State Of Washington v. Alexander Ortiz-obrego ( 2018 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 70320-0-1
)
Respondent, )
)
v. )
)
ALEXANDER ORTIZ-ABREGO, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
Appellant. ) FILED: January 16, 2018
)
VERELLEN, C.J. —A jury convicted Alexander Ortiz-Abrego of three counts
of child rape in the first degree. In a post-conviction competency hearing, the King
County Superior Court found that Ortiz-Abrego was incompetent for the trial that
occurred and granted a new trial. The State appealed. While that appeal was
pending, the State pursued a statutory procedure seeking a new competency
hearing, this time before a jury. New evidence was presented at this second
competency hearing, and the jury found Ortiz-Abrego competent to stand trial.
This court accepted the trial court's certification of two issues for
discretionary review: (i) whether competency to stand trial requires the capacity to
understand a trial as it unfolds, and (ii) whether the jury in this case was correctly
instructed on the law as to the competency requirement.
Competency is a capacity-based standard, but the court or a jury may
consider whether a defendant did understand his or her trial as valid circumstantial
No. 70320-0-1/2
evidence of his or her capacity to understand. r And a defendant may be found
competent even in the absence of demonstrated understanding. Ortiz-Abrego's
challenges to the jury instructions fail.
We affirm.
FACTS
A jury convicted Alexander Ortiz-Abrego of multiple counts of child rape in
the first degree. After trial, the court ordered a competency evaluation.
After an evidentiary hearing including expert testimony of Ortiz-Abrego's
cognitive limitations, the trial judge found he was "not competent to stand the trial
we gave him" and granted a new tria1.1 While the State's appeal was pending,
Ortiz-Abrego was sent to Western State Hospital(WSH)to restore his competency
for a new trial. The State commenced a second competency proceeding, but this
time, the hearing took place before a jury. The same experts testified, but the
State presented new evidence, including Ortiz-Abrego's jail phone calls consistent
with his ability to understand strategies and analytical thinking.
The State retained Dr. Brian Judd and moved for permission to interview
Ortiz-Abrego. The court ordered the interview, but required that it be taped. The
State's experts agreed that, at some points, Ortiz-Abrego was malingering or
exaggerating the extent of his disability.
Dr. Hendrickson opined that Ortiz-Abrego had the capacity to assist in his
defense, meaning he was able to consult with his attorney with a reasonable
1 Clerk's Papers(CP)at 383.
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degree of rational understanding and had the capacity to have a factual and
rational understanding of the charges and court proceedings. His opinion was
based on his own interviews with Ortiz-Abrego, Ortiz-Abrego's jail phone calls, Dr.
Tedd Judd's testing, police interviews with Ortiz-Abrego in 2006 and 2008, and
chart notes from WSH. The jail phone calls demonstrated Ortiz-Abrego's
analytical and planning skills and, unlike Dr. Hendrickson's interviews, they
showed his familiarity with the role of his attorney, the potential penalties, and the
role of the jury.
Dr. Nelson also observed that the jail phone calls showed a more
sophisticated understanding of his legal situation. In one call, Ortiz-Abrego
engaged in abstract problem solving involving his apartment, directing his wife in a
strategy to deal with items based on contingencies, and managing their finances.
In another, he also displayed abstract problem solving and the relatively
sophisticated ability to break down a task to explain it to his son.
Portions of two interviews that Dr. Brian Judd conducted with Ortiz-Abrego
were played at the competency hearing. He concluded that the low scores
recorded by a defense expert in an adaptive functioning test were not credible
based on Ortiz-Abrego's functioning in the community, that is, he drove, worked
competitively with no special supervision needs, interacted effectively with
coworkers, and spoke English at some jobs.
Dr. Tedd Judd administered a number of psychological tests in 2010 and
2012. He opined that Ortiz-Abrego has a borderline intellectual disability and a
learning disability in auditory comprehension with conceptual problems.
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No. 70320-0-1/4
The court instructed the jury:
A defendant is incompetent when he lacks the capacity to
understand the nature of the proceedings against him or to assist in
his own defense as a result of a mental disease or defect.
To prove that the defendant is incompetent, the State must
establish either that the defendant has the capacity to understand
the nature of the proceedings and the capacity to assist in his own
defense, or that the lack of these capacities is not the result of a
mental disease or defect.[21
The court also instructed:
"Understanding the nature of the proceedings" means that the
defendant must have the ability to have a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him. This includes the
capacity to understand that he can plead guilty or proceed to trial, to
choose whether to testify or not, and to appreciate his peril.
"Assisting in his own defense" means that he has sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding.
To be competent, the defendant need not be able to choose
or suggest trial strategy, help to form defenses, or even be able to
recall past events. He is also not required to be able to decide which
witnesses to call, to decide whether or how to cross examine
witnesses, or to challenge witnesses.
