State Of Washington v. Christopher Xavier Beck ( 2017 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
No. 74103-9-1
Respondent,
DIVISION ONE
V. rTi rrlim
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
CHRISTOPHER XAVIER BECK, c.n
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Appellant. FILED: September 5, 2017
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TRICKEY, A.C.J. — Christopher Beck appeals his convictions of three counts of firsT
degree rape and one count of robbery in the second degree. Beck contends that the trial
court abused its discretion when it declined to sever his counts and try them separately;
deprived him of his constitutional right to an impartial jury when it denied a defense
challenge for cause against a juror; and deprived him of his right to present a defense
when it barred him from introducing evidence attacking the credibility and motive to lie of
a victim. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
C.Q.
C.Q. was a massage therapist who provided services at her apartment in
downtown Seattle. C.Q. placed advertisements on Backpage.com, and would perform
erotic massages including "energetic release" at the end.1 C.Q. did not allow clients to
touch her. C.Q. usually accepted cash payment, but sometimes allowed clients to pay
with credit cards. When a client paid with a credit card, the payment would go to Rainbow
Love, an acquaintance of C.Q., who would give C.Q. cash later.
1 Report of Proceedings (RP) (Aug. 25, 2015) at 626.
No. 74103-9-1 / 2
In February 2014, Beck called C.Q. in response to her Backpage.com
advertisement. He set up an appointment and asked to pay with a credit card. Although
it appeared that the payment had gone through, the card company Beck used notified
Love that she should not accept payments from that card because the account was
fraudulent.
Beck's appointment with C.Q. went normally. C.Q. learned later that the payment
had been rejected. Beck contacted Love because he was "trying to make this right," and
Love told C.Q. to contact Beck.2 C.Q. and Beck exchanged e-mails and arranged to meet
on March 4, 2014, for Beck to pay C.Q. for the past appointment. When Beck arrived, he
told C.Q. that he was not going to pay her. Beck physically assaulted C.Q., including
choking her, and then forced her to perform oral sex.
C.Q. was expecting her friend Carmen Garcia to arrive shortly after Beck. After
knocking on C.Q.'s door, Garcia heard the sounds of a struggle and a female voice that
sounded as if it was being choked saying, "Call 911."3 Garcia began to alert tenants in
other apartments. Beck, identified by Garcia at trial, came out of C.Q.'s apartment and
fled. Garcia went into C.Q.'s apartment and saw that C.Q. had marks on her neck and
shoulders and that the contents of a purse had been emptied onto the floor. C.Q. reported
the incident a few days later, and pictures were taken of her injuries.
C.F.
In March 2014, C.F. had lost her job and apartment and moved to a motel in the
Georgetown area of Seattle. During that time, C.F. began using heroin. C.F. was living
with her friend April Bucklin, Bucklin's boyfriend, Bucklin's son, and C.F.'s boyfriend at
2 RP (Aug. 25, 2015) at 639.
3 RP (Sept. 8, 2015) at 1302-03.
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No. 74103-9-1/ 3
the motel. C.F. posted advertisements on Craigslist offering to sell her underwear for
money or food.
On March 13, 2014, Beck e-mailed C.F. in response to one of her Craigslist
advertisements. Beck and C.F. arranged to meet at the motel. Beck asked C.F. to get
into his car, but C.F. refused and Beck left. A short time later, Beck e-mailed or texted
C.F. to apologize and offer her money again and to take her to the store to get food. C.F.
accepted.
C.F. let her friends know she was leaving. C.F. got into Beck's car and he took
her to a McDonald's restaurant. After parking, Beck choked C.F. and attempted to force
her to perform oral sex. When she resisted, Beck threatened her life, forced her into the
back seat, and vaginally raped her. C.F. escaped and fled the car in only her shirt and
shoes, and was picked up by a stranger and returned to the hote1.4 She left her cell phone
and other clothes in Beck's car.
Bucklin called 911 when C.F. returned to the motel. Seattle Police Department
(SPD) Officer Stephen Smith responded to the call. Officer Smith saw that C.F. was
visibly upset. A deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis and comparison was performed
using a sexual assault kit, and the male component matched Beck.
A.M.
A.M. is an independent insurance claims adjuster and corporate trainer who lived
in Florida but frequently traveled for work. While traveling, A.M. worked "in the adult
industry doing erotic massage work."5 A.M. placed advertisements on Backpage.com in
cities where she would be working.
