State of Washington v. Kasi Lynn Sleater ( 2017 )

FILED
SEPTEMBER 28, 2017
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
) No. 34851-2-111
Respondent, )
)
v. )
)
KASI LYNN SLEATER, ) PUBLISHED OPINION
)
Appellant. )
KORSMO, J. - Kasi Sleater appeals from an order denying her motion to vacate
her 2006 conviction for possession of methamphetamine, arguing that a subsequent
conviction occurring after the certificate of discharge issued for an offense committed
prior to that date was not a "new crime" preventing vacation of the offense. We disagree
with the focus of her argument and affirm the trial court.
FACTS
Ms. Sleater pleaded guilty on February 8, 2006, to possession of methamphetamine
and complied with all the terms of the judgment and sentence. A certificate of discharge
issued on May 22, 2008. However, one week before the certificate issued, she had been
arrested for possessing methamphetamine with the intent to deliver.
She promptly pleaded guilty on May 29, 2008, to one count of unlawful possession
of methamphetamine with the intent to manufacture or deliver and was sentenced to 22
No. 34851-2-III
State v. Sleater
months in prison. On October 3, 2016, Ms. Sleater moved to vacate the 2006 conviction,
declaring that she did "not have a conviction for any new crime in any jurisdiction since
discharge." Clerk's Papers at 16. The State responded that the 2008 conviction prevented
vacation of the 2006 conviction.
The trial court heard argument on the motion and agreed with the State's
interpretation of the statute. Ms. Sleater timely appealed to this court. A panel considered
the matter without argument.
ANALYSIS
The sole issue presented is whether the 2008 offense prevented the vacation of the
2006 conviction. Ms. Sleater wrongly focuses on the timing of her 2008 arrest rather
than the date of conviction for that offense.
This case presents an issue of statutory interpretation, so the basic rules of
statutory construction govern this claim. Questions of statutory interpretation are
reviewed de novo. State v. Bradshaw, 152 Wn.2d 528,531, 98 P.3d 1190 (2004). A
court begins by looking at the plain meaning of the rule as expressed through the words
themselves. Tesoro Ref & Mktg. Co. v. Dep 't of Revenue, 164 Wash. 2d 310, 317, 190 P.3d
28 (2008). If the meaning is plain on its face, the court applies the plain meaning. State
v. Armendariz, 160 Wash. 2d 106, 110, 156 P.3d 201 (2007). Only if the language is
ambiguous does the court look to aids of construction. Id. at 110-11. A provision is
ambiguous if it is reasonably subject to multiple interpretations. State v. Engel, 166
2
No. 34851-2-III
State v. Sleater
Wn.2d.572, 579,210 P.3d 1007 (2009); State v. McGee, 122 Wn.2d 783,787,864 P.2d
912 (1993).
The rule of lenity can be applied to ambiguous criminal statutes. If a statute is
truly ambiguous, the rule of lenity requires that "the court must adopt the interpretation
most favorable to the criminal defendant." McGee, 122 Wash. 2d at 787.
Vacation of a felony conviction in Washington is a two-step process under the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, chapter 9.94A RCW. When a convicted offender
completes the requirements of his judgment and sentence, a certificate of discharge will
enter and restore many civil rights. RCW 9.94A.637. After the receipt of the certificate
of discharge and the passage of the requisite amount of time, 1 the offender can seek
vacation of the conviction pursuant to RCW 9.94A.640.
At issue here is the meaning of one of the vacation policy's exceptions found in
RCW 9.94A.640(2). The relevant provision states:
(2) An offender may not have the record of conviction cleared if: ...
(d) the offender has been convicted of a new crime in this state, another
state, or federal court since the date of the offender's discharge under
RCW 9.94A.637.
RCW 9.94A.640 (emphasis added).
1
A five year period for most class C felony offenses and ten years for most class
B felony crimes. RCW 9.94A.640(2).
3
No. 34851-2-111
State v. Sfeater
Focusing on the phrase, "new crime," Ms. Sleater argues that there was nothing
"new" about the 2008 offense since it occurred and was known to law enforcement prior
to the certificate of discharge. She contends that the 2008 conviction could not therefore
prevent vacation of the 2006 conviction since it did not involve a new offense occurring
after the certificate of discharge. She also contends that her reading of the statute shows
that, at a minimum, the statute is ambiguous and the rule of lenity should apply.
Although Ms. Sleater has a clever argument, we do not agree with her reading of
the statute. The plain reading makes inescapable the conclusion that since Ms. Sleater's
2008 conviction was entered after the certificate of discharge for the 2006 conviction, she
is ineligible to vacate the earlier offense. The statute does not mention, let alone focus
on, the date of the "new crime." Instead, the statute clearly states the trigger mechanism
is whether the offender has been "convicted of a new crime" after the date of discharge
and is, therefore, ineligible for vacation. RCW 9.94A.640(2)(d) (emphasis added). The
words "new crime" modify the verb "convicted." That verb is the focus of the sentence. 2
It is the fact of conviction of a new crime, not the date that the new crime was committed,
that has significance for the vacation rules. This statute is not ambiguous and there is no
2
Ms. Sleater places emphasis on the word "new" in the phrase "new crime" to
contend that the crime had not occurred prior to the date of discharge. That interpretation
does not flow from a plain reading of the sentence. The natural reading, based on the
total construction of the sentence, is that "new" means "different." This clarifies that the
second crime for which an offender was convicted must be different from the crime that
had been discharged.
4
No. 34851-2-III
State v. Sleater
need to resort to the rule of lenity. The trial court correctly concluded that the 2006
conviction could not be vacated due to the subsequent 2008 conviction.
Nonetheless, Ms. Sleater is not without remedy. Once she has received her
certificate of discharge for the 2008 offense and is eligible to vacate it, she can first
vacate that conviction and then seek vacation of the 2006 offense. See State v. Smith,
158 Wash. App. 501, 246 P.3d 812 (2010). 3 There is little utility to vacating the 2006
possession conviction while the more serious 2008 possession with intent conviction
remains on her record.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
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3
Our decision is consistent with Smith. There, Division One of this court affirmed
the vacation of an offender's 1989 felony conviction following the vacation of his 1995
misdemeanor conviction. 158 Wash. App. at 503. That court's analysis also focused on
whether the vacated 1995 offense constituted a subsequent conviction rather than whether
it was merely a post-discharge "new crime."
5