State of Washington v. Karion H. Thomas ( 2018 )

FILED
JANUARY 30, 2018
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
COURT OF APPEALS, DIVISION III, STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 34634-0-111
)
Respondent, )
) ORDER GRANTING MOTION
V. ) FOR RECONSIDERATION
) AND WITHDRAWING THE
KARION H. THOMAS, ) OPINION FILED DECEMBER 5,
) 2017
Appellant. · )
THE COURT has considered appellant's motion for reconsideration and is of the
opinion the motion should be granted. Therefore,
IT IS ORDERED, the motion for reconsideration of this court's decision of
December 5, 2017, is hereby granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, the court' s opinion filed December 5, 2017, is
hereby withdrawn and a new opinion will be filed this day.
PANEL: Judges Fearing, Lawrence-Berrey, Pennell
FOR THE COURT:
FILED
JANUARY 30, 2018
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
) No. 34634-0-III
Respondent, )
)
v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
KARION H. THOMAS, )
)
Appellant. )
FEARING, C.J. — The trial court convicted the minor, Karion Thomas, of second
degree assault. We affirm the conviction.
FACTS
On the evening of December 11, 2015, 16-year-old Karion Thomas visited the
home of his friend Ruben Lizarraga. Ruben’s father, Joseph Lizarraga, and stepmother,
Erica Cauffman, left Ruben and Thomas home alone for several hours. When the couple
returned home around 10:30 p.m., they discovered juveniles partying and consuming
alcohol. Some guests were intoxicated.
Joseph Lizarraga confronted his son Ruben, who stood on the back patio. Joseph
and his son entered the home, and the two engaged in a physical fight inside the kitchen.
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State v. Thomas
Ruben punched Joseph in the mouth. Joseph retaliated, struck Ruben, and Ruben fell to
the kitchen floor. A lady friend of Ruben’s attempted to intervene and jumped on
Joseph’s back. Erica Cauffman pushed the lady out the front door.
Joseph Lizarraga and son Ruben took the fight into the backyard. Ruben hit his
father three times, after which Joseph punched Ruben and knocked him to the ground.
Defendant Karion Thomas remained inside the house while Joseph Lizarraga and
Ruben fought outside. After the altercation ended and Ruben lay on the ground, Thomas
exited the residence. Thomas then argued with Joseph Lizarraga and sought to fight the
father. An angry Thomas threatened to harm Joseph. Joseph spoke into Thomas’ face
and told Thomas to leave the property. Joseph Lizarraga turned around, Thomas came
from behind Joseph, and Thomas wrapped an arm around Joseph’s neck. Thomas
pressed against Joseph Lizarraga’s throat and constricted his breathing. Another juvenile,
Christopher Darion Simon, pulled Thomas off Joseph Lizarraga. Lizarraga believed he
would have lost consciousness if Simon had not rescued him.
Erica Cauffman called 911. All juveniles attending the party, including Ruben
Lizarraga and Karion Thomas, fled the scene before police arrived.
PROCEDURE
The State of Washington, in juvenile court, charged Karion Thomas, under RCW
9A.36.021(1)(g), with one count of second degree assault of Joseph Lizarraga by
strangulation or by suffocation. The case proceeded to a bench trial.
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State v. Thomas
During trial, Joseph Lizarraga testified that he spoke to a police officer the night of
the assault, and, on the next day, he gave a written statement. On cross-examination,
defense counsel asked Lizarraga if he told the officer that night about Thomas choking
him, and Lizarraga replied in the affirmative.
Ruben Lizarraga testified that after his father knocked him to the ground outside,
he did not see any activity. Ruben testified he did not see Karion Thomas attack his
father.
Darion Simon testified during trial that Karion Thomas remained in the house
while Joseph and Ruben Lizarraga fought outside. Simon testified that Thomas exited
the home after the ending of the father-son struggle. According to Simon, he restrained
Thomas because an angry Thomas wanted to fight Joseph Lizarraga after Joseph hurt
Ruben.
In Karion Thomas’ case in chief, defense counsel called Richland Police Officer
John Raby, who responded to the scene on the night in question. Officer Raby testified
that he journeyed to the Lizarraga home to address a domestic altercation between a
father and son. Raby observed that Joseph Lizarraga suffered a bloody lip but no other
injuries. The officer spoke with Joseph and Erica Cauffman, and, to his recollection,
neither mentioned Thomas fighting or choking anyone.