4 RP (Sept. 1, 2015) at 938-39.
5 RP (Sept. 8, 2015) at 1361.
3
No. 74103-9-1 / 4
A.M. traveled to Seattle in March 2014. She booked a room at the Westin Hotel in
downtown Seattle and placed several advertisements. Beck responded to one of the
advertisements by e-mail. They arranged to meet on March 19. When Beck arrived, A.M.
gave him a standard description of what he could expect, which implied that that she did
not permit mutual contact.
Beck repeatedly tried to confirm A.M.'s rate, which was unusual for a client and
made A.M. uncomfortable. When A.M. would not confirm the rate, Beck began to move
toward her and A.M. attempted to cancel the appointment. Beck responded that he was
going to "get what [he] came for" and began to choke A.M.6 A.M. blacked out. When
A.M. regained consciousness, Beck forced A.M. to perform oral sex and vaginally raped
her. Beck took the money that A.M. had made from earlier appointments and left.
A.M. tried but was unable to continue with the other appointments she had
scheduled for that day. A.M. contacted hotel security and met with SPD officers. The
officers observed that A.M. was "very upset."7
A.M. went to Harborview Medical Center. A DNA analysis of samples collected
with a sexual assault kit matched DNA from Beck.
Criminal Proceedings
The State charged Beck by second amended information with rape and robbery
for his assaults on the three women: rape in the first degree and robbery in the second
degree of C.Q. on March 4, 2014; rape in the first degree of C.F. on March 13, 2014; and
rape in the first degree and robbery in the second degree of A.M. on March 19, 2014.
At pretrial, Beck moved to sever the counts for each alleged victim. The trial court
6 RP (Sept. 8, 2015) at 21.
7 RP (Sept. 8,2015) at 1132.
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No. 74103-9-1 / 5
denied the motion to sever, stating that there was enough indication of a common scheme
or plan under ER 404(b) and that the prejudicial effect did not substantially outweigh the
probative value of the evidence under ER 403. Beck renewed his motion to sever during
trial.
The jury convicted Beck on all three counts of rape and one count of robbery. It
found him not guilty of his charge of robbery in the second degree against A.M.
Beck appeals.
ANALYSIS
Motion to Sever
Beck argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to
sever his counts related to each victim from one another. He argues that the trial court's
erroneous denial of his motion to sever allowed the admission of unduly prejudicial
evidence, and thus, violated his constitutional right to a fair trial and CrR 4.4(b). Because
the evidence of Beck's charges would have been cross-admissible in separate trials since
Beck acted pursuant to a common plan or scheme, we disagree.
A defendant has a constitutional right to due process and a fair trial. U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 3. When a defendant faces multiple charges, the
trial court shall grant a motion to sever if it determines "that severance will promote a fair
determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence of each offense." CrR 4.4(b).
CrR 4.3 provides:
(a) Joinder of Offenses. Two or more offenses may be joined in one
charging document, with each offense stated in a separate count, when the
offenses, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both:
(1) Are of the same or similar character, even if not part of a single
scheme or plan; or
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No. 74103-9-1 / 6
(2) Are based on the same conduct or on a series of acts connected
together or constituting parts of a single scheme or plan.
A defendant seeking severance has the burden of demonstrating that trying the
counts together would be manifestly prejudicial and outweigh any concern for judicial
economy. State v. Bvthrow, 114 Wash. 2d 713, 718, 790 P.2d 154 (1990). Joinder of
offenses may prejudice a defendant because
"(1) he may become embarrassed or confounded in presenting separate
defenses; (2) the jury may use the evidence of one of the crimes charged
to infer a criminal disposition on the part of the defendant from which is
found his guilt of the other crime or crimes charged; or (3) the jury may
cumulate the evidence of the various crimes charged and find guilt when, if
considered separately, it would not so find."
State v. Smith, 74 Wash. 2d 744, 755, 446 P.2d 571 (1968) (quoting Drew v. United States,
331 F.2d 85, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1964)), vacated in part, 408 U.S. 934, 92 S. Ct. 2852, 33 L.
Ed. 2d 747 (1972), overruled on other grounds by, State v. Gosby, 85 Wash. 2d 758, 539
P.2d 680 (1975). Also, a defendant may be prejudiced by "a latent feeling of hostility
engendered by the charging of several crimes as distinct from only one." Smith, 74
Wash. 2d at 755 (quoting Drew, 331 F.2d at 88).
