State Of Washington v. Yemane Teklai Weldeselase ( 2015 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 72410-0-1 r-7
) CUT*
Respondent, )
)
v. )
)
YEMANE TEKLAIWELDESELASE, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
V.W-
)
Appellant. ) FILED: November 23,2015 ^
)
Verellen, A.C.J. — Yemane Weldeselase claims his counsel was ineffective
for failing to argue at sentencing that his first degree burglary, second degree
assault, and felony violation of a court order convictions constituted the same criminal
conduct. We conclude counsel's failure to argue same criminal conduct at
sentencing constituted deficient performance. A reasonable probability exists that,
had counsel so argued, the sentencing court would have determined that his second
degree assault and felony violation of a no-contact order convictions constituted the
same criminal conduct for purposes of calculating Weldeselase's offender score.
The State concedes that Weldeselase's sentence for felony violation of a court
order exceeds the trial court's sentencing authority under the Sentencing Reform Act,
chapter 9.94A RCW. We accept the State's concession.
We affirm Weldeselase's convictions, but remand for a new sentencing
hearing.
No. 72410-0-1/2
FACTS
Weldeselase and his wife Luula Araya have three children together. In
February 2012, Weldeselase and Araya separated when Araya obtained a no-
contact order against Weldeselase.
In October 2013, Araya returned home late one evening after work. As Araya
exited her car, Weldeselase grabbed her. Weldeselase told Araya that he had a gun
and ordered her to open the front door of the house. Araya refused. Weldeselase
choked Araya and pushed her into the door. Araya's niece heard noise outside and
opened the front door. Weldeselase held Araya's wrist as they entered the home.
Once inside, Weldeselase took Araya into their daughter's bedroom.
Weldeselase pushed Araya onto their daughter's bed. Their daughter stood in the
corner of the bedroom. Weldeselase grabbed Araya and began punching her in the
face. Weldeselase broke Araya's nose and left bruises on her face. When their
daughter attempted to intervene, Weldeselase hit her.
The State charged Weldeselase with one count of first degree burglary, two
counts of second degree assault, one count of felony violation of a court order, and
one count of fourth degree assault. The State alleged Weldeselase committed these
offenses against a family or household member and within sight or sound of the
victim's minor child.
A jury convicted Weldeselase of first degree burglary, two counts of fourth
degree assault, felony violation of a court order, and one count of second degree
assault. The jury found by special verdict that Weldeselase's convictions for first
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degree burglary, felony violation of a court order, and second degree assault
constituted an aggravated domestic violence offense.
At sentencing, the court accepted the State's offender score calculation of
eight points, which was the same for each of Weldeselase's three felony convictions.1
Defense counsel did not argue that the three felonies constituted the same criminal
conduct under RCW 9.94A.589. The court imposed concurrent sentences at the top
of the standard range: 102 months for first degree burglary, 82 months for felony
violation of a court order, and 70 months for second degree assault.
Weldeselase appeals.
ANALYSIS
Ineffective Assistance
Weldeselase contends his counsel was ineffective for failing to argue at
sentencing that his first degree burglary, second degree assault, and felony violation
of a court order convictions constituted the same criminal conduct for purposes of
calculating his offender score. We agree as to the second degree assault and felony
violation of a no-contact order convictions.
We review ineffective assistance claims de novo.2 Both the state and federal
constitutions guarantee criminal defendants the right to effective assistance of
1 For each felony conviction, four points were assessed for the other two
felony convictions. Weldeselase's convictions for fourth degree assault counted two
points, and his two prior domestic violence convictions counted two points.
