In Re C.s. v. State Of Washington ( 2018 )


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    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON cD
    In the Matter of the Detention of                      No. 75974-4-1
    C.S.,                                                  DIVISION ONE
    Appellant.                       UNPUBLISHED
    FILED: January 16, 2018
    Cox, J. — C.S. appeals the order committing him for 14 days of
    involuntary treatment. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing
    witnesses to testify regarding the contents of portions of the medical records that
    were not admitted into evidence. This evidence falls under the business records
    exception to hearsay, pursuant to RCW 5.45.020. We affirm.
    On September 16, 2016, a Designated Mental Health Professional filed a
    petition to place C.S. on a 72-hour involuntary treatment hold after he was
    brought to Highline Medical Center. The next day, C.S. was transferred to
    No. 75974-4-1/2
    Fairfax Hospital, which sought an additional 14 days of involuntary treatment.
    The court held a two-day commitment hearing on September 21 and 22, 2016.1
    After considering the evidence, the trial court determined that C.S.
    suffered from a mental disorder, specifically Bipolar Disorder, Type 1, and as a
    result presented as a substantial risk of harm to himself, harm to others, and as
    gravely disabled.2 It entered an order committing C.S. to Fairfax for a 14-day
    period.
    C.S. appeals.
    BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO HEARSAY
    C.S. argues that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting
    witnesses to testify regarding the contents of his medical records where those
    records were not admitted into evidence. We disagree.
    "Hearsay is 'a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
    testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
    matter asserted.'"3 In general, hearsay is not admissible.4 RCW 5.45.020
    provides an exception for records kept in the ordinary course of business.5
    This statute provides:
    A record of an act, condition or event, shall in so far as relevant, be
    competent evidence if the custodian or other qualified witness
    testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation, and if it was
    made in the regular course of business, at or near the time of the
    1 See RCW 71.05.240.
    2 See 
    id. 3 State
    v. Iverson, 
    126 Wash. App. 329
    , 336, 108 P.3d 799(2005)(quoting
    ER 801(c)).
    "Id.
    5 See   also ER 803(a)(6).
    2
    No. 75974-4-1/3
    act, condition or event, and if, in the opinion of the court, the
    sources of information, method and time of preparation were such
    as to justify its admission.[8]
    The provisions of RCW 5.45.020 require the proponent of evidence to lay
    a foundation before that evidence may be admitted as a business record.7
    We review the trial court's decision to admit business records under RCW
    5.45.020 for a manifest abuse of discretion.8
    Here, the State laid the foundation for admitting portions of C.S.'s medical
    chart by presenting testimony from Dr. Richard Thomas and Dr. Angel Lugo-
    Steidel, Ph.D. Dr. Thomas testified that he was a contract evaluator at seven
    different facilities including Highline. He testified that he was authorized to
    review and write notes in medical charts at Highline. He testified that: he was
    familiar with the manner in which medical records were maintained at Highline,
    medical records were regularly maintained in the course of business, the entries
    were made into the medical charts at or near the time of the events being
    described, and the notes in the medical charts were used by Highline to establish
    medical diagnosis and treatment. He further testified that the medical charts
    were relied upon by hospital experts to formulate their opinions.
    6RCW 5.45.020.
    7Id.; see State v. Ziegler, 
    114 Wash. 2d 533
    , 538-40, 789 P.2d 79(1990);
    