A reviewing court uses several factors to determine whether a trial court's denial
of a severance motion was unduly prejudicial to the defendant:
(1) the strength of the State's evidence on each count; (2) the clarity of
defenses as to each count; (3) court instructions to the jury to consider each
count separately; and (4) the admissibility of evidence of the other charges
even if not joined for trial.
State v. Russell, 125 Wash. 2d 24, 63, 882 P.2d 747 (1994).
"A trial court's refusal to sever counts under CrR 4.4(b) is reviewed for manifest
abuse of discretion, and the defendant has the burden of demonstrating that abuse on
appeal." State v. Cotten, 75 Wash. App. 669, 686-687, 879 P.2d 971 (1994).
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No. 74103-9-1/ 7
Strength of the Evidence
Beck argues that the strength of the State's evidence for certain counts bolstered
its case against him for counts where its evidence was weaker. Beck also argues that
joinder invited the jury to cumulate the evidence and to infer criminal disposition, rather
than relying on the evidence presented for each count. Because there was no clear
difference in the strength of the State's case for each rape and each was supported by
strong evidence, we disagree.
The court considers the strength of the State's evidence on each count to ensure
that weaker counts are not unduly benefitted by stronger counts. Russell, 125 Wash. 2d at
63-64.
Beck argues that the State did not have strong evidence on any of the counts
against him and, therefore, the trial court's failure to sever his counts invited the jury to
infer a criminal disposition from the accumulated evidence. But Beck's arguments
primarily focus on the credibility of the State's witnesses.8 Beck raised a consent defense
against the rape allegations at trial and did not dispute identity. He denied taking property
from C.Q. or A.M.
Beck's defense was that the victims consented to sexual activity and intercourse.
The evidence that each victim did not consent was strong. The State offered substantial
testimony from the victims themselves, police testimony corroborating the victims'
demeanors following their encounters with Beck, and forensic evidence supporting their
allegations. Their testimony directly contradicted Beck's consent defense.
8 Beck focuses on C.Q.'s and Garcia's involvement with prostitution, C.F.'s drug use and
homelessness, and A.M.'s delayed reporting of the rape to law enforcement and use of racially
derogatory terms.
7
No. 74103-9-1 / 8
Each rape count against Beck largely depended on the jury's determination of the
credibility of Beck and the victims. Beck's credibility arguments focused on the
background of the victims and their alleged motivations to fabricate their allegations. His
arguments did not show that the strength of the State's cases varied by victim. We
conclude that the State presented strong evidence supporting each count.
Clarity of Defenses
Beck argues that he was prejudiced by the trial court's denial of his motion to sever
because he needed to testify about certain counts but not others. Specifically, he argues
that he asserted a general denial defense for each count but presented different theories
as to each victim's motive to fabricate their allegations against him.9 We disagree
because Beck presented general denial or consent defenses to each charge and,
therefore, trying the counts together did not infringe on the clarity of his defenses.
In State v. York, the trial court denied York's pretrial motion to sever counts of rape
of female students at the school where York was an instructor. 50 Wash. App. 446, 447,
749 P.2d 683 (1987). The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial, holding that
York was not embarrassed or confounded in presenting his defenses because his
defense to one charge was a denial and his defense to the others was consent. York, 50
Wash. App. 451.
Here, Beck contended at trial that each victim had consented. Beck argues on
appeal that, although he asserted a general denial defense for each count, he offered
different theories as to each victim's motive to fabricate their allegations against him. This
does not change the nature of his legal defenses against each count, only their underlying
9Beck characterizes his defense as a general denial, but at trial he characterized his defense as
consent with each victim having a different motivation to fabricate their rape allegation.
8
No. 74103-9-1 / 9
facts. We conclude that Beck was not embarrassed or confounded in presenting his
defenses.
Beck also argues that the trial court's denial of his severance motion violated his
right against self-incrimination because he had to testify about certain counts but not
others. Because Beck has not shown that he had important testimony to offer on one
count and a strong need to refrain from testifying about another, we disagree.
A defendant has a right against self-incrimination. U.S. CONST. amend. V; WASH.
CONST. art. 1, § 9.
"A defendant's desire to testify only on one count requires severance only if a
defendant makes a 'convincing showing that she has important testimony to give
concerning one count and a strong need to refrain from testifying about another."
Russell, 125 Wash. 2d at 65 (quoting State v. Watkins, 53 Wn. App 264, 270, 766 P.2d 484
(1989)).