2 State v. Sutherbv. 165 Wash. 2d 870, 883, 204 P.3d 916 (2009).
No. 72410-0-1/4
counsel.3 To establish an ineffective assistance claim, a defendant must show
deficient performance and resulting prejudice.4
Counsel's performance is deficient if it falls "below an objective standard of
reasonableness."5 To establish deficient performance, the defendant must show the
absence of any conceivable legitimate tactic supporting counsel's action.6 We
strongly presume that counsel's performance was reasonable.7 But failure to argue
that several crimes encompass the same criminal conduct can constitute deficient
performance.8
To establish prejudice, the defendant must show there is a reasonable
probability that, but for the deficient performance, the outcome would have been
different.9 "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome."10
The trial court generally counts multiple current offenses separately for
offender score purposes unless the offenses encompass the same criminal
3 State v. Grier, 171 Wash. 2d 17, 33, 246 P.3d 1260(2011).
4 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d
674 (1984); State v. Nichols, 161 Wash. 2d 1, 8, 162 P.3d 1122 (2007).
5 State v. Townsend. 142 Wash. 2d 838, 843-44, 15 P.3d 145 (2001).
6 Grier, 171 Wash. 2d at 33.
7 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; State v. McFarland, 127 Wash. 2d 322, 335, 899
P.2d 1251 (1995).
8 State v. Saunders, 120 Wash. App. 800, 824-25, 86 P.3d 232 (2004) (defense
counsel's decision not to argue same criminal conduct as to the defendant's rape and
kidnapping offenses constituted ineffective assistance).
9 Nichols, 161 Wn.2dat8.
10 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; State v. Jones, 183 Wash. 2d 327, 339, 352 P.3d
776 (2015) ("'reasonable probability'" means "by less than a more likely than not
standard").
No. 72410-0-1/5
conduct.11 Offenses that are considered the same criminal conduct are scored as
one offense.12 Current offenses involve the same criminal conduct when they
"require the same criminal intent, are committed at the same time and place, and
involve the same victim."13 "If any element is missing, the crimes do not constitute
the same criminal conduct."14 We construe same criminal conduct "narrowly to
disallow most claims that multiple offenses constitute the same criminal act."15
Weldeselase's offenses occurred within a limited time period and at the same
place. In State v. Davis, the defendant was convicted of attempted first degree
murder and first degree assault.16 The assault occurred on a cabin's deck and along
an adjacent beach. The attempted murder occurred inside the cabin and on the
beach. The Davis court determined that where "the different physical locations are
adjacent and within a short distance of each other," the offenses involve the same
place for same criminal conduct purposes.17 As in Davis, Weldeselase's offenses
occurred within a short distance of each other. The felony violation of a court order
initially occurred in the driveway as Araya exited her car, the burglary initially
occurred as Weldeselase pulled Araya through the front door of the home while
holding her wrist, and the second degree assault occurred in the daughter's
bedroom.
11 RCW9.94A.589(1)(a).
12 id,
13 id
14 State v. Wright. 183 Wash. App. 719, 732-33, 334 P.3d 22 (2014).
15 State v. Graciano. 176 Wash. 2d 531, 540, 295 P.3d 219 (2013).
16 174 Wash. App. 623, 628, 300 P.3d 465 (2013).
17 Id. at 644.
No. 72410-0-1/6
The second degree assault and felony violation of a court order offenses
involved the same victim, Araya, but Weldeselase's burglary offense did not. In State
v. Lesslev. the defendant was convicted of, among other crimes, first degree burglary
and first degree kidnapping.18 On appeal, Lessley argued his burglary and
kidnapping offenses were the same criminal conduct.19 The Lesslev court
determined the offenses did not involve the same victim.20 Although the kidnapping
conviction involved one victim, the burglary "victimized" several victims who "were
asleep in their home when Lessley pounded on the door in the middle of the night,
and . . . were present when he barged in brandishing a revolver."21 Because the
burglary involved more than one victim, the Lesslev court concluded the offenses did
not constitute the same criminal conduct.22
As in Lesslev, the burglary victimized both Araya and her daughter. Araya's
daughter was awake in the home when Weldeselase pulled Araya through the front
door by the wrist. She was also present in the bedroom when Weldeselase
assaulted Araya. Because the burglary involved more than one victim, it was not the
same criminal conduct as the other offenses.
Weldeselase committed the second degree assault and the felony violation of
a court order at the same time and place and against the same victim. The only
18 118 Wash. 2d 773, 776, 827 P.2d 996 (1992).
