court held that a court
order may function as a warrant and may satisfy the warrant requirements, but did not state that a
court order is a warrant. Id. at 186. Therefore, we hold that the trial court’s order was not a
search warrant.
3. Functional Equivalent of a Warrant
The State also argues that under Garcia-Salgado, the trial court’s order is the functional
equivalent of a search warrant. A broad reading of Garcia-Salgado provides some support for
the State’s position. The court in Garcia-Salgado expressly stated that a court order can satisfy
the warrant requirement for a search and seizure if it meets the constitutional requirements of a
search warrant. 170 Wash. 2d at 186.
However, the court in Garcia-Salgado did not hold that any trial court order that satisfies
the warrant requirements could function as a warrant. The court allowed a trial court order to
function as a warrant because the trial court had authority independent of CrR 2.3 to issue the
order. See id. In Garcia-Salgado, the trial court’s order was issued under CrR 4.7(b)(2)(vi),
which expressly authorized the search. Id. at 181-82, 183. The court held that a trial court order
authorizing a search under CrR 4.7(b)(2)(vi) could function as a court order. Id. at 186.
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No. 47315-1-II
We hold that the Garcia-Salgado holding is limited to cases where the trial court’s order
is authorized by law. Allowing a court order to function as a warrant when there is no
independent authority for a seizure would render CrR 2.3 meaningless. Limiting the scope of
Garcia-Salgado preserves the integrity of CrR 2.3.
Here, the State cites no statute, court rule, or other authority allowing the seizure of a
defendant’s bank account in these circumstances.7 Therefore, the seizure was not authorized by
law. We hold that Garcia-Salgado is inapplicable and that the trial court’s order cannot be
treated as the functional equivalent of a warrant.8
We hold that the trial court’s order requiring the credit union to freeze Meza’s account
was not a warrant and was not the functional equivalent of a warrant that satisfied the warrant
requirement under Garcia-Salgado. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in ordering
the seizure of Meza’s credit union account.
7
Under RCW 10.105.010(1), money obtained as a result of any felony is “subject to seizure and
forfeiture,” although “[n]o property may be forfeited under this section until after there has been
a superior court conviction of the owner of the property for the felony in connection with which
the property was employed, furnished, or acquired.” The State did not argue in the trial court or
on appeal that RCW 10.105.010(1) authorized the seizure here, so we do not address this statute.
8
Because of our holding, we do not address whether the trial court’s order substantially
complied with the requirements of a search warrant under the United States and Washington
Constitutions and/or CrR 2.3. However, we note that the trial court’s order did not comply with
the requirement in CrR 2.3(c) that a warrant be directed to and executed by a peace officer.
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No. 47315-1-II
We reverse and vacate the trial court’s order directing the Twin Star Credit Union to
freeze and hold Meza’s account.
MAXA, J.
We concur:
BJORGEN, A.C.J.
LEE, J.
9