Beck has not made this showing. Beck has not identified, here or at the trial court,
which counts he wished to testify to or which counts to which he had a strong need to
refrain from testifying. He has not carried his burden of showing that he had important
testimony to offer on one count and a strong need to refrain from testifying to another,
and was unable to do so because of the trial court's ruling.
In support of his position, Beck cites his argument at trial that the court should limit
the scope of cross-examination if he testified about some counts but not others. Beck
cited below to State v. Hart, which held that the trial court infringed the defendant's
constitutional right against self-incrimination when it allowed the State to cross-examine
him about the facts underlying a charge that he did not testify to on direct examination.
9
No. 74103-9-1 /10
180 Wash. App. 297, 304-05, 320 P.3d 1109 (2014). Hart does not apply here, because
Beck testified to all of his charges on direct examination. Further, it is not relevant to
Beck's claim that he would have testified to only some of his charges if the court had
severed the counts.
Beck also asserts that the jury was prejudiced against him after being informed of
his prior criminal history. Beck does not offer significant analysis or citation to the record
in support of this argument. At trial, on direct examination, Beck's attorney asked him
about his guilty plea to a charge for robbery in the first degree based on an incident in
Pierce County in 2010. Assuming that this is the prior criminal history Beck is referring
to, Beck has not shown that he would not have testified to any charge to which his prior
criminal conviction was relevant or that his prior criminal history would not have been
admissible at each trial. In addition, this is insufficient to show prejudice standing alone.
In sum, Beck has not offered persuasive argument showing an issue with the
clarity of his defenses. He was not embarrassed or confounded in presenting his
defenses. He did not make a convincing showing that he had important testimony to give
on one count and a strong need to refrain from testifying about another. Beck has not
shown that he would have only testified to some counts and not to others or that the court
would have excluded his prior criminal conviction in a trial on some counts if they had
been tried separately.1° We conclude that Beck has not shown that there was an issue
with the clarity of his defenses.
'° Beck states that he did make this showing in his brief, but does not cite to the record in support
of this assertion.
10
No. 74103-9-1 Ill
Court Instructions
Beck argues that the court's instructions, although proper,11 could not overcome
the improper joinder of his counts. The jury was instructed to consider and decide each
count separately, and to only consider evidence related to other counts for the limited
purpose of determining whether a common scheme or plan existed. We conclude that
the jury was properly instructed.
Admissibility of Other Charges If Not Joined
Beck argues that the trial court erred when it found that evidence supporting each
of Beck's rape charges would be cross-admissible because they constituted a common
scheme or plan. Because evidence of the rapes would have been cross-admissible at
separate trials, we disagree.
Cross-admissibility of evidence is analyzed under ER 404(b). Bvthrow, 114 Wash. 2d
at 722; State v. Gatalski, 40 Wash. App. 601, 607, 699 P.2d 804 (1985) (analyzing whether
evidence in each count would be admissible in a trial on a separate count). ER 404(b)
provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident.
Evidence of prior misconduct may be admissible to prove "a scheme or plan of
which the offense charged is a manifestation." State v. Lough, 125 Wash. 2d 847, 853, 889
P.2d 487 (1995). One type of plan "arises when an individual devises a plan and uses it
repeatedly to perpetrate separate but very similar crimes." Lough, 125 Wash. 2d at 855. If
'1 Beck objected to the trial court's limited purpose instruction as inadequate, relying on his
severance arguments.
11
No. 74103-9-1 /12
similar acts have been performed over a period of time, this may strengthen the possibility
of a common plan or scheme. Lough, 125 Wash. 2d at 860 (citing State v. McKinney, 110
N.C. App. 365, 372, 430 S.E.2d 300 (1993)).
"Proof of such a plan is admissible if the prior acts are (1) proved by a
preponderance of the evidence, (2) admitted for the purpose of proving a common plan
or scheme, (3) relevant to prove an element of the crime charged or to rebut a defense,
and (4) more probative than prejudicial." Lough, 125 Wash. 2d at 852.
"[A]dmission of evidence of a common scheme or plan requires substantial
similarity between the prior bad acts and the charged crime." State v. DeVicentis, 150
Wash. 2d 11, 21, 74 P.3d 119 (2003). "Sufficient similarity is reached only when the trial
court determines that the 'various acts are naturally to be explained as caused by a
general plan . . . ." DeVicentis, 150 Wash. 2d at 21 (quoting Lough, 125 Wash. 2d at 860).