In reaching your determination, you may consider the
defendant's appearance, demeanor, conduct, personal and family
history, past behavior, and medical, psychological, and psychiatric
opinions. You also may consider whether the defendant can recall
and relate past facts, understand the roles of the judge,jury, defense
attorney and prosecuting attorney, and appreciate the possible
outcomes of a trial. You also may consider any other factor that
reasonably bears on whether the defendant can rationally assist his
attorney.[3]
2 CP at 271.
3 CP at 272-73.
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No. 70320-0-1/5
The jury found Ortiz-Abrego competent to stand trial. This court granted
discretionary review, accepting the trial court's RAP 2.3(b)(4) certification of two
issues.
Subsequent to the jury competency hearing, our Supreme Court issued its
opinion affirming the trial judge's analysis in the first competency hearing.4
ANALYSIS
The two issues certified by the trial court are (i) whether competency to
stand trial requires the capacity to understand a trial as it unfolds and, if so, to
what extent, and (ii) whether the jury in this case was correctly apprised of the law
as to the requirements for competency. There is no challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence.
I. Competency Standard
Constitutional due process requires that an incompetent person may not be
tried, convicted, or sentenced as long as that incapacity continues.5 Similarly,
RCW 10.77.050 bars an incompetent person from being tried or convicted for the
commission of an offense so long as such incapacity continues. The requirement
"seeks to ensure that [the defendant] has the capacity to understand the
proceedings and to assist counsel."6 RCW 10.77.010(15) provides
'"Incompetency' means a person lacks the capacity to understand the nature of the
State v. Ortiz-Abreoo, 187 Wash. 2d 394, 387 P.3d 638(2017).
5 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; State v. Wicklund, 96 Wash. 2d 798, 800, 638 P.2d
1241 (1982).
6 Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 402, 113 S. Ct. 2680, 125 L. Ed. 2d 321
(1993).
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No. 70320-0-1/6
proceedings against him or her or to assist in his or her own defense as a result of
mental disease or defect.7
As confirmed by our Supreme Court in Ortiz-Abrego's recent appeal,
competency is a capacity-based standard.8 A defendant must have the capacity
to understand the "proceedings."8 There is no requirement of actual
understanding, but a defendant's actual understanding may be considered as
circumstantial evidence in a competency determination." "[R]equiring proof of
actual understanding to support a finding of competence. .. would be a departure
from Washington's competency standard."11 "Yes, a defendant may be found
competent in the absence of demonstrated understanding."12
II. Jury Instructions
Ortiz-Abrego contends the jury instructions substantially misstated the
standard for competency. Specifically, that the trial court (i) improperly allowed the
jury to find him competent even if it found he lacked the ability to understand the
proceeding or rationally assist counsel, (ii) failed to instruct the jury it must give
great weight to !defense counsel's view of Ortiz-Abrego's inability to rationally
7 See State v. Ortiz, 104 Wash. 2d 479, 482, 706 P.2d 1069(1985)("In
Washington, a person is competent to stand trial if he has the capacity to
understand the nature of the proceedings against him and if he can assist in his
own defense.").
8 Ortiz-Abrego, 187 Wash. 2d at 405.
9 Id.
"Id. at 407.
11 Id. at 406(emphasis omitted).
12 Id. at 407.
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No. 70320-0-1/7
assist counsel, and (iii) erroneously instructed jurors they must unanimously agree
in order to find him incompetent.
Here, the jury was instructed:
A defendant is incompetent when he lacks the capacity to
understand the nature of the proceedings against him or to assist in
his own defense as a result of a mental disease or defect.
To prove that the defendant is competent, the State must
establish either that the defendant has the capacity to assist in his
own defense, or that the lack of these capacities is not the result of a
mental disease or defect.[131
Ortiz-Abrego argues this was an incorrect statement of the law, but his
argument fails.
The focus of the competency inquiry is "the defendant's mental capacity;
the question is whether he has the ability to understand the proceedings."14 The
instructions to the jury adequately included the capacity-based standard. Contrary
to Ortiz-Abrego's suggestion in his opening brief, it would have been improper to
instruct the jury that a demonstrated lack of understanding compels the conclusion
that he lacked the capacity to understand. Consistent with our Supreme Court's
recent decision addressing the first competency hearing in this case, actual
understanding during trial is merely circumstantial evidence that may be
considered to determine whether he had the capacity to understand.15
13 CP at 271.
14 Godinez, 509 U.S. at 401 n.12.
15 Ortiz-Abrego, 187 Wash. 2d at 406-07.
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No. 70320-0-1/8
Ortiz-Abrego contends the instruction with the statutory definition limiting
incompetence to a lack of capacity resulting from mental defect or disease runs
afoul of due process standards. We disagree.
The reference to a mental defect in RCW 10.77.010(15) is sufficiently broad
to include a cognitive impairment, as the trial court found. "Defect" has the
common meaning of "want or absence of something necessary for completeness,
perfection, or adequacy in form or function."16 Where the legislature has not
defined a term, courts must give the term its everyday meaning.17 When a word
"is not exclusively of legal cognizance," an understanding of its meaning can fairly
be imputed to laypeople." Our Supreme Court incorporated the ordinary meaning
of the term "mental disease or defect" in another section of chapter 10.77 RCW
relating to release of persons acquitted by reason of insanity." The court noted
the definition is broad, but observed that other aspects of the statutory scheme
would provide an appropriate framework.26 Ortiz-Abrego does not establish the
instruction based on the statutory definition of "incompetency" violated due
process standards.