The State called Joseph Lizarraga as a rebuttal witness. Over defense objections
of hearsay and improper rebuttal, the trial court allowed Lizarraga to testify regarding the
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State v. Thomas
written statement he proffered to law enforcement the day after the incident. Lizarraga
testified he wrote: “Thomas grabbed me and choked me, hold [sic] me and started
choking me and another boy, [Simon] had grabbed [Thomas] to get him off of me.”
Report of Proceedings at 69.
The trial court found Karion Thomas guilty of second degree assault.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
On appeal, Karion Thomas contends the trial court erred when overruling his
objection to the hearsay and rebuttal testimony when Joseph Lizarraga read from his
written statement given to law enforcement. Thomas also argues his trial counsel
performed ineffectively when failing to raise the defense of the defense of others.
Hearsay Testimony of Joseph Lizarraga
Karion Thomas assigns error to the trial court’s permitting Joseph Lizarraga to
read his prior statement to law enforcement. He claims the testimony constitutes
inadmissible hearsay. ER 801(d) and another Thomas case controls this assignment of
error. The rule reads:
(d) Statements Which Are Not Hearsay. A statement is not
hearsay if—
(1) Prior Statement by Witness. The declarant testifies at the trial
or hearing and is subject to cross examination concerning the statement,
and the statement is (i) inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony, and was
given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other
proceeding, or in a deposition, or (ii) consistent with the declarant’s
testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the
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declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or (iii) one
of identification of a person made after perceiving the person. . . .
ER 801.
At trial, Karion Thomas challenged the credibility of Joseph Lizarraga by
suggesting that Lizarraga never reported being choked. This challenge freed Lizarraga to
testify to his prior statement.
In State v. Thomas, 150 Wash. 2d 821, 865, 83 P.3d 970 (2004), the court held that, if
cross-examination raises an inference that the witness changed her story in response to an
external pressure, then whether that witness gave the same account of the story prior to
the onset of the external pressure becomes highly probative of the veracity of the witness’
story given while testifying. The proponent of the testimony may then show that the
witness’ prior consistent statement was made before the witness’ motive to fabricate
arose in order to show the testimony’s veracity.
Improper Rebuttal Testimony
Karion Thomas also characterizes Joseph Lizarraga’s reading of his written
statement as improper rebuttal. He argues, based on State v. White, 74 Wash. 2d 386, 444
P.2d 661 (1968), that the State may employ rebuttal testimony only to answer new issues
raised by the defense in the defense’s case. He adds that the State may not withhold
testimony in its case in chief so that it may later present the evidence cumulatively after
completion of the defense’s testimony. This second argument contains an internal
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State v. Thomas
inconsistency since, if the State withheld evidence during its case in chief, the evidence
would not be cumulative if presented in rebuttal.
Rebuttal evidence is admitted to enable the State to answer new matter presented
by the defense. State v. White, 74 Wash. 2d at 394. Genuine rebuttal evidence does not
reiterate evidence presented in chief but consists of evidence offered in reply to new
matters. State v. White, 74 Wash. 2d at 394-95. The law does not permit the State to
withhold substantial evidence supporting issues on which it carries the burden of proving
merely in order to present this evidence cumulatively at the end of defendant’s case.
State v. White, 74 Wash. 2d at 395. The trial court may encounter difficulty in ascertaining
whether the rebuttal evidence replies to new matters established by the defense. State v.
White, 74 Wash. 2d at 394-95. Frequently true rebuttal evidence overlaps or coalesces with
the evidence in chief. State v. White, 74 Wash. 2d at 395. Therefore, the question of
admissibility of evidence on rebuttal rests largely on the trial court’s discretion, and error
in denying or allowing it can be predicated only on a manifest abuse of that discretion.
State v. White, 74 Wash. 2d at 395.