This standard does not require uniqueness, which applies to identifying the defendant
through a unique modus operandi. DeVicentis, 150 Wash. 2d at 21; State v. Vv Thang, 145
Wash. 2d 630, 643,41 P.3d 1159 (2002).12
In State v. Gresham, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's finding of a
common scheme or plan when the defendant created opportunities to fondle child victims
using the same pattern, such that instances were "naturally to be explained as ``individual
manifestations' of the same plan," despite differences in location and the sexual acts
performed. 173 Wash. 2d 405, 423, 269 P.3d 207 (2012). In DeVicentis, the Supreme Court
held that the "existence of a design to fulfill sexual compulsions evidenced by a pattern
of past behavior is probative." 150 Wash. 2d at 17-18. The court affirmed the trial court's
12 Beck conceded below that identity was not at issue.
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No. 74103-9-1 / 13
admission of the defendant's prior convictions involving sexual misconduct with young
adolescent girls based in part on the defendant's building of relations with his victims
through "'a safe channel, such as a friend of his daughter," and wearing revealing clothing
around his victims in order to make nudity normal. Devicentis, 150 Wash. 2d at 22.
Here, the rape allegations against Beck bore sufficient similarity to one another to
have occurred under a common scheme or plan. In each instance, Beck responded to
online advertisements offering money in exchange for sexual services or favors. The
victims were unlikely to avail themselves of help from law enforcement due to being
vulnerable or marginalized. After meeting the victims in isolated locations, Beck refused
to pay them, choked them, and forced them to engage in sexual activities. These acts
occurred over the course of 15 days. Because of the similarities between the incidents
and their occurrence over a period of time, we conclude that trial court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that the three rape charges would be cross-admissible in separate
trials as part of a common scheme or plan.13
In sum, any prejudice suffered by Beck from trying the counts together did not
outweigh the concern for judicial economy. The State presented comparatively strong
evidence supporting each count against Beck. Beck raised consent defenses to each
count, and the clarity of his defenses were not infringed by the denial of his severance
motion. The trial court properly instructed the jury to determine each count separately.
The evidence of each count would have been admissible in separate trials because they
13The trial court excluded a separate rape allegation against Beck filed in Kitsap County from the
common scheme or plan because it involved multiple rapes over a span of five hours and a child
was present.
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No. 74103-9-I / 14
were part of a common scheme or plan. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when
it denied Beck's motion to sever.
Right to an Impartial Jury
Beck argues that he was denied his constitutional right to an impartial jury when
the trial court denied a defense for-cause challenge against Juror 106 for exhibiting actual
bias. Because Beck failed to show actual bias on the part of the juror, we disagree.
A defendant is entitled to an impartial jury. State v. Brett, 126 Wash. 2d 136, 157,
892 P.2d 29 (1995). The court must excuse a juror for cause if the juror demonstrates
actual bias. Ottis v. Stevenson-Carson Sch. Dist. No. 303, 61 Wash. App. 747, 754, 812
P.2d 133 (1991). Actual bias is "the existence of a state of mind on the part of the juror
in reference to the action, or to either party, which satisfies the court that the challenged
person cannot try the issue impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of
the party challenging." RCW 4.44.170(2).
Actual bias may exist when a juror admits to a bias and indicates that it is likely to
persist throughout the trial. State v. Gonzalez, 111 Wash. App. 276, 281, 45 P.3d 205
(2002), review denied, 148 Wash. 2d 1012 (2003).14 "[E]quivocal answers alone do not
require a juror to be removed when challenged for cause, rather, the question is whether
14Beck also offers Mach v. Stewart for the proposition that the trial court should have begun anew
with a fresh jury pool after Juror 106's comments. 137 F.3d 630 (9th Cir. 1997). In Mach, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that the trial court erred when it struck a prospective juror for comments
about her bias but denied a motion for a new panel. 137 F.3d at 632-33. The Ninth Circuit stated
that the trial court should have conducted additional voir dire to determine whether other jurors
had been influenced by the comments, and remanded for new voir dire with a fresh jury pool. 137
F.3d at 633. Mach is not persuasive here. Beck challenged the entire panel for cause after
approximately two-thirds of the jurors, including Juror 106, raised their hands when asked whether
they would be biased by the number of counts against him. The court denied this "group challenge
for cause" and instructed Beck to make individual cause challenges. RP (Aug. 24, 2015) at 505.