As to the other instructions challenged by Ortiz-Abrego, we do not consider
an issue raised for the first time on appea1.21 A party must object to an instruction
16 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 591 (1993).
17 State v. Daniels, 87 Wash. App. 149, 156, 940 P.2d 690 (1997).
18 Id.
19 State v. Klein, 156 Wash. 2d 102, 116-17, 124 P.3d 644(2005).
29 Id. at 118.
21 RAP 2.5(a); State v. Kirkman, 159 Wash. 2d 918, 926, 155 P.3d 125(2007).
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No. 70320-0-1/9
given by the trial court, identifying the legal deficiency.22 When a party fails to
request an instruction, it "'cannot predicate error on its omission.'"23 A claimed
error may be raised for the first time on appeal only if it is a "manifest error
affecting a constitutional right."24 For a constitutional error to be manifest, the
defendant must demonstrate actual prejudice to his rights at trial, and that
prejudice must appear in the record.25 Actual prejudice means that the alleged
error had practical and identifiable consequences at tria1.26 This exception to the
ordinary requirement that an error be preserved by a timely objection must be
construed narrowly.27
To the extent Ortiz-Abrego's supplemental brief suggests the trial court
should have instructed the jury it could consider whether he actually understood
the trial as it occurred, this suggestion is raised for the first time in his
supplemental brief on appeal. Ortiz-Abrego did not object to the trial court's
instructions on this basis, nor did he propose such an instruction. We conclude he
has not sufficiently raised this issue for review.
22 State
v. Sengxav, 80 Wash. App. 11, 16, 906 P.2d 368 (1995); State v.
Scott, 110 Wn.2d 682,685-86, 757 P.2d 492(1988).
23 State v. Lucero, 152 Wash. App. 287, 292, 217 P.3d 369(2009)(quoting
McGarvey v. City of Seattle, 62 Wash. 2d 524, 533, 384 P.2d 127(1963)), rev'd on
other grounds, 168 Wn.2d 785(2010).
24 RAP 2.5(a)(3); State v. McFarland, 127 Wash. 2d 322, 333, 899 P.2d 1251
(1995).
25 Kirkman, 159 Wash. 2d at 926-27.
26 State v. O'Hara, 167 Wash. 2d 91, 99, 217 P.3d 756(2009)(quoting id. at
935).
27 Kirkman, 159 Wash. 2d at 935.
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No. 70320-0-1/10
Ortiz-Abrego contends the trial court failed to instruct the jury it must give
great weight to defense counsel's view of Ortiz-Abrego's inability to rationally
assist counsel. But Ortiz-Abrego did not make such an objection or request such
an instruction in the trial court. This challenge is not a manifest constitutional
error.
Ortiz-Abrego contends the trial court erroneously instructed jurors they must
unanimously agree in order to find him incompetent. But he failed to preserve that
issue for review. The unanimity issue arose twice in the trial court, and Ortiz-
Abrego did not argue unanimity was not required. He took exception to the
unanimity instruction, but only in that it referred to the proceeding as a criminal
case. Ortiz-Abrego does not establish manifest constitutional error allowing this
issue to be raised for the first time on appeal, particularly for the first time in his
supplemental brief.
III. State's Expert Witness Interview
Ortiz-Abrego argues the trial court erred when it allowed the State to retain
an expert and required Ortiz-Abrego to submit to an interview, but this issue is
outside the scope of our narrow discretionary review.
RAP 2.4(a) provides:
The appellate court will, at the instance of the appellant, review the
decision or parts of the decision designated in the notice of appeal
or, subject to RAP 2.3(e), in the notice for discretionary review, and
other decisions in the case as provided in sections (b), (c), (d), and
(e). The appellate court will, at the instance of the respondent, review
those acts in the proceeding below which if repeated on remand
would constitute error prejudicial to respondent. The appellate court
will grant a respondent affirmative relief by modifying the decision
which is the subject matter of the review only (1) if the respondent
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No. 70320-0-1/11
also seeks review of the decision by the timely filing of a notice of
appeal or a notice of discretionary review, or (2) if demanded by the
necessities of the case.
This court granted discretionary review based on the certification from the
trial court regarding two specific legal issues relating to the legal standard and jury
instructions in the competency hearing. The ruling granting discretionary review
under RAP 2.3(b)(4) accepted the certification as well taken. Such a certification
is inherently limited to the issues certified. Allowing an appellant to raise any and
all other interlocutory rulings not certified would undercut the purpose behind
RAP 2.3(b)(4). The order allowing an interview by the State's expert was a
separate earlier order not referenced in the certification and is beyond the scope of
this discretionary review.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
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