    Iverson, 126 Wash. App. at 337-38
    .
    8 
    Ziegler, 114 Wash. 2d at 538
    ; State v. Garrett, 
    76 Wash. App. 719
    , 722, 
    887 P.2d 488
    (1995).
    3
    No. 75974-4-1/4
    Based on this testimony, the trial court determined that Dr. Thomas had
    properly laid the foundation for admission of portions of C.S.'s Highline medical
    chart pursuant to RCW 5.45.020.9
    Dr. Thomas then testified to notes in C.S.'s medical chart that described
    C.S.'s actions and statements. The notes documented that, while in the
    emergency room, C.S. was hostile, demanding to staff, and manic. C.S.
    admitted being manic but denied needing further treatment. The next day, C.S.
    presented as extremely agitated, refused to return to his room, postured with his
    fists clenched, and said he would "show karate" if not given underwear. The trial
    court did not allow Dr. Thomas to testify about the statements made by the
    ambulance driver or by C.S.'s wife even though those statements were contained
    in C.S.'s medical chart.
    Dr. Angel Lugo-Steidel also testified to lay the foundation to admit entries
    from C.S.'s medical record at Fairfax. Dr. Lugo-Steidel testified that he is a
    licensed clinical psychologist and employed by Fairfax where he is a court
    evaluator.
    He testified that he was familiar with C.S.'s medical chart, and he was
    authorized to write in that chart and to review the notes contained therein. He
    testified that he was familiar with the manner in which the medical chart was
    maintained, that it was regularly maintained by the hospital in the course of its
    business, and that entries in the chart were made at or near the time of the event
    9 See   
    Iverson, 126 Wash. App. at 338-39
    ; 
    Garrett, 76 Wash. App. at 725
    .
    4
    No. 75974-4-1/5
    being described. He further testified that the chart notes were used by Fairfax to
    establish the medical diagnosis of patients, and that the charts were relied upon
    by hospital experts to formulate their opinions. The trial court determined that Dr:
    Lugo-Steidel laid the foundation for admission of C.S.'s Fairfax medical records
    under the business records exception to the hearsay rule.1°
    Dr. Lugo-Steidel read entries from C.S.'s Fairfax medical chart into the
    record. Those entries stated that C.S. had claimed he was from the planet
    "Alamd," and he was delusional, manic and very psychotic. He attempted to
    avoid taking his medications by placing them inside his cheek instead of
    swallowing. He was guarded, fidgety, hyperactive, restless, illogical,
    uncooperative, and paranoid. He had poor eye contact, repeatedly asked for
    discharge, threw trash, flipped tables and banged on the floor. C.S. threatened
    staff and had to be given emergency medication.
    Dr. Lugo-Steidel testified that in evaluating C.S., he relied on his interview
    with C.S., the medical charts from Highline and Fairfax, and the testimony of
    Deputy Graeme Glasgow, the police officer who had referred C.S. for an
    involuntary treatment hold. Dr. Lugo-Steidel stated that C.S. held a diagnosis of
    Bipolar! Disorder, with manic, severe or psychotic, and opined that C.S.
    presented a substantial risk of physical harm to himself, to others, and that he
    presented as gravely disabled.
    10 See 
    Garrett, 76 Wash. App. at 725
    .
    5
    No. 75974-4-1/6
    C.S. argues that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Dr.
    Lugo-Steidel and Dr. Thomas regarding material contained in his medical records
    because the medical records themselves were not admitted into evidence. He
    does not contest the relevancy of the evidence, only whether it was otherwise
    admissible.
    Once Dr. Thomas and Dr. Lugo-Steidel laid the proper foundation for
    admission of C.S.'s medical records, they could testify regarding statements and
    acts attributed to C.S. even though the witnesses who entered that information
    into his medical chart did not testify.11
    C.S. relies on this court's decision in State v. Hamilton as support for his
    argument that the trial court erred in allowing testimony about the content of his
    medical chart because the State never offered the medical records as an
    exhibit.12 Such reliance is misplaced.
    In Hamilton, Jimi Hamilton introduced expert opinion testimony from Dr.
    Stuart Grassian in support of his diminished capacity defense to a charge of
    second degree assault.13 Dr. Grassian testified that Hamilton was not able to
    form the requisite intent to commit assault.14 Dr. Grassian based his opinion on
    his interviews with Hamilton and others.15 Although he reviewed Hamilton's
    voluminous medical records, Dr. Grassian testified that he did not rely on them
    11See 
    Iverson, 126 Wash. App. at 338-39
    ; 
    Garrett, 76 Wash. App. at 725
    .
    12 
    196 Wash. App. 461
    , 383 P.3d 1062(2016), review denied, 
    187 Wash. 2d 1026
    (2017).
    13 
    Id. at 464-65.
          14 
    Id. at 467.
          15 
    Id. at 466.
    6
    No. 75974-4-1/7
    when forming his opinion.18 The State then sought to impeach Dr. Grassian
    using Hamilton's medical records and the opinions of four other medical doctors
    contained therein.17
    This court held that the State could not impeach Dr. Grassian using
    records and opinions that he never claimed to have relied upon in formulating his
    expert opinions.18 This court also rejected the State's argument that the opinions
    contained in Hamilton's medical records were admissible as business records,
    because RCW 5.45.020 "does not create an exception for the foundational
    requirements of identification and authentication."18 Because the State "never
    called the witnesses necessary to identify and authenticate the various medical
    records" as required by RCW 5.45.020, those records, and the opinions
    contained therein, were inadmissible.20
    Here, unlike in Hamilton, the State laid the proper foundation for
    admission of portions of C.S.'s medical records through the testimony of Dr.
    Thomas and Dr. Lugo-Steidel. In addition, unlike in Hamilton, here the State
    presented Dr. Lugo-Steidel's testimony that he actually relied on the evidence in
    the medical charts when formulating his opinion.
    16  
    Id. at 466-67.
           17 
    Id. at 468-73.
           18 
    Id. 19 Id.
    at 483(quoting State v. DeVries, 
    149 Wash. 2d 842
    , 847, 
    72 P.3d 748
    (2003)).
    20 
    Id. 7 No.
    75974-4-1/8
    C.S. cites no other authority as support for his contention that all of his
    medical chart must be admitted before witnesses could read entries from that
    chart into the record.21 We assume there is none.
    We affirm the order of commitment.
    WE CONCUR:
    21Darkenwald v. Emp't Sec. Dep't, 
    183 Wash. 2d 237
    , 248, 
    350 P.3d 647
    (2015); RAP 10.3(a)(6); King Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. Lane, 
    68 Wash. App. 706
    , 717,
    
    846 P.2d 550
    (1993).
    8
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 75974-4

Filed Date: 1/16/2018

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021