Beck was allowed to proceed with further voir dire to ensure that the jurors were not actually
biased against Beck, as evidenced by his questioning of Juror 106. The trial court did not err in
denying Beck's "group challenge for cause" and not starting anew with a fresh jury pool.
14
No. 74103-9-1 / 15
a juror with preconceived ideas can set them aside." State v. Noltie, 116 Wash. 2d 831, 839,
809 P.2d 190 (1991).
A trial court's ruling on a challenge for cause is reviewed for manifest abuse of
discretion. State v. Gregory, 158 Wash. 2d 759, 814, 147 P.2d 1201 (2006).
Here, Juror 106 did not exhibit actual bias. Juror No. 106 was one of many jurors
who indicated that they were concerned that they were more likely to find Beck guilty
because there were several charges against him. When questioned by Beck's attorney,
Juror 106 said, "So with the culmination of the amount of accusations, for me, it was
shocking. So it's overwhelming for me to be unbiased as to how I feel whether or not Mr.
Beck is guilty or not but persuaded to be more so than if he is guilty based on those type
of accusations."15 In response to further defense questions, however, Juror 106 said,
"But I would still want to hear the proof that has to be given in order for me to say that
[Beck] is guilty."16 After a defense for-cause challenge against Juror 106, the trial court
allowed additional questioning by the prosecution. In response to the prosecutor's
questions, Juror 106 stated that he would be able to "make an unbiased decision based
on the evidence."17 The trial court then denied the defense for-cause challenge, and the
defense did not use a preemptory strike against Juror 106.
Beck has not shown actual bias on the part of Juror 106. Juror 106 repeatedly
stated that, although he may be more inclined to feel that Beck was guilty, he was capable
of making an unbiased decision of guilt based on the evidence presented at trial. The
trial court allowed for additional questioning of Juror No. 106, and was satisfied that Juror
15 RP (Aug. 24, 2015) at 493-94.
16 RP (Aug. 24, 2015) at 494.
17 RP (Aug. 24, 2015) at 497.
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No. 74103-9-1 /16
106 could try the issue impartially and without prejudice. We conclude that the trial court
did not err when it denied Beck's for-cause challenge against Juror 106.
Right to Present a Defense
Beck argues that the trial court denied him his right to present a defense when it
excluded evidence of a criminal investigation into Love that Beck offered to establish
C.Q.'s bias and motive to lie. Because the State's need to exclude the evidence of the
criminal investigation into Love outweighed Beck's need to present it at trial, we conclude
that the trial court did not infringe Beck's constitutional right to present a defense.
An accused person has a right to a meaningful opportunity to present a defense.
WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 22; State v. Jones, 168 Wash. 2d 713, 720,230 P.3d 576 (2010). But
this right is not absolute. Jones, 168 Wash. 2d at 720. The evidence offered by a defendant
must be at least minimally relevant. Jones, 168 Wash. 2d at 720. If the evidence is relevant,
the court balances the State's interest in excluding the evidence against the defendant's
need for the evidence. Jones, 168 Wash. 2d at 720.
A claim of denial of constitutional rights is reviewed de novo. State v. Iniguez, 167
Wash. 2d 273, 280-81, 217 P.3d 768 (2009).
Relevancy of Evidence
Beck argues that evidence of the investigation into Love was relevant to C.Q.'s
credibility and C.Q.'s "vulnerability as a minor player in [the prostitution ring being
investigated] supported her motive to lie about Mr. Beck, in order to protect Rainbow
Love, as well as herself."18 Beck contends that the evidence was necessary to show the
jury an accurate portrayal of C.Q.'s lifestyle, and that the criminal investigation of Love
18 Opening Br. of Appellant at 31.
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No. 74103-9-1 / 17
motivated C.Q. to lie and biased her against Beck. The State argues that C.Q. had
already admitted to her prostitution activities, and thus, cross-examination into the
investigation of Love for prostitution-related activities would produce testimony that was
not relevant.
"Evidence that a defendant seeks to introduce 'must be of at least minimal
relevance." Jones, 168 Wash. 2d at 720 (quoting State v. Darden, 145 Wash. 2d 612, 622, 41
P.3d 1189 (2002)). "Defendants have a right to present only relevant evidence, with no
constitutional right to present irrelevant evidence." Jones, 168 Wash. 2d at 720 (citing
Gregory, 158 Wash. 2d at 786 n.6). Relevant evidence is that which tends to make the
existence of any material fact more or less probable. ER 401. Evidence of bias, which
"describe[s] the relationship between a party and a witness which might lead the witness
to slant, unconsciously or otherwise, his testimony in favor of or against a party[,]" is
almost always relevant. United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52, 105 S. Ct. 465, 83 L. Ed.