19 id,
20 Id, at 779.
21 id
22 Id.
No. 72410-0-1/7
issue is whether Weldeselase committed these offenses with the same criminal
intent.
To determine whether multiple offenses share the same criminal intent, we
consider "how intimately related the crimes committed are,"23 whether "the criminal
intent, when viewed objectively, changed from one crime to the next,"24 and "'whether
one crime furthered the other.'"25 We may also consider whether the crimes were
part of the same scheme or plan and whether the defendant's criminal objectives
changed.26 Crimes may also involve the same criminal intent if they were part of a
continuing, uninterrupted sequence of conduct.27
We conclude there is a reasonable probability that the sentencing court would
determine the offenses were committed with the same criminal intent. The felony
violation of a court order and the second degree assault were part of a continuing,
uninterrupted sequence of conduct.28 A reasonable probability exists that the court
would conclude Weldeselase's objective criminal purpose was to assault Araya: he
grabbed her the moment she exited the car, pulled her by the wrist into the home,
and struck her several times in the face.29 There is a reasonable probability that the
23 State v. Burns, 114 Wash. 2d 314, 318, 788 P.2d 531 (1990).
24 Wright, 183 Wash. App. at 734.
25 id, (quoting State v. Vike. 125 Wash. 2d 407, 411, 885 P.2d 824 (1994)).
26 State v. Calvert. 79 Wash. App. 569, 578, 903 P.2d 1003 (1995).
27 State v. Porter, 133 Wash. 2d 177, 186, 942 P.2d 974 (1997).
28 See id, at 185-86 (defendant's drug sales "occurred in a continuing,
uninterrupted sequence of conduct as part of a recognizable scheme to sell drugs").
29 See State v. Adame, 56 Wash. App. 803, 810-11, 785 P.2d 1144 (1990).
No. 72410-0-1/8
court would determine the felony violation of a court order furthered the offense of
second degree assault.30
We conclude counsel's failure to argue same criminal conduct at sentencing
constituted deficient performance. There is a reasonable probability that, had
counsel so argued, the court would have found that the second degree assault and
felony violation of a court order offenses encompassed the same criminal conduct.
Therefore, we must remand for a new sentencing hearing. On remand, the trial court
has full discretion to determine if Weldeselase's offenses constitute the same criminal
conduct.
Sentence for Felony Violation of Court Order
Weldeselase contends, and the State concedes, that his sentence for felony
violation of a court order exceeds the statutory maximum. We agree that the trial
court exceeded its sentencing authority and accept the State's concession.
We review whether a "trial court has exceeded its statutory authority" under
the Sentencing Reform Act de novo.31 "A trial court may only impose a statutorily
authorized sentence."32 "If the trial court exceeds its sentencing authority, its actions
are void."33
30 See State v. Phuong, 174 Wash. App. 494, 548, 299 P.3d 37 (2013) (where
defendant dragged the victim from her car, through the garage, and upstairs to his
bedroom, the court could determine that defendant's convictions for unlawful
imprisonment and attempted rape constituted the same criminal intent).
31 State v. Murray, 118 Wash. App. 518, 521, 77 P.2d 1188 (2003).
32 State v. Paulson, 131 Wash. App. 579, 588, 128 P.3d 133 (2006).
33 Id.
No. 72410-0-1/9
Felony violation of a court order carries a statutory maximum sentence of five
years' imprisonment.34 Weldeselase's sentence for his felony violation of a court
order conviction was 82 months, exceeding the statutory maximum by more than two
years.
CONCLUSION
We conclude Weldeselase's counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing
to argue same criminal conduct at sentencing. Because Weldeselase received
ineffective assistance, we remand for resentencing, where counsel can argue that the
second degree assault and felony violation of a court order offenses encompass the
same criminal conduct. On remand, the sentence for felony violation of a court order
shall be corrected to not exceed the statutory maximum.
We affirm Weldeselase's convictions, but remand for a new sentencing
hearing.
WE CONCUR:
"j7\cAev/y ^J
34
RCW 26.50.110(4); RCW 9A.20.021 (1)(c).