We reject Karion Thomas’ argument because the State was not permitted to ask
Joseph Lizarraga to read from his statement to law enforcement during the State’s case in
chief. The statement constituted inadmissible hearsay until the defense challenged
Lizarraga’s story during the defense’s case in chief when Officer Raby stated that he did
not recall Lizarraga complaining of being choked. The reading from the prior statement
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State v. Thomas
was permissible only after Thomas attacked the credibility of Lizarraga during Thomas’
case by noting that Lizarraga did not purportedly report any injury to his throat. Thus,
reading of the statement served proper rebuttal testimony. The trial court abused no
discretion.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Karion Thomas argues that his trial counsel unreasonably failed to assert the
defense of others as a defense in his prosecution. This argument requires us to analyze
rules of ineffective assistance of counsel.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 22 of
the Washington Constitution guarantee the right to effective assistance of counsel.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674
(1984); State v. Grier, 171 Wash. 2d 17, 32, 246 P.3d 1260 (2011). Washington courts have
not extended the protections of the state constitution beyond the protections afforded by
the United States Constitution. Instead, state decisions follow the teachings and rules
announced in the United States Supreme Court’s seminal decision of Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). An accused is entitled to more than a lawyer who sits
next to him in court proceedings. In order to effectuate the purpose behind the
constitutional protection, the accused is entitled to effective assistance of counsel.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 686.
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A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires a showing that (1) counsel’s
performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687. If one prong of the test fails, we need not
address the remaining prong. State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wash. 2d 61, 78, 917 P.2d 563
(1996).
For the deficiency prong of ineffective assistance of counsel, this court gives great
deference to trial counsel’s performance and begins the analysis with a strong
presumption that counsel was effective. State v. West, 185 Wash. App. 625, 638, 344 P.3d
1233 (2015). Deficient performance is performance that fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness based on consideration of all the circumstances. State v. McFarland,
127 Wash. 2d 322, 334-35, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995). The appellant bears the burden to prove
ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. McFarland, 127 Wash. 2d at 335. Effective
representation entails certain basic duties, such as the overarching duty to advocate the
defendant’s cause and the more particular duty to assert such skill and knowledge as will
render the trial a reliable adversarial testing process. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
at 688; In re Personal Restraint of Yung-Cheng Tsai, 183 Wash. 2d 91, 100, 351 P.3d 138
(2015).
An attorney’s failure to recognize and raise an affirmative defense can fall below
the constitutional minimum for effective representation. State v. Coristine, 177 Wash. 2d
370, 379, 300 P.3d 400 (2013). Nevertheless, if insufficient evidence supports a defense,
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counsel cannot be faulted for failing to raise the defense. State v. Flora, 160 Wash. App.
549, 556, 249 P.3d 188 (2011). So we must decide if evidence supported a defense of
defense of others for Karion Thomas.
In Washington, one may lawfully use force in defense of others when one has a
reasonable belief that the person being protected is in imminent danger. State v. Penn, 89
Wash. 2d 63, 66, 568 P.2d 797 (1977). As the rule states, the use of force is not lawful
unless the actor reasonably believes that the danger is imminent. The undisputed
evidence is that the fight between father and son Lizarraga ended before Karion Thomas
left the house and ran to the backyard. Thomas took no steps to end the fight or protect
his friend, Ruben Lizarraga. Thomas, without provocation, challenged Joseph Lizarraga
to a fight, and, when Joseph turned his back, Thomas choked Joseph.
Karion Thomas claims that Ruben Lizarraga’s friends grew concerned for Ruben’s
safety. Nevertheless, the trial record cited by Thomas for this factual allegation only
establishes that one friend held concern for Ruben’s safety while Ruben and his father
fought in the kitchen. No one testified to concern for Ruben’s safety after Joseph
Lizarraga and Ruben went to the backyard.
Karion Thomas emphasizes Joseph Lizarraga’s testimony that he understood that
Karion Thomas sought to protect his friend, Ruben. This testimony does not provide any
factual support, however, for a conclusion that Thomas attacked Lizarraga at a time that
Ruben was in imminent need of protection.
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(c) Consider any predisposition reports.
In State v. JA.B., 98 Wash. App. 662, 991 P .2d 98 (2000), this court rejected a juvenile
offender's argument that basing his standard range on the criminal history in the
disposition report violated his right to due process.
CONCLUSION
We deny Kari on Thomas any relief on appeal. We grant Kari on Thomas'
appellate counsel's motion to withdraw.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW
2.06.040.
Fearini,ciy 1
WE CONCUR:
Pennell, J.
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