2d 450 (1984).
Beck argues that the evidence would have been at least minimally relevant to the
questions of C.Q.'s credibility, motive to lie, or bias. He offers the conclusory argument
that C.Q. was biased against him because of the investigation into Love.19 Assuming that
C.Q. knew of the investigation, this would likely meet the low threshold of establishing
that the evidence would have been relevant to the material facts of C.Q.'s credibility and
19 Whether C.Q. was aware of the investigation into Love is unclear from the record. Beck
attempted to ask questions about the investigation during cross-examination, and the court
sustained the State's objection. During recess, the trial court ruled that it was going to exclude
the evidence about the Love investigation. C.Q. was not asked further questions about the
investigation.
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No. 74103-9-1/18
motive to lie. Therefore, the evidence would have been at least minimally relevant to the
question of C.Q.'s credibility or bias against Beck.
Prejudice Verses Need for Information
Beck argues that the evidence was properly offered under ER 404(b). He argues
that the evidence was of high probative value, and thus, should have been admitted. The
State argues that the evidence was not highly probative, and admitting it would have led
to confusion of the issues and been a waste of time.
If the evidence at issue is relevant, the State bears the burden to show that the
evidence is "so prejudicial as to disrupt the fairness of the fact-finding process at trial."
Darden, 145 Wash. 2d at 622. The State's interest in excluding prejudicial evidence is
weighed against the defendant's need for the information sought. Darden, 145 Wash. 2d at
622. Relevant information can only be withheld "if the State's interest outweighs the
defendant's need." Darden, 145 Wash. 2d at 622. If evidence is highly probative, no State
interest is compelling enough to preclude its introduction. State v. Hudlow, 99 Wash. 2d 1,
16, 659 P.2d 514 (1984).
Here, the State's interest in excluding the evidence of the investigation into Love
outweighed Beck's need for the evidence. The evidence would have been prejudicial to
C.Q. by implicating her in organized prostitution. It also may have confused the issues
for the jury by raising the question of whether C.Q. would be criminally liable for her
involvement in the prostitution ring and would have taken up time.
Moreover, the record shows that the State's interest was not outweighed by Beck's
need. The evidence would have been offered to show C.Q.'s possible criminal liability for
her activities, her motivation to falsify her allegation of rape to avoid this criminal liability,
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No. 74103-9-1/ 19
and her bias against Beck. Beck already had evidence to support these arguments. C.Q.
testified about her prostitution activities, her concern that she would be criminally liable if
she reported the rape, and the fact that Beck had refused to pay her.2° She also testified
about her connections with Love, including being trained by Love, Love's role in referring
clients to C.Q., and Love's handling of credit card transactions for C.Q.
C.Q.'s testimony to these issues significantly reduced the probative value of the
evidence offered by Beck. The State's interest in excluding the prejudicial evidence was
not outweighed by Beck's need for it. Thus, Beck's right to present a defense was not
infringed by the trial court's exclusion of evidence regarding the investigation of Love.
Statement of Additional Grounds
Beck raises a number of issues in his statement for additional grounds for review.
None merit reversal or dismissal.
C.Q.
Beck argues that the trial court erred or the State acted wrongfully when evidence
showing that C.Q. was dishonest was not admitted or disclosed to the defense. First,
Beck's argues that the trial court erroneously excluded evidence that a ledger C.Q.
claimed Beck stole was later found in her possession. This appears to refer to the trial
court's decision to exclude evidence related to the investigation of Love, as analyzed
above. The list of items seized from the apartment does not include a ledger and the
ownership of the items was not established in the record. Beck acknowledged that the
State presented substantial documentation during discovery. Beck has not shown that
the trial court erred or that the State acted wrongly with regard to this evidence.
20 Beck focuses on the disagreement over payment as a reason for her false allegation, along
with possible criminal liability.
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No. 74103-9-1 / 20
Second, Beck argues that forensic evidence showed that C.Q. was not truthful
when she claimed Beck used a rope to bind her hands. C.Q. testified that Beck attempted
to tie her hands and feet with a rope he brought with him. It is unclear from the record
what forensic evidence Beck is referring to that contradicts this claim. RAP 10.10(c).
Third, Beck claimed that C.Q. was dishonest about him ejaculating on her clothing.
At trial, C.Q. testified that he ejaculated on her, not her clothing. The record does not
appear to contain a reference to Beck ejaculating on her clothing.
Fourth, C.Q. testified that Beck took three cell phones from her. The fact that these
cell phones were not found in his possession is insufficient to overcome C.Q.'s sworn
testimony.
Beck argues that that the trial court erred when it excluded evidence of C.Q.'s
involvement in Love's prostitution ring because he was denied an opportunity to impeach
C.Q. or attack her credibility. As analyzed above, the trial court did not err when it
excluded evidence of the criminal investigation into Love's prostitution activities.
Beck argues that the prosecutor improperly asked C.Q. whether she knew of
Love's past convictions by leaving the courtroom during cross-examination to ask her.
The jury had left the courtroom and the court and counsel were discussing legal
questions. The prosecutor left the room and asked C.Q. if she was aware that Love had
ever been convicted of any criminal offense after being ordered to do so by the court.
The prosecutor stated on the record the language he used to ask the question and C.Q.'s
response. Beck has not shown that this was improper or that the trial court erred.
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No. 74103-9-1/21
A.M.
Beck argues that photographs of a used condom, which would have undermined
A.M.'s testimony that she did not have sexual intercourse with other clients because Beck
testified that he did not use a condom, were erroneously excluded. The record does not
appear to contain references to a used condom. RAP 10.10(c).
Beck argues that the State and SPD acted improperly during their investigation
into his case. Specifically, Beck argues that they failed to investigate whether A.M. had
sexual intercourse with other clients, failed to interview those other clients, and failed to
preserve or investigate other evidence, such as the used condom or the sexual devices
used by A.M. with her clients. The State does not have an obligation to expand the scope
of a criminal investigation. State v. Judge, 100 Wash. 2d 706, 717, 675 P.2d 219 (1984).
"The police are required only to preserve that which comes into their possession either
as a tangible object or a sense impression, if it is reasonably apparent the object or sense
impression potentially constitute material evidence." State v. Hall, 22 Wash. App. 862, 867,
593 P.2d 554 (1979). SPD did not act improperly when it declined to preserve or
investigate the evidence cited by Beck.
C.F.
Beck argues that C.F. and Bucklin were not credible due to their drug use and that
there was no forensic evidence showing that he and C.F. did not engage in consensual
sexual intercourse. Credibility determinations are for the trier of fact and are not subject
to review. State v. Camarillo, 115 Wash. 2d 60, 71, 794 P.2d 850 (1990). Challenges to
evidence not based on the relevancy of evidence go toward the weight of the evidence,
not its admissibility. Gregory, 158 Wash. 2d at 835, overruled on other grounds by State v.
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No. 74103-9-1 / 22
W.R. Jr., 181 Wash. 2d 757, 336 P.3d 1134 (2014). Beck's challenges to C.F. and Bucklin's
testimony go toward the weight of their testimony rather than its admissibility. The lack
of forensic evidence at trial does not overcome C.F.'s testimony. The facts offered by
Beck in support of this ground were offered by Beck at trial, and contradict those offered
by C.F. The jury was free to believe C.F.'s account over Beck's.
Juror 23
Beck argues that the trial court erred by denying a defense request to remove Juror
23 and by failing to dismiss the jury pool after Juror 23 discussed possible racial bias with
defense counsel during voir dire. As discussed above, a trial court errs when it fails to
dismiss a juror who exhibits actual bias. Juror 23 did not exhibit actual bias. When
questioned about the multiplicity of charges, Juror 23 stated that he would be able to
follow the court's instructions. Juror 23 expressed that his upbringing could have
influenced his views toward black people, but stated that he did not hold the same
prejudices as his peer group and did not think it would be a factor in his decision-making
during trial. Moreover, Juror 23 was not empaneled as a jury member, and the record
does not show that Juror 23 had any influence over the jury's deliberations. Beck has not
shown that Juror 23 was actually biased against him, nor that Juror 23 influenced the
jury's ultimate decision.
In sum, Beck has not raised any issue that warrants dismissal or reversal in his
statement of additional grounds for review.
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No. 74103-9-1/23
Affirmed.
el.(*) cike 7 j AC(
WE CONCUR:
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